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Preface
The evolution of the concepts of jus cogens norms and obligations owed to the inter-
national community as a whole, as developed in international legal theory 
and practice, has had a strong impact on the work of the International Law 
Commission for the codifi cation of the law on state responsibility. The acceptance 
that not all primary international norms are of the same gravity or signifi cance 
because of the nature of the rights they seek to protect could not but infl uence 
the legal consequences to derive from the violation of such norms. However, the 
categorization of internationally wrongful acts to serious and less serious raises 
signifi cant questions concerning the enforcement of these ‘superior’ norms through 
countermeasures and also the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
the wrongdoing state in case of their infringement. This becomes even more 
compelling in the absence of effective and compulsory centralized mechanisms 
for the protection and enforcement of the most fundamental interests of the 
international community. 
The adoption of the 2001 Final Articles on State Responsibility has far from 
concluded the debate over the entitlement of states other than the individually 
injured to resort to countermeasures, which falls at the heart of this book. While 
the ILC has found that state practice supporting a right to third-state countermea-
sures in response to the violation of these collective interests is still inconclusive, 
the book challenges these conclusions and demonstrates, through extensive analy-
sis of state practice, that a right to solidarity measures has become an integral part 
of the international legal order. 
The book starts with an analysis of how the notion of fundamental community 
interests emerged in international legal thinking and in the law on state responsi-
bility, and proceeds to a detailed account of evidence in support of a right to 
countermeasures by third states in their protection. It further considers the inter-
relationship between the right to solidarity measures and obligations emanating 
from self-contained regimes amidst claims of risks of fragmentation of the interna-
tional legal order and explores in some depth the signifi cance of proportionality as 
a necessary legal restriction of such right. 
Foreword
There is a lot of talk about ‘The International Community’ these days but it can 
hardly be said that the promiscuity of the conversation has done much to enlighten 
us about what ‘The International Community’ is and how it works. It is sometimes 
a term of the simple realism – refl ecting the fact that politicians of consequence 
invoke ‘The International Community’ as though it was a concrete thing and, 
accordingly, it falls to commentators to supply the unexplicated features of the 
concept (or concede that the statesmen are talking nonsense). This is a burden for 
political scientists, one which many of them are ready to assume. At the other 
extreme, ‘The International Community’ is a utopian construct; a regime of inter-
national perfection where everyone can pursue the good life in conditions of 
perpetual peace and security. This is a task for the imaginations of political philoso-
phers: they also are up for the task. Not willing to be left out, there is a considerable 
community of international lawyers who invoke the notion of ‘The International 
Community’. A truly realistic inquiry would reveal substantial defi ciencies in sus-
taining the legal characteristics of ‘The International Community’; a utopian 
prescription would lack the normative foundation which some international law-
yers still regard as an essential characteristic of any system of law.
But international lawyers will not be left out. Fired by ideas of international 
justice (not ones wholly discerned within the rules and principles of extant interna-
tional law) and appalled by the unjust conditions which prevail in so much of the 
world, they invoke ‘The International Community’ to justify some exercises of 
power and to demand the execution of some duties which seem to serve good 
ends. Those who have reservations about the project are dismissed as churls 
or cynics. It will be clear where I stand, though I should prefer ‘cautious’ and 
‘sceptical’ as the preferred terms of use. Simply, there is a lot of work to be done 
to turn either the malleable, political references to ‘The International Community’ 
into a legally literate notion or to implement the high aspirations for a universally 
better world into the practical legal means to justify or structure the decisions 
necessary to do justice. The problem, of course, is States, with their central role in 
the international legal system and their tight control over the guns and money 
required to stop things getting worse and make things get better. The interna-
tional legal system in which States have operated has been predominantly based 
on a civil or private model of legal relations – bilateral and delictual. The claims 
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of ‘The International Community’ would introduce public law elements into these 
arrangements; innovations harder to adopt when the legislative powers in interna-
tional law are so constrained and limited, and the supplementary initiatives which 
courts might take are so circumscribed by the rules on jurisdiction. It takes ener-
getic investigation, great organisational capacity and acute legal imagination to 
make a positive contribution to the elucidation of the public law of public interna-
tional law which might persuade States of its utility.
Dr Katselli Proukaki has brought these qualities to this much expanded and 
reconsidered version of her PhD thesis. I was her supervisor and learnt once again 
the lesson that supervisors soon lose control over the work of their students. 
Dr Katselli Proukaki has demonstrated an impressive independence in developing, 
maintaining and refi ning her ideas. She is, of course, aware of all the reservations 
expressed in the preceding paragraphs but she has been driven by a commitment 
to fi nd what there is in the law which might be useful to her project – a peaceful 
world, in which human rights are broadly and widely enjoyed. The results are set 
out in what follows. The method is to look at the practice, some of it familiar, some 
not so well-known, over a long period through the lens of public law. She is not so 
unrealistic as to imagine a system which would fi t within the paradigm of a domes-
tic legal order but she is able to conclude that some of the more controverted 
limitations of international law are not so disabling to the pursuit of common 
interests as is sometimes maintained. She dispatches the hesitations of the 
International Law Commission about the legality of third-party countermeasures 
in response to serious breaches of peremptory norms as being unnecessarily timid, 
when the legal materials are examined as a whole. The attention which she 
gives to countermeasures is explained partly by the conceptual signifi cance of the 
topic – a role for a materially uninjured State in the implementation of interna-
tional law – but also because these ‘serious breaches’ are attacks on the values 
which she holds to be most important and which, in many cases, will only be pre-
vented from being consolidated or getting even worse by actions which impose 
real costs on the perpetrators.
The work which Dr Katselli Proukaki has started here will keep her and many 
others in challenging inquiry for the remainder of their careers. One can not but 
admire the aspiration and, whatever one’s caution, hope for the persuasiveness of 
the project where it matters – in the council rooms of Governments.
Colin Warbrick
Honorary Professor 
Birmingham Law School 

Introduction
‘Μή ’πíτασσ’ ά  μή κρατεı-ς’.
Sophocles1
In the absence of a structure equivalent to that existing in domestic legal systems, 
with compulsory legislative, judicial and enforcement procedures, international 
law has often come under attack as being not ‘real’ law. This seems to suggest that 
international law is a system of moral values and principles that vanish whenever 
the geostrategic, political or other interests of the stronger components of the 
international community are at stake.2 While law-making takes place in the inter-
national legal order in the form of customary and conventional rules and general 
principles and adjudication fi nds expression in the jurisdiction, even if consensual, 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals, the 
lack of an automatic and compulsory enforcement mechanism remains the most 
striking feature of public international law. The legal loophole is not fi lled by the 
existence of the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) whose role is 
restricted to the safeguarding of international peace and security, which does not 
include enforcement of international law, although the two may at times coincide. 
As a consequence, compliance with international law and with fundamental 
principles still, and to a great extent, relies on the good will of each state. 
The problem of enforcement becomes, as this book argues, compelling in the 
event of serious infringements of fundamental interests owed to the international 
community of states as a whole known as obligations erga omnes, including peremptory 
norms or jus cogens norms of international law derogation from which is not permitted. 
Indeed, it will be shown in the course of the following analysis that the evolution of 
1 Sophocles, Greek tragic dramatist (496–406 BC), Οιδíπους επí Κολωνώ, 838–40. This is offi cially 
translated as ‘Ne me donne pas d’ordre; tu n’es pas mon maitre’ in J. C. Kamerbeek, The Plays of 
Sophocles: Commentaries VII The Oedipus Coloneus, 124.  A more close consideration of Sophocles’ words 
suggests that one should refrain from giving orders that he cannot observe. This is particularly true in 
the light of contemporary international law, which is often unable to enforce its commandments.
2 See, for this purpose, the analysis on the Austinian school of thought in M.W. Reisman, Nullity and 
Revision: The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards (Yale University Press: 1971) 645. 
Also see H. Bull, The Anarchichal Society: A Study of Order and World Politics, 2nd ed. (Columbia:1995) 136.
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the concept of fundamental community norms has led to the expansion of the circle 
of states that have a legal interest in their observance, but also in their enforcement. 
In view of the decentralized nature of the international legal system, but also of the 
principles of sovereign equality of states and state consent that hold prominent role in 
the system, the enforcement of such essential norms becomes problematic. The same 
holds true regarding the violation of interests established for the collective interest of 
a group of states. Although the emphasis of this book is predominantly placed on the 
enforcement of interests owed to the international community as a whole, the enforce-
ment of such collective interests is not precluded from its scope either.
In such a decentralized legal system in which, as a matter of general rule, resort 
to the use of armed force is prohibited, the notion of countermeasures comes to fi ll 
the legal lacuna and contributes signifi cantly towards compliance with and the 
enforcement of international law. As noted: ‘Countermeasures are mechanisms of 
private justice that fi nd their raison d’être in the failure of the institutions.’3 In par-
ticular, this notion corresponds to peaceful measures resorted to by states, unilateral 
in character, taken in response to an internationally wrongful act that was previ-
ously committed by the state against whom they are turned and which, under 
normal circumstances, they would themselves be unlawful as infringing the rules of 
international law. It is accordingly imperative to distinguish the concept of coun-
termeasures from other concepts of international law such as retorsion, in other 
words unfriendly but still lawful measures, sanctions authorized by an international 
organization, self-defence that is permitted in response to an armed attack and the 
suspension or termination of treaties as it will be further explored in Chapter 4.
The concept of countermeasures fi nds justifi cation in the need to restore the 
equality between sovereign states and to restore the balance that has been dis-
turbed with the commission of the internationally wrongful act. Despite the fact 
that they are otherwise internationally wrongful acts themselves, countermeasures 
are justifi ed and thus responsibility is precluded, by reasons of self-protection, 
reciprocity and the need to induce the defaulting state to cease the wrongful act, 
to offer reparation for the injury suffered by the aggrieved state and to secure 
guarantees for non-repetition in the future. It is also now clearly established that 
for countermeasures to be lawful, they must not be used as a means of revenge or 
punishment and their effects must be temporary.4 
Nevertheless, while the right to resort to countermeasures by an injured state 
is undisputed, the same does not apply with the right of third states to respond 
with countermeasures or, as otherwise known, solidarity measures,5 whenever the 
3 D. Alland, ‘Countermeasures of General Interest’ 13 EJIL (2002) No. 5, 1221, 1226.
4 O. Elagab, The Legality of Non-forcible Countermeasures in International Law (Clarendon: 1988), 46. Also 
see J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (CUP: 2002) 283.
5 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?’ 71 
BYIL (2001) 337, 339. For the general acceptability of the right to countermeasures by injured states 
see M. Spinedi, ‘International Crimes of State: The Legislative History’ in J. Weiler, A. Cassese, M. 
Spinedi (eds), International Crimes of States: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State 
Responsibility, (de Gruyter: 1989), 1, 69.
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fundamental interests of the international community as a whole or other collec-
tive interests are endangered. The recognition of a norm permitting solidarity 
measures, third-state countermeasures or countermeasures by states other than 
the injured as they are referred to in this book, has been at the heart of controversy 
in academic commentary but also in the work of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) for the codifi cation of the law on state responsibility. This has led the ILC to 
leave the question of a right to such countermeasures by states not directly injured 
in response to violations of fundamental community and collective interests unset-
tled, causing yet more legal uncertainty on the matter. 
The analysis that follows focuses on the question of implementation and 
enforcement of such interests by way of solidarity measures. Of course, the analy-
sis could not ignore the judicial enforcement of community and collective interests 
and the circle of states entitled to initiate judicial proceedings seeking compliance 
with such norms, which is discussed extensively in Chapter 1.
Bearing in mind that in some cases of gross violations of international law there 
is no injured state but, rather, there are injured people, nationals of the same state 
committing the violation, to preclude the possibility of peaceful but nonetheless coer-
cive action by independent components of the international community means to 
deny those most in need the hope of justice. Such are the cases of genocide, apartheid 
and torture. Furthermore, and although aggression has for long been considered as 
the most serious offence of international law threatening peace and security, now 
other violations such as the ones mentioned earlier merit equal attention. The para-
dox lies, however, in the fact that third states are entitled to resort to the use of armed 
force in the light of collective self-defence in response to an armed attack. Contrary 
to this, however, and according to the ILC’s conclusions on the Final Articles on 
State Responsibility for the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted in 
2001 (hereinafter, Final Articles), the current international legal system seems not to 
allow third states from resorting to milder means, such as countermeasures, in reac-
tion to serious infringements of specifi c international rules, including aggression. 
This makes the protection of fundamental community interests weak, ineffec-
tive and subject to more abuse. It also leads to another paradox according to 
which while injured states are entitled to resort to countermeasures in response 
to ‘ordinary’ or less serious violations of international law, states, even if they are 
not directly injured by a given wrongdoing, are not entitled to do so in response to 
serious infringements of fundamental community or other collective interests.
In consequence, the position taken by the ILC against solidarity measures is 
questioned. The book, apart from the fact that it highlights the necessity of such 
countermeasures for the effective implementation of the rule of law particularly 
regarding fundamental community interests, demonstrates that the ILC’s conclu-
sions that there is no suffi cient state practice in support of a right to third-state 
countermeasures were restricted to a very limited number of examples. These 
examples are by no means exhaustive or refl ective of an unequivocal and clear 
stance on the question. The ILC did not take into consideration numerous other 
incidents that, in the author’s view, provide evidence of well-established practice 
and opinio juris in this regard. 
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While 8 years have passed since the adoption of the Final Articles, some of the 
ILC’s fi ndings remain controversial, including the question of the right to third-
state countermeasures. Moreover, uncertainty remains regarding the status of the 
Final Articles and as to whether they should be incorporated in a United Nations 
General Assembly (General Assembly) resolution or in an international treaty. 
This issue is dealt with in Chapter 2.
The book discusses how the concept of third-state countermeasures evolved in 
international jurisprudence, the literature and also in state practice. The analysis 
aims to show the origins of the concept, its scope and content and how it was 
endorsed in international legal thinking. At the same time, it recognizes that in 
view of the inherent risks entailed from the recognition of a right to solidarity 
measures, resort to such measures must be exceptionally permitted.
It will be demonstrated in the course of this book that the concept of third-state 
countermeasures is closely associated with the early realization in international 
legal doctrine that not all internationally wrongful acts are of the same legal 
weight, signifi cance and effect. Accordingly, the concept of third-state counter-
measures is closely associated with some other signifi cant legal developments 
concerning the emergence of the notions of peremptory norms and obligations 
erga omnes. These are refl ected in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (hereinafter 1969 VCLT) and the obiter dictum of the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction case respectively. Nevertheless, these were not new notions in 
international legal thinking. In 1915 Professor Elihu Root, making a comparison 
between municipal and international law, pointed to the necessity for a distinction 
in the international legal order between wrongs that affected only the parties 
directly involved in the dispute and wrongs that infl icted a legal injury to every 
nation.6 This early understanding was later to have a great impact on the fi eld of 
state responsibility, in other words, on the legal consequences to arise as a result 
of the infringement of primary international norms safeguarding fundamental 
community interests. 
However, it was not until the end of World War II that ‘a real current opinion 
emerged’ according to which general international law provided for two different 
regimes of responsibility: one that would apply as a result of the breach of obliga-
tions of great signifi cance to the international community as a whole and a second 
that would apply to breaches concerning obligations of less importance.7 This 
debate led to the realization that there may be different ways in which a state is 
affected by the commission of a wrongful act and that the legal consequences 
of certain violations do not leave unaffected the international community as a 
whole. It has been acknowledged, therefore, that should a violation of obligations 
established for the collective interest of a group of states or even of the interna-
tional community as a whole occur, these states should be entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of the defaulting state. By what means they may be entitled to do so 
6 E. Root , ‘The Outlook for International Law’, 10 AJIL (  Jan., 1916) No. 1, 2, 9.
7 Fifth Report on State Responsibility (Ago), YbILC (1976) Vol. II, Part One, 3, 26 (80).
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has been the centre of much controversy as noted already and it forms the focus 
of this book. 
Consequently, contemporary international law has been enriched with new 
principles, new rules and new concepts. In an increasingly interdependent 
world, community values have surfaced formulating a distinction between 
wrongful acts and legal consequences, simultaneously widening the spectrum of 
actors that have a legal interest to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing 
state. In this regard, current international law consists of more than just reciprocal 
obligations between two states: the recognition of interests and values placed to 
serve collective interests and the international community is now undisputed. 
Most signifi cantly, international law is now moving towards adopting new 
mechanisms for its enforcement in an attempt to escape from the legal stagnation 
imposed by its own lack of compulsory enforcement jurisdiction over the 
most fl agrant violations of international law. Similarly, the role of the individual 
in contemporary international law has been enhanced: thus, international law 
is not merely drafted to protect sovereign states, but also individuals and 
peoples. 
It is with this new orientation of international law in mind that this research 
was carried out and which was also the result of a deep urge to shed some light to 
what is, and what should be, the function of international law today. In a more 
specifi c context, this book evolves predominantly around the law on state respon-
sibility and the categorization of internationally wrongful acts, in respect of both 
their gravity and the international actors entitled to take action, by way of coun-
termeasures, in order to remedy the infringement of fundamental community 
interests. Emphasis is therefore on the notion of solidarity measures and how this 
notion is accommodated in international legal doctrine today. 
In this regard, the book is to be distinguished from other recent works that 
emphasize an extensive theoretical analysis of the scope, content and legal effects 
of peremptory norms of international law per se or on the general implementation 
of obligations erga omnes thoroughly distinguishing this notion from other concepts 
that have emerged in international legal doctrine.8 While the development of 
the concepts of peremptory norms and obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole hold prominent place in the scope of this book, its main 
focus lies on the enforcement of such fundamental norms by way of countermea-
sures by states other than the injured. The emphasis is accordingly placed on 
the evolution of such measures, including their scope, content, limits but also 
their relation with obligations emanating from other legal regimes. As such, 
the consideration of the notion of community interests is necessary for compre-
hending the impact that it has had on the question of standing in judicial 
8 A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP: 2006); C. Tams, Enforcing Obligations 
Erga Omnes in International Law (CUP: 2005).
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proceedings, but also, quite signifi cantly, on the law on state responsibility 
generally and on the development of the law on third-state countermeasures 
particularly. 
Furthermore, the analysis of this book is not confi ned to the question of whether 
state practice and opinio juris prove the existence of a customary norm permitting 
countermeasures by states other than the injured. Rather, it intends to set the 
background within which the concept of solidarity measures developed and the 
signifi cance that the concept of community interests has had in this regard. 
The study demonstrates the existence of a general standing to pursue respect for 
such community interests through judicial means and, signifi cantly, through coun-
termeasures. In the scope of this analysis also lies an in-depth consideration of the 
legal ramifi cations arising from recognition of a right to solidarity measures and to 
identify the existing tensions between such right and obligations emanating from 
other legal regimes, such as self-contained or special regimes. It also looks into the 
legal safeguards that must be in place before resort to solidarity measures can be 
justifi ed. These safeguards play a crucial role in the recognition of third-state 
countermeasures in order to mitigate fears of abuse by powerful states. In this 
regard, particular focus is given on the principle of proportionality, an issue that 
becomes diffi cult to assess especially if many states invoke their entitlement to take 
peaceful coercive action against the wrongdoing state in protection of fundamen-
tal community interests. 
At the same time, and despite the differences in focus, this book aims to add to 
the existing literature regarding the implementation of fundamental community 
interests9 and provides further evidence in support of a customary international 
rule on solidarity measures. The book therefore deals with decentralized and uni-
lateral mechanisms of enforcement of community interests and it is accordingly 
necessary to distinguish these mechanisms from institutionalized responses such as 
those authorized under a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter).
The examination starts in Chapter 1 with an analysis of the notion of commu-
nity interests as emerged through the recognition of peremptory norms of 
international law in Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT and obligations erga omnes in the 
Barcelona Traction case. It is shown that these concepts have signifi ed the fundamen-
tal changes the international community and international law itself have 
undergone with the passage from ‘pure’ bilateralism to the recognition of com-
munity values. It is further demonstrated that the changing nature of international 
law from a legal order confi ned to obligations of a reciprocal character to a legal 
order that safeguards fundamental community principles in the protection of 
which all states have a legal interest could hardly be disputed. In a decentralized 
and still rudimentary legal order such as the international one, concepts of a 
9 Also see M. Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law Enforcement without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of 
State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council’, 
BYIL (2006) 333.
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constitutional or quasi-constitutional nature start to make their appearance. In this 
context, the question of enforcement of such norms gains particular gravity and, 
in this regard, Chapter 1 considers the standing of states to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings seeking their protection. The research in this chapter establishes that 
even before the ruling of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case general international 
law recognized the entitlement of third states not directly affected by a certain 
wrongdoing concerning fundamental community or collective interests to make 
claims before judicial and other bodies seeking observance with these norms. This 
position becomes fi rmer with the obiter dictum of the ICJ on obligations erga omnes the 
signifi cance of which lies in the recognition that all states are entitled to demand 
observance with community rules even if no direct injury has been suffered. While 
this does not mean circumventing any jurisdictional rules that may be in place, it 
establishes general judicial standing for the protection of such obligations.
The analysis made in Chapter 1 lays the foundational stone for the discussion 
of the main theme of this book, in other words, the question of implementation 
and enforcement of these fundamental norms within the law on state responsibil-
ity, particularly by way of countermeasures. 
Chapter 2 builds on this analysis and turns its attention to the attempts of the 
ILC to codify the law on state responsibility – painstaking work that has lasted for 
almost fi ve decades – and to categorize the legal consequences of a given interna-
tional wrongdoing in accordance with the signifi cance of the rule infringed. The 
study in Chapter 2 intends to set the background within which the need for dif-
ferentiation between serious and less serious violations of international law and 
more specifi cally between ‘crimes’ and ‘delicts’ emerged in the law on state respon-
sibility. It also intends to highlight the strong impact that the concept of community 
interests has had on the determination of the legal consequences to arise there-
from and of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing 
state. Indeed, the analysis in this chapter illustrates that the infringement of funda-
mental community interests widens the circle of states affected from the wrongful 
act and entitles them to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state. It also 
considers how community interests are refl ected in the Final Articles and it exam-
ines the question of third-state countermeasures and how the ILC approached the 
matter in concluding its work on state responsibility. As noted earlier, the conclu-
sions of the ILC that contemporary international law does not recognize a customary 
rule permitting resort to solidarity measures are being put into question.
This leads to the analysis in Chapter 3, which is driven by the need to further 
examine the conclusions of the ILC according to which state practice permitting 
countermeasures by states other than the injured is sparse and embryonic. This 
study is mostly needed amid disagreement as to whether there is or there should 
be such a right in international law. Accordingly, while this chapter builds from 
the incidents relied on by the ILC, it provides an extensive and detailed analysis 
of yet more examples of solidarity measures arising from state practice and opinio 
juris. This work, while complementing the recent literature on the matter, goes 
beyond that by bringing into light some early incidents concerning solidarity mea-
sures, arguing that the question of solidarity measures was not a recent discovery 
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in international state practice. The results of this research also highlight the fact 
that states have often relied on community and collective interests in order to 
cease performance of other international obligations, such as those emanating 
from extradition treaties or, even more signifi cantly, from the United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter) as in the recent Kadi and Al Barakaat cases. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 provides additional evidence that even in those cases where states have 
justifi ed their conduct on other legal justifi cations, a claim in support of solidarity 
measures could be made instead. 
The purpose of the conclusions to emerge from Chapter 3 is to highlight the 
fact that states have often resorted to action in violation of their international com-
mitments in response to serious violations of fundamental community and 
collective interests and that, therefore, a customary norm allowing third-state 
countermeasures is recognized in international law. Moreover, the discussion in 
this chapter aims to show the signifi cance of countermeasures by states other than 
the injured for the enforcement of fundamental community and collective inter-
ests in the event of serious infringement. It is revealed through these observations 
that in the absence of other satisfactory enforcement mechanisms, such counter-
measures may at times constitute the only means to respond to violations that 
affect community and collective interests. The recognition of such a right, with its 
legal constraints, is much needed in a decentralized legal order that is often unable 
to respond with determination to serious violations of such interests. The existence 
of a right to third-state countermeasures provides an opportunity for the effective 
enforcement of interests the violation of which is of particular gravity and signifi -
cance for the international community of states as a whole. This is illustrated 
from the signifi cant contribution of such measures in the exercise of pressure and 
the cessation of gross violations of international law such as genocide, apartheid 
and aggression, as the cases of Uganda, South Africa and the Arab oil embargo 
demonstrate.
At the same time, however, the discussion reveals that caution must be exer-
cised in relation to the fulfi lment of the conditions allowing resort to such measures. 
In this regard, it is argued that in some cases there was no clear identifi cation of 
the norm infringed or there was uncertainty regarding whether a norm protecting 
community interests had indeed been infringed such as in the case of the military 
coup abolishing democratic rule in Haiti.
Whereas the analysis of state practice and opinio juris is by no means exhaustive, 
it intends to add to the existing literature and to provide a detailed and thorough 
analysis of the matter. 
With these observations in mind and having established the existence of a cus-
tomary rule on third-state countermeasures, Chapter 4 evolves around the 
relationship between lex specialis and so-called self-contained regimes, on the one 
hand, and the general law on state responsibility and countermeasures, on the 
other. The issue gains particular signifi cance in view of the proliferation of agree-
ments and autonomous legal regimes in the international legal order, thus 
narrowing signifi cantly the content of the international responsibility of states, and 
especially of countermeasures, even whenever the most fl agrant violations of 
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international law are involved. This is especially true insofar as the expansion of 
the competences of such regimes is concerned, arguably precluding or restricting 
to a great extent the application of the rules of general international law. While 
this position is contested, the emphasis is placed, among others, on the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and its position within the general framework of 
international law, including the law on state responsibility. It is shown in this 
regard that the more the WTO expands its competences the narrower the scope 
for countermeasures, even in response to serious violations of fundamental com-
munity interests, becomes. The analysis therefore leads to the examination of 
another, closely linked phenomenon, that of the fragmentation of international 
law. Should the international legal order be construed, as it is, as consisting of 
multiple ‘anarchical’ legal systems that exist in parallel but which at times clash 
between them, the danger of fragmentation then becomes evident. In this respect, 
legal opinion is divided with some international lawyers arguing that the specifi c 
terms of the self-contained regimes will prevail, with others arguing that such 
regimes are not to be seen in isolation from general international law. 
As the book argues, to claim that by agreeing to join such special regimes states 
have given up any other means of enforcing their general rights and interests 
would be tantamount to refusing their having access to other possible and effective 
means of enforcement of international law. This is particularly important insofar 
as community interests are concerned.
The last chapter, and in view of the recognition that countermeasures may be 
used and abused especially by powerful states, turns its attention on the legal 
restrictions of the right to resort to countermeasures. In this context, proportional-
ity plays a determinative role in drawing the limits between lawful and unlawful 
coercive action. This study is therefore carried out on the realization that the 
principle of proportionality constitutes an essential safeguard against the abuse 
of countermeasures generally and solidarity measures particularly. In fact, the 
danger of abuse is aggravated in the light of solidarity measures where proportion-
ality becomes diffi cult to be assessed in view of the plurality of the actors and the 
plurality of the action taken against the defaulting state. For this purpose, the 
determination of the scope and content of proportionality or, in other words, 
the elements to be taken into account, become essential for establishing legal cer-
tainty and legal predictability, diminishing, to the extent possible, subjectivity and 
arbitrary and excessive use of countermeasures in the pretext of community inter-
ests. In this respect, the analysis in Chapter 5 proceeds from a brief consideration 
of the principle of proportionality at a national and EU level, to consideration of 
proportionality in the law of armed confl ict, with the emphasis placed on the prin-
ciple as developed in the law on state responsibility and countermeasures. It is 
argued in this regard that the question of proportionality in respect of solidarity 
measures has received little attention and that serious concerns are raised in 
relation to how proportionality would be assessed under such circumstances. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that proportionality, developed in an already narrow 
legal framework, must be assessed in the light of numerous relevant factors that 
must be taken into consideration. These relate to the seriousness of the initial 
10 Introduction
violation, the aims and objectives pursued by the response, the signifi cance of the 
rights affected both by the initial wrongful act but also by the response, the injury 
caused, but also the appropriateness of the measures taken to achieve the said 
objectives. Accordingly, while a uniform standard of proportionality may not be 
feasible due to the varied nature and objectives of countermeasures, which in any 
event must not be aimed at revenge or the punishment of the defaulting state, 
there must be a clear identifi cation of the factors relevant for determining whether 
a certain response meets the standard of proportionality. 
The analysis concludes that the principle of proportionality in the law on coun-
termeasures is essential as it ensures clarity and legal certainty enabling the 
achievement of the goals of the international community and restricting further 
abuses.
Coming back to Sophocles’ quote at the beginning of this introduction, the 
protection of fundamental community interests, as refl ected in the concepts of jus 
cogens norms and obligations erga omnes, would become devoid of meaning if no 
enforcement mechanisms were available for their implementation. No theory 
regarding the ‘superior’ character of certain norms or the importance of certain 
obligations granting all states a legal interest in their observance would matter had 
it not been accompanied by specifi c rules concerning the legal consequences to 
arise as a result of violation of these signifi cant rules. Most importantly, no distinc-
tion between ‘ordinary’, or less serious and serious violations, or between bilateral 
or reciprocal and community or collective interests would be necessary had this 
distinction not been accompanied with a more serious regime of responsibility. 
This could not but exercise a huge impact on the states entitled not only to invoke 
the responsibility of the wrongdoing state but also to resort to coercive peaceful 
measures in order to induce the cessation of the wrongful act and the compliance 
of the wrongdoing state. The changing nature of contemporary international law, 
the recognition of fundamental community interests, but also the absence of com-
pulsory enforcement mechanisms advocate for alternative means of protection. In 
this regard, the right of not directly affected states to implement countermeasures 
in the name of fundamental community interests becomes necessary and essential 
for the effective protection and enforcement of rules owed to the international 
community of states as a whole. 
1 The international 
community, jus cogens 
norms and obligations 
erga omnes
1 Introduction
International law establishes a dynamic legal order that has progressively developed 
from an order of peaceful coexistence to an order of cooperation of states and from 
an order concerned with narrowly construed state interests to an order that pro-
motes the interests of the international community as a whole. In parallel to these 
developments and while for a long time states were recognized as the only subjects 
of international law, the international legal order today extends its rules and pro-
tection to other subjects such as individuals and international organizations.10 
These changes have had a tremendous impact on how international law is per-
ceived in a contemporary context with its nature and aims constantly evolving from a 
purely state-oriented understanding to one that gives prevalence to higher interests 
shared by all states of the international community. The incorporation of new concepts 
in the international legal doctrine that, as the analysis that follows purports to show, are 
now well rooted, contributed much to these groundbreaking developments. 
On the one hand, Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT encompasses the concept of 
peremptory norms of international law (  jus cogens) and provides that a treaty which 
infringes these norms is invalid.11 The Article identifi es peremptory norms as 
norms, which are recognized as fundamental by the international community of 
states as a whole as a consequence of which no derogation is permitted. Accordingly, 
the quality of the interests protected under such norms and their signifi cance to 
the international community endow them with compelling and hierarchical 
authority in relation to all other rules of international law.12 
On the other hand, the ICJ itself endorsed the idea of interests owed to the 
international community of states as a whole (obligations erga omnes) as distinct 
from interests of a bilateral and reciprocal nature, such as those arising from the 
law of diplomatic immunities. This was recognized in the Barcelona Traction case 
10 For a very interesting discussion on the changing nature of international law, see M.P. Dupuy, 
‘International Law: Torn between Coexistence, Cooperation and Globalization. General Conclusions’, 
9 EJIL (1998) 278, 280. Also see M. Shaw, International Law, 6th edn (CUP: 2008) Chapter 1.
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
12 Orakhelashvili (2006), op.cit., 8.
12 The problem of enforcement in international law
and, as will be discussed later, it was again the importance of the rights protected 
under such obligations that prompted the Court to make this pronouncement in 
its now famous obiter dictum on obligations erga omnes. 
In the midst of these legal events, questions emerged and still do emerge in rela-
tion to their impact on international legal thinking and the practice of states. The 
recognition of the concepts of peremptory norms and obligations owed to the inter-
national community as a whole, therefore, calls for a determination of their legal 
scope and content, their legal effects and the legal consequences that arise in the case 
of their infringement. In turn, and most signifi cantly perhaps, the determination of 
these specifi c issues must unavoidably lead to the determination of the subjects enti-
tled to rely on such concepts towards other states and of the mechanisms concerning 
their enforcement and implementation in the international legal arena. This is 
closely related to the question of standing and it will be at the heart of this work. 
As will be seen, the enforcement and implementation of these community inter-
ests in a largely decentralized international legal system may take various forms 
and may be fulfi lled by every state.13 In Chapter 1, however, attention will be 
turned onto the initiation of proceedings before international judicial bodies as 
one way of enforcement of community interests, together with an analysis of how 
the notion of community interests developed in the fi rst place and came to domi-
nate the literature and international jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this study does 
not intend to exhaust the topic of community interests. Rather, it aims to set the 
background within which these legal concepts were conceived and their effect on 
judicial standing, in order to proceed in other chapters, and in particular in 
Chapter 2, to a thorough consideration of how these developments infl uenced the 
ILC in its work on the codifi cation of the law on state responsibility. It will also be 
shown that the notion of community interests was instrumental in the introduc-
tion of another concept, that of countermeasures taken by states other than the 
injured, which is at the focus of this book.
2  Transition from bilateralism to the ‘international 
community as a whole’ 
2.1 A bilateralist approach
Traditional international law as most recently referred to in legal writings is built 
on the notion of bilateralism and establishes a bipartite relation of multiple rights and 
obligations that together constitute ‘minimal law’ and are reciprocal in character.14 
Within this framework, one state is the carrier of the right and the other the 
carrier of the duty, establishing legal relations among states identical in kind to 
those established under contractual law. Bilateralism is built on a strong percep-
tion of state sovereignty and the prohibition of non-interference in the domestic 
13 Tams, op. cit, 6–7.
14 P. Allott, Eunomia. New Order for a New World (OUP: 1990) 324; B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest in International Law’ 250 RdC (1994) VI, 217, 229.
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affairs of another state. States are legally bound by international rules only because 
they have themselves given their consent to restrict certain of their sovereign 
powers, usually because they have come to realize that it is for their own benefi t to 
do so. As the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) has stressed: ‘The 
rules of law binding upon States … emanate from their own free will as expressed 
in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law.’15 
State consent is accordingly the driving force of interstate relations and interna-
tional law. This position is co-related with the pacta tertiis rule, according to which 
no state may be bound by a treaty that it has not signed and ratifi ed. On the same 
footing, under this perception of international law no state may be bound by a rule 
the development of which it has opposed. This extends to dispute settlement 
mechanisms, which require the consent of all parties involved. In this bilateral 
relationship, and in case of an infringement, it is solely on the carrier of the right 
to pursue the fulfi lment of what has been refused to it and to resort to coercive 
measures that for a long time took the form of armed force or even to unilaterally 
denounce its obligations.16 The fact that it is the state to which a specifi c obligation 
is individually owed that is entitled to demand its performance is a very well-
established principle of international law that has been upheld by the ICJ, with 
particular emphasis made in its Opinion concerning the Reparation for Injuries case. 
In this instance, the ICJ concluded that ‘only the party to whom an international 
obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach’ and that the injury 
sustained by the UN in this case related to the violation of obligations owed to the 
UN itself.17 To what extent this position may have been altered by a broadening 
of the circle of states entitled to initiate judicial proceedings in response to viola-
tions not of rights individually owed to them, but rather of interests owed to the 
international community as a whole is considered in detail.
Bilateralism could also not leave unaffected the sphere of ‘sanctions’. For many 
commentators, in the absence of a hierarchical order which was precluded by the 
nature of international law as a legal order of coordination rather than subordina-
tion and in the light of the principle that all states were equal actors in international 
affairs, ‘sanctions’ themselves found no place.18 
Despite the fact that under bilateralism states are protected (at least in theory) 
from unlawful interference and there is clear identifi cation of the injured states enti-
tled to seek redress, it leaves enforcement to the state whose subjective rights have 
been infringed. Given the factual inequality of states, bilateralism weakens the posi-
tion of already weak and small states which are unable to take action against the 
wrongdoer, no matter how serious the violation and how fundamental the right at 
stake.19 Furthermore, it ignores the need for certain common values essential for the 
15 The S.S. Lotus case, Judgment No. 9, September 7, 1927, PCIJ, Series A, WCR (1927–32) Vol. II, 20, 35.
16 See analysis in C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will’ 241 
RdC (1993) IV, 195, 353–4.
17 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1949) 
174, 181–2.
18 J. Delbruck, ‘International Economic Sanctions and Third States’ AdV (1992) 86, 88–90.
19 Simma (1994), op. cit., 232–3.
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very existence of mankind and which have to be protected even if no specifi c state is 
directly injured as a result of their infringement and independently of state consent. 
Accordingly, bilateralism cannot explain current legal trends such as the fact 
that there may be instances where the conduct of one state may adversely affect 
the interests of all other states without however causing a direct injury to their 
rights. Neither can it explain the fact that certain issues are the concern of all 
states, for example, human rights and environmental considerations, the legal 
status of Antarctica or the legal status of the seabed that extends beyond the juris-
diction of any state. It has been pointed out in this regard that human rights and 
the protection of the environment for instance ‘are typically the subject matter of 
multilateral treaties which defi ne mutually accepted uniform standards. Their 
conclusion as instruments of codifi cation or progressive development of interna-
tional law weighs against a bilateral perspective which signifi es a reciprocal 
exchange of commitments.’20 While this statement relates to a treaty-based regime 
establishing what are known as obligations erga omnes partes, the examination in this 
chapter will expand its scope mainly to community interests as protected under 
general international law and which are the concern of all states.21 
Bilateralism is therefore unable to adequately respond to the increasing need to 
protect certain collective principles and which, in turn, widen the circle of inter-
ested or affected actors in the international legal arena. Mosler explains in this 
regard that: ‘International law cannot be defi ned solely in terms of bilateral or 
multilateral relations between subjects which possess legal capacity. The collec-
tion of subjects participating in the international legal order constitutes a 
community living according to common rules of conduct.’22
It is therefore submitted that international law is no longer solely built upon 
bilateral relations among states or reciprocity. Rather, it also consists of norms 
intended to go beyond bilateralism and to safeguard the foundations of the inter-
national legal system as a system that aims to ensure the development of states and 
their subjects in conditions of peace and security. This has led to the development 
of the concept of community interests, considered in the next section.
2.2 Community interests in contemporary international law
While bilateralism is what still signifi cantly describes the international relations of 
states today, one can say with confi dence that contemporary international law 
has also evolved to something more than just being ‘minimal law’ in certain 
areas.23 In this way, contemporary international law has moved towards an expan-
sion of the competences of the organized community that ceases to be merely an 
abstract idea, on the one hand, while limiting the sovereign powers of the states, 
20 C. Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (Clarendon: 1993) 3.
21 This is a signifi cant distinction clearly made in Tams, op. cit., 120.
22 H. Mosler, ‘International Legal Community’ in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 7 Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (North-Holland Elsevier Science: 1984) 309–12; Chinkin (1993) op. cit., 5.
23 Allott, op. cit., 324. Also see Simma (1994), op. cit., 229.
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on the other. A contemporary understanding of international law promotes the 
notion of community interest to the extent that ‘absolute sovereign freedom to 
accept or dismiss a legal rule simply appears anachronistic in the present time’.24 
It has also been realized that narrowing the understanding of international law as 
being a system that is solely founded on state consent could not be reconciled with 
contemporary concerns which required an international public order with which 
all states would have to strictly comply.25 
In his Anarchical Society, Bull argues that international society is not structured 
exclusively on realist or moralist/idealist theories. He rather makes the point that 
the international society bears characteristics of both. Therefore, while it consists 
of sovereign states seeking to gain power, these very states recognize the signifi -
cance of peaceful cooperation and coexistence with other states. This is the 
intention behind the formulation of international organizations and common 
rules because a common interest constitutes the Gordian knot that binds all states 
together.26 At the present moment, the outlawing of the use of force and the pro-
tection of certain fundamental principles become the concern of all: their violation 
affects all states and, therefore, all states have an interest in their performance. 
This has increased the necessity for a strong international community and solidar-
ity among states, the latter being described by Professor MacDonald as:
An agreement among formal equals that will all refrain from actions that would 
signifi cantly interfere with the realization of common goals and fundamental 
interests. Solidarity requires an understanding that every member of the com-
munity must consciously and constantly conceive of its own interests as being 
inextricable from the interests of the whole. No State may choose to use its power 
to undertake actions that might threaten the integrity of the community.27
As early as 1937, three decades before the conclusion of the 1969 VCLT and its 
express reference to the concept of peremptory norms Verdross wrote that 
the international community consists of higher interests that restrict both the 
sovereignty and freedom of states. More specifi cally, he noted that ‘it is the quin-
tessence of norms of this character that they prescribe a certain, positive or 
24 Tomuschat (1993) op. cit., 213.
25 S. Kirchner, ‘Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of International Law: A 
Place for Values in the International Legal System?’ 5 GLJ (2004) No. 1, 47, 51. This is also evident 
in the case of emergence of new states in international law where the new entities enter the inter-
national legal system without the possibility of opting out from already established rules, such as the 
prohibition of the use of armed force. As a consequence, consent cannot always provide adequate 
explanation as the only source of state obligations. It is noted in this regard that while consent is 
required for the acceptance of specifi c rules, the international legal system is founded on state 
consensus, i.e. states accept and recognize this system as a ‘general system of international law’ 
within which they exist and develop. See in this regard Shaw, op. cit., 9–11.
26 Bull, op. cit., 13. 
27 R. Macdonald, ‘The Principle of Solidarity in Public International Law’ in C. Dominicé, R. Patry 
and C. Reymond (eds) Études de droit international en l’honneur de Pierre Lalive (Helbing & Lichtenhahn: 
1993) 293 quoted in Simma (1994), op. cit., 238.
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negative behaviour unconditionally; norms of this character, therefore, cannot be 
derogated from by the will of the contracting parties.’28 
It accordingly became common ground, especially in the post-World War II 
era, that the sovereignty of states no longer has the absolute and exclusive charac-
ter that it possessed in the past. This absolute authority was expressed in three 
ways. First, states enjoyed absolute freedom concerning their domestic affairs.29 
Second, states possessed unrestricted power to enforce international law when a 
breach against them had occurred. Third, states were empowered to select the 
norms with which they would be bound.30 That states do no longer enjoy unlim-
ited sovereign powers is revealed from the various state responses to serious 
violations of international law of an internal character, as will be illustrated later 
in the book. With the current growing interdependence of states, sovereignty 
despite the fact that it still possesses a prominent role in contemporary interna-
tional law is not conceived as an absolute instrument of strength and inviolability 
in the hands of dictators or human rights violators.31 At the same time, and as a 
result of progress in international legal thinking concerning the protection of inter-
national peace and security, states recognized that it was to their benefi t to avail 
themselves of certain international rules in the light of the realization that war and 
confl ict could not be factors of stability and development. Hence, a new concep-
tion of the role of states in the international arena had gradually begun to unfold 
amid the necessity for the cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the various 
states of the international community.32 
The appearance of the ‘international community’ as a legal concept changed 
the international legal balance in that a state which violated fundamental princi-
ples of international law would now be faced with the international community as 
a whole.33 The protection of certain higher interests in the name of the interna-
tional community supports the idea that an international public order exists, which 
qualifi es the scope and content of norms in the light of these superior interests.34 
28 A. Verdross, ‘Forbidden Treaties in International Law: Comments on Professor Garner’s Report 
on the “Law of Treaties” ’ 31 AJIL (1937) No. 4, 571, 571–2. Also see N. Jorgensen, The Responsibility 
of States for International Crimes (OUP: 2000) 86.
29 This perhaps is best refl ected in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter according to which mem-
ber states undertake not to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. Nevertheless, there is suf-
fi cient evidence in state practice to show that massive and gross human rights violations no longer fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, thus broadening the scope of this provision. See analysis in 
F.A. Von Geusau, ‘Staying the Course: The Concept of Sovereignty in the Work of Pieter Kooijmans’ 
in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance (OUP: 2002) 619, especially 625, 629.
30 Shaw, op. cit., 9–11.
31 Von Geusau, op. cit., 629.
32 Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996) I, 270 (13).
33 Although the term ‘international community’ is being frequently used in various contexts, it does 
not always have a normative character. On the signifi cance of the concept of international com-
munity, see discussion in D. Greig, ‘International Community’, ‘Interdependence’ and All That … 
Rhetorical Correctness?’ in Kreijen, op. cit., 521, 563–66.
34 Orakhelashvili (2006), op. cit., 27–8.
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The reference to this concept, although not unknown before, has fl ourished ever 
since the adoption of Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT on jus cogens norms. As noted 
earlier, peremptory norms qualify norms that are ‘accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole’ and ‘from which no derogation is 
permitted’.35 
Not long after the adoption of Article 53, the ICJ pronounced in the Barcelona 
Traction case that there needed to be a distinction between obligations that derived 
from the law of diplomatic immunities, on the one hand, and obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole, on the other.36 Although the Court did 
not say what action could specifi cally be taken in response to the violation of the 
latter obligations, it expressly recognized a legal interest of all states in their pro-
tection. The signifi cance of this ruling lies not only in the fact that the international 
community is authorized to attach an erga omnes character to certain obligations, 
but also on the fact that obligations of this category are owed to all states and are 
enforced on behalf of the international community.37 However, as Tams points 
out this should not be construed as meaning that individual states are not entitled 
to invoke the responsibility of the state that infringes such obligations or that they 
do not have standing to either initiate judicial proceedings or to take countermea-
sures under international law in protection of these obligations.38
The concept of the ‘international community’ has often been cited as evidence 
to the evolution of international law. Judge Bedjaoui, moving away from the ruling 
in the Lotus case according to which states have such freedom of action as long as 
it is not prohibited by a rule of international law, commented that:
[I]t scarcely needs to be said that the face of contemporary international 
society is markedly altered ... Witness the proliferation of international orga-
nizations, the gradual substitution of an international law of co-operation for 
the traditional international law of co-existence, the emergence of the con-
cept of “international community” … The resolutely positivist, voluntarist 
approach of international law still current at the beginning of the [twentieth] 
century … has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, 
a law more readily seeking to refl ect a collective juridical conscience and 
respond to the social necessities of States organized as a community.39
35 The linkage between jus cogens norms and the international community was made on a proposal 
submitted by the governments of Finland, Greece and Spain. Rozakis, in particular, spoke of a 
‘confrontation between … growing social concerns and the … perseverance of States in their sov-
ereign rights’. The inclusion of the notion of peremptory norms revealed ‘that the international 
community is rapidly heading towards some more advanced forms of organization under the rule 
of law and justice’. C.L. Rozakis, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties (North-Holland: 1976) 
194; Greig (2002), op. cit., 537.
36 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), Judgment of 5 
February 1970, ICJ Reports (1970) 4, 32–3, (33–4).
37 Greig (2002), op. cit., 547.
38 Tams, op. cit., 175.
39 Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons op. cit., 270 (13).
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The dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabudeen in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons also constitutes a refl ection of the grow-
ing view that international law has not remained static.40 Rejecting the Lotus ruling 
Judge Shahabudeen addressed the question before the ICJ by pointing out that 
the lack of a rule, conventional or customary, to prohibit the use of nuclear weap-
ons could not imply that the use of such weapons was lawful. Rather, it was 
imperative to look at more general principles, and he suggested, ‘in a case of this 
kind, the action of a State is unlawful unless it is authorized under international 
law’.41 According to him, since the appearance of nuclear weapons there has been 
no crystallized opinio juris towards the direction of outlawing what was previously 
allowed, or vice versa, permitting what was previously unlawful. In determining 
therefore whether the use of such strong weapons that could signal the end of 
mankind was allowed, Judge Shahabudeen suggested looking at the ‘juridical 
foundations’ on which a legal system, here the international legal system, is struc-
tured. He pointed in this regard to Ibn Khaldun according to whom ‘laws have 
their reason in their purposes they are to serve’, namely the preservation of civili-
zation, and that ‘injustice invites the destruction of civilization with the necessary 
consequence that the species will be destroyed.’42 
Judge Shahabudeen concluded accordingly that since ‘the preservation of the 
human species and of civilization constitutes the ultimate purpose of a legal system’ 
the immense, ‘clear and palpable’ risks for the very survival and existence of the 
international community that can arise from the use of nuclear weapons, make 
their use unacceptable and ‘repugnant to the conscience of the community.’43 
Most signifi cantly, support of the position that what is not prohibited is permitted, 
he said, would bring to mind the advice given by Persian judges to King Cambyses 
when asked if he could marry his sister. In answering the question posed by the 
King the judges said that ‘though they could discover no law which allowed 
brother to marry sister, there was undoubtedly a law which permitted the King of 
Persia to do what he pleased.’44 Similarly, to say that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons is permitted under international law ‘would mean that, while the Court 
could discover no law allowing a State to put the planet to death, there is undoubt-
edly a law which permits the State to accomplish the same result through an 
exercise of its sovereign powers’.45
Judge Shahabudeen further emphasized that even if no prohibition of nuclear 
weapons is found the coexistence of states in the international legal system restricts the 
freedom of action of each state. These restrictions defi ne the very notion of state sov-
ereignty, which he described as an ‘objective structural framework’ which ‘shuts out 
40 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons op. cit., 375. 
41 Ibid, 377. 
42 I. Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History (N.J. Dawood: 1981) 40 in ibid, 381. 
43 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, ibid, 381 and 387. 
44 Herodotus, The Histories (trans. Aubrey de Selincourt, Penguin: 1959).187 in ibid, 392, fn6. 
45 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, ibid, 392, fn6. 
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the right of a State to embark on a course of action which would dismantle the basis 
of the framework by putting an end to civilization and annihilating mankind’.46 
Moreover, the conclusions to be derived from the Lotus case were improper for 
another reason as well. In particular, that case did not concern the possibility of the 
entire destruction of humanity and that since that ruling there have been signifi cant 
legal developments in contemporary international legal community refl ected, fi rst, 
in the prohibition of the use of force and, second, in the promotion of a ‘universal 
international community’. Both, it seems, at the expense of state sovereignty.47 
These conclusions seem to refl ect an earlier distinction between two kinds of 
international law and, in particular, between the necessary law of nations embody-
ing the law of nature (  jus strictum) and the law created by agreement and custom. 
According to Vattel: 
Since therefore the necessary Law of Nations consists in the application of 
the law of nature to states – which law is immutable as being founded on the 
nature of things, and particularly on the nature of man – it follows, that the 
necessary Law of Nations is immutable. Whence as this Law is immutable, 
and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can 
neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their 
own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.48 
The same conclusion was reached by Mosler over a century later, who emphasized 
that: ‘The law cannot recognize any act either of one member or of several members 
in concert, as being legally valid if it is directed against the very foundation of law.’49 
The recognition of community interests, as refl ected also in the ILC’s work on state 
responsibility that will be discussed in the next chapter, signalled the categorization 
of various internationally wrongful acts based on their seriousness and the inter-
ests they affect, on the one hand, and of differentiated legal consequences, on the 
other. The discussion of community interests could not but infl uence the determi-
nation of the actors affected by a certain infringement of obligations establishing 
community interests, and their entitlements arising therefrom, with special atten-
tion given to whether or not they possess a right to resort to countermeasures, an 
issue that constitutes the kernel of this book. 
Nevertheless, the recognition that contemporary international law is founded 
on the concept of collective interests refl ected in the concepts of jus cogens norms 
and obligations erga omnes is not without its sceptics. Some authors have expressed 
their unease at accepting these ‘superior’ notions whose exact scope and content 
46 Ibid, 392–3. 
47 Ibid, 394. 
48 E. Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (tr. Charles G. Fenwick, Vol. 3, 1916) 
(Washington, DC: 1916), Vol. 3, Book 1, Chapter 2, Sections 16–18, lviii in Jorgensen op. cit., 86.
49 H. Mosler, ‘The International Society as a Legal Community’ (1980) 18 in J. Frowein, ‘Reactions 
by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International Law’ 248 Academie de Droit 
International, Recueil des Cours, Collected Courses (1994) IV, 345, 364.
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remains uncertain and which arguably contravene the nature and function of 
international law as they attempt to alter the consensual character of the interna-
tional legal system and its profound horizontal structures of state equality.50 There 
is no doubt that the concept of jus cogens norms alters the nature of international 
law from being a system of norms of equal standing to a system of a hierarchy of 
norms to which all other norms need to comply.51
Recently, for instance, Professor Weil was warning emphatically against an 
international law that was moving towards a ‘relative normativity’ and away from 
the traditional principles on which it was structured. With modern international 
law having developed through the decentralized system of state entities that 
emerged from the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia and which resulted in the 
collapse of the hierarchical structure of international society,52 the emphasis was 
placed on the peaceful relations and the common interests of states, equals among 
equals and sovereigns among sovereigns.53 Professor Weil was of the view that the 
essence of this Westphalian system and modern international law remained 
unchanged. He argued in this regard that modern international law remained a 
legal order deeply rooted on the principle of sovereign equality and the consent of 
states.54 For this reason, he described the distinction made between jus cogens and 
ordinary norms (a distinction that prevailed during the debates of the ILC as 
Chapter 2 will show) and between state crimes and delicts, as ‘a key that will not 
fi t the lock it will have to open’.55 The intrusion, he said, of ideology in the neutral-
ity of international law, where all states are equal and therefore none could impose 
its own values on the others, of ill-defi ned notions over clearly established norms 
and the weakening of the consensual character of the international legal order 
‘might well destabilize the whole international normative system and turn it into 
an instrument that can no longer serve its purpose’.56 It was therefore imperative, 
for international law to fulfi l its normative functions, to consist of norms of ‘good 
quality’.57 Professor Weil warned against the adoption of notions which lacked 
defi nition, such as the notion of ‘international community of states as a whole’, 
simultaneously stressing that these ideas would work only were international soci-
ety fundamentally to change the structures on which it was built.
It is further argued that ‘international law scholarship lacks a coherent under-
standing of hierarchy and, in essence, nothing has been changed since Weil argued 
in his famous 1982 article that such a hierarchy would hinder the functioning of 
50 Shaw, op. cit., 129.
51 Rozakis, op. cit., 19–20. Also see Orakhelashvili, op. cit., 14.
52 Treaty of Munster (Westphalia), Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of 
France and their respective Allies, 24 October 1648, 1 CTS 271.
53 O. Okafor-Obasi, The Enforcement of State Obligations to Respect and Ensure Human Rights in International 
Law (Universität Potsdam, Series 10: Juni 2003) 22–3.
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international law in its main role, namely to ensure coexistence and a common 
aim in a fundamentally pluralistic society’.58
Despite the scepticism that surrounds these concepts, however, it cannot be dis-
puted that they now fi nd express recognition in the theory and practice of 
contemporary international law. While one needs to be cautious in clearly identify-
ing these signifi cant norms and their legal consequences, these concepts have 
become, as the analysis that preceded aimed to establish and as the discussion that 
follows aims to enhance, an integral part of international legal thinking. The neces-
sity therefore to preserve the juridical foundations of the international legal system 
which can be identifi ed as the continuation of mankind in conditions of peace and 
security and the coexistence and cooperation of states is the driving force behind the 
concept of community interests. This can be no better refl ected than in the absolute 
prohibition of genocide or torture today. States have realized that they share certain 
common principles and that it is in their interest to protect them even if they are not 
the direct victims of a certain violation. This is mostly the case when genocide is com-
mitted by one state against its own nationals. In instances such as these, there is no 
injured state, no violation of a bilateral relation of any kind, and yet, contemporary 
international law, and states themselves have outlawed such conduct as infringing 
fundamental community interests. This leads to the recognition that the freedom of 
states is not unlimited, rather, it is restricted by the freedom of other states which 
have the right to exist and develop in the light of equality, but also, by certain norms 
which are essential to protect the international legal order itself and its subjects.
3  The concepts of jus cogens and obligations 
erga omnes
3.1 Peremptory norms of international law
Since the adoption of Article 53, there have been several attempts to determine not 
only the exact scope and content of jus cogens norms, but also the legal effects that 
peremptory norms have both in relation to enforcement and state responsibility.59 
Article 53 provides the following: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it confl icts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, 
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modifi ed only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.60
58 T. Koji, ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective 
of Non-derogable Rights’ 12 EJIL (2001) 917, 918.
59 For a recent detailed study on peremptory norms, see the work of Orakhelashvili, op. cit.
60 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, op. cit.
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The fact that the concept of peremptory norms is entailed in an international treaty 
does not mean that only states parties to the 1969 VCLT are bound by it. On the 
contrary, Article 53 seems to refl ect a concept that already existed in customary 
international law as it intends to safeguard norms of general international law.61
Identifying the elements that qualify a norm as one of a peremptory character 
is essential not least because of the serious consequences that its violation may 
incur such as the invalidity of a treaty, but also of other serious consequences that 
may arise under the law on state responsibility. The analysis in the following sec-
tions is therefore necessary, as the right to countermeasures by states other than 
the injured is closely related to the content of such norms as protecting fundamen-
tal community interests. 
3.1.1 The legal roots of peremptory norms and state consent
As noted earlier, inclusion of the notion of jus cogens norms in Article 53 of the 1969 
VCLT has contributed signifi cantly, to the shift of the discussion from a bilateral, 
exclusively consent-based traditional international law, to the recognition of cer-
tain common values the protection of which is cherished as fundamental to the 
benefi t of the international legal order. 
One of the main diffi culties concerning the concept of jus cogens norms, how-
ever, relates to how it may be reconciled with the consent theory as affi rmed in the 
Lotus case discussed earlier, according to which states are only bound by those 
norms to which they have consented. The requirement of consent is problematic 
in the sense that no peremptory norms would ever have been developed had the 
consent of every state been required. This can be contrasted, for instance, with 
Article 103 of the UN Charter according to which Charter obligations prevail 
over all obligations arising from other international agreements since the hierar-
chy here is established by state consent. Peremptory norms therefore have an 
indispensable legal effect that seems to be disassociated from state consent,62 which 
may fi nd explanation in the ‘immutable Law of Nations’ as Vattel has pointed out, 
or in the ‘objective structural framework’ of international law that cannot be 
dismantled as Judge Shahabudeen has argued.63 
The concept of jus cogens norms corroborates the existence of an international 
public order that is founded on ‘principles of morality’ that cannot be dispensed 
with by any agreement.64 As noted, these are essential for the ‘legal coexistence’ of 
states within the international community65 and they are ‘inherent’ in every legal 
system, including the international one.66
61 Rozakis, op. cit., 22. Also see Orakhelashvili (2006), op. cit., 113.
62 Orakhelashvili, ibid, 106–08.
63 See section 2.2.
64 A. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: 1961) 213–14. 
65 Separate Opinion of Judge Moreno Quintana, Guardianship of Infants, ICJ Reports (1958) 106–07. 
66 Orakhelashvili distinguishes what he identifi es as ‘structural norms’ such as the principle that trea-
ties must be respected from peremptory norms in that the latter leave no choice as to the legal effect 
of a certain conduct in breach of such norms resulting in their invalidity. Orakhelashvili (2006), 
op. cit., 32, 45.
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This has taken place amid a barrage of arguments that the evolution of the 
concept has sparked as some authors expressed reservations and concerns over the 
ability of the concept to invalidate treaties and ‘interfere’ with the bilateral and 
consent-based nature of the international legal system, but also with the principle 
that treaties must be observed.67 Despite the reservations expressed, Professor 
Tomuschat emphasized that: ‘[I]t would be wrong to assume that States as a mere 
juxtaposition of individual units constitute the international community. Rather, 
the concept denotes an overarching system which embodies a common interest of 
all States and, indirectly, of mankind.’68 
This may somehow also be revealed by the gradually evolved practice of the 
Security Council which has on some occasions directed its resolutions for arms 
and economic embargoes not only to those member states of the UN, but also to 
non-member states whenever it has felt that there has been a breach of or threat 
to international peace and security.69 Nevertheless, this can hardly fi nd justifi ca-
tion under the conventional and customary rules on the law of treaties regarding 
the imposition of rights or obligations to third states without their consent.70
Moreover, as becomes clear from the debates on article 53 and from the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee: 
[T]he Drafting Committee had wished to stress that there was no question of 
requiring a rule to be accepted and recognised as peremptory by all States. It 
would be enough if a very large majority did so; that would mean that if one 
State in isolation refused to accept the peremptory character of the rule, or if 
that State was supported by a very small number of States, the acceptance 
and recognition of the peremptory character of the rule by the international 
community as a whole would not be affected.71
Not only a hierarchy of norms now seems to make its appearance also in the inter-
national legal order, but also states will be bound by such norms even if they have 
opposed them. It then seems that the notion of jus cogens norms has deprived tradi-
67 G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Problem of International Public Policy’, 18 CLP (1965) 191, 213–14.
68 Tomuschat (1993), op. cit., 227.
69 Security Council Res. 660 (1990); Security Council Res. 670 (1990); Security Council Res. 713 
(1991); Security Council Res. 757 (1992). For an analysis see Tomuschat (1993), ibid, 252–5.
70 Having said that, it is also important to stress that the UN, and in particular the Security Council, 
does not possess a role of law enforcer in the international arena. Rather, its powers are limited to 
the safeguarding of international peace and security, even though a broad interpretation to this 
end has been attempted since the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, the Security Council remains 
a political body where states’ own interests still bear gravity in its decision-making process. For 
more analysis on the contemporary challenges the Security Council is faced with see E. Katselli, 
‘Holding the Security Council Accountable for Human Rights Violations’, Human Rights and 
International Legal Discourse (2007), Vol. 1, Issue No. 2, 301–333.
71 Comment by Iraq’s representative, Mr Yaseen, 80th Meeting Committee of the Whole, 21 May 
1968, I, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Offi cial Records of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, 80th meeting, UN doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) 
472, (12) also cited in Greig (2002), op. cit., 534–5.
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tional international law of one of its most characteristic features: the understanding 
that international law was structured merely on the consent of states. This issue 
gains particular signifi cance in the context of customary rules. In this respect 
Professor Sur wonders whether: 
[T]he formation of a rule of jus cogens is identical to that of a customary rule 
and that jus cogens is a strengthened form of custom, a higher derivation of 
custom, or is there an autonomous, original mode of formation, which per-
haps does not form part of practice?72
As Shelton very pointedly observed: ‘The urgent need to act […] fundamentally 
challenges the consensual framework of the international system by seeking to 
impose on dissenting States obligations, that the “international community” 
deems fundamental.’73 Verhoeven, however, takes the view that no rule can be 
considered as having a peremptory character unless states agree.74 It is argued in 
this regard that the fact that a norm of this kind must be recognized by the inter-
national community of states as a whole indicates that consent is essential and it 
takes two forms: fi rst, consent about the character of a norm under general inter-
national law and, second, consent as to its non-derogable nature.75 However, the 
fact that peremptory norms protect higher interests owed not to individual states 
but to the international community makes them independent of consent particu-
larly if a limited number of states oppose their creation. Neither can a state invoke 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness for the violation of such norms.76 
Moreover, Orakhelashvili wonders whether a peremptory norm ‘has to be so 
known as recognised by the consent of States or on the basis of the norm’s 
character’.77 While acceptance of a norm as fundamental and therefore as peremp-
tory may rely on state consent, it may also depend on ‘a belief of the international 
community that the interest protected by that norm is so essential that the norm 
binds States even if they have not consented to it’.78
72 S. Sur, ‘Discussion Statement’ in A. Cassese and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) Change and Stability in International 
Law-Making (de Gruyter: 1988) 128 in Simma (1994), op. cit., 291.
73 D. Shelton, ‘International Law and Relative Normativity’ in M. Evans (ed.), International Law, 2nd 
edn (Oxford: 2006) 159, 173.
74 J. Verhoeven, ‘Jus Cogens and Reservations or “Counter-reservations” to the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice’ in K. Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice, Essays in 
Honour of Eric Suy (Martinus Nijhoff: 1998) 195, 196.
75 Koji, op. cit., 928–9. Once again, however, the consent theory cannot explain why a state would 
still be bound by a jus cogens prohibition if that state, either at the moment of its accession to the 
international legal order or at a later stage, withdraws its consent to be bound by such a norm. 
Neither does the consent theory adequately explain how a norm may acquire a peremptory char-
acter if, as it will be shown in the discussion that follows, not all states need to agree and give their 
consent about the peremptory character of the said norm.
76 Orakhelashvili (2006), op.cit., 69.
77 Ibid, 106.
78 Ibid, 107.
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Having considered the legal justifi cation of peremptory norms and their rela-
tion with state consent, we next focus on the scope and content of such norms.
3.1.2 The scope, content and legal effect of peremptory norms
There has been much ambiguity regarding the scope and content of peremptory 
norms and therefore a consideration into the distinctive elements that make such 
norms of a prevailing and non-derogable character is essential. It was discussed in 
section 2.2 in this chapter that some authors have considered this ambiguity as a 
threat taking away the necessary certainty of the law amid fears of abuse by states 
that may move behind imperialistic motives for imposing their own ‘moral’ values 
on the rest of the world.79 Even though the vagueness or ambiguity of a norm 
cannot be said to take away its legal or peremptory character,80 we need to be 
careful in identifying which norms are jus cogens and which are not. 
Although the 1969 VCLT does not provide a defi nition of peremptory norms, 
something that may indeed entail the risk of abuse, it incorporates three distinctive 
elements that may be used by way of interpretation for the determination of these 
norms. More specifi cally, Article 53 highlights that under general international 
law a peremptory norm is one accepted and recognized as such by the interna-
tional community of states as a whole, that allows for no derogation and that can 
be modifi ed only by a subsequent norm of the same character. It is noted in this 
regard that these characteristics differentiate jus cogens norms from other non-
derogable rights, which do not have a peremptory character. 
With respect to the requirement that these norms are recognized and accepted 
by the international community of states ‘as a whole’, this does not, as already 
noted, presuppose unanimity. Roberto Ago, the second Special Rapporteur 
appointed for the codifi cation of the law on state responsibility, suggested that 
such a norm should be recognized by the ‘basic components’ of the international 
community such as western and eastern countries, equally developed and devel-
oping, although this position has been criticized due to the continuous evolution 
of the international community.81 The Drafting Committee itself clarifi ed that this 
did not require acceptance of the norm by all states.82 
Furthermore, the reference to obligations ‘owed to the international commu-
nity as a whole’ should not be construed to imply that the international community 
is a legal person. This is due to the fact that even down to the present day where 
states have conferred large powers on the UN as a body to observe international 
peace and security with the ability to authorize armed force, states remain the main 
actors in international affairs and international lawmaking. Although some states 
suggested during the second reading of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
79 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’, 16 EJIL (2005) 
No. 1, 113, 115.
80 H.J.G.Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Deventer: 1983) 165.
81 See Fifth Report on State Responsibility (Ago) 53, op. cit., (151).
82 Comment by Iraq’s representative, Mr Yaseen, 472, (12) in Greig (2002), op. cit., 534–5.
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adopted by the ILC in 1996 that reference to international community as a whole 
should read as ‘international community of States as a whole’, the ILC did not 
consider this as being necessary. This was mainly because it was well established 
that states continued to have a central role in international decision making, 
although it is now acknowledged that apart from states, the international com-
munity now includes other entities such as the European Union (EU) and other 
international organizations.83 
Yet the decisive requirement is the importance of the rights and the interests 
protected under a norm that qualifi es it as peremptory. The violation of such 
interests is a violation towards all because they are ‘universal in scope, and cannot 
be reduced to bundles of bilateral interstate relations’.84 However, Professor Koji 
tried to qualify this by saying that because jus cogens norms must be recognized as 
such not only by a specifi c group of states, even if it is the majority, but by all the 
essential components of the international community, the substance of the norm 
has a signifi cant role to play. Consequently, ‘jus cogens must include common ele-
ments among major different (legal) cultures.’85 
Signifi cantly, due to the lack of a defi nition, the question of whether a specifi c 
norm qualifi es as peremptory must be the subject of individual consideration. 
Thus, the emphasis must be placed on the substance and content of the norm, in 
other words, on the signifi cance and essentiality of what is protected by it.86 This 
is because: ‘Not all rules which are important, or even indispensable, for the exis-
tence and working of international law are peremptory.’87 Accordingly, jus cogens 
norms protect prevailing interests that ‘do not exist to satisfy the needs of the indi-
vidual states but the higher interest of the whole international community’.88 
During the debates for the codifi cation of the law of treaties, it was commented 
that what makes a norm of peremptory character is not merely that it is recognized 
as such by all states but also the nature of the interests at stake, which touch moral-
ity and the international legal order.89 However, not all rules of international law 
83 J. Crawford,  J. Peel and S. Olleson, ‘The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading’ 12 EJIL (2001) 963, 973. Also Fourth Report 
on State Responsibility by Mr Crawford, UN doc. A/CN.4/517 (37).
84 J. Crawford, ‘Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole’, Fourth Annual Snyder 
Lecture, April 2000, Bloomington School of Law, Indiana University, 4, available at http:// www.
lcil.cam.ac.uk/ media/ lectures/ doc/ Snyderlect00(f ).doc.
85 Koji, op. cit., 929.
86 Orakhelashvili (2006), op. cit., 43–4. On the legal character and effect of jus cogens norms, see 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., 258, (83); G. Abi-Saab, 
‘The Concept of Jus Cogens in International Law’, 2 Lagonissi Conference: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 
II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Geneva: 1967) 7, 15.
87 Orakhelashvili (2006), ibid, 46.
88 A. Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’, 60 AJIL (1966) 55, 58.
89 Third Report on the Law of Treaties (Fitzmaurice), YbILC (1958) Vol. II, 20, 40–1, (76). Also United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Offi cial Records of the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of Treaties, First Session, 80th meeting, UN doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) 472, (12).
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are of such character but on the contrary, only those that protect fundamental 
interests of the international community are considered as such.
Agreement seems to exist, although not always unanimous, that as jus cogens norms 
qualify norms concerning the prohibition of the use of armed force, the right to 
self-determination, the core of fundamental human rights and humanitarian 
law.90 Nevertheless, while international legal theory and practice reveal very few, 
exceptional examples of jus cogens norms, this is only a refl ection of the rudimentary 
character of the international community.91 
With respect to the non-derogability of a peremptory norm as required under 
Article 53, this must be distinguished from its limitations or qualifi cations, in other 
words, the scope of the norm itself.92 The signifi cance of this becomes apparent in 
relation to the question of whether the prohibition of the use of armed force con-
stitutes a jus cogens norm. According to one view, the fact that force is allowed in 
circumstances of self-defence or in the light of Security Council authorization 
makes the norm derogable. However, the other school of thought supports that 
these exceptions merely defi ne the scope of the prohibition.93 
It has thus far been established that jus cogens norms protect fundamental inter-
ests of the international community and that states are bound by such norms 
irrespective of their consent. This is particularly evident when a new state is cre-
ated as it will be bound by norms such as the prohibition of the use of armed force 
irrespective of whether it consents or not. Nevertheless, peremptory norms are 
also distinguished for their aggravated legal effects. Article 53 provides in this 
regard that a treaty that violates a peremptory norm is void, signifying in this 
manner the importance of the rights protected under the infringed norm but also 
the seriousness of the violation itself. In addition to the legal consequences that 
derive from the law of treaties, and as will be discussed in depth in the next chap-
ter, the violation of peremptory norms incurs consequences also under the law on 
state responsibility. 
Suffi ce it to say here that states in breach of international norms, including 
jus cogens norms, have a duty, as proclaimed in the Chorzow Factory case, to provide 
90 Orakhelashvili, op. cit., 50–66. In support of the jus cogens character of the prohibition of the use of 
armed force, see Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986) 14, 100–101; Separate Opinion of 
Judge Bruno Simma, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Merits, ICJ 
Reports (2003), Judgment of 6 November 2003, 161, 329–30, (9). Separate Opinion of Judge 
Elagaby, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004, General List No. 131, para. 3.1. For arguments in support of the jus cogens 
character of at least certain human rights, see R. Higgins, ‘Derogations under Human Rights 
Treaties’, BYIL (1976–77) 281, 282; B. Simma and P. Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, 12 AYIL (1992) 82, 103.
91 Verhoeven, op. cit., 195, 196.
92 Orakhelashvili (2006), op. cit., 72.
93 Ibid, 72 et seq.
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reparation.94 This enables all other states to seek reparation even for the violation 
of a norm that protects not state interests directly but rather the rights of individu-
als.95 At the same time, restitution seems to be an essential and non-derogable 
condition of the peremptory character of the infringed violation.96 The signifi -
cance of this must be particularly stressed because a violation involving the 
unlawful use of force, for instance, would result in a non-negotiable duty of with-
drawal from the occupied territory.97 The unlawfulness created cannot be 
remedied by an international agreement. As a result, in the example just cited, 
acquisition of territory through the unlawful use of force could not become legally 
justifi ed by an international agreement such as, for instance, a peace treaty.98 
Moreover, the right of displaced persons to return to their homes is arguably also 
non-negotiable creating a duty of return.99 At the same time, a derivative effect of 
the peremptory character of a norm is the duty not to recognize the legal effects of 
conduct committed in violation of such norm. 
Quite separately from the legal effects of peremptory norms, many industrial-
ized states had made it clear that they would not ratify the 1969 VCLT unless it 
provided for adequate and compulsory procedures whenever the parties in a dis-
pute regarding a specifi c treaty could not themselves settle the matter. By way of 
contrast, socialist and Third World countries opposed this idea. As a compromise, 
the ILC adopted Article 66, which provides that whenever a dispute regarding a 
peremptory norm arises under Article 53 then it must be submitted to the ICJ 
unless the parties agree to resort to arbitration. This means that a state which is 
not a party to the 1969 VCLT cannot be forced to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court, as Article 66 does not refl ect a customary rule of international law. 
However, these states would still be bound by jus cogens norms, which are accepted 
to have a customary character.100 
After the conclusion of the 1969 VCLT, some states placed specifi c reservations 
regarding Article 66. Despite the fact that especially for the industrialized states 
the inclusion of Article 66 was a precondition for accepting those provisions of 
Part 5 that were expressive of progressive development, according to one view, 
such reservations could not be regarded as invalid as they did not oppose the object 
and the purpose of the convention.101 In such an event, states opposing reservations 
 94 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, Merits, 13 September 1928, Permanent Court of International 
Justice (1928) Series A, No. 17, 4, 29.
 95 Orakhelashvili (2006), op. cit., 246–48.
 96 B. Graefrath, ‘International Crimes and Collective Security’ in Weiler, Cassese and Spinedi 
op. cit., 161,165.
 97 Orakhelashvili (2006), op. cit., 252.
 98 Ibid, 220–1.
 99 Final Report on Human Rights and Population Transfer, Special Rapporteur Al-Khasawneh E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1997/23, (60–61) in ibid, 252–3. 
100 Verhoeven, op. cit., 202.
101 Ibid, 197–8, 202.
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regarding Article 66 are entitled to oppose the force of the convention between 
themselves and the states that have expressed reservation to this provision. 
Moreover, acceptance of the concept of jus cogens norms had implications in 
relation to whether states other than the contracting parties to a treaty in breach 
of a jus cogens norm would be entitled to invoke the invalidity and nullity of the 
said treaty. However, the 1969 VCLT in Article 65 provides that only a state 
which is party to the treaty may invoke its invalidity, making the two positions 
diffi cult to reconcile.102
Some states have felt that the inclusion of Article 53 would threaten the stability 
of treaty relations, while at the same time the attribution to the ICJ of jurisdiction 
to resolve issues regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention 
would make states more hesitant to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.103 
3.1.3 Treaty execution and indirect violations of jus cogens norms 
While Article 53 makes clear that a treaty in contravention of peremptory norms 
is null, it makes no reference to the status of a treaty that only indirectly contrib-
utes to the breach of a jus cogens norm and the legal consequences deriving 
therefrom. In fact, contemporary international law fi nds no examples of treaties 
under which two or more states agree to commit genocide or torture.104 On the 
contrary, in almost all cases treaties seem, as Professor Crawford put it, ‘innocent’ 
in their purpose.105 Nevertheless, it often happens that compliance with the 
terms of a particular treaty indirectly assists in the infringement of a peremptory 
norm. A question closely related to this is, therefore, whether a state which is 
party to a certain treaty may be entitled to either suspend or terminate that 
102 G. Gaja, ‘Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention’ 172 RdC (1981) III, 271, 281, 283. 
103 France is among those states that have not signed or ratifi ed the 1969 VCLT. France’s opposition 
is not against the notion of jus cogens in general; on the contrary it supports such notion with 
respect to certain human values accepted by all states. However, as a state that supports nuclear 
testing itself, France was afraid that accepting the notion without clearly identifying the criteria by 
which norms would be described as possessing a peremtory character, would have an impact on 
the stability and security of the law of treaties, but also to state sovereignty. Offi cial Records of 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, 80th meeting, Vienna, 
26 March–24 May 1968, UN doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) 309–310; Offi cial Records of the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, Vienna, 9 April–22 May 
1969, UN doc. A/Conf.39/11/Add.1, 93–5.
104 However, one could refer to other agreements that may directly infringe peremptory norms. As 
an example of this, one may mention state agreements providing for the use of armed force in 
circumstances other than self-defence and Security Council authorization. In particular, it has 
been argued that the Treaty of Guarantee that is annexed as part of the London Agreement 
establishing the Republic of Cyprus that grants rights of ‘intervention’ to Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom for the purpose of restoring legal order is in violation of the peremptory norm 
prohibiting the use of armed force. See Cyprus–Greece, Turkey, UK, Treaty of Guarantee of the 
Republic of Cyprus, 16 August 1960, 382 UNTS 3.
105 Second Report on State Responsibility (Crawford), Addendum 2 (1999), A/CN.4/498, Add. 2 (306).
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treaty or refuse to perform it under the law on state responsibility by way of 
countermeasures. 
As will be analytically discussed in Chapter 4, Article 60 of the 1969 VCLT 
only permits the suspension or termination of a treaty in case of a material breach 
of the terms of that specifi c treaty. Any events occurring outside the framework of 
the treaty are not relevant and therefore leave unaffected the obligations of the 
concerned parties. As for the non-performance of the treaty by way of counter-
measures it has been concluded by the ILC that current international law does not 
accommodate a right to third, non-injured states to resort to countermeasures. 
Although this conclusion will be questioned in the course of this analysis, one is left 
wondering as to the remedies available under international law regarding a treaty 
that indirectly assists in the commission of a violation of a jus cogens norm. In such 
cases, it is not the treaty itself that violates the norm, but rather the performance of 
the treaty. This can be illustrated by an example. Two states conclude a treaty for 
the sale of weapons and military material. The treaty, on its face, suffers no wrong. 
If, however, one of the parties is involved in a genocidal plan to exterminate a 
specifi c ethnic group living on its territory, the question arises as to whether the 
other state will still be obliged to conform to its treaty undertakings.106 Mr Ago used 
a similar example to state that no one could actually blame a state for not observing 
its treaty obligations under these circumstances since in observing those obligations 
it would be participating in the commission of an ‘international crime’.107
Professor Crawford further says in relation to this:
If a peremptory norm invalidates an inconsistent treaty, how can the obliga-
tion to perform the treaty stand against the breach of such a norm? No doubt 
the link between performance of the treaty obligation and breach of the 
peremptory norm would have to be clear and direct. But in such cases, the 
temporary suspension of the obligation to perform surely follows from the 
peremptory character of the norm that would otherwise be violated.108
Yet, Professor Crawford is of the view that in these cases of indirect confl ict with 
a peremptory norm there is no need for the total invalidation of the treaty in ques-
tion. Furthermore, in his opinion a norm having a jus cogens character should 
106 On the obligation of states to prevent genocide see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, 26 February 
2007, (427) and (430). According to the Court, ‘the obligation of each contracting State to prevent 
genocide is both normative and compelling’, while asserting that states have ‘obligation to take such 
action as they can to prevent genocide from occuring’. The state must accordingly take all reason-
able steps within its power to prevent genocide, a duty that derives from a specifi c treaty, namely, 
the 1948 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide. See in this regard, Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, UNTS, Vol. 78, 277.
107 Fifth Report on State Responsibility (Ago) op. cit.,18, (50).
108 Second Report on State Responsibility (Crawford), Addendum 2, op. cit., (306). 
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prevail over all other international obligations that do not have the same norma-
tive effect. Therefore: 
[I]n such cases the State concerned would not have the choice whether or not 
to comply: if there is inconsistency in the circumstances, the peremptory 
norm must prevail. On the other hand, the invalidation of a treaty which does 
not in terms confl ict with any peremptory norm, but whose observance in a 
given case might happen to do so, seems both unnecessary and disproportionate. 
In such cases, the treaty obligation is, properly speaking, inoperative and the 
peremptory norm prevails. But if the treaty can in future have applications 
not inconsistent with the peremptory norm, why should it be invalidated by 
such an occasional confl ict?109
It seems further to be the position of Professor Crawford that the obligations deriv-
ing from a jus cogens norm are to be found in the ‘system of international law’, but 
he did press for an inclusion of a provision on precluding the wrongfulness of an 
act if this act is required by a jus cogens norm.110 Indeed, the notion of jus cogens 
norms would diminish in signifi cance if it at least did not have this effect of enti-
tling the non-observance of a certain treaty obligation, which assists in the 
commission of a jus cogens violation. 
Along the same lines, Professor Fitzmaurice points out that: ‘A treaty obligation 
the observance of which is incompatible with a new rule or prohibition of interna-
tional law in the nature of jus cogens will justify (and require) non-observance of any 
treaty obligation involving such incompatibility’.111
Nevertheless, this raises the question as to whether there are any real differences 
between the legal consequences that arise from the violation of a peremptory 
norm such as in the examples mentioned earlier and countermeasures. As noted 
in the introduction to this volume, as countermeasures qualify measures of a 
peaceful character that are in violation of international law; however, they are 
justifi ed as they are taken in response to a previously committed wrongful act. It is 
also well established that countermeasures need not be of a reciprocal charac-
ter.112 If therefore an ‘inherent’ effect of peremptory norms is the obligation of 
states not to perform their international obligations if by doing so a jus cogens norm 
is infringed, then this would suggest that countermeasures are not only allowed 
under international law, but they are also required in circumstances when a peremp-
tory norm is at stake. Most signifi cantly, it seems that the concept of countermeasures 
by states other than the injured constitutes an integral part of the concept of jus cogens 
norms in that states are required – in other words, they have a legal duty – not to 
perform their obligations under that treaty even if they are not directly affected by 
109 Ibid, (311).
110 Ibid, (312).
111 Fourth report on the Law of Treaties (Fitzmaurice), YbILC (1959) Vol. II, 37, 46 in ibid, (308).
112 Also, see analysis in Chapter 5, section 5.4.
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such violation. At least it seems that this effect would apply towards those interna-
tional obligations the execution of which indirectly contributes to the violation of 
peremptory norms. Of course, the question remains with respect to whether inter-
national law permits the non-performance of international obligations in response 
to violations of obligations that, while of an erga omnes character, do not amount to 
peremptory norms. This is a question that is central to this book.
Furthermore, states are also under an obligation not to render any aid or assis-
tance to the state that infringes peremptory norms of international law, a duty 
now envisaged in Article 41 of the Final Articles. This illustrates the close relation 
between the two branches of international law and, in particular, the law of trea-
ties and the law on state responsibility. While the law of treaties, and in particular 
Article 53, has the effect of invalidating the treaty which itself violates a peremp-
tory rule establishing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the law on state 
responsibility provides in Article 41(2) the legal consequences arising in the event 
of serious violations of peremptory norms whether customary or conventional in 
character. More specifi cally, it incorporates the duty not to provide any assistance 
to the perpetrator although there is no mechanism equivalent to that provided 
under the 1969 VCLT to monitor possible abuses. This leads to the conclusion 
that the debate is not limited to the question of whether international law recog-
nizes a right to countermeasures by states other than the injured. In fact, the 
analysis thus far demonstrates that states have a legal obligation to resort to such 
measures by way of not performing their treaty or customary obligations in cir-
cumstances such as those just described. This necessary legal consequence is 
encompassed by the very notion of peremptory norms of international law.
In any event, in order to justify the non-performance of a treaty under these condi-
tions it will be imperative to show the existence of a direct link between the observance 
of the treaty and the commission of an act which is in violation of peremptory norms. 
On this reasoning, it could be argued that the use of nuclear weapons would be 
directly and clearly contributing to the violation of jus cogens norms since some of the 
rules of international humanitarian law have been enforced with such status.
Finally, although a treaty is null when in breach of a peremptory norm, there is 
not much said about the legal consequences of a customary rule in violation of a 
jus cogens norm. However, it would be safe to conclude that such a rule will become 
ineffective and inoperative in the same way as in the case of treaties.113 
The recognition of jus cogens norms as part of international law prepared the 
ground for the appearance of another notion, no less controversial – that of inter-
national state crimes, as thoroughly explored within the work of the ILC on its 
codifi cation of the law on state responsibility and which will be considered in the next 
chapter. The realization that not all violations had the same output and the need to 
attach a more grave nature to some of them due to the fundamental character of the 
rights protected under certain international rules was the driving force for the intro-
duction of the concept of state crimes in the international legal debate. The serious 
113 Shaw, op. cit., 123 et seq.
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implications arising from the incorporation of the concept in international law, with 
the possibility of some states being faced with punitive measures, forced many states 
to look at the notion with a great amount of suspicion and disbelief. The legal conse-
quences to derive from such violations and the states entitled to take action were 
among the most signifi cant concerns that attracted legal attention, aggravated by the 
lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism in international law. The debate that 
emerged around the notion of state crimes is considered in chapter 2.
At this point, it is necessary to consider in some depth another signifi cant con-
cept that emerged in international law and in particular the concept of obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole and its association with peremp-
tory norms.
3.2 Obligations erga omnes
One year after the incorporation of the notion of peremptory norms into the 1969 
VCLT, and apparently infl uenced from the latest developments, the ICJ made a 
signifi cant distinction between reciprocal and bilateral obligations arising from the 
law of diplomatic immunities and obligations owed to the international community 
of states as a whole. It will be seen, however, that despite the similarities between jus 
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations in that they both protect community inter-
ests and as a result they often overlap, the two concepts are not identical. While jus 
cogens norms establish obligations erga omnes, the same does not apply with respect to 
erga omnes obligations, which most of the time do not possess a peremptory charac-
ter.114 Moreover, while a jus cogens norm establishes an obligation of observance 
derogation from which is prohibited unless so provided by a rule having the same 
normative effect, erga omnes obligations do not have such a strong, compulsory effect. 
As already discussed, jus cogens norms also preclude the conclusion of treaties that 
may be in violation of them, while they invalidate any treaties that have this effect. 
Contrariwise, obligations erga omnes do not deal with the legal consequences per se, 
but rather, with the question of standing in response to such a breach.115
The ICJ’s ruling on obligations owed erga omnes constituted a further major turn-
ing point for the protection of community interests, despite attempts to diminish the 
signifi cance of the Court’s statement because of the fact that this was not part of its 
legal conclusions, but rather part of an obiter dictum.116 Some authors have even 
argued that the concept of obligations erga omnes signals the ‘constitutionalization of 
international law’.117 Signifi cantly, this concept contributed to the development of 
the rules concerning the enforcement of obligations of this nature.118
114 Jorgensen, op. cit., 97.
115 Tams, op. cit., 152.
116 See ibid, 168. For the signifi cance of the ICJ’s dictum also see Koji, op. cit., 933.
117 J. Delbruck, ‘ “Laws in the Public Interest” – Some Observations on the Foundations and 
Identifi cation of Erga Omnes Norms in International Law’ in Götz et al. (eds) Liber Amicorum Gunther 
Jaenicke – Zum 85. Geburtstag (1999) as cited in Tams, ibid, 3.
118 Tams, ibid, 102.
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The concept of obligations owed erga omnes, however, was not new in interna-
tional legal doctrine.119 In 1957, for instance, Schwarzenberger, commenting 
on the legal effects of treaties on third states referred to the notion of erga omnes 
obligations.120 The concept also appears in the debates for the drafting of 
Article 62 of the VCLT concerning treaties that give rise to rights and obligations 
of third states. During these debates, Manfred Lachs, later judge on the ICJ 
and in the Barcelona Traction case, suggested that a distinction should be drawn 
between such treaties and ‘treaties establishing objective regimes and obligations 
erga omnes’.121 Furthermore, Judge Jessup, a few years before the ruling in the 
Barcelona Traction case, observed that states might possess a general interest in the 
protection of values and benefi ts common to the international community.122
The examination that follows looks at the distinctive features of the concept of 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole and how this concept 
has infl uenced international jurisprudence in terms of legal standing. In other 
words, the signifi cance of the analysis that follows lies in the fact that the question 
of whether an obligation is of an erga omnes character is interrelated with the ques-
tion of standing of states not directly injured by a given breach to make a claim 
through judicial remedies invoking community interests. The question of whether 
such states have legal standing to resort to other means of enforcement such as 
countermeasures will be at the centre of examination in the following chapters.
3.2.1 The Barcelona Traction case
Nothing in the Barcelona Traction case was so widely discussed as the reference 
made by the ICJ to the concept of obligations erga omnes. While the Court has often 
been criticized for introducing a notion whose necessity was required by neither 
the legal issues nor the facts of the case,123 its pivotal contribution to the establish-
ment of this idea as a general principle of international law is now generally 
acknowledged.
The case concerned a complaint fi led by Belgium on behalf of several Belgian 
citizens who had been shareholders in the Barcelona Traction Company, a com-
pany registered in Canada, for damages they suffered in the hands of the Spanish 
authorities. Spain based its argument on the ground that the claim was of a bilat-
eral nature involving Canada and Spain, thus precluding Belgium from any right 
of action on behalf of Canada or the company. The Court’s dictum on erga omnes 
119 Ibid, 103. See however Koji, op. cit., 931. 
120 G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 1 (Stevens: 
1957) 459.
121 Summary records of the Sixteenth Session on the Law of Treaties, YbILC (1964) Vol. I, 1, 80, 83, 
(29) in M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Clarendon Press: 1997) 8.
122 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jessup, South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v South Africa) and (Liberia v 
South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966, ICJ Reports (1966) 373–4.
123 See in G. Gaja, ‘Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative 
Analysis of Three Related Concepts’ in Weiler, Cassese and Spinedi, op. cit., 151, 154.
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was a response to Spain’s reference to the possibility of invocation of state respon-
sibility by any state for the commission of an international crime, although fi nally 
rejecting that this was the case in the present circumstances. The judgment identi-
fi ed two main features of the notion of erga omnes: universality, insofar as erga omnes 
obligations bind all states without exception and solidarity in that every state has 
a legal interest in their protection.124 Consequently, a two-way approach is recog-
nized according to which the international community endorses certain 
obligations the compliance with, and respect for which are the concern of all 
states. Nevertheless, it will be established that the enforcement of these obligations 
is left to individual states in the absence of centralized or community enforcement 
mechanisms in international law.125
According to the famous dictum of the Court:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the fi eld of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.126
The dictum in the Barcelona Traction case came only 4 years after the ruling of the 
ICJ in the South West Africa case. In that case, as we discuss later, the Court rejected 
the existence of an actio popularis in international law according to which every state 
would possess a right to bring a claim for violations of international law irrespective 
of whether there had been a violation of an individual interest.127 As already dis-
cussed, the possibility of third-state measures for the infringement of an international 
obligation is a notion unknown to traditional international law as no state can act 
as a ‘world policeman’. The only state entitled to take action against another state 
is the one that has suffered a wrong, the state to whom the obligation was owed and 
the state whose rights have been disregarded. According to this view, any state 
claiming to be injured needs to establish the existence of a subjective legal interest. 
While the Court distanced itself from an absolute application of bilateralism in the 
Barcelona Traction case, recognizing that all states have a legal interest to demand 
compliance with obligations erga omnes, it went on to add in paragraph 91:
With regard more particularly to human rights, to which reference had 
already been made in paragraph 34 of this Judgement, it should be noted 
that these also include protection against denial of justice. However, on the 
124 Ragazzi, op. cit., 17. 
125 Also see the discussion in Tomuschat (1993), op. cit., 231. It has been noted that there was also 
disagreement among states regarding the existence of the international community itself, what 
that represented, which states and what powers did that community have in safeguarding the 
international legal order.
126 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, op. cit., 32, (33).
127 South West Africa cases, Second Phase (1966) 47, (88).
36 The problem of enforcement in international law
universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on 
States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights 
irrespective of their nationality.128
This statement has provoked much controversy as setting a legal impediment in 
the implementation of such general interests by states and as negatively fi ltering 
the erga omnes invocation of human rights abuses by imposing an unwanted restriction 
on states.129 If one thinks that in most cases human rights violations occur by the 
state of nationality of the victim, to demand that states respect the nationality rule 
would be tantamount to expecting the violator to protect its own victims. Frowein 
interpreted the Court’s approach by noting that: 
Although the relationship between this paragraph and the one on obligations 
erga omnes is not absolutely clear, it would not seem to be correct to interpret 
the latter as foreclosing the possibility for States to act on the basis of obliga-
tions erga omnes. This seems to be confi rmed by the difference of formulation 
the Court uses as far as human rights are concerned. While the Court explains 
in the fi rst part that the “basic rights of the human person” form part of those 
norms which create obligations erga omnes, it refers to the wider spectrum of 
“human rights” in the latter part.130
The same position is adopted by Professor Koji who identifi es two factors creating 
erga omnes obligations: rights that are incorporated in general international law and 
‘international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character’, the latter of 
which is absent with respect to rights referred to in paragraph 91.131 Tams reaches 
a similar conclusion by observing that paragraph 91 refers to international treaties 
as opposed to general international law where erga omnes obligations derive from. 
Yet Tams makes the point that the Court erred in its conclusion that at the time of 
its ruling such treaties did not empower states other than the state of nationality to 
invoke their infringement. By way of contrast, there existed at the time many exam-
ples of such treaties prohibiting for instance genocide and slavery, empowering all 
states parties to them to make a claim in relation to the violation of the treaty con-
cerned.132 Moreover, as the reference in paragraph 91 concerns human rights 
enforcement mechanisms established under treaties, it does not extend to the 
enforcement of obligations erga omnes that derive from customary international 
law. In this regard, ‘the enforcement of obligations erga omnes … is not a matter of 
128 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, op. cit., 47 (91).
129 For the view that paragraph 91 should not be interpreted as precluding third states from seeking 
protection for individuals other than their nationals, see A. de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and 
International Crimes (Kluwer Law International: 1996) 52.
130 Frowein (1994), op. cit., 406.
131 Koji, op. cit., 932. Gaja also notes in this regard that obligations ‘concerning the basic rights of 
the human person’ create obligations owed to all states irrespective of a direct legal interest on 
their part, and as a consequence, no derogation is allowed. Gaja (1981), op. cit., 281.
132 Tams, op. cit., 177.
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treaty law.’133 Signifi cantly, this means that the implementation of community 
interests, particularly those emerging under customary international law, is not 
subject to the nationality principle that may be applicable under specifi c treaties 
and therefore it is in this light that this paragraph must be read. 
Yet, the recognition of a legal interest in the observation of an obligation 
erga omnes does not give rise to an automatic right to initiate proceedings before 
international courts (locus standi ) or a right to take countermeasures. On the contrary, 
there also has to be a distinct right of protection conferred on the state taking 
action.134 This rule applies to both states with a subjective right and states with a 
legal interest as understood under the concept of obligations owed to the inter-
national community as a whole. Simma notes in this respect that ‘although the 
terms “legal interest” and “capacity of action” (qualité pour agir) are identical, spe-
cifi c international agreements may channel such qualité pour agir into appropriate 
procedures, thereby excluding the possibility of recourse to the classical means of 
self-help under general international law to a certain extent, that is, as far as these 
agreements can be considered self-contained.’135 As a consequence of this, the 
right of states to invoke the liability of the defaulting state by means of judicial 
remedies, which is at the scope of the examination in this chapter, may be quali-
fi ed by certain procedural guarantees. This is justifi ed by the consent-based 
character of the international judicial machinery that has not been defeated even 
with the emergence of such norms and obligations such as those qualifying as jus 
cogens and erga omnes respectively. However, the erga omnes character of an obliga-
tion is not precluded even in the case where states have agreed for specifi c 
requirements to be fulfi lled regarding their implementation. 
Moreover, it will be established that even in cases concerning the violation of 
obligations erga omnes, the ICJ may not disregard its own jurisdictional rules regard-
ing the capacity of a state to bring a case before it.136 It is noted in this regard, that 
the ICJ, when called to determine a specifi c dispute between certain parties, must do 
so weighing its jurisdictional powers, on the one hand, and the interests of the inter-
national community, on the other.137 The question of the interests of third states that 
have not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court is also relevant here. In such 
circumstances, it is imperative that the Court fi nds a balance between preventing 
parties from making claims before it that would endanger third states’ interests, and 
not allowing third states to prevent the Court from adjudicating issues submitted 
with the consent of the parties before it, a matter that will be considered in turn.138 
The following sections will elaborate on the scope, content and legal effects of 
obligations erga omnes and, importantly, on the question of standing to bring claims 
133 Ibid, 178.
134 Hoogh (1996) op. cit., 25–8. Also see ibid, 19–25; I. Scobbie, ‘The Invocation of Responsibility 
for the Breach of “Obligations” under Peremptory Norms of General International Law’ 13 EJIL 
(2002) 5, 1201, 1218–9.
135 Simma (1994), op. cit., 296.
136 J. Charney, ‘Third State Remedies in International Law’ 10 MJIL (1989) 57, 90–1.
137 Chinkin (1993), op. cit., 149.
138 Ibid, 202.
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before international courts for the protection of general community and collective 
interests when individual injury is lacking.
3.2.2  Collective interests before international bodies and legal standing 
for violations erga omnes 
Apart from the fact that international law lacks compulsory enforcement mecha-
nisms except where expressly provided (and therefore the existence of such 
mechanisms is conditioned on the initial agreement of states), it also lacks compul-
sory judicial jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation 
and implementation of international rules. Consequently, international courts, 
including the ICJ, do not have jurisdiction to look into a case without the consent 
of all parties concerned.139 Due to the fact that not all states are always willing to 
subject a certain dispute to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Court often fi nds it dif-
fi cult to look into the substance of the questions submitted before it and is hence 
unable to adjudicate on signifi cant issues of international law. 
Moreover, a dispute may often involve a wider number of subjects that may be 
affected in numerous different ways, either directly or indirectly, and in moral, 
economic, legal, ideological or other terms.140 This raises the question whether all 
states will have a right to seek the performance of the infringed rule, a matter that 
gains signifi cance in the context of obligations erga omnes. This is particularly so in 
light of the PCIJ’s earlier ruling in the Mavrommatis case, according to which a 
dispute constitutes a disagreement between two states on issues of law, fact, legal 
views or interests, thus associating proceedings before it with bilateralism.141 
Nevertheless, this narrow understanding of legal standing for the enforcement of 
erga omnes obligations by states not directly affected will be challenged. The atten-
tion will subsequently focus on the enforcement of such obligations by initiating 
proceedings before international judicial and other bodies, although, as noted 
already, this may not be the only way by which such rules may be enforced, includ-
ing countermeasures,142 a subject that will be separately considered.
The question of standing relates to the persons entitled to give effect to a certain 
rule by seeking its observance and to the link they need to establish between the 
infringed obligation and their entitlement to make a claim. As will be shown, in the 
case of community interests all states have an interest in seeing the observance of the 
obligation concerned. How they may be able to do so will usually depend, as dis-
cussed earlier, on specifi c procedural and substantive requirements that may need 
to be satisfi ed. Furthermore, it will become clear that standing is recognized solely 
139 See, for instance, Article 36 of Statute of the International Court of Justice, Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 39 AJIL (1945) Supp. 215n.
140 Chinkin (1993), op. cit., 16, 18.
141 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v Great Britain),  Judgment No. 2, 30 August 1924, Permanent 
Court of International Justice (1924) Series A, 11 in ibid, 15.
142 Tams, op. cit., 25–6.
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for those interests that are legally protected or, in other words, are veiled with legal 
effect. This was affi rmed by the ICJ in the South West Africa case143 and, accordingly, 
a state that claims that it has standing to initiate judicial proceedings must establish 
its right or legal interest. Quite signifi cantly, and as Tams points out, ‘a State that 
can establish a general right to invoke another State’s responsibility should be pre-
sumed to have standing to do so by way of ICJ proceedings.’144 This will often 
depend on the source of the infringed obligation or the gravity of the violation 
itself.145 At the same time, a state’s right to initiate judicial proceedings even if not 
directly injured by a certain violation may be treaty based and may derive from the 
nature of certain treaties as interdependent or as establishing an objective regime. 
Even more so, this entitlement may derive from the nature of the infringed obliga-
tion as one that is owed to the international community as a whole. 
With these preliminary observations, the analysis is now turned to the enforce-
ment of obligations arising from treaty-based regimes and general international 
law and how international bodies have approached the question of disputes involv-
ing the rights of third states, but also the quest for standing in protection of general 
interests.
3.2.2.1  STANDING FOR TREATY-BASED OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHING 
GENERAL INTERESTS
Issues relating to the notion of obligations erga omnes came to the attention of inter-
national courts and bodies a long time before the ICJ’s dictum in the Barcelona 
Traction case. However, inconsistencies in international jurisprudence have caused 
confusion with respect to whether states not affected in their subjective rights are 
entitled to make an international claim against the wrongdoing state. In this sec-
tion, the emphasis will be placed on the enforcement of rights and legal interests 
arising from treaty-based regimes and it will be shown that there exists suffi cient 
evidence that supports the right of third states to instigate proceedings before 
international bodies in response to the violation of obligations arising from such 
regimes. These regimes establish a general right to all states which are parties to 
enforce the rights protected under them, regardless of whether they have suffered 
a direct injury to their individual rights.146 
The PCIJ was concerned with such a case when France, Italy, Japan and the 
United Kingdom initiated proceedings against Germany as ‘interested’ powers for 
the violation of the Treaty of Versailles and, in particular, its obligation to allow free 
and open access to the Kiel Canal to the vessels of all nations at peace with Germany. 
The violation took place when Germany denied canal access to a British vessel 
chartered by a French company that was carrying military material to Poland, 
which at the time was at war with Russia. Germany justifi ed its action with the 
143 South West Africa cases, Second Phase, op. cit., 34, (51).
144 Tams, op. cit., 40.
145 Ibid, 41.
146 Ibid, 71.
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argument that allowing access to the vessel would put its neutrality at risk. While 
Italy and Japan, unlike France and the United Kingdom, were not injured or spe-
cially affected states, the PCIJ accepted their claim on the basis that they all possessed 
‘a clear interest in the execution of the provisions relating to the Kiel Canal, since 
they all possessed fl eets and merchant vessels fl ying their respective fl ags’.147 In par-
ticular, the Court held that these states were entitled to raise a claim against 
Germany because of express treaty provisions according to which ‘a legal interest is 
deemed to be vested in all States by operation of general international law’.148 The 
Court, in examining Germany’s entitlement to deny access to the canal, determined 
that with the Treaty of Versailles the parties wished to establish an ‘international 
regime’ that would benefi t all nations.149 The Court’s ruling was not therefore 
restricted to fi nding standing solely in favour of France and the United Kingdom as 
the state of registry of the vessel and as a specially affected state respectively. Rather, 
the Court acknowledged that under Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles ‘any 
interested Power’ was entitled to initiate judicial proceedings for matters concerning 
the non-compliance with, or the interpretation of, the treaty.150
A similar question regarding the notion of ‘permanent international interests’ was 
raised in the dispute regarding the Åaland Islands. This case related to the obliga-
tions of states arising under treaties that determine territorial issues. Under these 
treaties, and in deviation from the principle that treaties do not create obligations for 
non-parties, an objective regime is established that not only states that are parties to 
such treaties must respect but also non-parties.151 In this particular incident, Sweden 
offered the Åaland Islands to Finland, then still part of Russia, in 1809, but when 
Russia was defeated in the Crimean War, the latter concluded an agreement in 
1856 with France and Great Britain to demilitarize the islands.152 This agreement 
was annexed to the General Peace Treaty signed by Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, 
Sardinia, Turkey and Great Britain. When Finland later gained its independence in 
1917 a dispute broke out between Finland and Sweden concerning, inter alia, the 
duty for the demilitarization of the islands. While Finland and Sweden were not 
parties to the demilitarization agreements, the Committee appointed by the Council 
of the League of Nations to examine the dispute concluded that: 
The Powers have, on many occasions since 1815, and especially at the con-
clusion of peace treaties, tried to create true objective law, a real political 
147 The S.S. Wimbledon, Judgment No. 1, August 17, 1923, Permanent Court of International Justice 
(1923) Series A, 20.
148 Ibid. Also see Ragazzi, op. cit., 25. 
149 The S.S. Wimbledon, ibid, 28.
150 Treaty of Versailles (Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany), 
28 June 1919, 16 AJIL (1922) Supp. 1. See analysis in Tams, op. cit., 76–9.
151 Tams, ibid, 87.
152 1856 Åaland Islands Convention, 15 NRG, 1st Series, 788–90. Also see ibid, 86.
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status the effects of which are felt outside the immediate circle of contracting 
parties.153
The Committee held in particular that ‘every interested state’ was empowered to 
seek compliance with the 1856 Convention. Indeed, the Agreements did not estab-
lish reciprocal rights, but on the contrary, the provisions relating to the prohibition 
of fortifi cation intended to protect European interests by establishing ‘a special 
international status’ in the observance of which every state had an interest.154 
This case too seems to recognize a general right of standing irrespective of 
whether an individual injury can be established. Quite distinctively however from 
the Wimbledon case, the Committee’s fi ndings lead to the conclusion that a claim 
regarding the fortifi cation of the islands could be brought not only by the contract-
ing parties but also by other states as well.
The ICJ reached similar conclusions in its Advisory Opinion in the Reservations to 
the Genocide Convention case in 1951. In particular, the Court acknowledged that the 
prohibition of genocide established a general public interest, irrespective of the 
nationality of the victim allowing therefore every state which was party to the 
Convention to make a claim against the wrongdoer in case of a violation. This is due 
to the fact that the Convention aims to protect not individual state interests but rather 
a common interest that benefi ts the international community in its entirety.155
In another case brought before the ICJ in 1963 an erga omnes claim was raised 
regarding certain provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement for Cameroon estab-
lished for the purpose of protecting the common interests of UN member states. 
The ICJ was called on to determine whether each member state possessed a right 
of action; however, the Court never considered the substance of the case as it 
dismissed the action on other grounds.156 
Nevertheless, in the South West Africa case, which concerned a mandate con-
cluded in 1920 to protect the common interests of the former member states of the 
League of Nations, the ICJ gave rather contradictory rulings. In its ruling on the 
preliminary objections, the Court recognized the legal right or interest of mem-
bers of the League of Nations to demand from the mandatory to comply with its 
obligations towards the people of the mandated territory and the League of 
Nations.157 The Court further acknowledged that since neither the Council 
nor the League of Nations was entitled to appear before it, the only route for the 
153 Åaland Islands Question, ‘Report of the International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council 
of the League of Nations with the task of giving an Advisory Opinion upon the legal aspects of the 
Åaland Islands Question’, L.N.O.J., Special Supplement No. 3 (October 1920) 17 in Ragazzi, 
op. cit., 32.
154 Åaland Islands Question, Report, ibid, 19. 
155 Reservations to the Genocide Convention case, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1951) 15, 23.
156 Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment 
of 2 December 1963, ICJ Reports (1963) 15, 34–6. 
157 South West Africa cases, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962, ICJ Reports 
(1962), 319, 343. Also see C. Annacker, ‘The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in 
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protection of the rights of the people protected under the sacred trust was resort 
to the Court initiated by any member of the League. Despite the fact that the 
Court made no express reference to the notion of erga omnes obligations, it pointed 
out that the people of the mandated territory needed to turn to the organized 
international community for the achievement of the goals of the trust. According 
to the Court, there existed ‘“a sacred trust of civilisation” laid upon the League as 
an organized international community and upon its Members’.158 
Despite these conclusions, the Court dismissed the cases at the second phase on 
the ground that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked a legal right or interest in the issue 
before it.159 More specifi cally, the Court, examining whether the mandate created 
obligations owed to other individual member states of the League of Nations, held 
that ‘the mandatories were to be the agents of the League and not of each and 
every member of it individually.’160 In consequence, the League members were 
not considered as being directly concerned with the mandates to which they were 
not parties. The Court even stated that the fact that it was recognized that the 
mandatory was a ‘sacred trust of civilization’ did not endow it with a legal effect. 
As pointed out by the Court, the principles on which the system of mandated ter-
ritories were founded refl ected moral rather than legal principles and, therefore, 
did not establish legal rights or legal obligations that could be enforced.161 
However, the Court did not reject the notion of implementation of general inter-
ests by states that have not individually suffered an injury, pointing out that such 
rights and interests, ‘in order to exist, must be clearly vested in those who claim 
them, by some text or instrument, or rule of law’.162 Still, the Court’s reference to 
the notion of actio popularis was, according to Tams, ‘unnecessary’ as it was not 
asked to do so by the parties. Instead, the Court’s ruling relied on a restrictive 
interpretation of the rules on standing in the light of Article 7(2) of the South West 
Africa Mandate Agreement, according to which it did not confer a broad entitle-
ment of initiating proceedings before the ICJ in response to a violation of the 
agreement’s provisions.163 These conclusions of the Court cannot be reconciled 
with the previous ruling of the PCIJ in the Wimbledon case as discussed earlier or 
with the fi ndings of the Committee of the League of Nations in the Åaland Islands 
incident. On the contrary, they uphold a narrow understanding of the rules on 
standing restricting the right to initiate judicial proceedings to those states that 
have directly suffered a wrongdoing unless otherwise provided.
However, in 1971, one year after its ruling in the Barcelona Traction case and a 
few years after its ruling in the South West Africa case, the Court was asked to 
give its Opinion regarding the legal consequences of the continuing presence of 
South Africa in South West Africa despite a Security Council resolution in 1970 
158 South West Africa Cases, ibid, 329.
159 South West Africa cases, Second Phase, op.cit., 51, (99). 
160 Ibid, 25 and 29, (24) and (33).
161 Ibid, 34, (49–51).
162 Ibid, 32, (44). Tams, op. cit., 67. 
163 South West Africa Mandate, 17 December 1920, LNOJ 1921, 89.
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terminating the mandate. The ICJ held that (a) member states were bound not to 
recognize the lawfulness of South Africa’s administration of South West Africa and 
(b) non-member states should assist the UN in its action relating to South West 
Africa, fi nding the termination of the mandate as being an obligation erga omnes. 
The Court did not elaborate the grounds on which a Security Council resolution 
was binding on non-UN member states, thus having an erga omnes effect. Different 
interpretations have been attempted, including the view that the obligations of all 
states in this particular case derived from an obligation erga omnes not to recognize 
a jus cogens breach, although the ICJ made no reference to this latter concept.164 
In contrast to the restrictive approach followed by the ICJ in the South West 
Africa case in 1966, regional courts have on many occasions considered cases 
brought by states other than those injured. The case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, for instance, reveals that for the initiation of proceedings before it, 
it is not a prerequisite that a state is directly injured by a violation of a right 
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. An example of 
this kind constitutes the interstate application brought against the dictatorship 
in Greece by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden in 1967. These 
states justifi ed their action on the public order established under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, empowering them with a legal interest in seeing 
the performance of the obligations arising thereunder.165 
While the ICJ in the South West Africa case adopted a cautious approach restrict-
ing the right of third states to instigate proceedings before it, it has been shown 
that a rather broader approach was accepted a long time before the 1966 ruling 
for the protection of general interests that had been set up under specifi c treaty 
agreements. The signifi cance of these examples is not to be underestimated as 
they enhance an argument in favour of the judicial enforcement of general inter-
ests even by states that have not been directly affected by their breach.
3.2.2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF INDISPENSABLE THIRD RIGHTS
Having considered how international bodies approached the question of standing 
for the protection of general interests established under specifi c treaties, this sec-
tion aims to look at how international judicial bodies dealt with disputes that, 
although affecting general interests, also had an impact on the rights of third 
states. While the concept of community interests and obligations erga omnes gained 
ground in international fora, the extensive jurisprudence predominantly of the 
ICJ reveals a reluctance to consider cases, even when raising erga omnes consider-
ations, whenever the rights of states not parties to the proceedings are affected. 
This is known as the doctrine of ‘indispensable third rights’. This enhances the 
164 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 4, 58 
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earlier submission that any relevant substantive or procedural requirements in 
place cannot be overlooked even if the fundamental interests of the international 
community are at stake.
In the dispute between Albania and the United Kingdom concerning the explo-
sion of mines within Albanian territorial waters resulting in loss of life and damage 
to British warships, the ICJ was called to consider Albania’s responsibility over the 
explosions. It was accepted by all parties to the dispute that the principles endorsed 
in the Hague Convention No. VIII of 18 October 1907 relating to the laying of 
mines, applicable in time of war, refl ected principles that constituted a ‘minimum 
international standard binding at all times on civilized States’.166 As a corollary to 
it, there was a duty on any state laying mines to give notifi cation to international 
shipping. Therefore, the disagreement between the two parties was not one of law 
but, rather, one of fact: Albania claimed that it was not aware of the mines. The 
Court concluded that Albania must have been aware of the mines while stressing 
that the duty of notifi cation established general and well-recognized principles. 
More specifi cally, it constituted a duty establishing:
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in 
war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States.167
When Albania refused to comply with the ruling of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel 
case and to compensate the UK for damages it incurred as a result of the explo-
sions, a tripartite commission was established after the end of World War II. The 
committee, consisting of France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
decided to grant seized Albanian gold to the United Kingdom. Italy initiated pro-
ceedings before the ICJ against France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States claiming compensation for the expropriation of the Albanian National 
Bank, which according to it had been built mainly with the use of Italian capital. 
The Court, however, declined to examine the case as it would inevitably not only 
affect Albania’s legal interests but it would constitute the main subject matter of 
the proceedings with legally binding implications on Albania which was not par-
ticipating in the proceedings.168 The United Kingdom, in the proceedings before 
the Court, justifi ed France’s and the United States’ standing on the basis that all 
states are empowered to resort to measures that will ensure compliance with 
and enforcement of the judgments of the ICJ in the light of a general interest they 
166 Corfu Channel case, Merits, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949) 4, 22.
167 Ibid, 22.
168 Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, 15 June 1954, ICJ Reports (1954) 19, 32. Also 
see C. Schulte, ‘The Enforcement of Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of 
Justice, Procedural Law and the East Timor Judgment in Might and Right in International 
Relations’ XXIII Thesaurus Acroasium (1999) 531, 538. 
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possess in this regard. According to the UK’s view at the time, all states are enti-
tled to ‘reasonable and legitimate steps’ in order to ensure compliance with the 
ICJ’s decisions.169 Although not expressly stated, this statement could imply a 
right of third states to resort even to countermeasures in response to a violation of 
community interests, namely the disregard of international decisions.
It is worth mentioning that, had the gold been Albania’s, the action of France 
and the United States, as third states, to seize it could arguably be justifi ed as a 
countermeasure in response to Albania’s failure to comply with the earlier ruling 
of the ICJ, providing yet more evidence in support of a right to third-state coun-
termeasures. Charney suggests in this regard that there is a universal right to assist 
in ensuring compliance with the judgments of the ICJ,170  although the ILC seems 
to take the view that international judgments can only be enforced by the states 
that are parties to the dispute.171
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ upheld the indispensable third-right rule stressing 
that it would only dismiss a case that involved the rights and legal interests of a 
third state if these formed the subject matter of the case.172 Similarly, in the Nauru 
case, concerning compensation claimed by Nauru against Australia for damages 
caused during mining activities when Australia was an administering power, the 
Court dismissed Australia’s argument that the ruling of the Court would unavoid-
ably have an impact on New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which were not 
parties to the proceedings. Although both these two states had joint authority with 
Australia to administer Nauru under the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory 
of Nauru, the Court held that Australia’s responsibility was independent from any 
responsibility of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, differentiating this case 
in this way from the Monetary Gold case.173 
It can be concluded that international judicial bodies cannot disregard the 
consent-based nature of international judicial proceedings by adjudicating on 
issues that may affect the rights of states not parties to the proceedings, even if 
these involve the violation of community interests.
Attention will now be turned to various attempts to initiate judicial proceedings 
before the ICJ in response to violations of obligations owed to the international 
community of states as a whole in the aftermath of the Barcelona Traction case.
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3.2.2.3 ERGA OMNES CLAIMS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL BODIES
Despite the signifi cance of the ICJ’s ruling in the Barcelona Traction case, there has 
been uncertainty in relation to whether this recognized a general right to instigate 
judicial proceedings in the name of community interests or not. More specifi cally, 
the question that arose as a result of the Court’s obiter dictum was whether the viola-
tion of such obligations gave rise to a legal interest to the international community 
or whether each and every state was empowered with legal standing to judicially 
demand observance with that obligation. The latter view is supported by the fact 
that the Court makes clear that ‘all States … have a legal interest’ in the protection 
of obligations erga omnes.174 The concept would also become meaningless if the 
international community as a whole, together with the ambiguity that this term 
entails, was the only possible enforcer of these obligations.175
However, the ICJ has not so far had the opportunity to take a clear stance on 
this matter. In the East Timor case, the ICJ has dismissed the case on the ground 
that a third state’s rights would be adversely affected. In this case, Portugal initi-
ated proceedings before the ICJ against Australia arguing that the treaty concluded 
by the latter with Indonesia concerning the exploitation of the natural resources 
of East Timor, violated both the right of East Timorese to self-determination and 
the subjective right of Portugal, as the administrating power of East Timor. 
Furthermore, Portugal complained that Australia’s actions constituted an infringe-
ment of Security Council Resolutions 384 and 389 with which all states were 
called on to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and the right of East 
Timorese to self-determination and which called on Indonesia to withdraw its 
troops from the territory of East Timor.176 As a consequence, Australia incurred 
international responsibility both towards the East Timorese people but also 
towards Portugal. The ICJ, while recognizing the right of East Timorese to self-
determination as having an erga omnes character, refused to examine the merits of 
the case ruling that this would unavoidably require it to adjudicate on the lawful-
ness of the actions of Indonesia, a state that was not a party to the proceedings. 
More specifi cally, the Court drew a distinction between the erga omnes character of 
a norm and the issue of consent to the jurisdiction of the Court.177 While the 
Court did not preclude the entitlement of a third state to complain about the vio-
lation of an erga omnes obligation, it emphasized that its ruling would have an 
impact on a third state that had not consented to its jurisdiction. 
The judgment has been criticized as preventing the enforcement of obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole and as insisting on a bilateral 
approach to the proceedings. It has been argued, in particular, that since erga omnes 
obligations by their very nature involve many states, bear legal consequences extend-
ing beyond a strict bilateral relationship and are owed to the international community 
174 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, op.cit., 32, (33).
175 Tams, op. cit., 175.
176 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports (1995) 90, 96 (14–15). 
177 Ibid, 102 (29). 
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as a whole, each state ut singuli possesses a legal interest in their observance. Even 
more so, in the case of violations of jus cogens norms there exists a duty to do so.178 
Simma, by the same token, is of the view that the ruling of the ICJ in the East Timor 
case, while not adding anything to the concept of obligations erga omnes, does not pose 
a threat to it either. The Court, having accepted that the right to self-determination 
is an obligation erga omnes, retained the doctrine of the ‘indispensable third party’ 
established in the Monetary Gold case concluding that it could not adjudicate a matter 
in the absence of a state that would be directly affected by such ruling.179
One may observe from this analysis that only if a fi nding relating to the legal 
interests of a third state is necessary for the determination of the responsibility of 
another state will such a third state be regarded as an indispensable state and will 
thus preclude the examination of the case by the international court. Accordingly, 
where the legality of the action of a third state is inseparable from the legality of 
the action of another state, the Court will decline to examine the claim before it.180 
One crucial point that arises however is whether the ICJ would have accepted 
Portugal’s legal standing to bring an erga omnes claim in the East Timor case had 
Indonesia recognized the Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, it would be interesting 
to see how the ICJ would approach a claim made by Portugal that the treaty 
between Australia and Indonesia infringed a jus cogens norm and whether the 
Court would accept Portugal’s standing to invoke the invalidity of the treaty and the 
responsibility of the states concerned. This is particularly so in view of the fact that 
the 1969 VCLT provides that the invalidity of a treaty can only be invoked by states 
that are parties to it. If one accepts, as the earlier analysis has shown, that the viola-
tion of peremptory norms gives rise to obligations that are owed to the international 
community and that as a consequence every state has a legal interest in their protec-
tion, it would be devoid of meaning to prevent such states from asserting its 
invalidity. While third states would, in principle, have legal standing to raise viola-
tions of obligations erga omnes, they would not be able to do so in relation to violations 
of the most serious nature, that is treaties that infringe norms so fundamental from 
which no derogation is permitted. Scobbie notes in this regard that a state could 
seek a declaration that another state infringed a peremptory norm of international 
law provided of course that ‘the jurisdictional link in issue is wide enough’.181 
Moreover, third states, while not entitled to invoke the nullity of the treaty, may 
have other means of pressure outside the scope of the 1969 VCLT against the 
implementation of the treaty. The entitlement to use such other means will derive 
from the erga omnes character of the obligation incorporated in the infringed jus cogens 
norm. To this end, the concept of erga omnes obligations becomes a shield for the 
protection of fundamental principles embedded in jus cogens norms.182
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Erga omnes issues were also raised in the proceedings initiated by Australia and 
New Zealand against France’s atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in the South 
Pacifi c between 1966 and 1972.183 In this regard, the Court reached the conclu-
sion that certain statements of the French government amounted to a unilateral 
undertaking of ceasing further nuclear tests that was made erga omnes. However, 
the meaning of the notion used in this case differs from its meaning given in the 
Barcelona Traction case. While the reference to erga omnes in the latter case was closely 
associated with the question of enforcement and standing in the terms of a legal 
interest, in the former case, the reference was restricted only to the circle of states 
towards which such statement was made.184 Despite the fact that the Court did 
not have the chance to consider the question of the erga omnes effect of the conduct 
complained of, some of the Judges in the case gave their views on the matter. 
Judge de Castro, for instance, was of the opinion that states could not rely on a 
general erga omnes obligation in order to initiate proceedings before the Court and, 
instead, had to establish that they had suffered an injury to their own rights.185 
Other judges, however, seemed to accept that the possibility of a general right to 
standing could be argued in view of the ICJ’s ruling on erga omnes obligations.186 
In other decisions, the Court chose a more careful approach with respect to erga 
omnes considerations. In the Teheran Hostages case, although the Court highlighted 
the imperative character of the norms envisaged in the Vienna Convention on the 
diplomatic and consular relations for the international community as a whole, it 
restricted the matter as being a dispute between the United States as the injured 
state and Iran as the wrongdoing state.187 Also, in the Nicaragua case, the Court 
refused to accept that the prohibition of non-intervention had an erga omnes 
character, thus concluding that the United States, as a third party, had no right to 
use force in response to armed intervention in another state. In particular, the 
Court concluded that ‘[the acts of which Nicaragua is accused] could not justify 
countermeasures taken by a third State, the United States, and particularly could 
not justify intervention involving the use of force’.188 
3.2.2.4 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that considerations concerning obligations 
erga omnes, either arising from specifi c treaty arrangements or from general interna-
tional law have not been unknown in the jurisprudence of international courts 
and other bodies. While the 1966 ruling of the ICJ in the South West Africa case may 
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185 Dissenting opinion of Judge De Castro Case Concerning Nuclear Tests, op.cit., 387.
186 Joint Dissenting Opinions of Judges Onyema, Dillard, de Arechaga, Waldock, Case Concerning 
Nuclear Tests, ibid, 369–70 (118) and Case Concering Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France), 20 December 
1974, ICJ Rep. (1974) 457, 521 (52).
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constitute a retrogression in relation to the standing of third states to raise concerns 
affecting community interests, there is suffi cient evidence that shows that such a right 
was recognized long before the ICJ’s dictum in the Barcelona Traction case. Accordingly, 
this shows that the South West Africa case is not the only ruling that can be relied on. 
At the same time, however, it has been established that the concept of erga omnes 
obligations does not confer an automatic right or legal standing on states to initiate 
judicial proceedings in the event of a violation of an obligation of this nature. 
Accordingly, the rules concerning the jurisdiction of international courts cannot be 
disregarded, even in cases that concern the violation of an erga omnes obligation.
Finally, the ICJ’s own reference to the legal interest of all states in relation 
to obligations erga omnes signals a signifi cant legal turning point that supports a 
general right of standing for initiating proceedings before the ICJ for the protec-
tion of community interests.189 
3.2.3 Scope and content of obligations erga omnes
The ICJ’s dictum had without doubt a tremendous impact on the further develop-
ment of community interests. However, other than an express reference to 
aggression, slavery, racial discrimination and genocide as illustrating some exam-
ples giving rise to obligations owed to the international community as a whole, the 
ICJ did not give a defi nition of what these obligations are or how they can be 
identifi ed. This gave rise to claims over the years that all human rights obligations 
have an erga omnes effect.190 What the Court did make however was a reference to 
the importance of the rights concerned, which bestowed a legal interest on all 
members of the international community for their protection.191 
In an effort to establish the criteria that qualify a given obligation as of an 
erga omnes character, Tams puts forward a material and a structural approach. 
According to the material approach, erga omnes obligations are characterized by 
the importance of the rights they protect, although the vagueness of this term may 
lead to confusion. This adheres to the quality of the protected right. The structural 
approach, by way of contrast, places the emphasis on the fact that erga omnes 
obligations possess a ‘non-bilateralizable’ and ‘non-reciprocal’ nature as a result of 
which the obligation must be observed towards all members of the international 
community.192 The problem with the structural approach, however, is that it 
accepts that every non-bilateralizable obligation would be considered as having 
an erga omnes character, thus extending its scope to all interdependent and absolute 
obligations. At the same time, it precludes obligations that have both an erga omnes 
and a reciprocal character, such as prohibition of aggression.193 
189 Tams, op. cit., 163.
190 Y. Dinstein, ‘The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights’, 30 AVR (1992) 16.
191 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, op.cit., 32, (33).
192 Tams, op. cit., 129–30.
193 See ibid, 130.
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The importance of the protected rights is, therefore, a distinctive feature of obli-
gations erga omnes. Yet a question arises as to whether all important rights acquire 
such character or whether a further distinction is required. More specifi cally, the 
ICJ itself makes a distinction between basic human rights that possess an erga omnes 
character and other human rights, indicating that it did not consider that all 
human rights had an erga omnes effect.194 In the East Timor case, the Court identifi ed 
some factors that may illustrate the erga omnes character of that obligation such as 
the recognition of the obligation in the UN Charter, in general international law 
or in universal treaties.195 
One further signifi cant aspect of obligations owed to the international commu-
nity as a whole and, consequently, to all states is the fact that derogation from such 
norms is made very diffi cult. 
Consent therefore plays a signifi cant role in the understanding of the concept of 
erga omnes rules and of the legal effects that arise for the carriers of an obligation that 
qualifi es as such. Accordingly, if one accepts that erga omnes rules establish obligations 
empowering all states with a legal interest in their performance, it is necessary to 
consider what will happen in the event that two or more states decide, with a specifi c 
agreement, to derogate from such rules. There is no doubt that, since the obligation 
is owed to all states, such an agreement would unavoidably affect the interests of all 
the other members of the international community that were not included in the 
pact. In these circumstances, the violation of an erga omnes obligation with the con-
sent of some but not all states is not permitted. Consequently, only with the consent 
of all states to which the obligation is owed will any state be entitled to derogate from 
such obligations, otherwise their violation will constitute an internationally wrongful 
act empowering the other states to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer. 
Nevertheless, if one accepts that there can be no derogation from an erga omnes obli-
gation without the consent of all the states concerned, then the legal effect of erga 
omnes obligations is identical to the legal effect of jus cogens norms, raising the question 
of how these two notions differ in reality. As Professor Crawford observes:
From the Court’s reference to the international community as a whole [ICJ 
in the Barcelona Traction case], and from the character of the examples it gave, 
one can infer that the core cases erga omnes are those non-derogable obliga-
tions of a general character which arise either directly under general interna-
tional law or under generally accepted multilateral treaties (e.g in the fi eld of 
human rights). They are thus virtually coextensive with peremptory obliga-
tions (arising under norms of jus cogens). For if a particular obligation can be 
set aside or displaced as between two States, it is hard to see how that obliga-
tion is owed to the international community as a whole.196
194 Ragazzi, op. cit., 140–41; ibid, 138.
195 East Timor case, op. cit., 102, (29); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, East Timor case, 
op. cit., 194. Also see ibid, 153.
196 Third Report on State Responsibility (Crawford), A/CN.4/507 (2000) 46, (106)(a).
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When Russia invaded Afghanistan, for instance, claiming that it had the consent 
of the Afghan government, the General Assembly, in a resolution adopted in 
1980, declared that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of states constituted a fundamental principle entailed in the UN Charter, 
which permitted no violation ‘on any pretext’.197 This is because an obligation 
falling under this category is owed towards all states as members of the interna-
tional community as a whole and therefore its violation is the concern of all unless 
all states had consented to it. As Professor Gaja remarks: 
The fact that an act is considered to be wrongful also in the relations between 
the injuring State and the State specifi cally injured has little practical mean-
ing so long as the latter State does not put forward any claim. In order to give 
the provision in the draft articles a greater signifi cance one would also have to 
assume that no waiver to such a claim is admissible.198
Gaja further differentiates the legal consequences to derive from the violation of 
jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes. In this regard, the violation of the former 
leads to the invalidity and illegality of a treaty, while the violation of an erga omnes 
obligation through the implementation of a specifi c treaty does not lead to its 
invalidity and, therefore, it does not have the same legal effect. 199 
Similarly the ILC, examining the differences between these two notions, stressed 
that: 
There is at least a difference in emphasis. While peremptory norms of general 
international law focus on the scope and priority to be given to a certain num-
ber of fundamental obligations, the focus of obligations to the international 
community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest of all States in com-
pliance – i.e. in terms of the present articles, in being entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of any State in breach.200 
Although jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations overlap, the former entail ‘ele-
ments of international public policy’ and, for this reason, they cannot be derogated 
from.201 It is stressed, however, that it should not be concluded that whenever a 
rule permits of no exceptions it is thereby of a jus cogens character.202
Furthermore, a state cannot evade responsibility and cannot justify the violations 
of an erga omnes obligation on the ground that it responded to a previous wrongful 
197 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Record of World Events Vol. 26 (1980) 30229, 30236.
198 Gaja (1981), op. cit., 295–6.
199 Ibid, 281. 
200 ILC Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001 
(A/56/10 and Corr.1 and 2) 281, (7) in Scobbie, op. cit., 1212.
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act by another state.203 The issue was raised for the fi rst time in the case brought by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia for breaches of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Yugoslavia submitted a 
counterclaim concerning violations of the Convention allegedly committed by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.204
At the same time, as in the case of jus cogens norms, a reasonable question that 
derives from the notion of obligations erga omnes concerns the legal effect of an objec-
tion in relation to the creation of an erga omnes obligation formulated by one or more 
states. One could argue that, once an obligation has gained an erga omnes character, 
no state will be able to derogate from it other than under the conditions described 
earlier. Therefore, in this instance, the moment of creation of the obligation is crucial 
for the determination of this question. In other words, if one or more states object to 
the creation of an obligation as having an erga omnes character at the moment of its 
inception, it would be diffi cult to see how a norm would acquire such status in the 
fi rst place. By way of contrast, however, this would have serious ramifi cations, as no 
rule would ever develop to have such a character since it is almost impossible to 
achieve or expect the unanimous agreement of all states of the international com-
munity. Quite to the contrary, one would be able to argue that the development of 
erga omnes obligations results from the fact that the international community has 
moved away from a solely consent-based understanding of international law that 
allows the development of certain rules irrespective of the consent of all states. Again, 
this issue is closely related to the proposition that states are presumed to have accepted 
international law as a general legal system that is structured on state consensus.205 
4 Conclusion
The preceding analysis intended focusing on the emergence of peremptory norms, 
obligations erga omnes and community interests in international law. The adoption of 
Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT, together with the ICJ’s pronouncement on obliga-
tions in which all states have a legal interest in the Barcelona Traction case, signifi cantly 
changed the legal scene concerning the very nature of international law. The devel-
opment of these concepts was unavoidably met with scepticism as they were regarded 
by some states and commentators as a tool restrictive of the sovereign powers of 
states and as being irreconcilable with the ‘traditional’ function of international law 
that is founded on the coexistence of equal sovereign states without the consent of 
which no norm can evolve. The recognition of these notions raises signifi cant ques-
tions with respect to the nature of international law, as they seem to go beyond 
merely establishing bilateral relations between states. Accordingly, if international 
law is construed as a minimal legal system consisting of powerful sovereign states 
203 O. Pegna Lopes, ‘Counter-claims and Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of 
Justice’ 9 EJIL (1998) No. 4, 724.
204 For a review on the case, ibid, 733–5. 
205 See, in this regard, analysis in section 2.2. 
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that are restrained only to the extent they have accepted, then these norms have no 
place in such a system. If, by the same token, international law is, in addition, con-
strued to be structured on the basis of collective interests not only owed to, but also 
binding on, all states and from which no derogation is permitted, then international 
law seems to resemble a constitutional or quasi-constitutional legal order. 
The discussion showed how contemporary legal thinking has progressed from a 
restrictive perception of interstate relations that are characterized mainly by their 
bilateral and reciprocal nature, to community interests the protection of which 
constitutes the concern of all states. It has been shown that these developments 
played a crucial role in the area of enforcement, although the discussion in this 
chapter was restricted to the enforcement of community interests and obligations 
erga omnes by way of initiating proceedings before international judicial bodies. 
It has further been established that the obiter dictum of the ICJ had compelling effects 
on the question of standing of states not affected in their individual rights to bring a 
claim for the protection of community interests as arising from customary interna-
tional law. It has also been shown that the question of general standing has been 
accepted in many cases that preceded the dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction 
case, supporting the right of third states to make a claim for the violation of general 
interests established under specifi c treaties and under general international law. 
Moreover, it has been argued that international courts are not free to disregard 
the rules concerning their jurisdiction or consent, thus preventing them from con-
sidering disputes brought before them that may have an adverse effect on the legal 
interests of states not parties to the proceedings. 
While neither Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT nor the obiter dictum of the ICJ pro-
vides a defi nition of what peremptory norms or obligations owed erga omnes are, 
both place an emphasis on the importance of the rights they protect. While fears 
have been expressed about an arbitrary expansion of which obligations qualify as 
such, it has been shown that it is the quality of the protected rights that play a 
signifi cant role in their identifi cation.
The examination of these concepts has been deemed necessary for the compre-
hension of the emergence of another concept, that of countermeasures taken by 
states other than the injured and which lies at the heart of this book. The recogni-
tion of certain norms, which due to the nature of the rights they protect are 
fundamental for the protection of community interests, has unavoidably raised 
questions regarding their implementation in the international legal order in the 
event of their violation. Therefore, a look into the content and scope of jus cogens 
norms and obligations erga omnes, as these are elaborated in the literature, state 
practice but more specifi cally the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and the ICJ, may 
reveal the justifi ability behind the development of the notion of enforcement of 
these collective interests by way of third-state countermeasures. The next chapter 
will therefore consider in depth the infl uence that these developments exercised in 
the work of the ILC in the codifi cation of the law on state responsibility.
1 Introduction
The recognition of the concept of ‘higher’ norms of international law from which 
no derogation is permitted, but also of the concept of legal interests that belong to 
all states, has infl uenced to a great extent the work of the ILC on the codifi cation 
of the law on state responsibility. The analysis in Chapter 1 into these doctrines 
that have now become an integral part of contemporary international legal think-
ing was therefore essential in setting the background for the analysis that will 
follow in this book. Naturally, these developments had a compelling effect on the 
legal consequences arising from the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act, with particular emphasis placed on the signifi cance of the rights protected 
under the infringed norm, the gravity of the violation and also the subjects entitled 
to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state. More signifi cantly, these 
developments prepared the ground for the emergence of the concept of counter-
measures taken by states other than the injured or solidarity measures, as they are 
often referred to, the lawfulness of which is focal to this book. 
This chapter will pay particular attention to the circumstances under which the 
ILC engaged with the notion of countermeasures in the name of community inter-
ests. This presupposes consideration of another signifi cant concept that also made 
its appearance in international legal doctrine, including the work on state respon-
sibility, namely, the concept of international state crimes. It will also be shown that 
in spite of the infl uence of the concept of higher community interests in the law on 
state responsibility, the ILC in its Final Articles decided to leave the question of a 
right to third-state countermeasures to the progressive development of interna-
tional law. The reluctance of the ILC to incorporate a provision to this effect, 
concluding at the same time that there existed no suffi cient evidence in state 
practice in support of such a right refl ects the controversial character of the issue 
before it. A detailed analysis into the ILC’s fi ndings on state practice, which have 
been questioned, is undertaken in the next chapter, so here the analysis will focus 
on how community interests are perceived to have infl uenced the law on state 
responsibility. 
This analysis is necessary due to the increasing reliance of national and interna-
tional jurisprudence, state practice and the literature on the Final Articles. 
2 Community interests in the 
law on state responsibility
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As pointed out, the Final Articles have become an ‘authoritative statement of the 
rules on State responsibility’.206 They not only codify already established interna-
tional norms regarding state responsibility incorporated in customs or treaties, 
but also incorporate concepts that have evolved through the progressive devel-
opment of international law leading the way as to how the law in this particular 
area could and perhaps should develop in the future. Nevertheless, uncertainty 
remains in relation to the fate of the Final Articles and in particular as to whether 
these will be incorporated in an international convention or will be endorsed in a 
General Assembly resolution.207 Despite the fact that the General Assembly, 
immediately after the completion of the work of the ILC incorporated the Final 
Articles in Resolution 56/83,208 it did so without prejudice to their ultimate status. 
Similarly, General Assembly Resolution 59/35, stressing the signifi cance of the 
Final Articles, called on all states to discuss proposals about the legal future of the 
Final Articles.209 The matter remains unsettled with the General Assembly post-
poning the discussion until its 66th session.210 However, it is necessary that the 
General Assembly reviews its position on the matter. The incorporation of the 
Final Articles in an international treaty would enhance their legal status, creating 
clear binding obligations on states, thus enhancing the effectiveness and certainty 
of international law and the law on state responsibility. This becomes evident 
from the wide acceptance and extensive application of another general interna-
tional treaty, namely the 1969 VCLT, which codifi ed to a large part existing 
customary rules on the law of treaties. The signifi cance of the 1969 VCLT can 
hardly be disputed today and, therefore, the incorporation of the Final Articles in 
206 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Comments and Information 
received from Governments, Report of the Secretary-General, 9 March 2007, 62nd session, 
A/62/63. Also see Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Compilation of 
Decisions of International Courts, Tribunals and Other Bodies, Report of the Secretary-General, 
1 February 2007, 62nd session, A/62/62.
207 Various arguments have been produced supporting the one or the other solution. It has been 
argued for instance that while a treaty would be a more legally attractive solution as it would so-
lidify the norms refl ected in the articles, the possibility of many states not signing and ratifying it 
would put in jeopardy the customary character of some of the norms codifi ed by the ILC. By the 
same token, a General Assembly resolution would lack any legally binding effect. However, 
supporters of this approach argue that the incorporation of the Articles on State Responsibility in 
such a resolution would create hopes for the future development of at least some of the provisions 
as customary rules of international law. For a discussion on the matter see views of Economides, 
Hafner and Simma in Summary Records of the First Part of the Fifty-Third session, ILCYbk 
(2001) Vol. I, (21)–(23).
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an international convention will similarly have a huge impact on the clarity and 
coherence of the rules on state responsibility.
Before turning next to the question of how community interests were dealt with 
in the deliberations of the ILC and to the proposals concerning the manner with 
which such interests would be enforced, it is fi rst important to say a few words 
about the Commission’s own mandate and the concept of state responsibility.
2  The ILC’s mandate to codify the law on state 
responsibility
The absence of centralized enforcement mechanisms in international law – as 
understood in domestic law – has often been the subject of criticism, albeit not 
necessarily unjustifi ably. These weaknesses notwithstanding, the development of 
the rules on state responsibility, namely the legal consequences imposed on states 
as a result of their failure to conform to their obligations under international law, 
has strengthened the integrity of the international legal system. It has further put 
legal strains on the impunity of states that act in disregard of their international 
commitments, while at the same time it has ensured that the defaulting state is 
protected from excessive, abusive or unrestricted reaction by the injured or any 
other state. Accordingly, the lack of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms in 
international law makes it even more necessary to defi ne the legal regime appli-
cable in cases of violation of the rules of international law, including certain 
limitations that would restrain states from arbitrarily exercising their powers 
against smaller and weaker states. Moreover, the codifi cation of the law on state 
responsibility is central to the compliance of states with their international obliga-
tions and the reinforcement of the binding character of the international legal 
order.
The international responsibility of states was a concept deeply rooted in the 
theory of international law and upheld in international state practice and interna-
tional jurisprudence. More specifi cally, it is accepted that the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act creates new international legal relationships that 
differ from the ones existing before the commission of such act and which entail 
the accountability of the wrongdoer. Already in 1938, the PCIJ affi rmed in the 
Phosphates in Morocco case that, whenever a state is guilty of an internationally 
wrongful act against another state, then international responsibility is established 
‘immediately as between the two states’.211 In what ways responsibility today 
affects states other than those that are bound by bilateral and reciprocal relations 
is central to this book. Yet, the diversity of opinions and the uncertainty of the 
law on state responsibility, on the one hand, and the failure of previous attempts 
to see the regime of state responsibility as a distinct fi eld of international law, 
211 Phosphates in Morocco case, Preliminary Objections, 14 June 1938, PCIJ (1938) Series A/B, No. 74, 
28 in World Court Reports (1936–42) Vol. IV (ed. Hudson) 325. Also see in Second Report on 
State Responsibility (Ago), YbILC (1970) Vol. II, 177, 179, (12). 
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on the other, delayed further development on the study concerning state 
responsibility.212
The topic regained signifi cance after the end of World War II, when, in 1953 
realizing the signifi cance of such a codifi cation in contemporary international law, 
the General Assembly established the ILC that was empowered to codify interna-
tional law, including the rules governing the law on state responsibility. In the 
years that followed, the fi rst Special Rapporteur, Mr Amador, took the view that 
state responsibility was not restricted to the duty of wrongdoing states to offer 
reparations, but also extended to international criminal responsibility. However, 
he confi ned responsibility to violations concerning the treatment of aliens. His 
views were met with criticism since many states opposed the idea of ‘criminal’ 
state responsibility and the attempts to limit state responsibility merely to injuries 
caused to the property and person of aliens thus circumventing other substantial 
areas of state responsibility.213
The second Special Rapporteur, Mr Ago, emphasized that the codifi cation 
of state responsibility should concern responsibility resulting from the violation 
of international obligations, irrespective of their nature, origin or object.214 
Responsibility for the commission of an internationally wrongful act also arose 
irrespective of the source of the infringed obligation, whether customary or con-
ventional.215 In this regard, Mr Ago made a distinction between ‘primary’ rules of 
international law, that is to say, rules that impose certain obligations on states in 
the international plane, and ‘secondary’ rules, in other words, complementary 
rules that determine the legal consequences that arise when a ‘primary’ rule 
has been infringed.216 Only the latter set of rules falls within the sphere of state 
responsibility.217 
At an early stage, both Mr Ago and the ILC focused their attention on, among 
other things, the forms and degrees of state responsibility in the light of the sig-
nifi cance of the rules giving rise to the international obligations of states and in 
view of the seriousness of the violation of such rules. Equally important was the 
question of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of another state. The 
ILC was tasked to determine whether a breach established a legal relationship 
merely between the injured and the defaulting state or as to whether, in cases of 
212 First Report on State Responsibility (Ago), YbILC (1969) Vol. II, 125, 126, (2). 
213 Ibid, 127 (6).
214 Ibid. 
215 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, YbILC (1976) Vol. II, Part Two, 69, 180, 
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serious breaches of international law, it could give rise to legal relationships 
between the defaulting state and a group of states or the international community 
as a whole. Mr Ago, for instance, correlated legal obligations with corresponding 
subjective rights. He noted in this regard that: ‘[A]s distinct from what is said to be 
the situation in municipal law, there are certainly no obligations incumbent on a 
subject which are not matched by an international subjective right of another 
subject or subjects, or even … of the totality of the other subjects of the law of 
nations.’218 According to this interpretation, the violation of norms establishing 
community interests widens the circle of states affected in their subjective rights 
and entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state. 
Furthermore, it was realized that the determination of the various degrees of 
responsibility would unavoidably also have an impact on whether a state had a 
right to seek reparation and/or to impose sanctions against the defaulting 
state.219 
With these preliminary observations, the examination is next focused on the 
role that the content of the international obligation breached has played in the law 
on state responsibility, and also in the determination of the legal consequences 
applicable as a result. 
3  Content of the obligation breached and subjects 
entitled to invoke state responsibility
Infl uenced by the developments regarding jus cogens norms and obligations erga 
omnes, the ILC was called on to consider whether the type of responsibility and of 
legal consequences to emerge after the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act depended on the importance of the infringed obligation in the light of its con-
tent and the seriousness of the breach.220 While a wrongdoing state would still 
incur responsibility irrespective of the content of the infringed obligation, it had to 
be determined whether there existed a single regime of responsibility or whether 
different legal consequences applied in the light of the content of the infringed 
obligation.221 
Indeed, there was early recognition that both the signifi cance of the obligation 
and the seriousness of the breach were relevant factors that must be taken into 
account in determining the legal consequences to apply in the event of a wrongful 
act.222 It would otherwise be meaningless to distinguish wrongful acts on the basis 
of their content, if the same legal consequences were to be applied for every inter-
nationally wrongful act.223
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The distinction between responsibility for the violation of obligations of great 
signifi cance to the international community as a whole, such as the prohibition of 
aggression, genocide and apartheid, and responsibility for breaches concerning 
obligations of less general importance, paved the way for the appearance of the 
notion of state crimes, which will be discussed later.224
Nevertheless, the content of the infringed obligation is not only necessary for 
the distinction between wrongful acts and legal consequences, but also for the 
determination of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdo-
ing state.225 While in most cases of violations of international law it is not diffi cult 
to identify the state entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state, 
problems arise when so-called ‘extra-state’ interests are being infringed.226 This 
led to the question of whether such right was merely recognized in relation to the 
states directly affected and injured by the infringement or whether there were 
cases in which this right should also be recognized in relation to other states as 
well.227 
Support for the latter in the law on state responsibility was drawn in this regard 
from the distinction made by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case in relation to 
community and other, ‘ordinary’, interests. According to Mr Ago, this distinction 
resulted in a confi rmation of the varying character of legal consequences to emerge 
from the violation of these fundamental community interests and of the broaden-
ing of the circle of states with a legal interest to react to such violations. In this 
regard: 
[The] responsibility fl owing from the breach of those obligations is entailed 
not only with regard to the state that has been the direct victim of the breach 
(e.g. a state which has suffered an act of aggression in its territory); it is also 
entailed with regard to all the other members of the international community. 
Every state, even if it is not immediately and directly affected by the breach, 
should therefore be considered justifi ed in invoking the responsibility of the 
state committing the internationally wrongful act.228 
This coincides with the view that although traditional international law has been 
hesitant in recognizing rights in relation to third states, contemporary interna-
tional law:
[S]eems to admit increasingly a ‘constructive injury’ to a state, either as a re-
sult of its participation in multilateral rule-making, or as a result of the 
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recognition of extra-state interests being protected by the primary rule of in-
ternational law.229 
The ILC, relying on state practice and the literature, distinguished its study on the 
subjects entitled to invoke state responsibility in the light of the views held on the 
matter before World War II and the views that developed after the end of the war. 
For the purposes of this book, it is essential to consider in some detail how legal 
thinking approached issues relating to both the signifi cance of certain obligations 
and the states possessing a legal interest in their protection.
3.1 Early approaches to responsibility and standing
During the 19th century and until the outbreak of World War I, there was little in 
the literature to suggest differentiation between wrongful acts and legal conse-
quences on the basis of the content of the infringed obligations. On the contrary, 
some authors had implicitly ruled out such differentiation by holding that repara-
tion constituted the only legitimate response to the commission of a wrongful act, 
whatever the content of the obligation.230 Those writers, however, who distin-
guished various forms of reparation such as restitution, redress for moral and 
material damage, satisfaction or preventative measures for the non-repetition of 
the breach, did not do so on the basis of the content of the obligation but solely on 
the ground that the injured state had the right to choose among various forms of 
reparation.231 
In this environment, Bluntschli, a Swiss expert of international law and sup-
porter of the view that the injured state could even resort to punitive measures in 
response to serious violations of international law, argued that when the interests 
of the international community were under threat, all states were entitled to safe-
guard and restore the international legal order.232 This resembles Grotius’ 
authoritative early writings according to which sovereign states have the right to 
demand punishment not only for wrongdoing directed against them, but also for 
violations of ‘the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever’.233 
However, there was a general suspicion towards the acceptance of this position by 
other authors of international law.234 As remarked, this ‘lone but highly authorita-
tive voice of Bluntschli’ whose ideas a century ago coincide with ‘the most advanced 
229 Third Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), YbILC (1982) Vol. II, Part One, 22, 36–7 (92).
230 D. Anzilotti, Teoria generale della responsabilita dello stato nel diritto internazionale (1902) in Fifth Report 
on State Responsibility (Ago), op. cit., 40–1 (122).
231 See analysis in Fifth Report, ibid, 41 (123).
232 J.C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilizierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (Beck: 1872) in 
ibid, 41 (124).
233 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (1646/1925) Book II, Chapter 20, para. 40 cited in Tams, 
op. cit., 48–9.
234 R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, Vol. I, 3rd edn (1879) 442 cited in Tams, ibid, 49.
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ideas of the authors of today’235 did not have a great impact on the development 
of legal opinion during the period under consideration. 
In the period between 1919 and 1939, some authors took the view that the 
content of the obligation had an impact on the subjects entitled to put forward an 
international claim against the wrongdoing state. Hence, Root and Peaslee main-
tained that international law should make a distinction between breaches that 
affect merely the injured states and breaches that affect interests of the interna-
tional community and the punishment of which any state is entitled to seek,236 
preparing the way for the development of the notion of state crimes. Some of the 
advocates of this theory, namely Pella, Saldana, de Vabres and others, supported 
the adoption of a code that would list all the serious breaches of international law 
and the legal consequences–sanctions attached to them, although they condi-
tioned this on the establishment of an international criminal court.237 
Although such views were not generally endorsed, it becomes evident that a 
doctrine supporting the distinction between a category of less serious international 
violations subject to the traditional regime of responsibility and a category of the 
most serious, even qualifi ed as criminal violations of international law subject to a 
much stricter regime of penal sanctions, gradually begins to emerge.238 
At the same time, the conclusions of the 1930 Codifi cation Conference provide 
a very characteristic refl ection of the prevailing opinion of states on the matter 
under consideration held in the period post-World War II. While having accepted 
that any violation of the obligations relating to the treatment of aliens entailed the 
international responsibility of the state, there was nothing in the replies of the 
representatives of the participating states to associate the legal consequences as a 
result of a wrongful act with the content of the breached obligation.239 Neither did 
the participating states regard the content of the obligation as having any signifi -
cance on the determination of the state entitled to invoke the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing state.240 Hence, any distinction concerning the categories of interna-
tionally wrongful acts, the forms of responsibility applicable and the subjects 
entitled to respond to a wrongful act were issues independent of the content of the 
obligation infringed.
235 See Bluntschli, op. cit., 259 in Fifth Report (Ago), op. cit., 41, (124).
236 Root, op. cit., 7–9; J.A. Peaslee, ‘The Sanction of International Law’, AJIL (April 1916) Vol. 10, 
No. 2, 328, 335–6. However, Peaslee was in support of the idea that these collective interests 
should be protected through institutionalised mechanisms rather than individual measures. 
237 Q. Saldana, ‘La Justice Penale Internationale’, Recueil des Cours (1925) (Hachette: 1927) Vol. 10, 
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Yet during this period, aggression was regarded as a violation of a more serious 
character, described in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance prepared by the 
League of Nations in 1923, as an ‘international crime’. Furthermore, the 1924 
Geneva Protocol for the settlement of international disputes refers to war of 
aggression as a violation of the solidarity of the members of the international com-
munity and again as an international crime. While these documents make no 
reference to the regime of responsibility to apply when the prohibition of aggres-
sion is violated, it would be contradictory if states had only wished to distinguish 
crimes from other violations of international law if they did not mean to attach to 
these more serious offences a heavier regime of responsibility as well. The 
Covenant of the League of Nations itself provided for a special regime of respon-
sibility in case of breach of the obligation not to resort to a war of aggression and 
especially for the imposition of sanctions against the aggressor by all member 
states.241
These developments paved the way for a change in legal thinking, particularly 
in the aftermath of World War II, as the following section will illustrate.
3.2  Approaches to responsibility and standing after 
World War II
The end of World War II signifi ed fundamental changes in the domain of state 
responsibility and gave new impetus for the distinction between aggression, the 
use of force and violations of international humanitarian law as serious violations 
of international law and other, ordinary, violations.242 With the signifi cant devel-
opments that followed in the context of self-determination, independence and 
decolonization new rules made their appearance, while the concept of peremp-
tory norms with which the analysis in the fi rst chapter dealt enhanced the 
understanding that the violation of certain norms is unavoidably more serious 
than others. This led the Special Rapporteur Mr Ago to speak of ‘a different 
regime of responsibility’ to apply in the event of violation of these fundamental 
norms from which no derogation is permitted.243 Likewise, the recognition of the 
existence of such essential rules for the international community could not leave 
unaffected the determination of the subjects empowered with the right to respond 
to their infringement.244 However, the type of action and the subjects empowered 
to respond to such serious violations of international law remained matters both 
highly controversial and deeply contentious. 
Lauterpacht, on his part, referred to ‘international delinquencies’ resulting 
from ordinary violations that gave rise to a right for pecuniary compensation and 
241 Ibid 30–1 (96). Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, 13 AJIL (1919) Supp. 
128, 361.
242 Fifth Report, ibid, 31, (97). 
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid, 31–2, (99) and 32, (100).
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‘international crimes’ that gave rise to a graver form of responsibility and permit-
ted coercive measures such as the conduct of war, reprisals or sanctions as 
envisaged in the UN Charter.245 Levin also distinguished between simple breaches 
of international law and international crimes that turned against the ‘very founda-
tions and essential principles of the legal order of international society’.246 Similarly, 
Jessup, like Root in 1916, raised the question as to whether there was a need to 
consider violations against the peace and order of the international community as 
a ‘violation of the right of every nation’ with which all states are regarded as 
having been injured.247 According to this school of thought, a separate category of 
more severe internationally wrongful acts amounting to crimes existing in the 
international plane should be established, one that would accordingly bear more 
severe legal consequences than any other violation of international law, hence 
attaching to them a punitive character. Nevertheless, the supporters of this theory 
again associated the existence of serious offences with the existence of an interna-
tional criminal court. 
On similar lines, the State Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the 
Soviet Union stressed that the commission of certain wrongful acts amounted to 
‘assaults upon the fundamental principles of international relations and thus 
encroach upon the rights and interests of all states’.248 Moreover, authors such as 
Verzijl expanded the concept of state crimes not only with respect to aggression, 
but also to violations of the laws of war and crimes against humanity.249 Schindler 
wrote that colonization and racial discrimination constituted violations erga omnes 
justifying even non-forcible third-party reprisals,250 while Brownlie characterized 
as an international crime any breach of the rules of jus cogens.251 Graefrath and 
Steiniger identifi ed various categories of internationally wrongful acts and, in par-
ticular, aggression and threat to the peace by forceful maintenance of a racial or a 
colonial regime, other violations of sovereignty and violations of other conven-
tional or customary law obligations.252
245 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 6th edn (ed. Lauterpacht, Longmans, Green & Co.: 
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There was a strong academic opinion supportive of a distinction of internation-
ally wrongful acts in the light of the signifi cance of the interests protected under 
the infringed norm. It is evident from this analysis that: 
[I]n the internationalist literature of various countries and of various legal 
systems, ideas have moved substantially ahead. The positions which in older 
doctrine represented the isolated voices of certain especially forward-looking 
thinkers have become more and more frequent and increasingly fi rm, to the 
point that in modern works they represent a solidly established viewpoint and 
signifi cantly, one which is not contested.253 
It thus becomes indisputable that, by the 1970s, a basic unity of opinion emerged 
in international legal theory and practice regarding the general awareness that 
contemporary international law required the distinction between two types of 
internationally wrongful act in the light of the content of the obligation breached. 
While all international obligations must be respected, there are certain obligations 
such as aggression that due to the interests that they protect are recognized as 
being of a more fundamental character for the fulfi lment of the goals of the inter-
national community, namely international peace and security. The commission of 
these acts is no longer confi ned to the establishment of a bilateral relation between 
the wrongdoer and the wronged state, but it is also extended to the establishment 
of a relation that involves all the members of the international community. This is 
also consistent with the development of the concepts of peremptory norms and 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole elaborated in the fi rst 
chapter, which exercised an immense impact on the secondary rules concerning 
state accountability. 
In the light of these developments, the ILC endorsed the view that the form of 
responsibility depended very much on the signifi cance of the infringed obligations 
affi rming that under certain circumstances the commission of a wrongful act could 
extend the circle of affected states not only to those directly injured but also to 
other states. This was predicated on the condition that the nature of the infringed 
obligation was one which was attached to either a group of states or to all mem-
bers of the international community.254 
These developments signifi ed the evolution of another concept, that of state 
crimes as refl ective of violations of the most serious nature and as entailing legal 
consequences of a graver character.
4 State crimes in the law on state responsibility
The notion of state crimes in what was later to become Article 19 in the Draft 
Articles on the Law on State Responsibility was not new in international law. 
253 Fifth Report, ibid, 50 (142).
254 Report of the Commission (1976) op. cit., 76 (4).
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As already discussed, it appeared in the 1923 Draft Mutual Assistance Treaty 
prepared by the League of Nations and the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacifi c 
Settlement of International Disputes. It was also referred to in many acts of the 
General Assembly such as the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States and the 1975 
Defi nition of Aggression.255 
The concept of state crimes with an erga omnes effect also appeared in many 
academic writings. According to these, the commission of an international crime 
created new obligations on states, such as a duty to refrain from supporting the 
unlawful situation ex post either by recognizing its result as legal or by rendering 
aid or assistance in maintaining such a result. States also had a duty to assist those 
specially affected by the breach and to participate in collective action for the pro-
tection of these fundamental community interests.256 
The ILC incorporated the concept of state crimes in Draft Article 19 adopted 
in its fi rst reading in 1996.257 While uncertainty remained as to the action that 
could and should be taken in response to the violation of these fundamental inter-
ests, the ILC, by adopting Draft Article 19 concerning the responsibility of states 
for the commission of crimes, opened the way to further developments regarding 
the implementation and enforcement of community interests. It has often been 
noticed that the distinction made under the Draft Article between international 
delicts and international crimes and the categorization of responsibility on the 
basis of the importance of the infringed right, the subjects entitled to respond with 
sanctions and the scope and kind of sanctions, strengthened the effectiveness of 
responsibility.258 
Nevertheless, during the debates in the ILC not all states were supportive of the 
inclusion of state crimes in the Draft Articles. On the contrary, there was great 
reluctance to do so. Some states argued that there could be no clear distinction 
between crimes and delicts based on their gravity as this would require an exami-
nation of the primary rule itself, something that could not fall within the ambit of 
examination of the rules on state responsibility. Concerns were also expressed in 
relation to the fact that the term ‘crime’ bore punitive connotations with it and as 
such it should be precluded, something that the ILC at that stage did not accept.259 
Other states pointed to the fact that a state, unlike individuals, could not be pun-
ished and that the victims of such punishment would be the nationals belonging to 
the ‘criminal’ state. There were also fears that a determination that a crime had 
255 See, in this regard, Protocol for the Pacifi c Settlement of Disputes (League of Nations), 2 October 
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been committed would empower strong states to resort to countermeasures entail-
ing much risk for abuse while raising the issue that even when a crime is committed 
not all states have the same entitlements in responding to such violations. Other 
states suggested that the individual accountability for violations of fundamental 
interests should be strengthened instead. The further point was made that the 
‘universalization’ of the notion of the injured state entailed the risk of multiple 
claims with a threat for escalation of the confl ict.260 The discussion also brought to 
light the question as to who was entitled to determine that a crime had been com-
mitted, with some members suggesting that such an authority should be placed on 
a third-party settlement procedure so that powerful states would not abuse such 
powers borne from countermeasures.261
At the same time, while there was little evidence as to the legal consequences 
that should ensue as a result of the commission of an international crime, it was 
clearly understood that not all international crimes gave rise to identical legal 
consequences.262 Within the ILC, there was some discussion about establishing a 
‘minimum common element’ of legal consequences that would apply to all inter-
national crimes.263 One such element was the erga omnes character of the infringed 
obligation that gave every other state the right to demand from the wrongdoing 
state the performance of the obligation concerned. It was also held at the time that 
the commission of an international crime empowered the organized international 
community such as the UN to deal with the situation, while the principle of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of another state became ineffective.264 In the 
following sections, consideration will be given to the question of whether these 
views prevailed and to the extent to which they are refl ected, if at all, in the Final 
Articles adopted in 2001.
Regarding the legal consequences arising as a result of an international crime 
there was a general understanding in the ILC that the commission of such a 
wrongful act, such as aggression, entailed consequences of a more severe nature 
which could give rise to a right to individual or collective self-defence.265 As already 
seen, the subject matter of the breached obligation had an impact on the regime 
of responsibility since the commission of an international crime caused injury to 
260 Ibid, 50 (274)
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all states in deviation from the traditional bilateralist approach of interstate 
affairs.266 Mr Riphagen, the third Special Rapporteur on state responsibility advo-
cated a clear determination of the legal consequences to emerge in the case of 
international crimes and of the means of their enforcement, placing the emphasis, 
as Mr Ago had, on the international community as the main body to deal with 
such violations.267 The protection of fundamental community interests however 
had to be adjusted to the principle of sovereign equality of states as the ‘original 
basis of international law’.268 
Although the notion of state crimes was introduced in the ILC’s Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility in 1976 with the provisional adoption of Article 19, it was 
not until 1996 that the substantive consequences of state ‘crimes’ were actually 
formulated. During the discussions that took place on the matter, Mr Arangio-
Ruiz held the position that the nature of a wrongful act as a crime would reasonably 
aggravate the substantive and instrumental legal consequences to arise for the 
defaulting state, which included the recognition of a right to all states to resort to 
countermeasures.269 
This was refl ected in the 1996 Draft Articles, in which the ILC incorporated 
special consequences to derive from the commission of a state crime and, more 
specifi cally, the removal of the specifi c restrictions concerning the obligation of the 
wrongdoing state to make restitution in kind and to satisfaction. In particular, the 
restrictions provided under Draft Article 43 according to which the defaulting 
state would not be obliged to make restitution if this placed on it a great burden 
disproportionate to the benefi t restitution would bring to the injured state was 
removed. It was the ILC’s position that a state having committed a crime should 
not be able to benefi t from the fruits of its wrongful conduct.270 In the light of this 
position, the loosening of the specifi c restriction was not considered to be contrary 
to the requirement of proportionality as the restoration of the previous situation in 
the case of a crime could rarely be disproportionate. More controversially, the 
ILC decided to remove the restriction that prohibited, in international delicts, 
restitution which could seriously jeopardize the political independence or eco-
nomic stability of the wrongdoer. With respect to the requirement under Draft 
Article 45 that satisfaction does not impair the dignity of the defaulting state, the 
ILC noted that by committing the crime the state concerned ‘had itself forfeited its 
dignity’.271 Despite this, the ILC considered it necessary that the requirement that 
the claim for damages was proportionate to the gravity of the crime should remain. 
As for the other legal consequences provided under Draft Articles 41 to 45 and, 
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more specifi cally, the duty for cessation of the wrongful act, reparation, restitution 
in kind, compensation and satisfaction, these were equally applicable in interna-
tional delicts and international crimes. 
This analysis shows that a graver regime of responsibility was established in the 
event of a commission of an international crime, which imposed particularly bur-
densome obligations on the defaulting state and which could be described as 
punitive in character and as infringing fundamental principles of international law 
such as state equality. The concerns that states expressed in this respect were well 
founded, leading the ILC to abandon the notion of state crimes in the second 
reading of the Draft Articles. The concerns expressed over the notion of state crimes 
notwithstanding, this did not impose an impediment in the understanding that 
community interests needed to be effectively protected under the rules on state 
responsibility. While the fate of the concept of state crimes will be further explored in 
later sections, the examination is next turned to a fundamental concept in this book, 
that of countermeasures, particularly when taken by states other than the injured.
5  Countermeasures as enforcement of 
international law
5.1 The progressive development of countermeasures
International law recognizes that in certain circumstances the responsibility of a 
state for the violation of its obligations will be precluded, thus rendering, for as 
long as they persist, the obligations concerned inoperative.272 This principle fi nds 
prominent place in the law on state responsibility and in the Final Articles, 
although the attention in this analysis is confi ned to the notion of countermeasures 
as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of a given conduct. 
Whenever these circumstances exist, the legal obligation affected does not cease 
to exist, as when a treaty is terminated, neither does it cease to have legal effect, 
even temporarily, as when a treaty is suspended. Therefore, an essential distinc-
tion must be made regarding the legal consequences to emerge from the violation of 
an international agreement such as termination and suspension in the event of a 
material breach and the legal consequences to arise from the violation – any viola-
tion – of international norms, including conventional norms, entailed under the law 
on state responsibility. This issue is separately considered in Chapter 4.
Within the deliberations of the ILC, countermeasures were soon recognized as 
exceptions under which a fi nding of wrongfulness would be precluded. The notion 
of countermeasures gained particular signifi cance as a mechanism of enforcement 
of international law. Countermeasures can be defi ned as peaceful measures taken 
by states in violation of their obligations under international law in response to an 
international wrongdoing committed by another state. In these exceptional cir-
cumstances, the wrongfulness of the act, and consequently the responsibility of the 
272 Second Report on State Responsibility (Crawford), Addendum 2, op. cit., (221).
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state resorting to countermeasures, is precluded. The lack of an adequate and 
effective institutional framework by which the respect for international obligations 
can be safeguarded becomes even more apparent and compelling in this particu-
lar area of international law. Through countermeasures, individual states, acting 
unilaterally, are empowered to take the law into their own hands and implement 
international law, a power that exposes small and weak states to the abuse of pow-
erful states. It was therefore essential for the ILC to ‘devise ways and means which, 
by emphasizing the best of lex lata or careful progressive development, could 
reduce the impact of the great inequality revealed among States in the exercise of 
their faculte (and possibly obligation) to apply countermeasures, which is such a 
major cause of concern.’273
Countermeasures must be distinguished from acts of retorsion that, although 
unfriendly, are not otherwise unlawful (unlike countermeasures). It has also been 
concluded by the ILC that countermeasures may be reciprocal, but are not neces-
sarily confi ned to reciprocal measures.274 
In the early debates that took place on the codifi cation of the law on state 
responsibility, the ILC referred to the concept as ‘sanctions’ or even ‘reprisals’. Mr 
Ago, for his part, used the term ‘sanctions’ to mean the infl iction of punishment or 
the securing of performance of the obligation breached, as a result of the infringe-
ment of the subjective rights of another state.275 In view of the serious ramifi cations 
involved, only legitimate sanctions could fall under the circumstances precluding 
a fi nding of wrongfulness if certain conditions were met. Accordingly, the injured 
state, or even other subjects of international law, was entitled to resort to such 
action under exceptional circumstances on the condition that the response was 
commensurate to the injury suffered.276 
In 1979 the ILC, in its report to the General Assembly replaced the term ‘sanc-
tions’ with that of ‘countermeasures’.277 The use of this term was preferred to that 
of ‘sanctions’ in both contemporary legal thinking and the work of the ILC as 
sanctions were associated with action authorized by an international body or 
organization.278 
During this time the ILC also accepted that countermeasures, as a means of 
punishing the wrongdoing state or securing compliance with its obligations, had 
been implicitly recognized in international law provided that certain requirements 
273 Third Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz) YbILC (1991) Vol. II, Part One, 1, 7–8 (4). 
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were met.279 In particular, countermeasures could only be resorted to after a prior 
demand for reparation has been made and they should be proportionate to the 
offence, while any obligations regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes should 
be respected.280
Outside the ILC, the notion of sanctions had made its appearance in the arbi-
tration proceedings in the Naulilaa case between Germany and Portugal.281 The 
Tribunal, before considering the lawfulness of certain acts committed by the 
German authorities, justifi ed by the latter as reprisals to an internationally wrong-
ful act previously committed by Portugal, wished to establish when and in what 
circumstances reprisals were to be deemed legitimate. According to its ruling: 
[T]he latest doctrine, and more particularly German doctrine, defi nes repri-
sals in these terms: “Reprisals are an act of taking the law into its own hands 
by the injured state, an act carried out after an unfulfi lled demand in response 
to an act contrary to the law of nations by the offending state. Their effect is 
to suspend temporarily, in the relations between the two states, the obser-
vance of a particular rule of the law of nations. They are limited by the expe-
riences of mankind and the rules of good faith, applicable in the relations 
between states. They would be illegal if an earlier act, contrary to the law of 
nations, had not furnished the motive.”282
In this particular instance, the tribunal held that even if Portugal had indeed 
previously committed a wrongful act, the imposition of reprisals by Germany 
would again be unlawful since no prior demand for reparation had been made.283 
State practice, too, recognized that the legitimate application of sanctions pre-
cluded the wrongfulness of the act and the responsibility of the state. During the 
Codifi cation Conference in 1930, the Preparatory Committee accepted that repri-
sals could be justifi ed in certain circumstances, an issue that no government 
disputed. In the ‘Basis of Discussion’ drawn by the Committee for the Conference, 
it was fi nally concluded that, ‘a state is not responsible for damage caused to a 
foreigner if it proves that it acted in circumstances justifying the exercise of repri-
sals against the state to which the foreigner belongs’.284 Some decades later, and, 
more specifi cally, in 1968, the representative of the Dutch government in the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly stated that: ‘[A]ny state, no matter to 
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what region of the world it belongs, may fi nd itself in the position of suffering 
damage from illegal acts on the part of another state and that such a state, for that 
reason, would be justifi ed in taking measures of non-violent reprisal.’285 
The preclusion of wrongfulness in the case of legitimate sanctions is also upheld 
in the literature, sometimes referring to it as ‘sanctions’, at other times as ‘repri-
sals’ and at yet others as ‘measures of self-protection’. Undoubtedly, the emergence 
of the prohibition of the use of force as one of the most fundamental principles of 
international law after the end of World War II, as envisaged in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter, altered the position concerning the legitimacy of armed reprisals.286 
The prohibition of the use of armed force in circumstances other than self-defence 
and Security Council authorization highlighted the necessity for alternative mech-
anisms for the enforcement of international law, strengthening in this manner the 
relevance and signifi cance of countermeasures.
5.2 Conditions and functions of countermeasures
The acceptance of countermeasures in the law of state responsibility was accom-
panied by certain concerns and considerable reservations. In what was described 
as the most controversial aspect of state responsibility,287 countermeasures were 
dealt with in Chapter III of the Draft Articles provisionally adopted in the fi rst 
reading in 1996. According to the general commentary, countermeasures were 
justifi ed in response to a previous violation of the rights of the injured state and 
might be necessary in order to ensure the compliance of the wrongdoing state. 
Countermeasures, however, did not constitute a ‘wholly satisfactory remedy’ 
but rather a ‘rudimentary’ system for two main reasons. First, because the judg-
ment for their justifi cation is formed by the same state relying on them (unilateral 
assessment of both whether there has been an infringement and whether the reac-
tion is lawful) and, second, because of the actual inequality of states in respect of 
military, political and economic strength.288 For these reasons, some states opposed 
the incorporation of countermeasures in the Draft Articles and argued that to rely 
on the principle of proportionality as a way of limiting any possible excessiveness 
of such measures would not be of much assistance as the exact content of the prin-
ciple was not yet universally agreed and determined. The ILC, however, decided 
to include countermeasures in the Draft Articles as it found that there existed 
enough evidence in customary law that countermeasures are permitted as a lawful 
response to an unlawful conduct, emphasizing at the same time that the restric-
tions and limitations for resorting to such measures should not be ignored.289 
Countermeasures, ‘a refl ection of the imperfect structure of the international 
285 S. Swan, ‘Netherlands State Practice for the Parliamentary Year 1969–70’ I NYIL (1970) 171 in 
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community’,290 were also supported by many states. As pointed out, ‘in any society 
a certain degree of coercion had to be tolerated, provided it did not go beyond 
certain limits’ and that ‘at the present stage they were the only means whereby 
international law could be implemented when an international obligation was 
violated’.291 It was also the position that countermeasures should serve only for the 
cessation of the wrongful act and not as a means of punishment since the interna-
tional community was comprised of states that were legally equal between them.292 
They should further aim to restore the legal relationship between the injured state 
and the wrongdoer. 
To this effect, countermeasures are instrumental in character and they come as 
part of the implementation of state responsibility for the purpose of inducing the 
wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations.293 Their purpose is limited to 
inducing the wrongdoing state to cease its unlawful conduct and to offer repara-
tion to the injured state for as long as the wrongdoing state is not complying with 
its obligations. Countermeasures must also not violate obligations towards third, 
innocent parties while they are not unlimited in scope. Rather, they have to 
comply with the requirement of proportionality and they must be reversible in 
their effects. Likewise, certain obligations, because of their nature, do not allow 
their non-performance by way of countermeasures such as those owed to the 
international community as a whole and those arising from peremptory norms.
The recognition that countermeasures could turn into a powerful weapon in the 
hands of states was the driving force behind the urge to impose the strictest condi-
tions in the use of such measures. It was imperative that such measures were 
subjected to restrictions and limitations to ensure that they would only be used 
whenever necessary in response to another infringement. Draft Article 47 provided 
that countermeasures entitled the injured state ‘not to comply with one or more of 
its obligations towards the wrongdoing state’, in order to achieve the permissible 
functions and aims of such measures, in particular cessation or reparation. Anything 
exceeding these functions would be unlawful, particularly the infl iction of punish-
ment on the wrongdoer.294 Moreover, in order to ensure that countermeasures 
would not be used as a shield for possible abuses, they could only be resorted to after 
failure of the wrongdoer to comply with its obligations under Draft Articles 41 to 46 
concerning cessation, reparation, restitution in kind, compensation, safeguards for 
non-repetition and satisfaction. In addition to these restrictions, the injured state 
had a duty to enter into negotiations with the wrongdoing state unless of course 
urgent action was necessary and to submit the dispute before any dispute settlement 
procedure existing between the parties. At the same time, the acting state was under 
an obligation to ensure that its action was not out of proportion to the degree of 
290 Report of the Commission (1992), op. cit., 19 (122).
291 Ibid, 20–21 (131).
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gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the effects on the injured state. Such 
action should also not be inconsistent with the rules concerning the use or threat of 
force or impose extreme economic and political conditions in violation of the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of the wrongdoing state. 
Quite signifi cantly, countermeasures should be in compliance with the rules 
concerning diplomatic immunities and basic human rights, with obligations owed 
erga omnes and with peremptory norms of international law.295 The latter was 
affi rmed by Gaja according to whom it would be ‘illogical’ to allow the violation 
of imperative rules in response to a previously committed wrongful act, even if 
that act itself was in violation of rules possessing a peremptory character. As noted, 
‘the very existence of such a category of norms implies that there is a general inter-
est in international society that they should be respected’.296 Similarly, Lattanzi 
rejected the possibility of infringement of obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole by way of countermeasures since: ‘[T]he violation of an 
obligation to the detriment of one State in such a case simultaneously represents a 
violation of the same obligation to the detriment of all those to whom the rule 
applies. It would be inadmissible for the sanction imposed on one State to consti-
tute the violation of an obligation towards another State.’297 According to Gaja, 
countermeasures in such cases are not permitted as ‘the rights of innocent States 
would then necessarily be infringed.’298
Finally, countermeasures had to be necessary in order to induce the wrongdo-
ing state to comply with its obligations. This prerequisite meant, fi rst, that the 
injured state should only resort to countermeasures if other means failed or proved 
ineffective and, second, that countermeasures should be used reasonably, in good 
faith and at the injured state’s own risk. Effectively, the injured state was empow-
ered to judge whether the necessity for countermeasures had arisen. In this regard: 
‘The necessity of countermeasures diminishes in inverse proportion to the achieve-
ment of their legitimate aims.’299 The burden of establishing the necessity for 
countermeasures was, therefore, on the injured state. 
Having considered the legal restrictions of the entitlement to resort to counter-
measures, the next section considers in some depth the subjects entitled to resort 
to countermeasures and how the notion of countermeasures taken for the protec-
tion of collective interests evolved within the law on state responsibility.
5.3 Subjects entitled to resort to countermeasures
A crucial question that appeared in the discussions of the ILC concerned the sub-
jects entitled to apply countermeasures in response to another wrongful act and 
295 Ibid, 64.
296 Gaja (1981), op. cit., 297.
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whether this power should be restricted to directly injured states or not. The con-
sideration of this specifi c issue became essential in the light of the view advanced 
by some writers that not all the injured states were entitled unilaterally to resort to 
countermeasures.300 This was in light of the fact that under Draft Article 19 the 
notion of the injured state was widely defi ned and therefore in the event of 
the commission of an international crime all states were regarded as injured states. 
The issue was raised in fear that a general faculté to resort to countermeasures would 
pose a threat to the certainty in the enforcement of the law and would lead to reac-
tions not restricted to ensuring the compliance of the wrongdoer.301
While all states may have an interest in the respect of international law gener-
ally, this does not mean that all states are entitled to demand performance or even 
resort to countermeasures whenever a violation of an international norm occurs.302 
The issue, however, is particularly important with respect to obligations erga omnes. 
There was a general reluctance to widening the circle of states empowered to 
resort to such powerful means in safeguarding fundamental interests of the inter-
national legal order. In the light of the risks entailed in allowing individual third 
states to apply sanctions in response to a breach that does not directly affect them, 
Mr Ago for instance supported institutionalized responses. In particular, he stressed 
that the task of determining the existence of a breach of an obligation of fundamen-
tal signifi cance for the international community as a whole and of deciding the 
measures that should be taken in response should be vested not in individual states 
but in international institutions and organizations, such as the UN.303 
In later discussions, Mr Riphagen acknowledged that under certain circum-
stances bilateralism did not apply particularly in the event of violation of ‘a 
fundamental interest which is not solely an interest of an individual State’.304 This 
was related to the notion of international crimes envisaged in Draft Article 19, which 
outlined different legal consequences in the event of the commission of conduct of 
this nature. As pointed out by Mr Riphagen, the distinction between international 
delicts and international crimes would be of little signifi cance if it did not imply dif-
ferent legal consequences. Under Draft Article 14, an international crime entailed 
all the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act and, additionally, such 
rights and obligations deriving from its nature as criminal and accepted by the 
international community. These might entail a new collective right of every other 
state to require the wrongdoer to comply with its obligations, but they could also 
extend beyond a demand to ‘undo’ the wrongful act qualifi ed as an international 
crime, provided that such consequences were decided at a community level.305 
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With respect to the right of third states to take countermeasures in particular, 
Mr Riphagen, like his predecessor, insisted on the authorization of such action at 
a collective level. He drew support for this from the fact that the action authorized 
against South Africa as a result of its unlawful presence in South West Africa was 
a collective decision made by the Security Council, despite the fact that the imple-
mentation of this collective decision was left to individual states, although it can be 
doubted, as it will be established in this book, whether such measures can only be 
authorized by an international organization or institution.306 
Mr Arangio-Ruiz, on his part, while acknowledging the dangers that unilateral 
resort to countermeasures could envisage, noted that refusing such right amounted 
to denying erga omnes obligations from any binding effect, the violation of which 
would bear no consequences and no regime of liability for the wrongdoer. He 
went on to say:
The only real peculiarities of the situations determined by the presence of a 
plurality of injured States, that is to say, by the fact that the infringed rule is 
an erga plurimos or erga omnes rule – is that the rights and facultes of the various 
injured States must be determined in concreto and implemented with a view to 
the pursuit of the totally or partially common legal interest infringed by the 
breach.307
At the same time, Mr Arangio-Ruiz pointed out that the degree of involvement of 
injured states would vary in accordance with the nature and extent of the injury 
suffered.308 Specifi c attention was given in this regard to the various distinctions 
made between ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ injured states, specially affected, or even 
third states.309 It was acknowledged that according to the traditional understand-
ing of international law international relations are structured in such a manner 
that their violation affects only one or more states even in the case of multilateral 
treaties that seem rather to establish multibilateral legal relationships. This was 
also the case in relation to multilateral treaties giving rise to integral rights and 
obligations such as peace, disarmament or environmental treaties.310 By the same 
token, the practice and literature of international law indicate the existence of rules 
that simply ‘do not fi t the pattern of bilateralism just described. These are the rules 
306 Ibid. See analysis in chapter 3.
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which, in the pursuit of “general” or “collective” interests, create obligations, com-
pliance with which is in the legally protected interest and, in that sense, a legal right 
of all the States to which the rule applies’.311 As Spinedi commented in this regard:
These rules impose on every State obligations towards all the other States in 
each of which the corresponding subjective right is vested. A breach of these 
obligations simultaneously injures the subjective rights of all the States bound by 
the rule, whether or not they have been especially affected – apart, of course, 
from the subjective right of the State that committed the breach. The term “erga 
omnes obligation” is generally used to denote the obligations in question.312
Nevertheless, even the violation of an erga omnes obligation does not always affect 
states in an identical manner. As pointed out, while there may be no difference in 
the fact that all states are injured, there can be difference as to the way that each 
state has been injured. For instance, if a coastal state closes a canal within its juris-
diction that is connecting two parts of the high seas, then all the states possess a 
general entitlement under international law to transit. However, not all the states 
will be affected in the same way. More precisely, states whose ships have been 
prevented from crossing the canal and have suffered a material damage will be 
affected in a different way from the states that have a general right to innocent 
passage.313 Thus, a differentiation between injured and other states in the light of 
the nature and the extent of the injury suffered starts to emerge in the delibera-
tions of the ILC.314 
These conclusions further formulated the rules on state responsibility. It is 
therefore now necessary to see how these developments infl uenced the ILC in its 
consideration of state crimes and solidarity measures in its Final Articles on state 
responsibility. 
6  Jus cogens norms, erga omnes obligations and third 
states in the 2001 Final Articles on State Responsibility
6.1 State crimes and serious breaches of peremptory norms
At the second reading of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted in 
1996 Professor Crawford, appointed as Special Rapporteur, retained the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary norms of international law placing particular 
emphasis on the latter, as codifi cation of the primary rules would be very diffi cult 
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to achieve due to the innumerable treaty and customary international obliga-
tions.315 In view of the existence of some limited normative hierarchy in 
international law, Professor Crawford acknowledged that there exist various forms 
and degrees of state responsibility based on both the signifi cance of the rules 
imposing obligations on states and the seriousness of the violation of such rules. 
Consequently, such distinction had to be refl ected in the fi nal articles on state 
responsibility. 
Nevertheless, one of the most contentious areas with which Professor Crawford 
was faced was the inclusion of Draft Article 19 concerning state crimes. Professor 
Crawford concluded that there existed a deep division among states as to the 
inclusion of the notion of state crimes in Draft Article 19, which as it stood made 
no reference to any specifi c characteristics that would clearly distinguish delicts 
from crimes, such as, for instance, a special system of enforcement or substantive 
consequences. Moreover, Draft Article 19 did not specifi cally defi ne those acts 
that constitute a crime, but merely provided that a crime ‘may result’ from viola-
tions of the obligations referred to under paragraph 3. These extended to 
obligations essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, self-
determination of people, widespread violations of obligations essential for the 
protection of the human being and the preservation of the human environment. 
Ambiguity also existed with respect to the determination of whether the commis-
sion of a crime fi nally occurred as this was made dependent on the ‘rules of 
international law in force’, without further explanation.316 The Draft Articles, 
therefore, did not provide for any special procedure for determining whether a 
crime had been committed or what consequences should ensue, since such pro-
posals were rejected by ILC in 1995 and 1996.317 
Likewise, Professor Crawford observed that the defi nition of crime as refl ected 
in Draft Article 19 provided for an additional element of gravity that was not 
always existent in the elements of specifi cally defi ned internationally wrongful acts. 
For example, the reference to widespread violations of obligations essential for the 
protection of human beings added an element that did not exist, for instance, in 
the defi nition of genocide. It is not widespread genocide that it is prohibited but 
genocide in general and irrespective of the degree or scale of such violation. 
One further criticism exercised against the inclusion of state crimes in the Final 
Articles related to the legal consequences deriving from the commission of a crime, 
which in the Draft Articles did not appear to be distinguishable from the conse-
quences resulting from a delict. Furthermore, under Draft Article 40, following 
the commission of a crime all other states were considered as injured states and, as 
such, they were entitled to seek reparation and to resort to countermeasures, 
a move that entailed risks for abuse. Professor Crawford was also critical of the 
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decision to remove the restrictions placed on the exercise of restitution or satisfac-
tion whenever a crime was involved.318 
In the light of these concerns, Professor Crawford concluded that there existed 
no judicial practice supporting the existence of a distinction between state crimes 
and delicts, despite the recognition that international law consists of different 
norms that go beyond a strict bilateral relationship and that have a different hier-
archy.319 He further observed that the reference to a ‘criminal’ element could 
prove misleading. For all these reasons, Professor Crawford recommended the 
deletion of Draft Article 19, without prejudice, however, to the future develop-
ment of international law on the matter. 
Instead, there was support for the substitution of the provision on state crimes 
with a provision regarding serious breaches of peremptory norms, such as aggres-
sion, genocide, apartheid and denial of self-determination, since they ‘shock the 
conscience of mankind’.320 However, this proposal also met the negative reaction 
of some states that viewed the proposal as a remnant of the notion of state crimes.321 
It is noteworthy that nowhere in the articles does the ILC attempt to give a defi ni-
tion of jus cogens, relying instead on Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT. This, however, 
led Professor Pellet to argue that: 
[T]he 1969 text defi nes peremptory norms only in terms of their consequenc-
es in matters of treaty law, which is not very rational from the standpoint of 
the law of international responsibility: that amounts to saying that when a 
rule renders a confl icting treaty invalid, its breach entails particular conse-
quences in matters of responsibility; this is a not very useful combination of 
two quite distinct branches of law.322 
However, despite the differences between the law on treaties as refl ected in the 
1969 VCLT and the law on state responsibility, the two branches of international 
law overlap and complement each other.323 Moreover, the concept of peremptory 
norms is also refl ected in customary international law and, therefore, is a concept 
not limited to the law of treaties.324
Chapter III of Part 2 of the articles concluded in 2001, and more particularly 
Articles 40 and 41, provides for specifi c consequences arising from serious violations 
of obligations under peremptory norms. In the light of these provisions, however, 
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not all the breaches of jus cogens entail aggravated legal consequences but only 
those that are of a serious nature; in other words, those that constitute gross or 
systematic infringement of such norms. However, in the author’s opinion, refer-
ence to an additional element, that of the seriousness of the violation of such 
norms, imposes an unnecessary legal constraint that fi nds no support in state prac-
tice, the literature or the jurisprudence. The violation of jus cogens norms, 
irrespective of their intensity, suffi ces to be serious enough to entail the necessary 
legal consequences for the wrongdoer but also to give rise to specifi c obligations to 
all other states of the international community. This is particularly so in the case 
of genocide which seems to carry by defi nition an element of seriousness and 
gravity. However, it is acknowledged that the reference to ‘serious’ violations of 
peremptory norms intends to distinguish isolated incidents from a given practice.
Article 40 places the emphasis not only on the fact that certain norms are given 
priority over others, but also on the fact that all states have a legal interest in their 
preservation. It is imperative, if the distinction between serious and less serious 
violations of international law is to be meaningful, to attach additional conse-
quences to these violations for which all states are entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongdoing state. In this context, Article 41 sets out the spe-
cifi c consequences arising as a result of a serious violation of a peremptory norm, 
which, however, are directed not against the wrongdoing state but rather, against 
all other states. Article 41 establishes, therefore, a duty on states to cooperate in 
order to bring an end to the wrongful act by lawful means, not to recognize as 
lawful the situation that will result from the violation and not to render aid or 
assistance to the wrongdoing state.325 These consequences are additional to the 
consequences deriving from Article 48 concerning violations of jus cogens norms 
that cannot be qualifi ed as serious, and obligations established for the collective 
good either of a group of states or the international community as a whole. 
According to Article 48(2), any state entitled to invoke the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing state under that provision may claim the cessation and non-repetition 
of the wrongful act and reparation in the interest of the injured state or the benefi -
ciary of the obligation concerned.326
As already noted earlier, and in view of the concerns of states regarding the 
introduction of a punitive element in the law on state responsibility, the legal con-
sequences entailed in Articles 41 and 48 do not aim to impose punishment, a 
notion at odds with the principle of sovereign equality, but rather merely refl ect 
the gravity of the breach.327 
6.2 The injured state and states other than the injured
The Final Articles endorse a signifi cant distinction between ‘injured’ and ‘other’ 
states, in deviation from the position previously refl ected in the Draft Articles 
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adopted in the fi rst reading that made no such distinction, in recognition that not 
all states may be affected in identical ways in the event of a violation of an inter-
national norm. An injured state is the state whose individual right has been 
impaired (Article 42(a)), the state that has been specially affected by the infringe-
ment of a collective obligation (Article 42(b)(i)) or whenever the violation of a 
collective obligation radically changes the position of all the other states in relation 
to its performance (integral or interdependent obligations) (Article 42(b)(ii)).328 
Article 42(a) deals with obligations arising in the context of a bilateral, delictual 
relationship between the state to which an obligation concerning an act or omis-
sion is owed and the state that carries the duty not to violate the obligation in 
question. This form of relationship is a central characteristic of traditional inter-
national law: any third state is precluded from bringing a claim in case of violation 
of obligations of this nature. Obligations of a bilateral nature, however, are not only 
found in bilateral treaties or bilateral customs. It is thus possible that a multilateral 
treaty for instance, despite the plurality of the states that are parties to it, creates a 
bundle of multiple bilateral relations between different sets of member states. In 
these cases, despite the plurality of the states that are parties to the treaty and the 
fact that they are all bound by the same rules, the treaty creates a bundle of obliga-
tions of a bilateral character, with one state party being the carrier of the obligation 
set by the treaty and the other the carrier of the right. It is also noteworthy that such 
bilateral relationships are not necessarily established as between all the parties. 
An example of a multilateral treaty establishing rights and obligations between 
two states is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations: once 
a state accepts having a foreign diplomatic mission within its territory, it is bound 
to provide the mission all the rights and protections provided under the Convention. 
Although the Convention is a multilateral treaty, only the state whose rights and 
privileges have been infringed will be able to make a claim against the wrongdoing 
state. This is in spite of the signifi cance of compliance with the terms of the 
Convention for the international community as a whole recognized by the ICJ in 
the Teheran Hostages case. According to the Court, violation of the obligations 
under diplomatic immunities law could be detrimental for the ‘security and well-
being of the complex international community of the present day, to which it is 
more essential than ever that the rules developed to ensure the ordered progress 
of relations between its members should be constantly and scrupulously 
respected’.329 Still, only the state whose individual rights have been infringed will 
be entitled to make a claim under the Convention. 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea offers another example of a multilateral 
treaty establishing multiple bilateral obligations.330 The violation of a bilateral 
obligation contained in a multilateral treaty necessarily has a bilateral character 
328 Report of the International Law Commission (2001) 296.
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330 K. Sachariew, ‘State Responsibility Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the “Injured 
State” and its Legal Status’ 35 Netherlands International Law Review (1988) 273, 277.
Interests in the law on state responsibility 81
itself, meaning that the dispute arises between the two parties actually involved, 
with the one being the author state and the other the injured state. All the other 
parties to the treaty are not affected and thus they are third states to the dispute. 
As a consequence, if a violation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea occurs 
concerning the right to innocent passage, only the coastal state may bring a claim 
against the fl ag state. 
Article 42(b), on the other hand, deals with the violation of collective obligations 
that specially affects the state concerned, or radically changes the position of all 
the other states. In the latter case, the rule concerned creates ‘indivisible’ rights 
and obligations.331 Under these circumstances, there is an expectation of perfor-
mance of the obligation that is a precondition for the fulfi lment of the objectives 
set by the norm. The fulfi llment and performance towards one state, is fulfi llment 
and performance towards all. As pointed out, the notion of interdependent obliga-
tions envisaged in the Final Articles should be construed narrowly to cover 
‘obligations which operate in an all-or-nothing fashion, such that each state’s con-
tinued performance of the obligation is in effect conditioned upon its performance 
by each other part’.332 In this regard, interdependent obligations are obligations 
whose performance relies on the compliance of all the other parties, such as obli-
gations arising from disarmament treaties.333 They must however be distinguished 
from integral obligations the performance of which is unrelated with their perfor-
mance by another party, such as for instance obligations deriving from human 
rights treaties.
Article 60 of the 1969 VCLT that deals with interdependent obligations pro-
vides that any state which is a party is entitled to invoke the material breach and 
to suspend the treaty in question, thus threatening the treaty structure in its 
entirety. A disarmament treaty is a good example of obligations of this kind. Here, 
each state undertakes the obligation to reduce its military capability on the assump-
tion that the other states members to the agreement will do the same. Breach of 
such an obligation would destabilize the balance aimed to be established by the 
treaty and would result in the radical change of position of every other state party 
to the treaty. Human rights treaties are therefore not interdependent. On the 
contrary, ‘human rights obligations are incremental, and human rights treaties do 
not operate in an all-or-nothing way.’334 As a consequence, a state cannot rely on 
the infringement committed by another state to avoid the implementation of its 
own obligations regarding the protection of human rights. 
Chapter 1 and the preceding sections demonstrated that while international 
law is still characterized predominantly by state relations of a bilateral nature, 
331 E. Weiss Brown, ‘Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century’ 96 AJIL (2002) 
798, 800–1.
332 Crawford, Peel and Olleson, op. cit., 974.
333 ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties Arising from the Diversifi cation and Expansion 
of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized 
by Martti Koskenniemi, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, (262).
334 Crawford, Peel and Olleson, op. cit., 974.
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contemporary international law has also moved towards the recognition of certain 
international rules the observance of which lies within the interest of all states. 
These developments led to an expansion of the circle of the subjects entitled to 
invoke the responsibility of a defaulting state as will be shown in later sections. 
It is accordingly imperative to identify not only the subjects entitled to invoke 
the responsibility of another state but also their capacity for doing so, in other 
words whether they are injured states under Article 42 or states other than the 
injured under Article 48. The distinction is signifi cant as it entails different rights 
and entitlements in each instance. More specifi cally, while one state may be spe-
cifi cally and materially injured, others may have suffered nothing more than a 
‘moral’ damage. In the latter case, their interest comes as a result of the fact 
that an obligation owed to a group of states established for the collective interest 
(erga omnes partes) or an obligation owed to the international community as a whole 
(erga omnes) has been violated. Yet, the violation of collective interests does not 
preclude the possibility that a state may still be injured in its individual rights 
empowering that state even to resort to countermeasures, an entitlement that is 
disputed in relation to non-injured states. 
Professor Crawford advocated the distinction by noting that: 
We cannot make progress in developing the idea of a public international law 
(rather than a private spectre of international law), unless we distinguish 
between the primary benefi ciaries, the right holders, and those states with a 
legal interest in compliance.335
This position is now refl ected in Articles 42 and 48 of the 2001 Final Articles. In 
the case of Article 48, the state has a ‘legal interest’ in the compliance of the 
wrongdoing state without necessarily having to prove that the obligation is indi-
vidually owed to it or that it is specially affected by the violation.336 Although it is 
accepted that there are certain obligations the signifi cance of which concerns a 
wider spectrum of states, be it a group of states or the international community as 
a whole, the damage suffered by each state is not always the same. It will vary 
according to whether the rule involved an obligation owed to a state individually 
or as a member of a wider group of states. In the former case, the injury caused is 
of a more ‘direct’ nature, while in the latter case, although the legal interest is 
never disputed, the injury only comes as a result of a rule established for the gen-
eral good. The difference has legal ramifi cations as only the injured state is entitled 
to all the remedies provided under the Final Articles. In contrast, non-directly 
injured states enjoy only limited rights in relation to action they may be entitled to 
take against the wrongdoing state.337 
335 Crawford (2000), op. cit., 17 in Scobbie, op. cit., 1205.
336 Scobbie, ibid, 1207.
337 Sicilianos makes the point that Article 48 could be interpreted as allowing the gravest of measures 
such as the resort to ‘lawful measures’ even for minor violations of erga omnes obligations. 
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Article 48 distinguishes between obligations owed to the international commu-
nity as a whole as proclaimed in the obiter dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction 
case – genocide is often cited as an example – or to a group of states established 
for the protection of a collective interest. The latter includes regional agreements 
on security, protection of human rights within a specifi c region or regional systems 
established for the protection of the environment. It incorporates obligations erga 
omnes partes, thus obligations created for the protection of a common interest. 
Obligations falling under this category differ from obligations the violation of 
which radically changes the position of every state in the treaty in that they ‘tend 
to promote extra-state interests, are not of a synallagmatic nature and fall outside 
the interplay of reciprocity. A breach of human rights by state A, however serious 
it may be, in no way changes the position of other states regarding compliance 
with their own obligations in the same area.’338 
Under Article 48 states are affected by a given infringement based not on their 
individual capacity but rather because they are members of a group of states or 
the international community to which the obligation is owed. In the fi rst case, two 
requirements must be met: the state must be a member of that group and the 
obligation must aim to protect a collective interest. The second category concerns 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole and no further 
requirements need be satisfi ed. This provision concerns not merely the violation 
of jus cogens norms but also the violation of erga omnes obligations. The ILC avoided 
using the phrase ‘legal interests’ as it appears in the Barcelona Traction case since this 
would leave no room for distinction between the injured states under Article 42 
and states other than the injured under Article 48.339 
Terms such as ‘non-directly injured’ and ‘third states’ have frequently been 
used in the literature and the work of the ILC. They have been used to indicate 
those states whose legal interest is established not in the context of a bilateral rela-
tionship but in the spectrum of a multilateral relationship borne either within 
general international law or within the law of treaties. In its Final Articles, the ILC 
chose to refer to ‘states other than the injured’, in an attempt to remove the pos-
sibility of any misconceptions as to the meaning of such phraseology.
Once the criteria of Article 48 are fulfi lled, the state invoking the responsibility 
of the wrongdoing state may do so not only by demanding cessation of the inter-
nationally wrongful act but also by demanding reparation ‘in the interest of the 
injured State or of the benefi ciaries of the obligation breached’. This is another 
indication of moving away from the traditional perception of international law, 
which found expression in bilateralism. In relation to this, it has been argued that 
to allow a third state not individually affected by a breach of this kind to claim 
A.L. Sicilianos, ‘The Classifi cation of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations 
on International Responsibility’ 13 EJIL (2002) 1127, 1141.
338 Ibid, 1135. 
339 Report of the International Law Commission (2001), op. cit., 319 (2).
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reparation when the injured state itself has waived its right to do so is without 
precedent in international law.340 
Despite these developments, Article 44(a) of the Final Articles introduces a spe-
cifi c admissibility requirement for the invocation of state responsibility, thought by 
some to stand against the very notion of erga omnes obligations and jus cogens norms. 
More specifi cally, Article 44(a) provides that the responsibility of the state cannot 
be invoked unless in agreement with any applicable rule regarding the nationality of 
claims. This provision has been viewed by some commentators as being in confl ict 
with Article 48 by making it impossible for a state to act where its nationals are not 
the victims of a certain violation.341 While the ILC in its commentary on Article 
44(a) noted that the question of the nationality of claims will be dealt with within 
the framework of diplomatic protection, it has been characteristically pointed out 
that the latter is in apparent confl ict with the provisions on state responsibility.342 
This is due to the fact that diplomatic protection requires a link between the 
national whose rights have been infringed and the state exercising protection on 
their behalf. This is illustrated by the overlap between diplomatic protection and 
state responsibility since ‘a State acting on behalf of one of its nationals [is] none-
theless invoking State responsibility’.343 
However, in the debates of Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection it was 
pointed out that: ‘Under international law, obligations concerning human rights 
were typically obligations erga omnes. Any State could request cessation of the 
breach, whether the persons affected were its own nationals, nationals of the 
wrongdoing State, or nationals of a third State. Thus, any requirement of nation-
ality of claims appeared to be out of place when human rights were invoked.’344 
Moreover, the commentary to Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection notwith-
standing, Article 44(a) is subject only to those cases where the requirement of 
nationality of claims is applicable and therefore not all cases of invocation of state 
responsibility will raise such questions.
The signifi cance of Article 48 lies in the clear intention of its drafters to move 
away from the ruling of the ICJ in the South West Africa case and to affi rm a 
public interest approach as confi rmed in its obiter dictum in the Barcelona Traction 
case.345 As the analysis in Chapter 1 revealed, in the former case the Court refused 
to examine the claims brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against South Africa on 
the ground that they lacked a special material interest regarding South Africa’s 
practices over South West Africa in violation of the mandate. Furthermore, the 
340 Scobbie, op. cit., 1214.
341 Ibid, 1217.
342 Ibid, 1201.
343 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-second Session, 1 May to 9 
June and 10 July to 18 August 2000 (A/55/10) 50, (286). 
344 First Report on Diplomatic Protection by Mr J.R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. 
A./CN.4/506 (7 March 2000) and Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506/Add.1 (20 April 2000) 
in Scobbie, op. cit., 1216.
345 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 341.
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Court rejected that there existed an actio popularis in international law or a right of 
any member of the international community to take legal action whenever an 
issue of public interest was at stake.346 Article 48 is therefore signifi cant as it estab-
lishes a clear legal link between states and violations of this nature and an 
unequivocal legal interest in the protection of the norms breached by invoking the 
responsibility of the defaulting state. The position refl ected in Article 48 is in line 
with the previous conclusions of the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in the Reservations 
to the Genocide Convention case. It can be deduced from the Court’s Opinion that the 
Convention intended to ensure the rights of all individuals irrespective of their 
nationality, thus extending the circle of states entitled to invoke the responsibility 
of the wrongdoing state and to make a claim before international judicial bodies 
beyond the state of nationality.347 This leads to the question central to this book, 
whether states other than the injured may demand cessation of the wrongful act 
that attacks collective interests by way of countermeasures. As already shown, this 
is an issue that remains unsettled in the Final Articles.
6.3 Countermeasures by states other than the injured
One of the most disputed aspects of the law on countermeasures was the entitle-
ment of third states to resort to countermeasures. As seen from our earlier 
discussion on state crimes, under Draft Article 19 as adopted at the fi rst reading of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility countermeasures were open effectively 
to all states, if an international crime had been committed. At the second reading 
of the Draft Articles, the ILC, wary of the implications that the recognition of such 
a general right could have in the preservation of the international legal order, 
decided not to include such a right with respect to states other than the injured. 
The omission of express reference to the right of states other than the injured as 
defi ned in Article 48 to resort to countermeasures constitutes a controversial issue 
in the Final Articles. As will be discussed later, Article 54 recognizes the right of 
states other than the injured to invoke the responsibility of another state for viola-
tion of obligations that fall within the meaning of Article 48 and to resort to lawful 
measures to ensure cessation of the wrongful act and reparation. However, the 
provision avoids the use of the term ‘countermeasures’. The reference to ‘lawful 
measures’, in its place, has sparked divergent interpretations as to its exact mean-
ing and scope, while at the same time not ruling out future developments in this 
respect.348 In its commentary on Article 54, the ILC notes that countermeasures 
by states other than the injured state were still very much disputed while state 
practice was ‘embryonic’.349 The action of states other than the injured was rather 
confi ned to securing the cessation of the breach and reparation on behalf of the 
346 South West Africa cases, Second Phase, op. cit., 47 (88). Also Weiss Brown, op. cit., 804.
347 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, op. cit., 23.
348 Pellet, op. cit., 79.
349 Crawford (2002), op. cit., 302.
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injured state or the benefi ciaries by other means permissible under international 
law. It was therefore feared that codifying and establishing such a right would 
open Pandora’s Box, such that powerful states could behave in an arbitrary way 
as the law’s executors and enforcers. 
It should be noted, however, that the decision not to include an express right to 
solidarity measures did not refl ect the view of Professor Crawford. On the con-
trary, Professor Crawford advocated the inclusion of countermeasures in protection 
of general interests in two situations. First, whenever a state was invited to resort 
to such countermeasures by the state directly injured on the basis and scope of the 
given consent, and, second, in the absence of an injured state, whenever an obliga-
tion owed to the international community was infringed.350 In the end, neither of 
these suggestions was adopted. Despite this, one can see from the Final Articles 
and especially from the commentaries to Articles 22 and 54 that the issue was not 
intended to be conclusively settled. In particular, the commentary on Article 22 
provides that: 
Article 54 leaves open the question whether any State may take measures 
to ensure compliance with certain international obligations in the general 
interest as distinct from its own individual interest as an injured State. 
While Article 22 does not cover measures taken in such a case to the extent 
that these do not qualify as countermeasures, neither does it exclude that 
possibility.351
Furthermore, Article 41(3) on the consequences to ensue as a result of serious 
breaches of peremptory norms provides that it is without prejudice to other con-
sequences which may be entailed under international law. As Alland observed, 
this suggests that: ‘[I]nternational law allows the possibility for (“non-injured”) 
states to take countermeasures of general interest following breach by any state 
whatever of an obligation arising under a norm of jus cogens.’352 This becomes evi-
dent in cases of indirect violations of peremptory norms through the execution of 
the terms of a given treaty, which, although prima facie innocent, contributes to the 
commission of such violations, as elaborated in Chapter 1.353 The question, of 
course, remains as to the lawfulness of countermeasures taken in the name of col-
lective interests that do not however qualify as peremptory norms.
Alland criticized the wording used in Article 54 concerning ‘lawful measures’ as 
not reconcilable with the ‘saving’ remarks concerning countermeasures of general 
interest, made regarding Articles 22 and 41(3). As he points out, it is quite remark-
able that such countermeasures in response to serious violations of peremptory 
norms were left ‘outside’, if international law recognizes the existence of such a right. 
350 Third Report on State Responsibility (Crawford), Addendum 4, op. cit., (413).
351 Report of the International Law Commission (2001), op. cit., 183 (b).
352 Alland, op. cit., 1232.
353 Section 3.1.3.
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Furthermore, he stressed that Article 22 can by no means be reconciled with 
Article 54: the former clearly states that it concerns ‘wrongful acts’ of a state, while 
the latter speaks about ‘lawful’ measures. According to this interpretation, there is 
a fundamental difference between acts of retorsion and countermeasures354 and 
that, concomitantly, there are substantial reasons to believe that the ILC has pre-
cluded, at least for the time being, the concept of countermeasures by states other 
than the injured. As he points out, with its decision not to include a principle 
allowing countermeasures for the most serious violations of international law, the 
ILC gave preference to ‘the absence of any consequences for the most serious 
wrongful acts’ as against the admittedly ‘subjectivism of a decentralized response 
in defence of general interests’, should institutional action fail.355 Nevertheless, 
Professor Alland’s interpretation does not agree either with the intention of the 
ILC or with the Final Articles and their commentary. Accordingly, in the light of 
the commentary to Article 54 this provision does not, at least currently, incorpo-
rate a right to third-state countermeasures but neither does it preclude it should 
such a norm permissive of third-state countermeasures evolve in the future (an 
interpretation also in accordance with the commentary on Article 22 quoted ear-
lier). It is also suggested that a countermeasure that fulfi ls the predefi ned conditions 
of legality does not constitute an unlawful but rather a lawful measure itself, an 
interpretation that would enable third-state countermeasures to fall within the 
scope of Article 54 in future.
Nevertheless, the question of whether the conclusions of the ILC concerning 
the lack of suffi cient state practice in support of countermeasures taken in the 
name of collective interests are satisfactory will be explored in the following chap-
ter. It is necessary, however, to stress that while we cannot ignore the driving force 
behind the ILC’s decision not to recognize at the present time a right to solidarity 
measures, neither can we overlook the changing nature of the international legal 
system. There is little doubt that the concerns voiced by many states regarding the 
abuse of such entitlement by powerful states at the expense of the rights of states 
to sovereignty and equality bear real merit and must necessarily be taken into 
account in outlining the most stringent conditions for the right to resort to such 
measures. However, the analysis in the preceding and current chapter has demon-
strated that the international legal order establishes a community that is no longer 
an abstract idea, but a community founded on common structures and legal prin-
ciples from which no derogation is allowed. These principles constitute the 
minimum denominator shared by all states and, therefore, the infringement of 
any of these legal principles is an attack on the legal interests of every state. No 
matter how strong the idea of state sovereignty remains in international legal 
reality, there has been an undisputable force according to which these principles 
must be respected by all, even by states that have opposed their development. As 
already seen, this is refl ected in the notion of jus cogens norms. It has also been 
354 Alland, op. cit., 1233.
355 Ibid, 1239.
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demonstrated that in addition to peremptory norms from which no derogation is 
allowed, there are other norms that establish collective rights and obligations with 
an erga omnes effect, making their observance essential for the international com-
munity of states as a whole.
In the light of the immobility and infl exibility of institutionalized law enforce-
ment in the international legal order as revealed from the primarily political role 
of the Security Council and the unfair power balance within the Security Council, 
it is imperative that the international community fi nds effective mechanisms to 
fi ght international injustices that ‘shock the conscience of mankind’. It is not pos-
sible in today’s world to stay impassive, but also legally incapable, when genocide 
or torture is committed. The argument in support of a right to solidarity measures 
becomes even stronger in the light of the danger of leaving serious violations of 
international law to go unnoticed.356 If the international community is currently 
unable to agree on the existence of institutional mechanisms entitled to the imple-
mentation and respect of international law, then the gap should be fi lled with the 
recognition of an entitlement to third states to take countermeasures. Nevertheless, 
the recognition of such a right should only come with the most stringent condi-
tions to ensure that countermeasures are not turned into a powerful weapon to the 
detriment of international law and subject to manipulation by the existing super-
powers. As characteristically pointed out by the Dutch representative to the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly: ‘[T]he respectable and laudable object of 
preventing the abuse of reprisals would be served, better than by their abolition, 
by underscoring the conditions to which their exercise is subject.’357 The issue of 
proportionality, therefore, merits separate examination in the last chapter.
7 Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to provide a thorough analysis of the ILC’s 
work on the codifi cation of the law on state responsibility in view of the great 
impact that this work has had and will have in the future development of interna-
tional law. Most importantly, the examination aimed to show how the emergence 
of the notion of collective interests infl uenced the development of the rules on state 
responsibility and also the rules concerning the enforcement of international law, 
particularly when fundamental interests come under attack. Undoubtedly, one of 
the most interesting and intriguing features of the ILC’s work has been the realiza-
tion that not all internationally wrongful acts have the same signifi cance or the 
same legal effects and that as opposed to simple breaches, there are others which 
cannot leave unaffected the international community in its entirety. This had 
an impact on the nature of responsibility with the recognition of additional legal 
356 For a similar argument, see A. de Guttry, ‘Some Recent Cases of Unilateral Countermeasures 
and the Problem of their Lawfulness in International Law’, 7 IYIL (1986–1987)169, 170.
357 Statement dated 13 December 1968, 1 NYIL (1970) 171. The reference here must relate to coun-
termeasures not involving military action. See, in this regard, ibid, 170–71. 
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consequences in the event of serious violations of peremptory norms and also on 
the circle of states entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state. 
It has further been explained that the attempt to incorporate the notion of state 
crimes in the Final Articles was eventually abandoned, due to the concerns voiced 
by states that the notion was introducing punitive elements into the law on state 
responsibility and it was taking away something from the principle of sovereign 
equality of states. This did not prevent the ILC recognizing that states were 
affected in many different ways as a result of the violation of an international 
norm, a recognition refl ected in Articles 42 and 48 of the Final Articles. Quite 
signifi cantly, it was accepted that under certain circumstances, states may invoke 
the responsibility of another state even if they have not been injured in their indi-
vidual rights. In such circumstances, states act for the purpose of safeguarding 
obligations with an erga omnes effect but also obligations established for the collec-
tive interest of a group of states. This signifi cant development further enhanced 
the notion of community interests. 
Nevertheless, the enforcement of such interests remained a controversial issue. In 
fear that a general right to countermeasures would be subject to abuse, the ILC 
decided not to include an express reference to a right to solidarity measures. Instead, 
it recognized the right of states to resort to ‘lawful measures’, having concluded in 
the meantime that there currently exists no customary rule in support of a right to 
solidarity measures. These conclusions remain all the more signifi cant since the 
question of solidarity measures is, according to the ILC, the subject of the progres-
sive development of international law. In other words, the ILC has postponed any 
fi nal settlement on the issue leaving it to states themselves to decide whether to 
accept or reject such a right in the future. The fact that the ILC did not take a fi nal 
stance on the matter opens the door to yet more controversy and legal uncertainty. 
At the same time, there is compelling and amounting evidence that the ILC may 
have erred in its fi ndings on the existence of state practice and opinio juris to support 
a right to solidarity measures and this is thoroughly explored in the next chapter. 
Before turning to Chapter 3, however, it is imperative to note that the General 
Assembly must take a clear decision on the future and status of the Final Articles. 
In the light of their signifi cance and their wide use by states, commentators and 
courts, their authority must not be compromised by legal uncertainties and, there-
fore, an international agreement is required to give legally binding effect to the 
articles, giving at the same time opportunity for further clarifi cation on those issues 
that remain ambiguous.
With these concluding remarks, attention is next turned to state practice and 
opinio juris as evidence in support of a right to countermeasures taken in the name 
of collective interests.
3 Countermeasures in the 
name of community 
interests in state practice
1 Introduction
It has been established that the incorporation of the concepts of peremptory norms 
and obligations owed to the international community and to a group of states have 
prevailed in international legal doctrine as fundamental to the accomplishment of 
community and collective interests. These developments have infl uenced issues 
relating to judicial standing and the enforcement of such interests through judicial 
channels, but also the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of a state that 
infringes such norms and the legal consequences arising in the event of a violation. 
Having shown that states not individually injured may initiate proceedings before 
international courts and other bodies for the protection of community interests 
and also interests owed to a group of states, the main purpose of Chapter 3 will be 
to consider whether states may enforce such interests through the implementation 
of countermeasures.
The signifi cance of this examination lies in what Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT 
and the obiter dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case omit to say: the way by 
which peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes may be implemented and 
enforced. Neither Article 53 nor the Court’s dictum provide for the safeguard of 
community interests through judicial proceedings; furthermore, neither do they 
expressly recognize an automatic right to countermeasures by states other than 
the injured,358 contrary to some authors’ belief.359 At the same time, the preceding 
analysis made clear that international organizations such as the UN do not have 
exclusive authority over the protection of community interests. Moreover, the 
enforcement of international law, especially whenever fundamental community 
interests are threatened, is frustrated by the selectivity often exercised at an insti-
tutional level and also by the fact that the Security Council has a very restrictive 
mandate, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, rather 
than the enforcement of fundamental community interests generally.360 In the 
358 Tams, op. cit., 204.
359 G. Erasmus, ‘Third States and Sanctions in Public International Law – the Position of South 
Africa’, 30 AVR (1992) 128, 133–4. Also see Tams, op. cit., 203.
360 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 335.
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light of these realities, a legal entitlement to ensure observance with such norms 
and obligations is conferred on states,361 even though the manner by which they 
are entitled to do so is not specifi ed. The same applies in relation to the enforce-
ment of interests owed to a group of states collectively, such as, for instance, 
interests emanating from the European Convention on Human Rights. The Final 
Articles, as discussed in Chapter 2, do little to resolve determinatively the question 
arising with respect to the lawfulness of countermeasures taken by states other 
than the injured, leaving the matter in legal limbo.
This chapter focuses predominantly on an analysis of relevant state practice and 
opinio juris in support of a right to countermeasures taken by states other than the 
injured. What is essentially at the heart of this study is whether states not injured 
in their individual but rather in their collective rights are entitled to take counter-
measures against the defaulting state for the preservation of the international ordre 
public and in response to serious violations of interests of this nature.362 This means 
that in the absence of a clear and unequivocal rule recognizing such right, the 
investigation will concentrate on the practice of states. It is state practice that will 
tell us whether the required, inter alia, opinio juris exists for the formulation of such 
a customary rule.363 In the light of the decentralization of the international legal 
system and the outlawing of the use of force and punitive, even if peaceful, action 
in contemporary state affairs, the enforcement of community interests by way of 
countermeasures and by violating specifi c obligations under international – as 
opposed to national – law is of particular signifi cance. As explained in Chapter 2, 
countermeasures are self-executing measures in the sense that they are applied by 
the individual states because no other mechanisms to remedy a certain wrongdoing 
exist or, even if such mechanisms do exist, they are often ineffective or inadequate, 
especially where immediate action needs to be taken. Despite the fact that the 
entitlement of injured states to impose countermeasures is now widely accepted in 
international legal thinking, the lawfulness of countermeasures taken in the pro-
tection of collective interests remains unsettled. As seen from the fi ndings of the 
ILC, there is arguably controversy with respect to the acceptability and legitimacy 
in international law of countermeasures taken by states that have suffered no direct 
injury to an interest not individually owed to them. Yet, as the analysis in this 
chapter aims to establish, on many occasions states have reacted strongly to aggres-
sion, genocide and other gross human rights violations while they have also given 
their support to national liberation movements fi ghting for their right to self-
determination and against apartheid, racism and colonization.364 This support 
illustrates the commitment of many states to react to violations of obligations owed 
361 Tams, op. cit., 201.
362 There is a growing opinion that the element of ‘seriousness’ is an essential requirement for the 
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to the international community or to a group of states, often in violation of the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state.365 At the 
same time, it was elaborated in Chapter 2 that a compelling opinion exists in 
the literature according to which all states may resort to coercive action whenever 
fundamental interests are seriously imperilled.366
From the analysis that follows it will be shown that these and other examples 
provide concrete evidence that there is more to be said regarding the existence of 
a customary norm permitting the use of solidarity measures in international affairs 
than the conclusions of the ILC on the matter. It will further be established that 
there is a wealth of examples in state practice and opinio juris in support of such a 
right that go beyond the limited number of examples referred to by the ILC. 
Finally, the increasing state interdependence in economic and trade affairs – the 
WTO offers just one such example – makes it more likely, as the next chapter will 
show, that the imposition of a certain measure will be in breach of an international 
obligation arising in a specifi c legal context (lex specialis or self-contained regime). 
This makes the consideration of the right to solidarity measures all the more 
important.
It is also necessary at the outset to distinguish countermeasures from other con-
duct such as retorsion that, although unfriendly in nature, does not infringe any 
international rules. Nevertheless, it will be demonstrated that such retorsive action 
may provide evidence regarding the determination of states not only not to toler-
ate but also to take specifi c, even if lawful, action in response to serious violations 
of international law. This is evidenced from the increasing concern for human 
rights violations in other countries as refl ected in the inclusion in treaties of ‘human 
rights clauses’ discussed later, the conditionality of foreign aid and assistance on 
human rights improvements and the categorization of states according to their 
human rights records or their support of terrorist activities. It will be argued that 
these cases provide further legal ground for the argument that states not directly 
affected are entitled to make a claim and invoke the responsibility of the wrongdo-
ing state that has infringed fundamental interests of the international community 
or other collective interests, even if no direct injury is involved. Moreover, such 
measures are often taken in addition to countermeasures, revealing the intention 
of states to exhaust all possible, lawful and non-lawful, coercive means at their 
disposal in order to induce the compliance of the defaulting party with its obliga-
tions under international law. Furthermore, in the absence of documentation and 
supporting evidence it is often diffi cult to assess the lawfulness of certain action, 
which may move between retorsion and countermeasures. For all these reasons, 
365 See for instance Declaration of G77 Foreign Ministers, Seventh Annual Meeting (1983) and 
Declaration of G77 Foreign Ministers, Sixth Annual Meeting (1982) cited in ibid, 212.
366 See Chapter 2, section 3.1. Also see W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th edn (A. Pearce 
Higgins: 1924) 65–6. Hall, in particular, argued that all states are entitled to take appropriate 
action necessary whenever there is a gross violation of interests of ‘serious importance’. This 
was particularly so in the absence of an ‘organized authority’ empowered to enforce inter-
national law.
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such examples of state practice are not excluded from the scope of the present 
study. 
This chapter also considers statements and calls made by non-directly injured 
states to impose countermeasures against another state even if no action were 
taken thereafter, as refl ective of opinio juris in support of a right to third-state coun-
termeasures.
The assessment of state practice and opinio juris is, however, no easy task. On the 
contrary, such study comes with a number of inherent diffi culties, as state practice 
is often inconclusive, confl icting or ambiguous. Moreover, states often avoid 
clearly identifying the legal basis of their action or they attempt to justify their 
conduct on covert legal grounds. Neither is it always easy to determine whether a 
specifi c norm has been infringed and therefore uncertainty remains as to whether 
certain conduct amounts to retorsion or third-state countermeasures. Also signifi -
cantly, uncertainty may exist in relation to whether a given wrongful act entails 
violation of fundamental collective interests that would entitle a state other than 
the injured to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer and to resort to such 
means of enforcement of international law as countermeasures.367 Another diffi -
culty present in this study is that often it is not clear whether the action is attributed 
to private actors or to the state, making it diffi cult to recognize whether the action 
constitutes a countermeasure under international law. 
With these preliminary observations in mind, and before considering state prac-
tice in depth, attention is now turned to some considerations regarding the 
implementation of economic measures as a means of coercion in international affairs 
and how these have been used at a national, regional and international level.
2 Economic measures as a means of coercion
The legitimacy of sanctions in a broader sense for the purpose of infl icting hardship 
(punitive or other) on the targeted state, irrespective of whether imposed in viola-
tion of certain international obligations (countermeasures) or not, has often been 
brought into question. Having developed in a legal system with its roots deeply 
founded on the principles of sovereign equality of states and non- interference in 
domestic affairs, the imposition of coercive measures by one state against another 
was perceived as an ‘attack’ on the foundations of the system itself. As noted in 
earlier sections, it was inconceivable that in a non-hierarchical international legal 
order a state equal with all others could impose such measures at all. 
In addition, the effectiveness of sanctions, especially those of an economic nature, 
was, and remains today, disputed. The particularly burdensome and punitive sanc-
tions infl icted on Germany after its defeat in World War I,368 have often been 
blamed for not reintegrating the country into the international community, enhanc-
ing in this way a concealed menace that led to the outbreak of World War II with 
367 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 349–50.
368 Elagab, op. cit., 29.
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its catastrophic results for humanity. Furthermore, the sanctioning system pro-
vided under the League of Nations was not suffi cient to prevent forceful acts, such 
as the bombardment and occupation of Corfu in 1923 by Italy, which argued that 
its action did not amount to war, or the invasion and occupation of Manchuria by 
Japan some 10 years later.369 The system could be triggered only in case of war 
committed by a member state, but not in response to violations short of war. 
Neither was there an organized system to impose sanctions, the application of 
which was left to member states themselves.370 The sanctions’ regime provided 
under the Covenant of the League of Nations was invoked only on one occasion, 
namely against Italy for invading Ethiopia in 1935–36, albeit with no success. 
In the years that followed World War II and up until the end of the Cold War 
era, the debate on the issue of economic measures evolved around two substan-
tially different and confl icting schools of thought. The fi rst of these opinions 
refl ected the view of western states that, alarmed by the communist threat, showed 
willingness in certain cases to use economic measures against what they consid-
ered to be an expression of communist expansion in the world through serious 
violations of the most fundamental principles of international law. This is demon-
strated, inter alia, by the economic measures imposed by western states against the 
Soviet Union for its intervention in Poland in the 1980s. The other trend repre-
sented the position of countries belonging to the Soviet bloc, which, wary of 
foreign intervention in what they regarded as falling within their exclusive juris-
diction, opposed any notion of economic coercion. Economic sanctions were 
initially conceived as an instrument that fell within the powers of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity. Nevertheless, practice soon showed that the antiparathesis of east and west 
prevailed. What the one side proposed would be vetoed by the other except where, 
and this rarely happened, no confl icting interests existed, such as, for instance, in 
the case of the arms embargo imposed against South Africa in 1977. As Mayall 
observed, the trend during the Cold War period was ‘clearly towards using sanc-
tions as a symbol of “alliance”, European or even Third World solidarity rather 
than as an instrument of international order’.371 
The decision to enter into trade exchanges with another state belongs entirely 
within the discretion of each state. In the absence of an international agreement, 
there is nothing to oblige states to engage in economic or other relations with 
other states.372 The United States’ position on this matter was always fi rm, as is 
revealed by the decades-long imposition of an embargo against Cuba. More spe-
cifi cally, the US government has always maintained that in the lack of any treaty 
369 S. Neff, ‘A Short History of International Law’ in Evans (2006) op. cit., 29, 47.
370 Shaw, op. cit., 1216-17.
371 J. Mayall, ‘The Sanctions Problem in International Economic Relations: Refl ections in the Light 
of Recent Experience’ 60 International Affairs (1984) No. 4, 631, 633.
372 C. Eagleton, International Government, 3rd edn (Ronald Press: 1957). Also see L. Picchio-Forlati and 
A.L. Sicilianos, Economic Sanctions in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff: 2004) 101.
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commitment states possess an inherent right to exercise full control over their 
trade relations and to take decisions concerning the exports and imports of goods 
with other countries at will.373 
In the cases where no specifi c international obligation is involved, state practice 
offers abundant examples of especially economic responses to serious violations of 
fundamental principles of international law. Accordingly, when the Suez Canal 
crisis broke out in 1956 as a consequence of the decision of the Egyptian govern-
ment to nationalize the Canal, the United States distanced itself from the attack 
undertaken against Egypt by both the United Kingdom and France. Wary that 
such action encouraged Soviet aggression and, more importantly, undermined the 
role of the UN and the most fundamental principles of the UN Charter such as the 
prohibition of the use of force, the United States attempted unsuccessfully to 
resolve the matter within the UN. Although the United States found itself on the 
opposite side to its traditional allies, it was determined to use its economic power 
in order to put an end to the aggressive policies of France and the United Kingdom 
against Egypt. To this end, the United States made the provision of loans and aid 
in oil supplies very much needed by both countries conditional on a ceasefi re.374 
On other occasions, the United States did not hesitate to deny military assistance 
based on human rights considerations in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Korea and 
Uruguay.375 A similar approach was undertaken by European countries within the 
framework of regional organizations such as the EU. In particular, and in the 
context of the latter’s external relations with third countries, the EU institutions 
introduced clauses on human rights considerations according to which the con-
tinuation of the cooperation between the EU and these states is made conditional 
on respect for human rights. This issue is considered thoroughly later.
Nevertheless, the application of economic measures against another state has 
not been without diffi culties or controversy. On the contrary, it is often argued 
that Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits not only armed force but also economic 
force.376 However, this view does not seem to prevail either in the literature or 
in state practice. States have frequently resorted to their economic advantages 
to induce certain conduct. The EU itself uses trade and economic benefi ts 
‘in exchange’ for respect for fundamental rights. The prohibition of economic 
coercion may, however, arise in another context, that of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of the use of economic, political or other measures in order to exert 
pressure on the sovereign rights of another state for the purpose of securing advan-
tages of any kind. This principle fi nds expression in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
373 Foreign Boycotts, David H. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
US Department of State, Digest of US Practice in International Law (1976) 575–80, 577.
374 R.R. Bowie, Suez 1956: International Crises and the Role of Law (OUP: 1974) 61–5.
375 G.C. Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, DC: 1985) 461.
376 K. Ferguson-Brown, ‘The Legality of Economic Sanctions against South Africa in Contemporary 
International Law’ 14 SAYIL (1988–89) 59, 66–7.
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and in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations and its customary character 
can hardly be disputed. In this context, what is prohibited is not any economic 
coercion, but rather coercion that intends to subordinate the sovereign rights of 
another state.377 In this respect, states that have been responsible for serious viola-
tions of community interests such as for instance genocide, torture or racial 
discrimination have always relied on the principle of non-interference in their 
domestic affairs to block international outcry and reaction. The analysis that 
follows intends to illustrate that such serious violations may no longer fi nd 
justifi cation in international law and that states are entitled to use their economic 
power, even in violation of specifi c obligations, to induce the compliance of 
the wrongdoing state. 
3 Foreign policy and human rights
During the 18th century, US foreign policy was much more reserved concerning 
support of universal moral values due to fears that the United States would be 
viewed as an imperialistic power.378 With the protection of human rights at home 
having a dominant role, it was hoped that the American example would exercise 
infl uence over other states. In the years that followed World War II, special focus 
was given to the anti-communist struggle, even if that meant establishing alliance 
with countries that supported repression and committed human rights violations 
themselves. Human rights concerns gave way to national security considerations 
with the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, noting that: ‘[I]t is dan-
gerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct 
objective of American foreign policy … The protection of basic human rights is a 
very sensitive aspect of the domestic jurisdiction of … governments.’379 However, 
our analysis will demonstrate that the United States has in many instances, 
although not every, used economic coercion, even in violation of specifi c legal 
commitments in response to serious infringements of community interests.
The monolithic obsession to restrain communism in the world to the disadvan-
tage of human rights and other fundamental principles of international law 
elsewhere came to a halt when US foreign policy was reformulated to include 
human rights issues. Since 1973, US Congress, to its credit, pressed for the inclu-
sion of internationally recognized human rights in the foreign policy agenda. In 
particular, during the period 1974–78 several legislative measures were adopted 
to link foreign security and economic assistance with human rights, among 
them, Section 32 of the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, which associated economic 
377 Ibid, 69.
378 D. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics, 2nd edn (University of Nebraska Press: 1989) 102.
379 US House of Representatives, International Protection of Human Rights, The Work of International 
Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy, hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
93rd Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: 1973) 507.
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and military assistance to foreign governments with respect for human rights. In 
addition, the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act amended Section 502B according to 
which the president should withhold security assistance from governments that 
were fl agrantly violating human rights, subject to the exception of ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ imperative for the protection of vital national interests.380 
At the same time, one of the principal objectives of ex-President Jimmy Carter 
was the promotion and protection of human rights for the establishment of a new 
world order. It was the administration’s belief that human rights considerations 
should form a substantial part of US foreign policy regarding bilateral relations 
with other states and policy issues, concerning such issues as arms sales and for-
eign aid.381 Human rights considerations became a central issue of concern for 
that administration whose commitment to human rights was ‘absolute’.382 
According to that view, the United States possessed both a ‘legal right’ and respon-
sibility under the UN Charter and international law to react to human rights 
violations,383 although American foreign policy was not always disassociated from 
national interests.384 It can be deduced from this that a certain opinio juris existed 
for the implementation of measures for protecting essential community interests. 
It needs, however, to be pointed out that many of the measures associating bene-
fi ts and other assistance with the protection of human rights were adopted at a 
national level at the discretion of the US government through legislative acts and 
executive orders and not because or in violation of specifi c international legal 
obligations. Having said that, it will be established that the United States has often 
resorted to solidarity measures, enhancing both state practice and opinio juris in 
support of such a right under customary international law.
Canada, for its part, stressed that ‘as a matter of legal and commercial policy’ 
economic sanctions should be imposed only under a Chapter VII Security Council 
resolution or by states acting collectively in reaction to fundamental violations 
of international law and peace and security, in pursuance of a UN resolution, 
380 See Racial Discrimination, US Representative Albert Sherer, Digest of US Practice in International 
Law (1976) 163–6, and Economic and Military Assistance: Legislative Restrictions, Digest of US Practice 
in International Law (1976) 170. Also see Arms Export Act, International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 USC 2151, Public Law 94–329, 94th Congress, H.R. 
13680, 30 June 1976, 90 Stat. 729 and International Financial Institutions Act, International Financial 
Institutions Act, P.L. 95–118 in Economic and Military Assistance: Legislative Restrictions, Digest of 
United States Practice (1977) 221, 222–3. Yet, when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 the United 
States, in violation of both its domestic and international legal obligations continued providing 
the former with both military and economic assistance. For a thorough legal analysis of the 
administration’s refusal to suspend assistance to Turkey see E.T. Rossides, ‘Cyprus and the Rule 
of Law’ 17 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (1991) No. 1.
381 D. Kommers and G. Loescher (eds) Human Rights and American Foreign Policy (University of Notre 
Dame Press: 1979) 212.
382 President Carter’s Inaugural Address, 20 January 1977, New York Times, 21 January 1977.
383 Ibid. 
384 See statement of Foreign Secretary Cyrus Vance in J. Salzberg and D. Young, ‘The Parliamentary 
Role in Implementing International Human Rights: A U.S. Example’ 12 TILJ (1977) 251, 269–74.
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including a resolution by the General Assembly. According to the Canadian 
government, while international law gave states discretion to impose economic 
measures in response to ‘objectionable’ conduct of another state, economic sanc-
tions constituted derogation from the general principle concerning friendly 
relations among states and, therefore, any decision for their application was not to 
be taken ‘lightly’.385 While it may be argued that the Canadian government 
insisted on the express authorization of such action in accordance with the rules of 
international law, it can be inferred that Canada would resort to coercive mea-
sures in violation of international law even in the light of General Assembly 
resolutions. This is signifi cant since the General Assembly is not empowered under 
the UN Charter to take legally binding decisions. Accordingly, the determination 
of Canada to follow the recommendations of the General Assembly even, as indi-
cated already, in violation of the principle concerning the friendly relations among 
states, may be refl ective of support of solidarity measures, decided, however, 
within a collective context. 
In another memorandum issued in 1985 by Canada, it was noted that retalia-
tory action in violation of international law was justifi ed if it came in response to 
another international illegal act. Stressing again that sanctions violate customary 
rules of international law as refl ected in the 1970 United Nations Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States, it was noted that: ‘[I]t is the purpose behind certain economic mea-
sures that serves as the essential criterion to separate legally permissible conduct 
from illicit conduct.’386 While no explicit reference is made to whether states not 
directly injured may be entitled to implement such economic measures, the refer-
ence to the purpose of the measures may provide evidence that the statement 
refers to the right of third states to resort to solidarity measures. This is because in 
such circumstances the purpose of such measures, namely the protection of essen-
tial community interests, would justify the unlawfulness of such action. This 
interpretation is also supported by the fact that the Canadian statements made in 
1983 clearly referred to the right of third states to adopt coercive measures, as an 
injured state would not need authorization from the Security Council or the 
General Assembly to do so. 
The Netherlands, by way of contrast, following a mandatory decision of the 
Security Council in 1968 to impose sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, intro-
duced the so-called Sanctions Bill to fi ll in the legal loopholes in the national 
legislation for the implementation of the Security Council mandate. As noted in 
the Explanatory Memorandum, the Bill was intended to be used as a tool towards 
the national implementation of international decisions, recommendations or 
agreements concerning the maintenance of international peace and security or 
the furtherance of the interests of the international legal order. When asked to 
defi ne the phrase ‘international accords’ the Dutch government stressed that it did 
385 Economic Sanctions, memorandum issued on 15 April 1982 by the Canadian Legal Bureau, CYIL 
(1983) 311.
386 Economic Sanctions, memorandum dated 3 June 1985, CYIL (1986) 387–8. 
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not want to exclude from the scope of the Bill accords, which, although they did 
not constitute a decision of a certain international organization, were taken within 
the framework of an international organization. Under the explanation given, 
‘decisions’ taken by the EEC Council for common action or under European 
political cooperation could also fall into this category.387 The Bill allowed the 
application of measures for, inter alia, gross violation of human rights and breaches 
of the international legal order that could threaten international peace and secu-
rity.388 While no reference is specifi cally made in relation to the exercise of 
countermeasures by states other than the injured, it may be deduced that the 
Dutch government was committed to implement such international decisions 
taken, as in the case of Canada, in a collective context, even if this meant violation 
of specifi c international obligations towards the targeted state. 
4 European Community action
Human rights considerations and the observance of fundamental principles of inter-
national law could not be discarded from the ambit of the EU, the institutions of 
which on some occasions did not hesitate to resort to countermeasures in response to 
serious infringements of international law, even despite the fact that none of the EU 
member states had been individually affected. One crucial question that arises in this 
respect is on what legal grounds the EU, which in the 1980s was essentially struc-
tured on the common economic interests of its member states rather than on common 
foreign policy strategic goals, was allowed to take countermeasures in disregard of its 
own obligations under international law. Moreover, such action has been questioned 
as falling outside the exclusive competences of the Community institutions and as 
being targeted against states not members of the EU. This problem, which raises 
questions especially in the context of international and European law,389 was par-
ticularly apparent in the action taken by the European Community against Argentina 
in the 1980s but also against Yugoslavia in the 1990s discussed below.
In this context, the 1987 Single European Act and the 1992 Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) have dramatically reoriented Community internal policies. They 
have also had a great impact on the external policies of the EU, especially on 
issues of defence, security and human rights, on which the exercise of countermea-
sures by the European institutions can arguably now rely.390 
The incorporation of Articles 6 and 7 in the Treaty on European Union and 
the particular weight the EU attaches to human rights considerations in its exter-
nal relations are all indicative of the increasingly growing interdependence 
between the EU and fundamental interests owed to all states. This is evidenced by 
387 ‘The meaning of “international accords” in draft Article 2 of the 1976 Sanctions Bill”, 9 NYIL 
(1978) 235–7.
388 Sanctions Bill, Bijl. Hand. II 1975/76-14006 No. 3, 8.
389 C. Chinkin, ‘The Legality of the Imposition of Sanctions by the European Union in International 
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Publishing Company Ltd: 1996) 183, 185.
390 Ibid, 186. 
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the numerous ‘human rights clauses’, the clear interconnection of human rights 
with unilaterally granted benefi ts and trade preferences, the emphasis given by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to human rights as an integral part of the general 
principles of law and the political conditions including respect for human rights as 
preconditions for accession to the organization.
The legal framework applicable in the case of implementation of measures 
decided at Community level in the form of embargoes, withdrawal of unilaterally 
afforded benefi ts or suspension of treaties concluded by the Communities, often 
varies according to whether there exists a Security Council resolution authorizing 
or even imposing such measures. In the former case, the decision of the Security 
Council will as, a matter of general rule, prevail in accordance with Article 103 of 
the UN Charter that provides that the obligations deriving therefrom should pre-
vail over all other international treaty obligations. Nevertheless, the recent ruling 
of the ECJ in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases elaborated later may indicate that EU 
member states may be called to disregard such obligations for the purpose of 
upholding fundamental interests safeguarded under the European treaties such as 
respect for fundamental human rights.
Until 1970 the implementation of UN measures was largely perceived as falling 
within the domain of the EU member states and thus no regulations were adopted 
in order to give them legal effect at Community level. This, however, changed in 
1970 with the establishment of European political cooperation, institutionalized 
in 1987 with the Single European Act. European political cooperation intended to 
enhance the cohesion and unity of the member states regarding issues in the inter-
ests of the Community such as external policies and to establish, subject to the 
consensus of all member states, a ‘common European identity in their foreign 
affairs’.391 According to this system, it was through Council regulations, adopted 
after the political consultation of the member states in the context of European 
political cooperation that UN sanctions were given effect. With the adoption of 
the Treaty of the European Union such measures can now take effect under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar and the European Community. This 
practice is now refl ected in Article 301 (formerly Article 228a).392 This Article 
provides for measures adopted by the Council whenever: ‘[I]t is provided, in a 
common position or in a joint action adopted by the Treaty on European Union 
relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community 
to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or 
more third countries.’393 Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty, while not amend-
ing this provision, introduced a new article, Article 300(2), under the European 
Community treaty. According to this provision, the application of an agreement 
may be suspended with a decision taken by the Council (by qualifi ed majority or 
unanimity according to the matter under consideration) without the consultation 
391 Ibid, 186–7.
392 EU consolidated versions of the Treaty on EU and of the Treaty establishing the EC, OJ C 321 
E/1, 29 December 2006.
393 Ibid.
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of the European Parliament and without referring to a decision taken under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.394
Diffi culty is raised with respect to economic measures imposed in violation of 
existing treaties or other international commitments and in the absence of Security 
Council authorization. As noted, such measures do not necessarily aim at restor-
ing international peace and security, as do UN measures, but rather they ‘constitute 
a deliberate reaction against international law violations by other States’.395 They 
can only be justifi ed if they are provided under a treaty or a rule of customary 
international law, such as countermeasures. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, 
the European Community was reluctant to take coercive action against Uganda 
in response to the gross violations of human rights taking place within its territory 
in the late 1970s. The fact that the European Community continued its payments 
to the brutal regime of Idi Amin fi nds explanation as noted ‘in the limited possi-
bilities for reaction which general international law offered’.396 This is due to the 
fact that under the law of treaties a specifi c agreement can be suspended or termi-
nated on the ground of human rights considerations only if the treaty so provides 
or if the human rights violations go against the very object and purpose of the 
treaty.397 Nevertheless, violations of specifi c treaty commitments can be justifi ed 
as countermeasures under the law on state responsibility, as the analysis in this 
chapter establishes. Decisions of this nature that infringe specifi c treaty provisions 
must, therefore, be distinguished from acts of retorsion. This is the case of with-
drawal of unilaterally awarded benefi ts and many such examples can be found at 
Community level. Since such benefi ts constitute the exercise of sovereign rights, 
their withdrawal does not constitute an internationally wrongful act.398 
The issue differs with respect to measures taken in violation of specifi c conven-
tional or other international obligations. The controversial nature of this problem 
has driven the Community to incorporate human rights clauses when negotiat-
ing agreements with third states. This admittedly affords the Community institutions 
fl exibility granting them the right to terminate or suspend a treaty towards a state 
that does not conform to such principles, without having to rely on general inter-
national law for the non-performance of an agreement.399 As noted in this regard, 
a human rights clause ‘does not seek to establish new standards in the international 
protection of human rights. It merely reaffi rms existing commitments which, as 
394 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and related acts, Offi cial Journal C 340, 10 November 1997. Also see E. 
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general international law, already bind all states as well as the EC in its capacity as 
a subject of general international law’, although it was acknowledged that such a 
clause derived its legitimacy from an international agreement.400 Still, quite impor-
tantly, Brandtner and Rosas seem to suggest that a reaction by other states against 
a wrongdoing state would be justifi ed as a duty that derives from human rights 
norms.
From the examination of the state practice that follows, it will be established 
that suspension or termination of a treaty has often been justifi ed not on the provi-
sions of the treaty itself but rather on rules of customary international law, such as 
fundamental change of circumstances or impossibility of performance as a result 
of a state emergency or civil war.401 It is therefore suggested that Community 
institutions may also rely on a customary rule allowing countermeasures taken in 
the name of collective interests. Riedel and Will argue that since the European 
Community is not a party to human rights treaties, it would ‘possibly’ be entitled 
to take reprisals (countermeasures) only for ‘violations of the minimum standards 
of human rights protection recognized in customary international law as valid erga 
omnes’.402 Undoubtedly, the main challenge here will be to prove that there indeed 
exists a right to countermeasures by a state other than the injured under custom-
ary international law and this is what the following sections aim to establish.
5  Responses to violations of collective interests in 
state practice
The assessment of state practice requires the division of the various examples into 
two categories of case study. The fi rst category includes examples from state prac-
tice that, although they do not involve the infringement of specifi c international 
obligations arising either from treaty or custom, are nonetheless illustrative of the 
determination of states to exert economic and other pressure against states in 
response to serious violations of fundamental community and collective interests. 
In some of these cases, states had expressed their intention and willingness to resort 
to countermeasures when no direct injury was involved and even if no such action 
were actually taken in the end. In addition, in some of the examples considered in 
this category it was not possible to establish beyond any doubt the lawfulness of the 
action under international law. Quite signifi cantly, the decision of states to resort 
to retorsive measures should not be construed as an opinio juris against solidarity 
measures. On the contrary, it will be argued that in many of the incidents that will 
be considered in this section states had exhausted all possible means at their dis-
posal. This was often achieved through lawful measures but also measures in 
violation of specifi c international rules, in response to serious violations of interests 
owed either to the international community as a whole or to a group of states. 
400 Ibid, 475.
401 Riedel, Will, op. cit., 724–5.
402 Ibid, 726.
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The second category considers state practice that, in the author’s opinion, pro-
vides evidence concerning the enforcement of interests owed to the international 
community as a whole or to a group of states through the implementation of coun-
termeasures by states other than the injured. As the analysis will demonstrate, the 
implementation of countermeasures by such states is well developed by state prac-
tice and opinio juris, satisfying the essential legal requirements for the claim that a 
customary rule of international law on the right to solidarity measures has now 
come into existence. At the same time, this category also engages with state action 
that although justifi ed as third-state countermeasures, their categorization as such 
may be disputed on other grounds. In this regard, such action has given rise to 
questions not in relation to whether it infringes a specifi c norm of international 
law, but rather as not fulfi lling one of the other conditions of solidarity measures, 
namely the fact that they must be a response to the violation of community and 
collective interests. Despite this, it will be argued that such incidents refl ect the 
existence of a legal belief on the part of states that their action was aimed at the 
protection of community interests and that they enhance the argument that under 
customary international law solidarity measures are permissible. 
The results of the current research in either category are cited by way of chron-
ological order rather than signifi cance. 
5.1 State action not amounting to countermeasures
5.1.1 Soviet action against Israel (1956) 
In November 1956 the Soviet Union refused to grant export licences to the Soviet 
Petroleum Export Corporation for the shipment of petroleum to Israeli importers, 
in spite of the existence of a contract concluded between the Corporation and the 
Israeli companies in November 1955, later extended in May 1956, and another 
contract concluded by the same parties in July 1956. The decision of the Soviet 
Union came as a response to the Israeli invasion in the Sinai Peninsula in October 
1956 and to Israel’s aggression against Egypt in the Suez Canal crisis.403 Israel 
brought the case before the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, set up 
under Soviet law to adjudicate disputes of a contractual and other civil law nature 
arising in relations between subjects of various states during the conduct of foreign 
trade. The Corporation justifi ed its decision not to honour its contractual commit-
ments by invoking grounds of force majeure.404 
According to international law, a state-owned enterprise may invoke force majeure 
whenever the performance of its treaty commitments towards a private party is 
not possible due to a government order or decision of the controlling state, for 
403 See R. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order (Mitchie Company: 1976) 24; 
M. Domke, ‘The Israeli–Soviet Oil Arbitration’, AJIL 53 (October 1959) No. 4, 787.
404 USSR’s Prohibition of Shipment of Petroleum due to Israel’s Aggression against Egypt, Digest of US Practice 
in International Law (1970) 861.
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reasons not foreseen at the time of conclusion of the agreement. In this event, the 
state-owned company is treated by law as a private enterprise and thus discharged 
of its obligations under the treaty, if certain conditions are met.405 
Due to lack of further evidence, however, it was not possible to determine 
whether the decision of the Soviet Union was in violation of specifi c international 
legal commitments towards Israel. Therefore, it cannot be conclusively deter-
mined whether the Soviet Union’s refusal to provide the export licences constituted 
countermeasures under international law. Nevertheless, the incident shows the 
reaction of a third state, here the Soviet Union, not directly affected by the aggres-
sive policies of another, Israel, to infl ict a certain economic burden for violating a 
fundamental principle of international law owed to all states, namely the prohibi-
tion of the use of armed force. The position would substantially change had the 
Soviet Union possessed a specifi c obligation under customary or conventional 
international law to export petroleum to Israel or to conduct trade and commer-
cial activities with it. 
In addition to the Soviet Union’s decision not to issue the petroleum export 
licences, the government proceeded to cut off diplomatic relations with Israel by 
recalling its ambassador, a measure that does not infringe specifi c international 
obligations.406 
5.1.2 The Bonn Declaration (1978) and the hijacking incident (1981)
In a signifi cant move against acts of terrorism through aircraft hijacking, the heads 
of state and government of the seven most industrialized countries of the world 
issued in 1978 the so-called Bonn Declaration for the purpose of taking action 
against states involved in such conduct.407 The Declaration called for immediate 
action against a state that refused to extradite or prosecute individuals involved 
in the hijacking of aircraft or to return such aircraft by halting ‘all incoming 
fl ights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country 
concerned’. 
The legality of the measures authorized under the Declaration were, however, 
put into question as imposing obligations on states that had not given their consent 
to the Declaration. According to this view, the Declaration could not give rise to 
legal obligations regarding the return of the hijacked aircraft or the prosecution or 
extradition of individuals. Such obligations could only emerge from a customary 
rule of international law having an erga omnes character, or from the Tokyo 
405 C. Scott Maravilla, ‘The Ability of a State-Owned Enterprise to Declare Force Majeure Based 
Upon Actions of the State’ Journal of International & Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent (2002)  Volume 
2, 82.
406 Suez Canal Crisis, Letter by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin to Israeli Prime Minister David 
Ben-Gurion, 5 November 1956.
407 At the time these states were: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US and West 
Germany.
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Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft408 
and the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
provided, of course, that the targeted state was party to these instruments.409 
Therefore, a state not party to any of these international agreements could not be 
held internationally responsible, even more so because the Declaration did not 
constitute part of the agreements establishing special enforcement mechanisms in 
the event of their violation. Moreover, Busuttil argued that since the two conven-
tions had not been universally endorsed, it was diffi cult to say that they refl ected 
customary norms of international law.410 Accordingly, the mere fact of refusing to 
comply with any of the terms of the Declaration did not establish the responsibility 
of the state.411 Neither did the participating states intend to strengthen the 
Declaration with a legally binding effect, as a result of which it was doubtful if it 
created any legal obligations even as between them.412 
Counter to this view, it can be argued that the Bonn Declaration provides evi-
dence of state support of a right to suspend obligations arising from aviation 
agreements in response to violations of obligations erga omnes. From the wording of 
the Declaration, it becomes apparent that the participating states were determined 
to take action against any state that refused to extradite or prosecute individuals 
involved in hijacking. This was the case irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft 
involved in the hijacking and the nationality of the individuals affected therefrom 
or the territory on which such hijacking took place and irrespective of whether that 
state had accepted the Declaration.413 This refl ects the belief of the participating 
states that the commission of such acts violated obligations owed to all states. 
Chamberlain suggests, in this regard, that although it was diffi cult to conclude 
that the obligations entailed in the Hague and Montreal Conventions regarding 
extradition and prosecution were part of customary international law,414 ‘certain 
principles of customary international law can be formulated on the basis of these 
Conventions as well as of other international instruments’, such as UN and 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions.415 Therefore, 
according to him, all states possessed a duty under customary international law 
not to allow their territories to be used as safe havens for terrorists and individuals 
involved in acts of hijacking, provided that their refusal to extradite or prosecute 
408 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 14 
September 1963, 704 UNTS 219; J. Busuttil, ‘The Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: 
A Non-Binding International Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking’ 31 ICLQ (1982) 474, 476. 
409 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December 1970, 10 
ILM (1971) 133; Busuttil, ibid, 477.
410 Busuttil, ibid, 480. Also K. Chamberlain, ‘Collective Suspension of Air Services with States which 
Harbour Hijackers’ 32 ICLQ (1983) 616, 620.
411 Busuttil, ibid, 481.
412 Ibid, 487.
413 Bonn Declaration, 1978 (II) Pub. Papers 1308, reprinted in (1978) 17 ILM 1285.
414 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in 
Montreal, 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177; Chamberlain, op. cit., 617.
415 Chamberlain, ibid, 629.
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was not the result of technical diffi culties but rather of intentional systematic fail-
ure to do so.416 
However, the fact that all states have a certain duty not to allow their territory 
to be used for such purposes does not necessarily imply that in case of its violation 
all states have an interest in reacting. Chamberlain argues, in this regard, that if 
the wrongdoing state is a party to any of the conventions just mentioned, then 
other states that are parties would be entitled to take retaliatory measures against 
it under general international law, as that state would be in breach of an interna-
tional obligation owed to all the parties to the Conventions. He fi nds it diffi cult to 
support the legitimacy of retaliatory measures against a state that is not party to 
these Conventions, however, unless the other states were directly affected by the 
violation.417 
The Declaration reveals that the states concerned had a belief that acts of air-
craft hijacking infringed obligations owed to all states, entitling them to the 
response proclaimed in the Declaration. It can therefore be concluded from this 
that the intention of states to cease the performance of aviation agreements in 
such circumstances offers another example of state practice and opinio juris in sup-
port of a right to third-state countermeasures.418 It is well established that 
declarations can be used as precedents as they may refl ect the existence of legal 
norms and principles or they may assist in creating new norms of customary inter-
national law.419
Legal considerations regarding the Bonn Declaration have arisen from the 
decision of the seven participating states to implement its provisions against 
Afghanistan. In March 1981, a Pakistani aircraft was hijacked and taken to 
Afghanistan. The participating states condemned the Afghan government’s fail-
ure to cease giving refuge to the hijackers as in fl agrant violation of the obligations 
arising from the Hague Convention, to which Afghanistan was a party. They also 
considered a suspension of all fl ights to and from Afghanistan as provided under 
the Bonn Declaration unless Afghanistan complied with its obligations.420 Indeed, 
this position was reaffi rmed at the Ottawa meeting of the G7 where it was pro-
posed suspending all fl ights from and to Afghanistan, were Afghanistan to fail to 
comply with its obligations under the 1970 Hague Convention.421 During the 
meeting it was emphasized that aircraft hijacking and hostage taking were fl agrant 
violations of fundamental human rights and international law, including the 1970 
Hague Convention, and that they also threatened aviation safety. It is notable that 
the decision was aimed at the protection of collective interests, namely air safety 
established under the relevant Conventions.
416 Ibid, 630.
417 Ibid.
418 Tams, op. cit., 226.
419 D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: 2004) 56.
420 81 Department of State Bulletin, No. 2053, August 1981, 16.
421 Ottawa Statement on International Terrorism, 21 July 1981, available at http://www.
g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1981ottawa/terrorism.html; Keesing’s (1981) 31231.
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In December 1981, and in the light of no further progress, France, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany, the only countries having air agreements with 
the country, decided to denounce their air services agreements with Afghanistan. 
This decision was reached in response to Afghanistan’s failure to prosecute or 
extradite those responsible for the hijacking of the Pakistani aircraft. The decision 
was to have effect from December 1982, after giving 1 year’s notice, in accordance 
with the terms of the aviation agreements.422 Chamberlain, in particular, criticizes 
the politically cautious position of France, the United Kingdom and West Germany 
not to denounce the respective agreements with Afghanistan with immediate 
effect.423 
The adoption of the Bonn Declaration and the determination of states to imple-
ment the declaration through the suspension and denunciation of aviation 
agreements in response to a serious violation of international aviation safety 
enhance the argument concerning the recognition of third-state countermeasures 
for the protection of collective interests under customary international law. 
Declarations of this kind provide evidence of state practice and also of the legal 
belief of states on the rules of international law and therefore can be used as evi-
dence for the existence of a customary rule. The fact that in the case of Afghanistan 
the denunciation of the relevant aviation agreements was not in violation of inter-
national law or of the agreements themselves should not undermine the legal 
signifi cance of this incident as adding to the state practice and on the opinio juris on 
the matter.
5.1.3 US action against Iraq (1980)
This incident arose in early 1980 as a result of an attack on an Israeli kibbutz by 
the Arab Liberation Front, which Iraq allegedly supported. The United States, in 
response to this attack, decided to suspend an agreed sale to Iraq of $208 million 
worth of turbine engines, thus subjecting it to coercive measures on the ground of 
terrorist involvement. These trade restraints lasted until 1982 and, in 1984, the 
United States imposed a further embargo on chemical exports to Iraq that could 
be used for the development of chemical weapons.424 
The US decision, although not widely referred to in the literature, may indeed 
offer another example of third-state countermeasures in response to serious viola-
tions of international law. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear whether the agreed 
422 Keesing’s (1982) 31545; Chamberlain, op. cit., 628. Also see Frowein, (1994) op. cit., 418; 
Keesing’s (1978) 29293; Keesing’s (1981) 31071. 
423 Chamberlain, ibid, 632.
424 In Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories, 2nd edn (Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, DC: 1990) 526 and in J. Petman, ‘Resort to Economic 
Sanctions by Not Directly Affected States’ in Picchio-Forlati and Sicilianos, op. cit., 366. Also see 
‘Terrorism: Laws Cited Imposing Sanctions on Nations Supporting Terrorism’, Fact Sheet for 
the Honourable Frank R. Lautenberg, United States Senate, United States General Accounting 
Offi ce, April 1987, available at http://archive.gao.gov/d28t5/133073.pdf.
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sale was the object of a private contract or whether it constituted an agreement 
between the United States and Iraq, in which case the suspension would be in 
breach of international law and, therefore, would fall within the defi nition of 
countermeasures. Furthermore, in order for the action taken against Iraq to qual-
ify as solidarity measures it would have to be shown that these had been taken as 
a response to the serious violation of an obligation owed to all states, including the 
United States. As the attack did not injure the United States directly, the latter 
would need to establish that Iraq, by supporting terrorism, was in violation of 
specifi c norms that create obligations erga omnes. It could be argued, in this respect, 
that international terrorism threatens international peace and security and vio-
lates fundamental principles, such as human rights and, as such, involvement in 
terrorist activities entitles all states to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing 
state. Still, the United States would have to establish that Iraq’s conduct was a 
serious violation of fundamental interests of international law.425 
While the United States could establish a legal interest to take coercive action 
in this incident, uncertainty remains as to whether the suspension of the turbine 
engine sales and the chemical ban were in breach of treaty obligations towards 
Iraq. Accordingly, due to the doubts that exist relating to whether certain state 
obligations had been infringed by the United States in the particular case, since 
Iraq was not a party to GATT, it is regarded as necessary to include this example 
in that category of cases not clearly illustrating state practice in support of third-
state countermeasures.426 In any event, the signifi cance of this incident should not 
be undermined as it reveals the determination of a state not directly injured by a 
given wrongful act to take such measures necessary for the protection of collective 
interests, namely protection from international terrorism. 
5.1.4 Denmark against Turkey (2000)
The interstate application brought before the European Court of Human Rights 
by Denmark against Turkey in 2000 may provide some useful conclusions in rela-
tion to the right of states to exercise non-forcible coercion, not necessarily of an 
economic character, in response to serious violations of legal interests owed to all 
states. Although the case was later settled with the agreement of the two parties, 
and despite the fact that the violations occurred against a Danish national, thus 
giving Denmark the status of an injured state, it is worth looking at the specifi c 
terms of the settlement. 
The complaint of the Danish government concerned allegations that a Danish 
national detained in Turkey was subjected to ill treatment in violation of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the settlement that followed, a 
declaration made by the Turkish government was incorporated as an integral 
part of the settlement. In the declaration, Turkey acknowledged that there 
425 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 347–8.
426 For GATT membership, see http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/gattmem_e.htm.
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were occasional and individual cases of torture and ill treatment in the country 
while announcing a series of legislative and other measures on its part to decrease 
such violations. Turkey expressed its commitment to continue improvement 
measures in the fi eld of human rights, and especially against torture, and to coop-
erate with international organs and mechanisms in order to deal with these 
problems. Moreover, Turkey undertook to participate in a number of projects 
concerning the training of police offi cers especially in relation to investigation and 
human rights issues while the two countries decided to establish a continuous 
political dialogue between their governments that would also involve human rights 
considerations.427 
The example is stimulating because Denmark did not confi ne itself to remedies 
regarding the particular dispute but went even further by requiring, as part of the 
settlement, certain reassurances that general torture practices in Turkey would 
stop. Even more interesting, Denmark undertook fi nancially to support a bilateral 
project, the purpose of which would be the training of Turkish police offi cers ‘in 
order to achieve further knowledge and practical skills in the fi eld of human 
rights’.428
While this incident does not fall within the category of third-state countermea-
sures, the legal conclusions arising therefrom cannot be overlooked. Despite the 
fact that the settlement reached by the two countries was not imposed in violation 
of international law, but, rather, in conformity with the provisions of the European 
Convention for the protection of human rights and for the settlement of disputes, 
Denmark’s demand went beyond just seeking a remedy for the direct injury 
infl icted on it. Instead, acting as an interested party for the safeguarding of rights 
owed to a group of states (erga omnes partes), Denmark pursued, and obtained, a 
legal commitment by Turkey that it would respect its obligations concerning the 
prohibition of torture, owed to all states being parties to the Council of Europe 
and to the international community as a whole. 
5.2  Countermeasures by states other than 
the injured in state practice
The ILC, in its 2001 Final Articles restricted its reference to state practice support-
ing a right to solidarity measures to a limited number of examples than those that, 
in fact, exist. This led it to the conclusion that there is no suffi cient state practice 
and opinio juris to establish the existence of a customary rule on the matter. This 
may fi nd explanation in the ILC’s intention to fi nally reach a compromise between 
states and bring to a conclusion its work on state responsibility, a work that lasted 
more than four decades. Most importantly, the controversial nature of third state 
countermeasures and the objections of some states to incorporate such right in the 
Final Articles played a determinative role in the ILC’s decision. 
427 Denmark v Turkey, Friendly Settlement of 5 April 2000, Application No. 34382/97. 
428 Ibid. 
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The purpose of the following analysis is to provide evidence that countermea-
sures in the collective interest have frequently been used by states and that they 
are well established in international law.429 The consideration includes clear 
examples of third-state countermeasures, but also makes reference to specifi c 
examples that, although referred to by the ILC or the literature as third-state 
countermeasures, may give rise to questions as to whether there was a breach of a 
collective interest in the fi rst place. Moreover, in some of these examples states 
resorting to coercive action did not clarify the legal grounds on which they claimed 
an entitlement to resort to such action. In other words, they did not justify 
the reasons that the initial wrongdoing entitled them to respond with counter-
measures, such as in the case of the coercive action against Poland and the 
Soviet Union in the early 1980s. The decision to include these examples in 
the category of state practice in support of solidarity measures relied on the 
fact that these examples refl ect the legal belief of states that they were responding 
to an infringement that affected community interests and, therefore, their 
legal belief that countermeasures of this nature are recognized under interna-
tional law.
Finally, our analysis includes examples of state practice that, although justifi ed 
on other legal grounds such as fundamental change of circumstances, should have 
been justifi ed as third-state countermeasures. 
The wealth of examples in state practice examined in this section does not 
justify the conclusions of the ILC on the right to solidarity measures. In addition 
to the fact that the ILC considered only a very limited number of examples in 
its commentary on Article 54, these were limited to a very narrow period of 
time and, in particular, they concerned incidents that took place in the last 
three decades. Although this analysis will not extensively consider early practices 
going back to the 19th century or even before that, it is regarded as essential 
to refer to one such example concerning countermeasures in response to slavery. 
The reference to this early example is necessary not only for the invaluable 
conclusions that can be derived therefrom, but also to illustrate that much 
more evidence in support of third-state countermeasures exists than the ILC 
acknowledged. 
This will be followed by consideration of another example arising from the 
period during World War II, while the plethora of the examples examined here 
relate to state practice that occurred after the end of World War II. 
5.2.1 Slavery and the United States–Great Britain Mixed Commission (1853)
The fi rst example to be considered concerns four signifi cant cases brought 
before the United States–Great Britain Commission, established in the light of a 
convention concluded on 8 February 1853 to adjudicate claims by a mixed 
commission, in which the United States demanded damages and compensation 
429 For similar conclusions, see Tams, op. cit., 249 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 333.
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against Great Britain. In particular, the United States complained against the 
decision of British authorities to free a number of slaves who were on board 
American vessels that belonged to American nationals. 
In four separate developments in the early 19th century, the vessels Enterprise, 
Hermosa, Creole and Lawrence with a number of slaves on board were, due to bad 
weather conditions or for other reasons of necessity, induced to enter British juris-
diction in the West Indies. In all four cases, the British authorities freed the slaves 
despite the fact that the vessels carried the American fl ag and belonged to American 
nationals. 
The Enterprise was forced to enter British jurisdiction in 1835. The British gov-
ernment rejected American claims for compensation on the ground that slavery 
was prohibited in its territories and it was neither in its ‘interests’ nor acceptable 
under its ‘moral sentiments’.430 It was further the British assertion that slavery was 
in violation of the law of nature, recognized by many states.431 The United States, 
for its part, argued among others that no state could be forced by another state to 
change its laws and that such a matter fell within the jurisdiction of each state.432 
Rejecting the view that slavery was prohibited under the law of nations, the United 
States argued that: ‘[N]o one nation … has a right to … procure an eminent good 
by means that are unlawful, or to press forward to a great principle by breaking 
through other great principles that stand in the way.’433 The British representa-
tive, responding to US claims, pointed out that to accept the rights of slave owners 
would be a denial of both the laws existing in English territories at the time and 
the laws of nature. If that were the case, then ‘it would be to make international 
law a partial tyrant rather than an equal arbitrator between nations’.434 It was, 
moreover, stressed that the domestic laws applicable within British jurisdiction 
concerning the prohibition of slavery were in compliance, rather than in violation 
of, international law. 435
The Umpire was called to consider whether slavery had been abolished at the 
time the Enterprise sought refuge in Bermudas. If a norm prohibiting slavery existed, 
then the conduct of the British authorities to free the slaves onboard Enterprise 
would not give rise to the responsibility of Great Britain. If, however, no such 
norm existed, then Great Britain would incur responsibility towards the United 
States for infringing its obligation to respect and protect the property of 
430 J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party’, 
Vol. 4 (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Offi ce: 1898) 4349. It is noteworthy that in 
two similar cases, and in particular in Comet and Encomium, which sought refuge in British jurisdic-
tion in 1830 and 1834 respectively, the British government accepted the claims for compensation, 
since at the time slavery was still permitted under British laws.
431 Ibid, 4359–60, 4366. 
432 Ibid, 4360–61.
433 Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), Le Louis case, 2 Dod. 238 cited in ibid, 4360–61.
434 Ibid, 4369.
435 Ibid, 4370.
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foreign nationals and to provide refuge in British ports to foreign vessels caught 
in distress. 
While acknowledging that slavery violated principles of humanity and justice, 
the Umpire held that at the time of the specifi c incident, slavery was still common 
in many countries, including British dominions where it had not been entirely 
abolished and, therefore, it was not in violation of the laws of nations.436 The 
Umpire fi nally concluded that, in freeing the slaves of a vessel caught in distress, 
Great Britain had acted in violation of international law. 
Similar fi ndings were made in the case of Hormosa, concerning another American 
vessel that sought refuge in British jurisdiction in 1840, and in the case of Creole 
in 1841.437
Signifi cantly, the Umpire reached a different conclusion in the Lawrence case. 
This case concerned an American vessel that in 1848 sprang a leak and therefore 
sought refuge in Sierra Leone, at the time under British control. Amid seizure of 
the cargo onboard Lawrence by British authorities, its owners claimed compensa-
tion. However, the Umpire held that the vessel was equipped for and engaged in 
the slave trade and that therefore its owners could not seek compensation or pro-
tection of their interests. According to the Umpire, at the specifi c time that this 
incident occurred, the slave trade was prohibited by all civilized states as being in 
violation of the law of nations,438 distinguishing in this manner this case from the 
previous rulings.
As noted later by Mr Ago, the ruling on Enterprise would have today been 
different. In this regard:
[T]here is no doubt that between the date of the Umpire’s decision and the 
present day, a profound change has occurred in the rules of international law 
concerning the question to which this case related. We should be forced to 
take a different decision from Umpire Bates by the fact that slavery and the 
slave trade are no longer merely – as Bates noted at the time – practices 
prohibited by the law of “civilised nations”: they have become practices 
banned by a humanitarian rule of international law which is considered by 
the international community as a whole, as fundamental and, we believe, 
“peremptory”. States have reciprocally undertaken to combat such practices 
by all the means at their disposal. This is therefore a rule which, in our opin-
ion, would prevent us, even as far as the past is concerned, from fi nding a 
source of international responsibility in conduct which has in the meantime 
become not only “lawful”… but also “due”: the refusal to grant protection to 
individuals engaging in a practice which is unanimously condemned, and 
action designed to prevent this practice from attaining its inhuman goals.439
436 Ibid, 4373.
437 Ibid, 4373 et seq. In the case of Creole, crew members were forced to navigate to British jurisdiction 
after a rebellion by the slaves.
438 Ibid, 4372 et seq.
439 Fifth Report on State Responsibility (Ago) op. cit., 17–8 (49).
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This case makes a signifi cant legal contribution to the argument in support of 
countermeasures by states other than the injured for the purpose of upholding 
fundamental interests of the international community. In this instance, the gov-
ernment of Great Britain had suffered no direct injury or direct violation of its 
rights in seeking to seize the vessel and its cargo on the ground that it engaged in 
the slave trade. In this way, Great Britain was acting in the protection of commu-
nity interests even if its action were in violation of the rights of the United States 
for the protection of property belonging to its nationals. As is evident from the 
discussions in the Enterprise case, the action was found to be a violation of American 
rights and, therefore, the conduct of the British authorities to seize the vessel and 
its cargo constituted a violation of international law, amounting in this respect to 
countermeasures by a state other than the injured.
5.2.2 Coercive action against Japan (1940–41)
The next example that falls within the scope of this examination concerns a 
number of coercive measures taken by the United States against Japan in response 
to its aggressive policies in the wake of World War II. More specifi cally, in the 
period 1940–41, Japan was at war with China. In 1940 the United States, con-
cerned about possible advances of the Japanese in Indo-China, implemented a 
number of measures such as restrictions on the export of aviation fuel, iron and 
steel scrap in order ‘to deter aggression’.440 Even in the absence of further docu-
mentation for an assessment as to whether these measures were in violation of 
specifi c treaty commitments, it can be said that the freezing of Japanese assets 
imposed in 1941 by the United States was in violation of international law. More 
specifi cally, the freezing of assets involves interference with the property rights 
of another state and therefore it is a wrongful act under international law.441 
440 R. Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Center for International Affairs, Harvard Studies in International 
Affairs) No. 45, 62. For more on this incident see Department of State Bulletin (25 December 
1950) 1004; Keesing’s (1951) 11171, 11260; L. Damrosch, ‘Enforcing International Law through 
Non-Forcible Measures’, 269 RdC (1997) 109; Huffbauer, Schott and Elliott, Sanctions Reconsidered: 
History and Current Policy (1990) 110–14. For the economic measures decided in the early 1940s see 
Executive Order 8389 Protecting Funds of  Victims of Aggression, 10 April 1940; Executive 
Order 8785 Freezing the Assets of Certain European Countries, 14 June 1941; Executive Order 
8832 – Freezing Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States, 26 July 1941 also cited in A. 
Kuhn, ‘Foreign Funds Controls and Foreign Owned Property’, 35 AJIL (Oct., 1941) No. 4, 651–54.
441 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 351. On the unlawfulness of freezing of foreign assets, also see Tams, 
op. cit., 209. That the freezing of assests is in violation of international law can also be inferred 
from the early conclusions of the ILC according to which the obligation of states to enter into 
negotiations prior to taking countermeasures could not prejudice the right to take interim meas-
ures of protection necessary, including the freezing of assets. See in this regard Report of the 
Commission (1996) op. cit., 69 (4). Also see D. Bederman, ‘Counterintuiting Countermeasures’, 
96 AJIL (2002) 817, 825 and N. White and A. Abass, ‘Countermeasures and Sanctions’ in Evans 
(2006), op. cit., 509, 513. Moreover, according to Williams the freezing of assets ‘was one of the 
most notable of the “methods short of war” employed against the Axis during and after the 
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Indeed, these measures were seen by Japan as a threat to its existence.442 The 
United States action therefore enhances state practice and opinio juris in support of 
a right to third-state countermeasures for the protection of community interests, 
namely, protection of international peace and security.
5.2.3 US measures against North Korea and China (1950)
In this incident, the United States authorized unilaterally coercive action against 
both China and North Korea in response to their invasion of South Korea in 
1950. This involved an order for the freezing of their assets, a measure that as seen 
earlier is in contravention of international law and requires legal justifi cation.443 
Accordingly, the interference with another state’s property rights could only be 
justifi ed as a countermeasure. Bearing in mind that the action taken by the United 
States came in response to an ‘act of aggression’ in violation of the principles safe-
guarded under the UN Charter and that the United States was not a direct victim 
of this aggression, it supports the argument that the action under consideration 
amounted to solidarity measures. 
5.2.4  Organization of American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic (1960)
In 1960, at the Sixth Meeting of Consultation, the OAS decided to take action 
against the Dominican Republic in the light of its alleged subversive and aggres-
sive acts against Venezuela, its involvement in the attempted assassination of the 
Venezuelan president and in serious human rights violations.444 Such action was 
authorized in a resolution with which all OAS member states had to comply under 
the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.445 The resolution condemned the Trujillo regime for 
acts of aggression and intervention against a foreign country, while it authorized 
the implementation of a number of measures against the Dominican Republic. 
This action was justifi ed under Articles 6 and 8 of the Treaty that authorized the 
OAS to act accordingly whenever the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any American state was affected by any situation that posed a threat to 
summer of 1940’. B. Williams, ‘The Coming of Economic Sanctions into American Practice’, 37 
AJIL (  July, 1943) No. 3, 386, 391.
442 Renwick, op. cit., 62–3. Also see Keesing’s (1941) 4715.
443 For an analysis on this incident see Dawidowicz, op. cit., 351. 
444 Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation 
in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, San José, Costa 
Rica, 16–21 August 1960, Final Act, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/SER.C/II6 (1960). Also see Z. Selden, 
Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (Praeger: 1999) 117.
445 The resolution is available at http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20
CONSULTATION/Actas/Acta%206.pdf. 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-29.html; M. Akehurst, ‘Enforcement 
Action by Regional Agencies with Special Reference to the Organization of American States’ 
XLII BYIL (1967) 175, 188–9. 
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the peace in the continent.446 The measures initially involved cutting off diplo-
matic relations, partial interruption of economic relations and an export ban of 
military equipment to the Dominican Republic. The ban was later extended to 
the prohibition of exports of petroleum and petroleum products and lorries. The 
measures against the Dominican Republic, which were unprecedented as the 
OAS had never before imposed sanctions against another member state,447 were 
to have effect for as long as the country constituted a threat to the peace and 
security of the hemisphere. 
In accordance with Articles 53 and 54 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General 
of OAS reported the action to the Security Council. Article 53 in particular pro-
vides that ‘no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or 
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council’.448 The 
Soviet Union argued that under Article 53 only the Security Council was entitled 
to authorize the application of enforcement action by regional organs against any 
other state and, for this reason, the OAS was not empowered to take any action 
against the Dominican Republic.449 In the light of this interpretation, the measures 
authorized by the Organization were in violation of international law and could 
provide evidence of coercive peaceful action for safeguarding an interest owed not 
only to the member states of the OAS, but to all states. Although the United States’ 
response was that Article 53 precluded only forcible action and not economic, 
commercial and other peaceful measures, this was not the position taken by the 
United States during the drafting of the UN Charter.450 
Moreover, it was argued, among other things, that the specifi c measures fell 
within the sovereign discretion of states and that the enforcement action referred 
to in Article 53 related to action that ‘would be illegal unless based on a Security 
Council resolution’,451 suggesting that they were not in breach of international law 
and, therefore, they did not amount to countermeasures. However, even if such 
measures did not require the approval of the Security Council, the Dominican 
Republic, like many other members of the OAS such as Brazil, Haiti, Nicaragua 
and the United States, were signatory parties to GATT. Accordingly, the authori-
zation and implementation of at least some of the measures such as the export ban 
on petroleum and lorries and the interruption of economic activities with the 
Dominican Republic would be in violation of obligations arising from the latter 
446 Nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned that the Bogota Conference of 1948 which led to the draft-
ing of the OAS Charter intentionally did not incorporate the notion of sanctions for human rights 
violations except whenever international peace was threatened. Akehurst, ibid, 192, 205.
447 Ibid, 192. 
448 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS 16.
449 L.I. Claude, ‘The OAS, the UN and the United States’ 547 International Conciliation (1964) 1, 49. 
450 Ibid. 
451 A. Levin, ‘The Organization of American States and the United Nations’ in B. Andemicael, 
Regionalism and the United Nations (Oceana Publications: 1979) 165–66.
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agreement, providing evidence in support of a right to countermeasures by states 
other than the injured. 
The OAS member states, although acting on the basis of a treaty authorization, 
and in particular the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, were third states to the violations that 
were allegedly committed by the Dominican Republic. Their reaction in defending 
principles established for the collective interest of the OAS (erga omnes partes) and the 
international community (erga omnes) has therefore particular relevance in the con-
text of this study. 
5.2.5 Action against Greece (1967)
On 21 April 1967 a military coup emerged in Greece resulting in the overthrow of 
the democratically elected government and its substitution with a dictatorial regime. 
To establish its powers the regime proceeded to adopt numerous measures aimed 
at suppressing any political opposition or reaction. With the Royal Decree of April 
1967, a state of emergency was declared and certain constitutional provisions were 
suspended. In June 1967 the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe passed a damning resolution against Greece. In particular, 
the resolution deplored the situation in the country as in ‘grave violation of human 
rights’. As a result, Greece could be expelled from the organization while the reso-
lution called on the signatory states to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
on the basis of what was then Article 24, to refer the so-called Greek case to the 
European Commission of Human Rights.452 Signifi cantly, the resolution provided 
that the Council ‘holds itself ready to make a declaration at the appropriate time on 
the right of Greece to remain a member of the Council of Europe’.453 
A few months later, and in compliance with the resolution, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden initiated proceedings against Greece before the Commission. They 
argued that the Royal Decree was in violation of the Convention. In particular, 
the decree was in breach of the freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, the 
right to a fair trial, the right to private and family life, the freedom of thought, 
452 The resolution is reproduced in Council of Europe, Directorate of Information, Doc. B (67) 37 
(26.6.67).
453 In Keesing’s (1967) 22454; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221. Article 32(3) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights provided that the Committee of Ministers decides by majority of 
two-thirds ‘what effect shall be given’ to its fi nding that a state is in violation of its Convention 
obligations and that such a decision is of a binding character for the re-structuring of the control 
machinery under the European Convention on Human Rights see Protocol No. 11 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the 
control machinery established thereby, Strasbourg, 11.V.1994, ETS No. 5. Under the new rules, 
the former powers of the Committee of Ministers under Article 32 mentioned above have been 
amended. Moreover, Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe provided that whenever a 
member state seriously violates its obligations to respect human rights and the rule of law it may 
be suspended of its rights of representation and it may be called by the Committee of Ministers to 
withdraw from the Organization. The Statute is available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
EN/Treaties/Html/001.htm. 
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conscience and religion, the freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly 
and association, the right to an effective domestic remedy and the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of political beliefs. They also claimed that 
Greece had improperly invoked Article 15 that allowed for derogations from the 
Convention as there existed neither a war nor public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation; neither were the measures adopted and their continued 
application under the Royal Decree ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situ-
ation’. Just days later, the Netherlands fi led similar proceedings against Greece. 
Greece reacted by stating that the claims against it were ‘unjust’ and threatened to 
break all trade exchanges with the Scandinavian countries.454
The proceedings fi led against Greece are relevant in the scope of this examina-
tion as they raise the question whether Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden possessed a right to fi le proceedings against Greece under either the 
Convention or international law, particularly since they were not directly affected 
by the human rights situation in Greece. In turn, this relates to whether or not the 
action against Greece amounted to countermeasures by non-injured states. 
On the basis of former Article 24 of the Convention any contracting party was 
entitled to bring a claim before the Commission for alleged violations by another 
party, irrespective of the fact that the alleged violation was not directed against the 
nationals of the state bringing the action. In this regard, no special interest had to 
be established. Therefore, under the Convention, the member states were indeed 
entitled to seek judicial review by referring a case of infringement to the bodies 
established under the Convention for the protection of the rights entailed here-
with (erga omnes partes). 
In relation to the question whether such a contracting state would be bringing 
an action under former Article 24 as an injured state or not, the Commission had 
previously concluded that:
A High Contracting Party, when it refers an alleged breach of the Convention 
to the Commission under Article 24, is not to be regarded as exercising a right 
of action for the purpose of enforcing its own rights, but rather as bringing 
before the Commission an alleged violation of the public order of Europe.455
The Commission found in this case that Greece was in violation of its obligations 
emanating under the European Convention on Human Rights, including its 
obligation not to infringe Article 3 concerning the prohibition of torture and inhu-
man and other degrading treatment.456 Once a complaint arrived before the 
Commission, the Commission had to examine it and try to reach an amicable 
settlement of the dispute among the parties involved. In the absence of a consen-
sus, the Commission had to refer its conclusions on the facts and on the alleged 
454 Keesing’s (1967) 22454.
455 Pfunders case (Austria v Italy), European Commission on Human Rights, 4 Yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1961) 117, 140.
456 Greek case, Commission’s Report, 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (1969).
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violations of the Convention to the Committee of the Council of Ministers that 
could decide to send the case to the Court. However, at the time under consider-
ation, Greece had not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and, as a result, the 
case could not be referred to it without its consent. Whenever a case could not be 
referred to the Court, former Article 32 gave the Council of Ministers some adju-
dicatory jurisdiction to determine the dispute, although this capacity was criticized 
as the Committee of Ministers constitutes a political rather than a judicial body.457 
Once the Committee of Ministers concluded under this power that there had been 
an infringement of the Convention, it could order the violating party to take all the 
appropriate measures suggested by the Commission to comply with its obligations 
and could set a deadline by which date the state should conform. Among others, 
the Committee of Ministers could request the Greek government to abolish the 
Royal Decree Act that established the state of emergency and suspended the 
Constitution. In the event of non-compliance, former Article 32 (3) provided that 
‘the Committee of Ministers shall decide … what effect shall be given to its original 
decision and shall publish the Report’. This included a right to expel the wrongdo-
ing party for infringing ‘the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by 
all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 
It is clear from this analysis that the four states acting against Greece were not 
acting on the ground that there had been an infringement against rights individually 
owed to them. While the alleged violations took place thousands of miles away, none 
of their nationals or their other interests had suffered any kind of direct injury from 
Greece’s action. On the contrary, Greece’s own nationals were the direct victims of 
the violations. The four states rather took the action in defence of certain values 
established for the collective interest of the states that were parties to the Council of 
Europe. Their action, therefore, falls under what now constitutes Article 48(a) of the 
Final Articles. Moreover, the proceedings before the Commission were founded on 
express provision under the European Convention on Human Rights and, therefore, 
such action was in accordance with, rather than in violation of, international law.458 
Nevertheless, the signifi cance of the claim brought by the four states must not 
be underestimated. On the contrary, it reaffi rms the position that states have a 
legal interest in the safeguard of fundamental community and collective interests 
and they are entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state through 
judicial means for the preservation of the ordre public. 
It is also not without signifi cance that Greece, feeling the pressure of the pro-
ceedings against it, took the decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe. 
Although this was not the reaction the applicant states had wished for, it does 
457 T. Buergenthal, ‘Proceedings Against Greece under the European Convention of Human Rights’ 
62 AJIL (1968) No. 2 441, 446.
458 Tams, op. cit., 71–2. The Committee of Ministers powers towards a recalcitrant party are today 
also regulated under the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments 
and of the terms of friendly settlements, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 May 2006 at the 
964th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
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reveal the pressure that the dictatorial regime in Greece faced in the international 
arena, something that would not have happened had no such action been insti-
gated in the fi rst place. 
Similar action was taken in the early 1980s by France, the Netherlands and 
Scandinavian states against the military regime that assumed power in Turkey. 
Again it was stressed that the Convention is a ‘constitutional instrument of 
European public order in the fi eld of human rights’,459 which goes beyond merely 
establishing bilateral commitments between its member states. Rather, it creates 
objective obligations entitling all states to seek their observance.460 
The reaction against Greece did not cease at the Council of Europe. The situ-
ation also had an impact on Greece’s relations with the European Economic 
Community with which it was bound by an Association Agreement since 1962.461 
The agreement provided among others a common external tariff, elimination of 
quantitative restrictions on trade, free movement of persons, services and capital, 
while Greece was entitled to obtain loans from the Community.462 
The European Parliament, in reaction to the military coup d’état, passed 
what was later described as an unprecedented resolution expressing its solidar-
ity with the Greek people who were ‘suffering in defense of the ideals of freedom 
and democracy’.463 The Parliament also made clear that for as long as Greece 
lacked democratically elected institutions the Association Agreement was at stake 
and it would not be implemented fully unless Greece respected its obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights. The coup d’état also provoked 
a number of formal parliamentary questions to the Commission of the European 
Communities.464 In addition, and as will be shown, the Parliament had made 
repeated calls to the European Commission to suspend or terminate the Association 
Agreement with Greece. This could refl ect a certain opinio juris that the perfor-
mance of obligations emanating from international treaties could be stopped in 
response to violations of fundamental interests, even if there was no express provi-
sion in the treaties in this regard and even if no direct injury was involved. The 
specifi c invitation made by the Parliament to stop the performance of the 
Association Agreement may enhance the argument that there is suffi cient state 
459 In Chrisostomos et al. v Turkey, HRLJ 12 (1991) 113, (121) in Frowein (1994) op. cit., 360.
460 Frowein, ibid, 360.
461 Association Agreement between EC and Greece, Journal Offi ciel des Communautés Européennes (1963) 
No. 6 (January–March) 293/63. The Agreement came into effect on 1 November 1962. See 
Keesing’s (1963) 19260. 
462 V. Coufoudakis, ‘The European Economic Community and the “Freezing” of the Greek 
Association, 1967–1974’ 16 Journal of Common Market Studies (1977–78) 114, 116. 
463 Resolution sur l’association entre la C.E.E. et la Grèce (2 June 1967) OJ (1967) No. 10, 2058. 
Also Parlement Européen, Debats: Compte Rendu in Extenso des Seances, Vol. VI/67, No. 91, 11–20 
(1967).
464 For instance see Written Question No. 108 of 14 July 1967 (Question ecrite No. 108/97 de 
M. Seifriz a la Commission des CE: Accord d’Association CEE-Grece), Journal Offi ciel, No. 243 du 
07/10/1967, 3; Reply by the Commission of the European Communities of 22 September 1967, 
OJ (1967) No. 243/2 of 7 October, 2. 
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practice and opinio juris in support of a right to countermeasures in the name of 
collective interests.
In addition to the Parliament’s reaction, the European Commission decided to 
carry out those parts of its Association Agreement with Greece that involved spe-
cifi c obligations as in the areas of trade and tariffs and to associate those areas that 
still required negotiations and were not bound by specifi c legal duties with politi-
cal reform in Greece.465 Moreover, the suspension of further negotiations on the 
harmonization of agricultural policy, labour movement and development loans 
had an adverse effect on the Greek economy.466 Uncertain as to how to deal with 
the situation that emerged in Greece, the European Commission nevertheless 
rejected claims for the renunciation or suspension of the agreement. In doing so, 
the European Commission relied on legal grounds in view of the absence of spe-
cifi c clauses in the agreement.467 This was a refl ection of the diffi culty the European 
Economic Community found itself in, in their effort to infl uence the situation in 
Greece.468 The European Commission was reluctant for legal reasons to suspend 
or terminate the Association Agreement in the absence of express provision, 
despite calls from the European Parliament to do so.469 
What needs to be determined, however, is whether the European Economic 
Community had the competence to ‘freeze’ certain parts of the agreement since 
the latter entailed no specifi c provision that could be accommodated with the situ-
ation that emerged as a result of the coup, apart from some reference in the 
preamble to the need to strengthen peace and liberty. This led the Community at 
a later stage to place particular weight on the democratic governance of states 
with which the European Community is bound through Association Agreements.470 
However, in this instance, the political criteria of the Greek association could only 
be drawn by inference, while it remained unclear what the European Economic 
Community could do in case of their violation.471 
As already seen, there was a certain degree of hesitation on the European 
Commission’s part to proceed with the suspension or termination of the treaty, 
which under Article 60 of the 1969 VCLT is permitted in case of a material 
breach, or for any of the reasons provided under such treaty. 
This has led to confusion as to whether the European Commission’s reaction 
against Greece breached certain obligations under the Association Agreement 
and therefore amounted to third-state countermeasures. 
Buergenthal, for instance, recognized that were Greece to be expelled from the 
Council of Europe, the European Economic Community itself would be under 
465 Coufoudakis, op. cit., 117–18. Also see Keesing’s (1970) 24170.
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tremendous pressure to suspend its Association Agreement with Greece. However, 
he went on to note that: 
[E]ven if the Community should for legal reasons be unable to comply with a 
demand for the complete suspension of the Association Agreement, it is clear 
that Greece would be economically harmed by a Community policy which 
limited co-operation with Greece exclusively to a grudging compliance with 
the clearly-defi ned obligations of the Association Agreement and left unexe-
cuted the wider aims of this treaty.472
In his opinion, it would have been very diffi cult to suspend the Association 
Agreement in its entirety because apart from a general reference in the preamble 
of the agreement to the safeguarding of peace and liberty by the parties, there was 
no other clause on which such action could be based.
By the same token, it could be argued that the decision of the European 
Commission to reject a $10 million loan for development, despite the fact that the 
request had already been approved by the European Investment Bank, did infringe 
the terms and aims of the agreement, as is also admitted by Buergenthal.473 Since 
the object of the Association Agreement was to enhance trade and economic 
relations among the parties for the purpose of the development of the Greek 
economy, an argument could be made that this decision was in violation of the 
objectives of the agreement, thus enhancing the argument in favour of third-state 
countermeasures.474 
This view is endorsed by Dawidowicz according to whom the response of the 
European Economic Community provides yet another example in support of a 
right to solidarity measures. In his assessment, the decision of the Community 
institutions to suspend fi nancial assistance to Greece was in violation of Protocol 
19 of the Association Agreement.475 Since the Association Agreement and the 
Protocol did not include human rights violations as a ground for their suspension 
or an express denunciation clause, the measures taken could only be explained as 
third-state countermeasures.476 
Greece’s response could re-enhance the point as according to the junta these 
measures were in violation of the Association Agreement, questioning their legal-
ity under international law.477 
Finally, it is noteworthy that when the Community institutions were called almost 
a decade later to take coercive action against Uganda, it was pointed out that the 
measures against Greece were justifi ed in the light of the fact that the preamble of 
472 Buergenthal, op. cit., 449.
473 New York Times, 29 September 1967, 14, col. 3, 14. See ibid, 448.
474 For the object of the Agreement see Keesing’s (1961) 18168.
475 Protocole No. 19, Protocole Financier, Journal Offi ciel des Communautés Européennes (1963) No. 6 
(January–March) 340/63. 
476 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 355.
477 Coufoudakis, op. cit., 126.
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the Association Agreement made reference to the protection of human rights.478 
However, the passing reference to human rights could not be taken as permitting 
the Community to suspend or denounce the treaty and, therefore, its action could 
only be justifi ed as countermeasures taken in the name of community interests.479
While the European Economic Community did not directly rely on an argu-
ment concerning solidarity measures, a consideration of the action it gave effect to 
indicates that such action was in violation of specifi c treaty commitments and, 
therefore, is signifi cant for the purposes of this study.
5.2.6 The Arab oil embargo (1973)
5.2.6.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT
Since the Arab–Israeli war of 1947, many Arab countries have engaged in an 
economic offensive against Israel and other states supporting it. It is on this ground 
that in 1957 Arab states refused overfl ight and landing rights to Air France over 
their territories because of its involvement in fi nancially enhancing the Israeli fi lm 
industry.480 In a statement made by the Secretary of the Arab League, it was 
stressed that the Arab states targeted only those fi rms that were assisting in the 
strengthening of Israel’s economy, war efforts and its expansionist and aggressive 
objectives.481 However, due to lack of further information on this measure, it has 
not been possible to assess its lawfulness under international law.
In 1967 Israel, citing security reasons in the context of anticipatory self-defence, 
launched a military attack, invaded and occupied parts of Egyptian, Jordanian 
and Syrian territory. It was argued that the attack constituted an unlawful use of 
force not justifi ed under Article 51 concerning self-defence as there had not been 
a previous armed attack to which Israel had to respond or an imminent threat to 
its security.482 Despite UN calls for cessation of this aggressive policy, Israel con-
tinued to occupy these territories by force. 
In 1973 and after years of unsuccessful negotiations new hostilities broke out 
between Egypt and Syria, on the one hand, in an effort to regain their territories 
and Israel, on the other. During the confl ict, the United States provided Israel 
with military equipment such as jet fi ghter planes and equipment to replace Israel’s 
losses.483 It was against this background that states injured by Israel’s actions, 
478 Oral Question No. H-300/76 by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and Oral Question No. H-306/76 by 
Mr Patijn published in the Annex to Offi cial Journal of the European Communities (OJ) No. 214 – 
Debates of the European Parliament of 10 March 1977. 
479 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 355–6.
480 M. P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (OUP: 1971), 29.
481 Ibid.
482 I.F.I. Shihata, ‘Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law’ in 
J.J. Paust and A.P. Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon (Oceana Publications, Inc./Dobbs Ferry: 1977) 
97, 107. See The Situation in the Middle East, Security Council Res. 252 (1968); Security Council 
Res. 267 (1969); Security Council Res. 271 (1969).
483 Paust and Blaustein, ibid, 9–10.
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such as Egypt and Syria, and other states, not directly injured, such as Algeria, 
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, decided on oil reductions 
for a number of states directly or indirectly supporting Israel. The deployment of 
what was later to be known as the ‘Arab Oil Weapon’ as an economic means of 
coercion raised many concerns about its legality under international law. The fi rst 
question of importance is as to whether any, and, if so, which, Arab states were 
entitled to take any action against Israel, since not all of them were affected by 
Israel’s policies in the same way. And, second, whether third states such as the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa and the United States484 could be 
subjected to economic measures and especially countermeasures and, if so, on 
what legal grounds in view of the fact that they were not directly involved in the 
dispute and by whom. Since countermeasures are only allowed in response to a 
violation of international law and must be directed against the defaulting state, it 
is imperative to identify whether these states, by supporting Israel, were them-
selves committing a wrongful act.
5.2.6.2 LEGALITY OF THE OIL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
There can be little doubt that action by an injured state against the wrongdoer is 
justifi ed. Had other states not individually affected by Israel’s unlawful use of force 
taken unilateral peaceful measures against it in violation of their own obligations, 
it would only enhance the argument in favour of third-state countermeasures in 
response to fl agrant violations of international law, namely aggression, the unlaw-
ful use of force and deprivation of the right to self-determination. The question 
that also requires consideration here, however, is whether these states could 
impose countermeasures against not the direct aggressor, but rather against third 
states to the dispute. As shown earlier, for countermeasures to be lawful they must 
come as a response to another internationally wrongful act. Therefore, it would 
have to be established that the United States and the other states had violated a 
specifi c international obligation, an essential element of the notion of countermea-
sures by an injured or even a third state. In addition, such violation must involve 
a norm that is owed to the international community of states as a whole.
As frequently stated by the Arab states the measures were aimed at the 
liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel and the restoration of the 
rights of Palestinians. Orakhelashvili argues in this regard that the prohibition of 
the use of force, irrespective of its purpose and unless taken in accordance with the 
UN Charter, is peremptory in character. This position is also confi rmed from the 
debates of the ILC on the concept of jus cogens in the 1960s.485 It can thus be 
argued that the United States and the other states, in providing assistance to Israel, 
484 See Arab Communique, Conference of Arab Oil Ministers, Kuwait, 17 October 1973 in ibid, 42.
485 On the objectives of the oil embargo see Arab Resolution, Conference of Arab Oil Ministers, Kuwait, 
17 October 1973 in ibid, 44, 45. On the peremptory nature of the prohibition of armed force see 
Orakhelashvili, op. cit., 161. Also see ILCYbk (1966) Vol. II, 248 and Shaw, op. cit., 126.
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were violating their customary obligation not to provide aid or assistance in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act and especially in the violation of a 
norm with a peremptory character that creates obligations erga omnes, such as 
agression, use of force and the violation of the right to self- determination. As 
elaborated in Chapter 2, this principle today fi nds expression in Article 41 of the 
Final Articles. This duty is owed to all states collectively and its violation would 
entitle all states to invoke the responsibility of the wrongful state. The imposition 
of the oil embargo by the Arab states could as a result be indicative of practice 
supportive of third- state countermeasures. Of course, it remains to consider 
whether the Arab states, in imposing the embargo, had breached international 
law, a question to which the attention is now turned. 
Paust and Blaustein have argued that the exercise of economic coercion by the 
Arab countries was in violation of the UN Charter and of the most favoured 
nation treatment clause under GATT, which prohibits discriminatory practices 
among the member states and the imposition of export restrictions.486 
It needs to be noted that among the states participating in the embargo, only 
Kuwait and Egypt were parties to the GATT. While Egypt, as the directly injured 
state in the dispute could have made a valid defence under Article XXI, it is more 
likely that Kuwait’s action was tantamount to countermeasures taken in response 
to a violation owed to the international community as a whole, namely the duty 
not to support the infringement of a peremptory norm. In any event, no attempt 
was made by any of the parties involved to bring up the matter in GATT.487 
In relation to the legitimacy of the Arab measures with the bilateral trade agree-
ments concluded between the United States and Iraq, Oman and Saudi Arabia, 
only the fi rst agreement concluded with Saudi Arabia seems prima facie to raise the 
issue of the illegality of the oil embargo. More specifi cally, this agreement con-
cluded in 1933 provided that the two countries accord to each other unconditional 
most favoured nation treatment on the import, export and other duties and 
charges on commerce and navigation.488 Nothing in the treaty seemed to allow 
prohibitions or restrictions on any of the grounds given by Saudi Arabia when 
imposing the embargo against the United States, therefore strengthening the 
argument that at least the measures decided by Saudi Arabia were in contraven-
tion of the obligations under the treaty concerned. 
Shihata, on his part, supporting the legitimacy of the Arab measures argued 
that these were taken ‘in an attempt to secure an objective of the highest interna-
tional order: The restoration to the lawful sovereigns of illegally occupied territories 
486 J. Paust, A. Blaustein, ‘Commentary: The Arab Oil Weapon – A Threat to International Peace’ 
in Paust and Blaustein, op. cit., 71–2. 
487 S. Neff, ‘Boycott and the Law of Nations: Economic Warfare and Modern International Law in 
Historical Perspective’ 59 BYIL (1988) 113, 137 fn 106.
488 Provisional Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to diplo-
matic and consular representation, juridical protection, commerce and navigation, signed November 7 1933 in 
Paust and Blaustein, op. cit., 356–7.
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and the restoration of the rights of peoples deprived of self-determination.’489 
Although not expressly worded, this justifi cation seems to be equivalent to the 
argument in support of third-state countermeasures for the infringement of supe-
rior norms of the international legal order. 
What is indeed noticeable, however, is that the United States had never offi -
cially accounted the Arab measures to be in breach of international law.490 
In relation to the legitimacy of economic measures taken by states not directly 
injured by another state, Shihata argued that such measures, apart from deriving 
authority from state practice and the fact that there was no rule of international 
law prohibiting them, were all the more legitimate if they aimed at safeguarding 
respect for international law.491 Therefore, emphasis is placed on the legitimacy of 
the objective itself. Supporting the view that the oil measures deployed by the 
Arab states were not in violation of any customary or conventional rule of inter-
national law, he emphasized that:
A general and absolute prohibition on the use of economic measures for polit-
ical purposes in the international sphere is still an idealist’s dream. Before it 
hardens into a rule of international law, enforcement machinery must develop 
for the protection of the militarily weaker states, which may happen to have 
a relatively great economic power. Precluding such states from the use of 
their economic power in the settlement of political disputes before a general 
ban is imposed on armaments and in the absence of an effective collective 
security system could not serve the interests of international justice. It would 
only help the development of what President Roosevelt once described as “a 
one-way international law which lacks mutuality in its observance and there-
fore becomes an instrument of oppression”.492
While no express reference to the right to third-state countermeasures is made, it 
seems to be implicit in what we have just said that unilateral coercive action taken 
in response to serious violations of international law is not only prohibited, but 
also recognized under international law.
5.2.6.3 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It has already been pointed out that the wrongfulness of countermeasures arises 
only when certain legal conditions are met. Accordingly, it has been established 
that the US and other states’ support for Israel was in violation of their obligation 
not to render aid or assistance to a state that is responsible for the violation of one 
489 Shihata, op. cit., 130.
490 Ibid, 131. Also R. Lillich, ‘Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order’ in Paust and 
Blaustein, op. cit., 157.
491 Shihata, ibid, 124. 
492 Ibid, 132.
126 The problem of enforcement in international law
of the most fundamental principles of international law, namely, the prohibition 
of the use of armed force. As a consequence, these states could be subjected to 
countermeasures under international law. This, however, raises another crucial 
question concerning the subjects entitled to resort to such countermeasures, bear-
ing in mind that not all states were affected in the same way by the wrongful act in 
question. In the author’s opinion, this case, which is not mentioned in the com-
mentary to Article 54 of the Final Articles, offers a signifi cant example of state 
practice supportive of third-state countermeasures, at least with respect to the 
measures adopted by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and for this reason it deserves 
more attention in the future. 
5.2.7 Unilateral coercive action against Portugal (1973) 
This example concerns the calls made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
for the imposition of a trade embargo against Portugal in 1963, 1964 and 1973, in 
reaction to Portugal’s refusal to respect the right to self-determination in the ter-
ritories under its control.493 The General Assembly had also condemned Portugal’s 
practices as a ‘threat to the well-being of humanity and to international peace’,494 
while in 1965 it called states to implement a trade embargo against Portugal.495
Ghana, initially the only member state of GATT that implemented a trade 
embargo invoked the national security clause as justifi cation for the trade mea-
sures it implemented against Portugal. However, by 1973 many members of the 
OAU had also become members of GATT and therefore, their support to the 
imposition of coercive measures against Portugal revealed their support to third-
state countermeasures.496
5.2.8 US embargo against Uganda (1978)
In 1971 Idi Amin took power in Uganda signalling a period of a brutal dictator-
ship with 8 years of extermination, torture and economic exhaustion for the 
people of Uganda. In the light of these atrocities, African states remained silent, 
with few exceptions, under the pretext of the principle of non-intervention in the 
493 Resolutions adopted by the fi rst ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, Territories under Portuguese Domination, Cairo, 17–21 July 1964, AHG/Res. 10(I), 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/bHoGAssembly1964.
pdf. This is also cited in Dawidowicz, op. cit., 399.
494 Question of Territories under Portugese Domination, General Assembly Resolution 2107 (XX), 21 
December 1965, (3) and (7) (e). For more on the calls made by both the General Assembly and 
the Organization of African Unity to implement economic and diplomatic measures against 
Portugal see G. Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? (Pluto Press: 
1999) 81–83.
495 Question of Territories under Portuguese Adminsitration, General Assembly Resolution 2107 (XX) (7) (e), 
21 December 1965.
496 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 399–400; Keesing’s (1970) 23904.
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internal affairs of another state, fearing that possible involvement would turn 
against them like a boomerang.497 They also feared that American involvement 
and intrusion in the affairs of a small African country like Uganda by way of eco-
nomic sanctions bore a risk of similar action against them in the future. 
The US government had not been favourable towards the notorious regime 
and its serious and persistent violations of human rights from the very beginning. 
As early as 1973 the US government announced a series of measures. Among 
them were the closure of the embassy in Kampala, the suspension of its economic 
assistance to Uganda and its refusal to renew it unless there were improvement in 
the human rights situation in the country, the opposition to international develop-
ment loans to Uganda and the ban on munitions export and control over other 
sensitive materials.498 While most of these measures did not involve a violation of 
international law, it is likely that the munitions export ban was in breach of the 
United States’ obligations under GATT, particularly the provisions regarding 
non-discrimination and export restrictions.499 
Despite these efforts, there was some reservation with respect to the employ-
ment of unilateral countermeasures against Uganda. Even the Carter administration 
was hesitant due to its own trade and economic concerns and the possibility of 
other countries using economic means for the pursuit of political goals against the 
United States. Reluctant to set an unwanted precedent, the Carter administration 
stressed that any boycott action taken by the US government would be in violation 
of its obligations under the GATT. This governmental line found expression in the 
statement made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations 
Douglas J. Bennet according to whom:
Boycott actions are not consistent with the principles of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which the United States is committed 
as the basis for international commercial relations. Whenever these principles 
[of GATT] are set aside, their overall authority as a protection for our 
own international trade interests is undermined. Therefore, as a general 
matter, we are extremely reluctant to take actions which contradict these 
principles.500
Behind this position laid a well-rooted belief of American policymakers tracing 
back to the 19th century and according to which the United States, as a major 
497 R. Ullman, ‘Human Rights and Economic Power: The United States Versus Idi Amin’ 56 Foreign 
Affairs (1977–78) 529, 530.
498 Diplomatic Relations and Recognition, Digest of United Practice in International Law (1973) 11–13; 
S. Fredman, ‘Comment: U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Uganda: Legality Under International 
Law’ 11 Law & Policy in International Business (1979) 1149, 1159.
499 See Articles XI and XIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947). Uganda became 
a party to GATT in October 1962. The Agreement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.doc.
500 Cited in Ullman, op. cit., 534.
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trade power, should refrain from associating trade with political ends. This trend 
was strengthened after World War II where economics and politics were con-
strued as two different spheres, the one being autonomous from the other. This 
was necessitated by the fact that the infl uence of politics in trade and economic 
matters had in the past had catastrophic consequences for international stability, 
peace and security, a prominent example being the last world war. It was per-
ceived that economic measures should be applied only in response to economic 
violations unless they were authorized by the Security Council, while human 
rights violations should fi nd cure through political and legal means such as 
denunciation.501 
Furthermore, there was a need on the part of the US government to differenti-
ate the Ugandan case from other US imposed embargoes against Cambodia, 
Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam,which rather relied on national security reasons 
and enforcement of UN decisions.502 Moreover, the American government did 
not consider that there existed such extraordinary circumstances to justify coun-
termeasures.503 
Nevertheless, US Representative Pease stood fi rm on the Ugandan case. ‘If we 
adopt sanctions against Uganda’, he said, ‘we would be establishing a new prin-
ciple in our trade policies. We will indicate that we recognize limits of decency 
beyond which other governments may not go in their treatment of their own citi-
zens. We will demonstrate that in special cases the Congress will use its authority 
to insist upon corporate responsibility where it may otherwise be lacking.’504 
In 1977 American foreign policy changed considerably, becoming more actively 
and substantially involved in order to terminate Amin’s rule.505 It had become 
clear by then that the main source of Uganda’s foreign capital (which was later 
used to sustain the regime) derived from coffee exports abroad and, in particular, 
to the United States. By the same token, the Ugandan coffee going to the United 
States constituted only 7% of coffee imports in the country. For this reason, 
Congress concluded that to take action through boycotting Ugandan coffee would 
not severely harm the American economy. It was further realized that where 
military force could not be taken due to the general prohibition of the threat or use 
of force, it was the exertion of economic pressure that bore any chances of bring-
ing the brutal regime in Uganda to an end.506 It was also clearly understood that 
inaction regarding the atrocities that took place in Uganda meant acceptance of 
Amin’s remaining in power. 
501 Ibid, 535.
502 Fredman, op. cit., 1160.
503 Ibid.
504 Pease’ Statement at the US House of Representatives, H.R. Con. Res. 426, 95th Cong., 1st Session (1977) 
in ibid, 1162.
505 R. Nurnberger, ‘Why Sanctions never Work: In the Case of the Late Idi Amin, They Clearly 
Helped Drive him from Power – Almost’ 17 The International Economy (Fall 2003) Issue 4, 71. 
506 Ullman, op. cit., 531.
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In 1978 US Congress issued a declaration of policy that was incorporated in 
Section 2151 of Title 22 of the US Code Annotated on Foreign Relations and 
Intercourse. According to the declaration, the protection of the liberties, economic 
prosperity and security of the American people were ‘best sustained and enhanced 
in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and 
freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in 
an open and equitable international economic system’.507 This was particularly so 
in the growing interdependence of nations largely owed to technological, eco-
nomic and political advancements. 
On 7 October 1978 Congress passed a law entitled ‘Multilateral and Bilateral 
Action to Halt Atrocities in Cambodia and Uganda’ with the twin aims of dealing 
with the humanitarian situations that emerged there and abolishing the brutal 
regimes that ruled in the two countries.508 More specifi cally the law pointed to the 
‘systematic and extensive brutality’ taking place in Cambodia and Uganda that 
both required ‘special notice and continuing condemnation by outside observers’. 
In order for any action to be effective and substantial, as the infl uence of the 
United States alone was very limited, the US government was urged to seek mul-
tilateral support through the UN and other international bodies and to encourage 
action by states with stronger links with the two countries mentioned. Furthermore, 
Congress directed the president to ban the export of military, paramilitary and 
police equipment to Uganda and to impose visa restrictions for any Ugandan 
government offi cial wishing to enter the United States for military, paramilitary or 
police training purposes. The lifting of these measures was made conditional on a 
determination by the State Department that the Ugandan government had con-
formed to the rule of law and international human rights. Finally, the law 
authorized the submission to the Security Council of a draft resolution for a man-
datory arms embargo on Uganda to be implemented by all the UN member 
states.509
Only a few days later Congress, having concluded that the government of 
Uganda under the power of General Idi Amin had committed genocide against 
the Ugandan people, adopted Public Law 95-435 according to which Uganda’s 
serious misconduct permitted ‘an exceptional response by the United States’. 
Thus, Congress called on the United States to build up a policy by which it would 
disassociate itself from any state having committed what the United States 
described as the international crime of genocide. For this reason, it was decided 
that the direct or indirect importation of any products grown, produced or manu-
factured in Uganda by any corporation, individual, institution or group would be 
banned ‘until the President determines and certifi es to the Congress that the 
507 Foreign Relations Act, United States Code Annotated, Title 22, Chapter 32, Subchapter I, Part I, 
Section 2151, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Congressional fi ndings and declaration of policy.
508 22 USC s. 2151 (1978).
509 Uganda Act 1, Pub. L. 95-426, 1978 HR 12598, Title VI, section 610, 7 October 1978, 92 Stat. 
989; to also be found in Section 2151, United States Code Annotated. 
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Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of human rights’.510 It was further decided to prohibit trade export of 
goods to Uganda. The export ban also extended to cover articles, materials or 
supplies such as technical data or other information that fell within the US juris-
diction or exported by any person which was subject to US jurisdiction. Congress 
further urged the US president to encourage an international response to the 
human rights violations in Uganda, such as the infl iction of economic restrictions 
by other states of the international community. In addition to these measures, 
Congress included Uganda in the list of states that would be denied any assistance, 
monetary or otherwise, along with Cambodia, Cuba and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam.511 
On 10 October 1978 President Jimmy Carter authorized the imposition of a 
trade ban on Uganda and in February 1979, the embargo against Uganda took 
effect with Executive Order 12117 for as long as the Ugandan government did not 
cease its practices of gross violations of human rights.512 
These measures were in violation of the US obligations under GATT to which 
Uganda was also a member state, especially of its duty not to impose any export 
restrictions and quotas in their economic relations. It is worth pointing out that 
the US government did not attempt to justify its action on the basis of the exemp-
tions provided under the GATT, such as for instance under Article XXI which 
authorizes exceptions from the agreement on grounds of national security. On the 
contrary, the government justifi ed its action as a result of the genocide committed 
by the Ugandan government against its own people.513 
EEC member states, by way of contrast, took a more cautious stand towards 
Uganda, owing to their concerns that they had to comply with treaty commit-
ments towards that country. In particular, it was noted on several occasions that 
the EEC member states were bound by the Lomé Convention in which there was 
no provision authorizing coercive action in view of gross human rights violations. 
Moreover, it was emphasized that as with all the other ACP countries they had to 
fulfi l their obligations deriving from an international agreement.514 The Ugandan 
case was differentiated from the situation that emerged in Greece as a result of 
510 Uganda Act 2, Pub. L. 95-435, 1978 HR 9214, section 5, 10 October 1978, 92 Stat. 1052; to be 
found in Section 2151, United States Code Annotated. 
511 Uganda Act 3, Pub. L. 95-424, 1978 HR 12222 section 602; to also be found in Section 2151, 
United States Code Annotated, Title 22.
512 Executive Order, Executive Order No. 12117, Feb. 6, 1979, 44 F>R. 7937, Implementation of 
Import Restrictions Imposed Against Uganda; to be found in Section 2151, United States Code 
Annotated.
513 Embargo Act, Uganda Embargo Act, 22 USC, s. 2151 (1978). Also Third report on State 
Responsibility (Crawford) Addendum 4, UN doc. A/CN. 4/507/Add. 4 (2000) 14.
514 Human Rights in Uganda, Written Question No. 941/76, (De M. Van Der Hek au Conseil: Les 
Droits de l’Homme en Ouganda), OJ C214/1 (7 September 1977); Oral Question No. H-300/76 
by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and Oral Question No. H-306/76 by Mr Patijn published in the Annex 
to Offi cial Journal of the European Communities OJ 214 – Debates of the European Parliament 
of 10 March 1977, 71.
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the military coup in 1967. It will be recalled that in that case the EEC had 
‘frozen’ its relations with Greece under the Association Agreement. It was noted 
in this regard that in the Greek case the Association Agreement contained in the 
preamble reference to the basic principles of the Community such as human 
rights, which was not the case with the cooperation agreements with Third World 
countries.515 
However, while the Council of Ministers and the Commission were reluctant to 
suspend the Lomé Convention on human rights grounds as there was no express 
provision envisaged in the Convention itself,516 it was decided to redirect some of 
the development assistance provided under the Convention. As a result of this 
decision Uganda received only 5% of the assistance due to it, effectively suspend-
ing the implementation of the Lomé Convention. As there was nothing in the 
agreement to justify the reduction of development aid, the decision offers another 
example of third-state countermeasures.517 This conclusion seems to be enhanced 
by Commissioner’s Cheysson statement that the Convention did not allow action 
against Uganda on human rights grounds or suspension of the development assis-
tance.518 Neither did a fundamental change of circumstances exist that could 
justify the non-performance of the Convention. Accordingly, the suspension of the 
development assistance was in breach of the Lomé Convention and, therefore, 
can be justifi ed as another example of third-state countermeasures.
Only a few months after the implementation of the American countermeasures, 
and as a result of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda which had the support of 
Ugandan exiles and dissidents, Amin was forced to fl ee the country. Although 
many associate Amin’s loss of power to the Tanzanian invasion and not to the US 
trade embargo, it was noted that the US stand was not without effect in bringing 
down the inhuman regime of Idi Amin. 
In conclusion, the US action constitutes an invaluable precedent for the use of 
unilateral measures in violation of specifi c international obligations (countermea-
sures), such as GATT, imposed by a state not directly injured in response to serious 
violations of international law such as genocide and other serious human rights 
infringements. Similarly, the decision of EEC member states to reduce assistance 
to Uganda despite the express terms of the Lomé Convention enhances state prac-
tice in support of solidarity measures. These examples reveal the intention and 
determination of the United States and the European Economic Community, 
515 Oral Question No. H-300/76 by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and Oral Question No. H-306/76 by 
Mr Patijn published in the Annex to Offi cial Journal of the European Communities OJ 214 – 
Debates of the European Parliament of 10 March 1977, 71. 
516 The Commission, in particular, making reference to the ACP Partnership Agreement com-
mented that the Community was ‘bound to honour the commitments entered into vis-à-vis every 
one of those States under the Convention of Lomé’. See Answer of 6 March 1978, OJ (1978) No. 
C 74/18 (28 March 1978).
517 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 359. Also see Tams, op. cit., 210–11.
518 Statement by C. Cheysson, Commissioner on Development Cooperation, 8 July 1980 in Europe, 
Vol. 28, No. 2495, 11, cited in Tams, op. cit., 211.
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despite initial legal reservations, to take action, even in violation of international 
law, in the rise of ‘special’ circumstances.
5.2.9 Action against the Central African Republic (1979)
Following a military coup by Colonel Bokassa in the Central African Republic in 
1966, there was a wave of serious human rights violations including torture. The 
situation lasted until the French military intervention in 1979. During this period, 
while France and the European Community initially retained normal military and 
fi nancial ties with the regime, the position changed after the murder of 85 children 
who were participating in a demonstration against the use of school uniforms.519 
The bloodshed was widely condemned and resulted in the severance of relations 
between France and the European Community, on the one hand, and the Central 
African Republic, on the other.520 
The European Community, while not proceeding to the offi cial suspension of 
the Lomé I Convention nonetheless decided to suspend development aid to the 
country.521 According to Dawidowicz, this de facto suspension found no justifi ca-
tion in the terms of the Lomé I Convention as the European Community did not 
rely on specifi c clauses concerning either a fundamental change of circumstances 
or denunciation provided under Article 92.522 As in the case of the freezing of 
development aid to Greece by the European Economic Community in the late 
1960s, the decision taken at a Community level against the Central African 
Republic could provide another example in support of solidarity measures. This 
could be based on the argument that the decision opposed the aims and objectives 
of the Lomé I Convention for the development of the contracting parties through 
strengthening, inter alia, infrastructure and sustainable agriculture. 
In addition to the measures just cited, France announced the suspension of 
bilateral economic aid in 1979. In this particular instance and unlike the Lomé I 
Convention binding on the European Community and the Central African 
Republic, there was no specifi c agreement by which France was under a legal duty 
to provide such aid. Therefore, this specifi c measure could be categorized as retor-
sion rather than countermeasures.523 However, France also announced the 
suspension of the 1960 Agreement Concerning Technical Military Assistance in 
519 See, in this regard, the reply of the Commission of the European Communities to Written 
Question No. 115/78, by Mr Adams, (Question ecrite No. 115/78 de M. Adams a la Commission: 
Empire Centrafricain) OJ C (1978) 199/27 (21 August 1978); Central African Empire, Written 
Question No. 943/77 by M. Adams to the Commission of the European Communities (Question 
ecrite No. 943/77 de M. Adams a la Commission: Empire Centrafricain, OJ (1978) C 74/17 (28 
March 1978).
520 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 360.
521 For more on the incident, see Keesing’s (1979) 29750. Also see Question ecrite No. 115/78 de 
M. Adams a la Commission: Empire Centrafricain, OJ (1978) C 199/27 (21 August 1978).
522 ACP–EEC Convention (Lomé I), 28 February 1975, 12 CMLR 4633; Dawidowicz, op. cit., 360–61.
523 Dawidowicz, ibid, 361.
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force between itself and the targeted state.524 Again, the decision did not rely either 
on specifi c human rights or denunciation clauses and, accordingly, it provides 
another example of third-state countermeasures.525 
It becomes clear that at least some of the action authorized against the Central 
African Republic was taken by states not directly injured in response to a serious 
violation of fundamental human rights norms with an erga omnes effect, even in 
contravention of specifi c obligations under international law.
5.2.10 US action against Libya (1979)
The United States held a cautious approach towards Libya amid allegations of the 
latter’s involvement in international terrorism. The relations between the two 
countries deteriorated in 1979 when the United States implemented a number of 
measures against Libya, including export controls on goods and technology that 
could be used for military purposes.526 In 1985 the United States, again conclud-
ing that Libya was supporting state-sponsored terrorism announced an import 
embargo on petroleum products.527 Since Libya was not a signatory party to 
GATT, however, and in the absence of any other agreement binding between 
them, these measures cannot fall within the category of countermeasures.
Nevertheless, in response to the terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna airports 
in 1985 blamed on Libya, the United States decided in January 1986 to prohibit 
the sales of air transportation that involved a stop in Libya.528 Moreover, the US 
government announced blocking all property interests of the Libyan government 
and agencies in the country.529 As noted earlier, this measure involves interference 
with the property of a foreign state that in the absence of specifi c justifi cation 
would be a violation of international law. As such, this specifi c measure adds to the 
state practice and opinio juris relating to solidarity measures, in response to the 
commission of international terrorism that threatens international peace and 
security and which could arguably be said as having an erga omnes character.
5.2.11 Netherlands’ action against Surinam (1980)
In February 1980 the government of Surinam was overthrown in a military coup 
led by Colonel Bouterse. The Netherlands, responding to the serious human rights 
524 Agreement Concerning Technical Military Assistance, 821 UNTS 266 (27 January 1961).
525 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 361.
526 Export Administration Act of 1979 and Arms Export Control Act, 23 UST 4269, TIAS No. 7535.
527 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Public Law No. 99–83, 22 
U.S.C. 2151.
528 Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Public Law No. 85–726, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 731. The Act can be 
found in ‘Terrorism: Laws Cited Imposing Sanctions on Nations Supporting Terrorism’, op. cit.
529 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Public Law No. 95–223, 50 U.S.C. 1701. The 
Act can be found in ‘Terrorism: Laws Cited Imposing Sanctions on Nations Supporting 
Terrorism’, ibid.
134 The problem of enforcement in international law
violations taking place on the territory of Surinam, announced the suspension of 
the 1975 Treaty on Development Cooperation binding between the two states, 
which provided for Dutch fi nancial assistance to Surinam. 
In doing so, the Netherlands circumvented the normal procedures provided 
under the treaty invoking as justifi cation the principle clausula rebus sic standibus 
(fundamental change of circumstances), which would have immediate and direct 
effect.530 
A state that relies on this doctrine must fi rst establish that the changed circum-
stances constituted an essential basis for the consent of the contracting parties 
when concluding the treaty but also that the changed circumstances radically 
altered the obligations to be performed under the treaty. It has been argued in this 
regard that the suspension of the treaty by the Netherlands could not be justifi ed 
on the ground of change of circumstances since the condition for respect of human 
rights did not constitute the basis of the agreement between the two countries.531 
Accordingly, the Dutch reliance on fundamental change of circumstances was 
rather dubious in this instance and, therefore, its action could be justifi ed as third-
state countermeasures instead.532
Quite signifi cantly, the Dutch government attempted to justify its action on the 
fact that the Surinamese actions were in violation of the 1966 International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights to which both countries were signatories, 
in particular the right to life and the freedom from torture that establish obliga-
tions erga omnes.533 Since the Netherlands was not under the circumstances an 
injured state in the sense of Article 42 of the Final Articles, this example sets 
another signifi cant precedent of state practice supportive of action for the protec-
tion of collective interests. This is in spite of the fact that the argument put 
forward by the Dutch government in order to justify its decision did not rely on 
a right to third-state countermeasures, but rather on the ground of fundamen-
tal change of circumstances. It is for this reason that the ILC itself, in the 
commentary to Article 54 of the Final Articles, distinguished this example from 
other cases that clearly set a precedent in favour of countermeasures by states 
other than the injured. The consideration of this example is, therefore, important 
as it indicates the willingness of states to resort to unilateral coercive action for 
the protection of collective interests, even when they have done so on the basis 
of other legal justifi cations. Most importantly, as the preceding analysis showed 
the requirements of fundamental change of circumstances were not in this 
instance met and therefore providing evidence that the Dutch action constituted 
action taken by a third state in response to the breach of fundamental community 
interests.
530 Okafor-Obasi, op. cit., 98–9. Also Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 726.
531 Chinkin, (1996) op. cit., 196.
532 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 405.
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5.2.12 Action against Liberia (1980)
The next example providing evidence of a right to third-state countermeasures 
concerns the action authorized by the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in response to the military coup by Sergeant Doe in Liberia. 
ECOWAS decided not to allow Sergeant Doe to participate in the fi fth summit 
conference. Liberia responded that this act challenged its sovereign rights.534 
Dawidowicz notes in particular that a derivative right of the membership of any 
state to international organizations is its right to vote and, as a corollary to this, 
the state’s right to participate in the meetings of the organization.535 It can there-
fore be concluded from this that the decision to suspend Liberia’s right to 
participate in the proceedings amounted to a suspension of its membership rights, 
a measure that found no justifi cation under the ECOWAS Treaty. 
Moreover, the European Community announced the suspension of develop-
ment assistance towards Liberia that, as in the Central African Republic case, was 
in violation of the aim and objectives of the Lomé I Convention.536
5.2.13 The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1980)
Attention is now turned to another interesting example set in state practice con-
cerning the relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1975 the United States passed the so-called Trade 
Act according to which the president would not be able to grant most favoured 
nation status to the Soviet Union unless it was shown that the latter had ceased to 
impose restrictions on the emigration of its nationals. The Soviet Union in response 
denounced its 1972 Trade Agreement with the United States on the ground that 
the Trade Act was in violation of the 1972 Agreement and a serious interference 
in its domestic affairs.537 In addition to the question whether the non-granting of 
most favoured nation status was an act contravening the obligations of the United 
States under the 1972 Trade Agreement, it must be further established whether 
the other conditions concerning the lawfulness of solidarity measures have been 
met. In this regard, it will have to be established that the Soviet Union govern-
ment, by imposing such restrictions on its nationals, committed a serious violation 
of fundamental interests owed to the international community of states as a whole 
and that, therefore, the infringed obligation possesses an erga omnes character. This 
is necessary in order to include this example within the category of countermea-
sures imposed by not directly injured states. For this purpose, it would have to be 
established not only that nationals have a right under international law to fl ee 
534 Keesing’s (1980) 30407. 
535 For an analysis see Dawidowicz, op. cit., 362–3. Also see Article 5 of the Treaty of the Economic 
Community of West African States, 28 May 1975, 1010 UNTS 17.
536 Statement by C Cheysson, Commissioner on Development Cooperation, 8 July 1980 in Europe, 
Vol. 28, No. 2495, 11, cited in Tams, op. cit., 211. 
537 Keesing’s (1975) 26993 and (1976) 27642. 
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their country as part of the right to freedom of movement, but also that this right 
establishes obligations owed to the international community as a whole. While this 
right is not absolute empowering states to impose certain restrictions in cases of 
emergency or national security, it could be argued that the freedom of movement 
constitutes a basic human right within the meaning of erga omnes obligations. 
Restrictions that actually abolish this right enable third states to invoke the respon-
sibility of the wrongdoing state. In this case, the United States’ conduct reveals 
its belief that it was responding to a violation of a community interest, even in 
violation of its obligations under the 1972 Agreement and, as such, qualifi es as 
another example of third-state countermeasures.
Only a few years after this incident, the invasion of the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan in December 1979 provoked the immediate reaction of the US gov-
ernment that decided the implementation of a number of coercive measures. 
These measures were taken before the adoption of a General Assembly resolution 
pursuant to which the Soviet Union was called to withdraw its troops from 
Afghanistan. The measures announced by the US government were justifi ed on 
grounds of national security and the foreign policy interests affected by the Soviet 
invasion.538 It needs to be stressed, however, that not all measures resorted to by 
the US government were inconsistent with international law and, as such, they 
qualify as acts of retorsion rather than solidarity measures. 
Among the measures that were in violation of specifi c international obligations 
was the withdrawal of ratifi cation by the US Senate of the SALT II treaty that had 
already been successfully negotiated between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Both states had at the time taken the position that states were bound under 
customary international law to refrain from resorting to action that would confl ict 
with the object and purpose of an agreement that had been signed but not as yet 
ratifi ed, a principle that is also refl ected in the 1969 VCLT.539 Therefore, this 
measure falls within the category of countermeasures. The United States further 
decided to curtail Soviet fi shing rights in American waters in violation of the 1976 
US–USSR Agreement concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States540 
and to restrict Aerofl ot fl ights to the country.541 
The United States also authorized the suspension of the export of grain that 
exceeded the amount that it had been legally committed to sell.542 In particular, 
538 Economic Sanctions – Invasion of Afghanistan (1979); Polish Repression (1981), Cumulative Digest of 
International Law (1981-88) III, 2967–2979.
539 Obligations Prior to Ratifi cation (SALT II Treaty), Digest of US Practice in International Law (1980) 
398. For more information, see Keesing’s (1980) 30234.
540 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Digest of US Practice in International Law (1980) 601–602. 
Keesing’s (1980) 30234.
541 Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 655.
542 For a view that the specifi c decision to limit grain export to eight million metric tons of wheat and 
corn was required in order not to infringe the United States–Soviet Grain Agreement of 1975, see 
H. Moyer and L. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues and 
Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases (International Law Institute: 1988) 30–31.
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following the Soviet invasion, the Department of Commerce was instructed 
to terminate shipments to the Soviet Union of agricultural products including 
wheat and corn with the exception of the shipment of up to 8 million metric 
tons of wheat and corn provided for by the 1975 Agreement between the US 
and the USSR on the Supply of Grain.543 The decision of the US government 
resulted in the freezing of 17 million tons of grain, greatly impacting American 
farmers. 
This decision is not, however, unlawful,544 unless it is established that the United 
States had unilaterally undertaken a commitment to provide more grain than 
what was already agreed under the specifi c terms of the 1975 Agreement. In such 
a case, its refusal to provide more grain would be a breach of a unilateral 
obligation towards the Soviet Union and, therefore, another example of counter-
measures. This view is advocated by Sicilianos according to whom the suspension 
was in contravention of unilateral legal undertakings by the United States for 
the provision of a higher quantity of wheat and corn.545 It could also be argued 
that this measure was in violation of the Trade Agreement between the United 
States and the USSR concluded in 1972 (cited earlier), which provided, inter alia, 
equal trading access to the USSR and substantial grain purchases.546 It is accord-
ingly likely that the reduction of grain quantities infringed specifi c treaty 
commitments undertaken by the United States, offering yet more evidence in sup-
port of a right to exercise coercive measures in response to the disregard of 
fundamental interests protected under the norm prohibiting the use of armed 
force against another state. 
In addition to these, the United States announced a number of other measures. 
These included the boycott of the Moscow Olympics and an embargo on all 
exports intended for the Olympics with the exception of medical supplies, although 
these measures amounted to retorsion. Moreover, the United States authorized 
the suspension of exports of high technology and sensitive products, the prohibi-
tion and further restrictions on phosphates for fertilizers547 and restrictions on the 
import of Soviet ammonia. Further to this, the Department of Commerce sus-
pended all outstanding validated licences and new applications that were pending 
regarding the sale of oil, gas fi eld technology and other products.548 To the extent 
that these measures breached the object and purpose of the 1972 Trade Agreement 
between the two countries, they can be categorized as solidarity measures. 
543 Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 884. Keesing’s (1976) 27641.
544 Dawidowicz, for instance, in the light of lack of evidence supporting that the United States had 
unilaterally undertaken to increase the quantity of wheat and corn to be sent to the USSR, 
describes this particular measure as an act of retorsion rather than a third-state countermeasure. 
Dawidowicz, op. cit., 364.
545 A.L. Sicilianos, Les Réactions décentralizées à l’illicité: des contre-mesures la légitime défense (1990) 158 cited 
in Dawidowicz, ibid, 364.
546 Keesing’s (1972) 25585. 
547 Petman, op. cit., 363.
548 Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 603–604 .
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It is interesting to note that the Legal Adviser of the US State Department, 
Roberts B. Owen, rejected the Soviet claims that the invasion of Afghanistan 
was justifi ed under the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighborliness and 
Cooperation between the USSR and Afghanistan. According to the Soviet 
arguments, under this agreement the parties undertook the obligation to protect 
the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries, although 
the treaty also provided for respect for national sovereignty and the principle 
of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the other. The US government, 
by the same token, argued that the Soviet invasion violated international law 
and the UN Charter. President Jimmy Carter, referring to the Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan emphasized that:
Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant vio-
lation of accepted international rules of behavior … Soviet efforts to justify 
this action on the basis of the United Nations Charter are a perversion of the 
United Nations … the Soviet action is grave breach to peace.549
With specifi c reference to one of the paramount principles of the UN Charter, it 
was stressed that the USSR had an obligation under Article 2(4) to refrain from 
the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state. Pointing out that no treaty could prevail over obligations arising from 
the UN Charter it was further noted that: 
4. Nor is it clear that the treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan, con-
cluded in 1978 between the revolutionary Taraki Government and the 
USSR, is valid. If it actually does lend itself to support of Soviet intervention 
of the type in question in Afghanistan, it would be void under contemporary 
principles of international law, since it would confl ict with what the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties describes as a “peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law” (Article 53), namely, that contained in Article 2, para-
graph 4 of the Charter. 
5. Moreover, the Soviet action confl icts with the terms of the Soviet-Afghan 
Treaty, since it is a violation of Afghanistan’s national sovereignty.550
549 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Digest of US Practice in International Law (1979) 34.
550 Ibid, 35. By way of comparison, it is noteworthy to point out here that when on 20 July 1974 
Turkey used similar force to intervene in Cyprus and occupy one-third of its territory, there was 
no similar reaction by the US government despite the striking resemblance of both these two 
examples. More specifi cally, Turkey had justifi ed its action on the Treaty of Guarantee of 
1959–60 in response to the Greek-inspired coup against the democratically elected president, 
Archbishop Makarios. Not only the US did nothing to prevent the invasion or demand its cessa-
tion but it also continued providing Turkey with military and economic assistance in violation of 
both US and international law. For some more information, see Selden, op. cit., 128.
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In justifying the action against the Soviet Union, President Carter noted that the 
Soviet aggression was a national threat to the United States.551 Although he admit-
ted that he did not expect that the measures would force the USSR out of 
Afghanistan, he pointed out that they were aimed at making the Soviets pay a price 
for their aggression and at deterring them from future aggression. He subsequently 
emphasized that the aim of the United States in resorting to these measures was to 
convince the Soviets by peaceful means that they could not invade a foreign coun-
try with impunity and that they should bear the consequences of their action.552
Moreover, in his statement before the General Assembly in January 1980, US 
Ambassador McHenry noted the following:
For this body to remain silent in the face of open aggression would be for the 
members of the United Nations to condone a violation of the only principles 
that small nations can invoke to protect themselves from self-aggrandizement 
by larger and more powerful states. It is not the United States whose freedom 
is most threatened by Soviet indifference to the Charter; the small and non-
aligned countries, like Afghanistan, are most imperiled.553
The UK government acted on the same footing, describing the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan as an ‘unprovoked act of aggression’ that posed ‘a serious threat to 
world peace’.554 Canada condemned the atrocities and the gross human rights 
violations committed by the Soviets against the people of Afghanistan, while the 
Canadian Prime Minister Joseph Clark supported the implementation of mea-
sures as a means to impose pressure on the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan.555 
In particular, in January 1980 Canada announced the suspension of Soviet fi shing 
rights in its Exclusive Economic Zone provided under the 1976 Agreement on 
Mutual Fisheries Relations between Canada and the Soviet Union.556 The sus-
pension, which took place within 3 weeks after the Soviet invasion, was not 
provided under the terms of the Agreement that only allowed denunciation of the 
agreement after the passage of 6 years from its conclusion and then only after 
giving 12 months’ notice.557 In a similar move, New Zealand also announced the 
suspension of the Soviet Union’s fi shing rights provided under the 1978 Agreement 
on Fisheries between the two countries.558 As in the Canadian case, the suspension 
was not justifi ed under the treaty or any denunciation provisions, thus qualifying 
551 Afghanistan sanctions in Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 658.
552 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Digest of US Practice in International Law (1980) 31.
553 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Digest of US Practice in International Law (1979) 43. 
554 Coercion and Use of Force Short of War – Unilateral Acts Intervention, 29 BYIL (1980) 473.
555 Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 660. Also Afghanistan, 25 CYIL (1987) 432.
556 Agreement on Mutual Fisheries Relations between Canada and the Soviet Union 1132 UNTS 
139 (19 May 1976).
557 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 365.
558 Keesing’s (1980) 30241; New Zealand–USSR Agreement on Fisheries, 1151 UNTS 277 (4 April 
1978).
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the suspension as countermeasures taken in the protection of collective interests, 
namely international peace and security.
At the same time, the General Assembly and the European Community Council 
of Ministers condemned in unequivocal terms the Soviet invasion as interference 
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and also as infringing fundamental principles 
of international law.559 While the Community adopted measures that affected 
agriculture, food and humanitarian aid and commercial policy and left open the 
possibility of further measures in the area of export credits, these did not amount 
to countermeasures.560 
Other western countries were reluctant to impose countermeasures against the 
Soviet Union in violation of their treaty obligations, although it is suggested that it 
was the economic benefi t that was the determinative factor for not taking action 
against the Soviet Union. The European Economic Community, for instance, 
replaced the United States in the sales of grain to the Soviet Union,561 although the 
initial reaction of the organization and that of Argentina, Australia and Canada to 
the Soviet invasion was that they would support the US grain embargo.562 In a 
common statement days after the Soviet invasion, they asserted that they would not 
attempt to replace the grain that would have been sent to the Soviet Union before 
the measures announced by the United States.563 In later interpretations, the repre-
sentatives of these countries, with the exception of Argentina, said that the statement 
‘was viewed as a commitment not to allow sales to the USSR to exceed “normal” or 
“traditional’ levels”’.564 Argentina, by way of contrast, argued that it had no legal 
basis to interfere in the activities of private traders and thus rejected invitations to 
join in the economic coercive measures.565 
Nevertheless, the European Parliament did urge the Commission to consider 
economic, fi nancial and commercial measures against the Soviet Union.566
What can be concluded from this foregoing discussion is that at least some of 
the Canadian, New Zealand and US action against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan amounted to countermeasures taken by states other than the injured 
in the name of collective interests, more specifi cally in response to the unlawful use 
of force against another country. The prohibition of the use of force is one of the 
559 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, General 
Assembly resolution 35/37 (20 November 1980); EC Bulletin (1980) No. 1, Vol. 13, points 
1.1.3–1.1.11; Matters concerning Western Asia: Situation in Afghanistan, United Nations 
Yearbook, Volume 34 (1980) 296 seq.
560 EC Bulletin (1980) No. 1, Vol. 13, points 1.1.7–1.1.10. Also see Dawidowicz, op. cit., 364.
561 Petman, op. cit., 363.
562 Keesing’s (1980) 30235.
563 Ibid.
564 Afghanistan Sanctions, ‘An Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions: Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 
1980s’, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1981. Prepared for the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97 Cong., 1st Session, Washington in Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. 
cit., 659–60.
565 Hufbauer, ibid, 660.
566 Resolution on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, OJ (1980) No. C34/28.
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most fundamental principles in contemporary international law the respect for 
which creates obligations owed to all states of the international community. 
Subsequently, all states have a paramount interest in the protection of the rule 
and, therefore, they are not unaffected in the event of its infringement. It is in this 
context that the action just cited could be justifi ed. The fact that other states did 
not join in similar action cannot lead to the conclusion that they did so because 
they opposed the possibility of taking countermeasures in cases of serious viola-
tions of erga omnes obligations. Rather, it seems that economic and other 
considerations existed that interfered in their decision not to respond with more 
forceful measures against the Soviet Union in this instance. 
5.2.14 International reaction to the Teheran hostage crisis (1980)
Hostage taking has been frequently used as a means for the achievement of mainly 
political goals, imposing in this manner a threat not only to the lives of the indi-
viduals involved but also to international peace and security and, therefore, of 
concern to the international community as a whole. The Security Council’s reso-
lutions in the Teheran hostages crisis are indicative of this international concern. The 
dispute arose between the United States, as an injured state, and Iran on 4 and 
5 November 1979 when armed groups seized the premises and the staff working 
at the time in the American Embassy in Teheran and in the American consulates 
in Tabriz and Shiraz. The hostage takers had been protesting against the earlier 
decision of the United States to allow the former Shah of Iran to seek medical 
treatment in that country. While these events were initially instigated by non-state 
actors, the Iranian government was held responsible for its tolerance, encourage-
ment and failure to act duly in order to prevent and terminate them.567 
In reaction to the attacks against the US Embassy and personnel the Security 
Council took immediate action by calling for the immediate release of the hos-
tages while leaving open the possibility of further measures under Articles 39 and 
41 of the UN Charter should Iran fail to comply.568 Ultimately, these measures 
were never authorized due to the exercise of the Soviet veto. 
In view of the Security Council’s failure to take more coercive action against 
Iran, the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community issued a state-
ment on 14 April 1980 in which they stressed that the Iranian government 
continued to be in fl agrant violation of international law. In the statement, it was 
made clear that Iran had ignored the calls of both the Security Council and the 
ICJ to comply with its international obligations.569 On 22 April 1980 the EEC 
Foreign Ministers decided to initiate their national procedures for imposing an 
arms embargo against Iran in accordance with former Article 223 of the EEC 
567 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, op. cit., 44.
568 Islamic Republic of Iran–USA, Security Council Res. 457 (1979); Security Council Res. 461 
(1979).
569 On the Teheran Hostages, 29 BYIL (1980), 409.
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Treaty, despite the lack of Security Council authorization, for its continued disre-
gard of international law in what they determined would constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.570 On 17 May they decided to apply the mea-
sures provided under the draft Security Council resolution of 10 January, in spite 
of the fact that this resolution was never adopted. It is signifi cant to note that the 
specifi c resolution provided for a total trade embargo against Iran and, therefore, 
the determination of the EEC states to give it effect provides evidence of support 
of coercive measures taken in the name of community interests even in violation 
of international law. In any event, under this later decision all contracts concluded 
with Iran after 4 November 1979 were to be suspended, which would bring the 
EEC member states in violation of their treaty commitments.571 
The United Kingdom reacted to the Teheran hostage crisis with the adoption 
on 15 May 1980 of the Iran (Temporary Powers) Act that came into force 2 days 
later.572 Section 1(1) of the Act authorized the Queen to take such decisions about 
contracts with Iran concerning services or goods as she regarded necessary due to 
Iran’s violation of international law in the hostage crisis. The wording of the Act 
refl ects the intention of the United Kingdom to resort even to countermeasures as 
a third party against Iran. The Act was adopted 2 weeks before the ICJ’s judgment 
on the Teheran Hostages case according to which the seizure of the diplomatic staff 
constituted a violation of ‘obligations essential to the international community as 
a whole’.573 In justifying the decision to take action against Iran, the Minister of 
State, Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce, Douglas Hurd, made reference to an 
earlier ruling issued by the ICJ on the case, one which the United Kingdom 
regarded as binding in international law. Furthermore, the UK action against 
Iran came 3 days before the embargo authorized by the European ministers of 
foreign affairs.574 A few days later the UK government adopted two orders by 
which it imposed a prohibition on the conclusion and performance of any new 
contracts with Iran, although these measures did not affect already existing con-
tracts and, therefore, did not amount to countermeasures.575 The position of the 
UK government regarding the justifi ability of the measures decided against Iran 
was that Iran could not continue disregarding basic principles of international 
law.576 According to one view, the UK Act amounted to ‘lawful measures’ as in 
570 Ibid, 477. 
571 The Community and the Member States and the Events in Iran, Bulletin of the EC (1980) No. 4, 
20–26.
572 ‘An Act to enable provision to be made in consequence of breaches in international law by Iran 
in connection with or arising out of the detention of members of the embassy of the United States 
of America’, in On the Teheran Hostages, op. cit., 413. 
573 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, op. cit., 42–4 (91–92).
574 On the Teheran Hostages, op. cit., 413.
575 Iran Sanctions, The Export of Goods Control (Iran Sanctions) Order and the Iran (Trading Sanctions) Order, 
29 May 1980 in Statutory Instruments, London, 1981, 2579 and 2585 in Picchio-Forlati and 
Sicilianos, op. cit., 102, fn 4.
576 On the Teheran Hostages, op. cit., 413–4. 
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Articles 22 and 54 of Final Articles.577 Nevertheless, the United Kingdom’s reac-
tion is not without legal signifi cance as it illustrates the determination of a state not 
injured by a certain wrongdoing to respond to serious violations of obligations 
owed erga omnes, while indicating its intention to resort to any action necessary for 
the cessation of the wrongful act.
With respect to the position of Canada, the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, stressed that the seizure of the diplomatic staff and the 
premises of the American Embassy constituted grave breaches of international 
law that called ‘for an unequivocal response from the international community’.578 
Referring to the Security Council resolutions on the matter, the fi rst of which was 
adopted even by the Soviet Union, he drew attention to the threat posed to the 
international community as a result of the hostage crisis. With respect to the Soviet 
veto, he said:
The cynical Soviet veto, however, cannot obscure the fact that the interna-
tional community, both then and now, condemns the hostage affair. In addi-
tion to the overwhelming support given to the Security Council resolutions on 
Iran, this condemnation from the international community has been reiter-
ated by the International Court of Justice which, fi rst in December and then 
again in May, ordered Iran to restore the embassy to the U.S.A. and to free 
the hostages. These unequivocal judgments by the UN and the International 
Court of Justice fully satisfy the international community in applying eco-
nomic sanctions against Iran.579
Canada, and in the light of action taken by EEC countries, Japan and Australia, 
called for the implementation of the measures provided under the vetoed resolu-
tion, which provided for the implementation of trade, transport, fi nance and 
diplomatic measures. The government justifi ed its decision on ‘its concern to 
uphold a fundamental rule of international law which is vital to the conduct of 
international relations.’580
Even though Canada seemed to rely on the ICJ rulings and the UN resolutions 
to justify its own action against Iran, it is necessary to determine whether these 
could be relied on for the implementation of countermeasures. In relation to the 
UN resolutions it is noted that no legally binding resolution was adopted authoriz-
ing the application of peaceful coercive measures against Iran. As for the ICJ 
ruling, it is essential to remember that this creates obligations only towards the 
parties submitting the dispute before it. Moreover, the ICJ cannot authorize the 
implementation of countermeasures, as its role is confi ned to adjudicate on what 
577 Picchio-Forlati and Sicilianos, op. cit., 102, fn 3.
578 Iranian Economic Sanctions Act, CYIL (1981) 372.
579 Ibid, 373.
580 Ibid, 374.
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the law is and not to exceed these judicial powers. Yet, its ruling may have signifi -
cance for the determination that an internationally wrongful act has been 
committed. In any event, it seems from this that Canada was determined to pro-
ceed with a number of coercive measures against Iran. Although it is not clear 
whether these measures actually infringed specifi c obligations, this example is sig-
nifi cant as it lends support for third-state reaction in response to the violation of 
fundamental community interests and it refl ects a belief held by these states that 
such response would be justifi ed. 
As for the United Kingdom’s response, although this was actually confi ned to 
‘lawful’ measures, it seems that the door was left open to further action if ‘regarded 
necessary’. The emphasis placed on the seriousness of the wrongful act committed 
by Iran is indicative of the signifi cance attributed by the United Kingdom to the 
respect for international law and the international implications that arose from the 
forceful seizure of the diplomatic premises. 
However, it is necessary to identify the rules violated by Iran’s actions, or rather 
omissions, and also which states were entitled to react, if at all, by the implementa-
tion of economic measures and, even more signifi cantly, countermeasures. One 
could, therefore, argue in this regard that the obligations arising from the general 
law of diplomatic immunities are of a bilateral nature as between the receiving 
and sending states and that as a consequence no other state is entitled to invoke 
the responsibility of the defaulting state. While this is correct, one could turn to the 
way that the diplomatic immunities were disregarded in the particular case by 
Iran, namely the use of force against the American diplomatic premises and per-
sonnel. Had the Iranian government chosen to respond to alleged US violations 
of diplomatic law by declaring the American diplomats as persona non grata then no 
other state would be entitled to react to such a decision. It is, therefore, suggested 
that it is to the unlawful use of force that Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
other European Economic Community countries were responding, even though 
they were not directly involved in the dispute. Moreover, while it is true that the 
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations establishes multiple bilateral 
relations, it could be argued that the Convention aims at the protection of certain 
collective interests owed to all states parties to it, establishing accordingly an inter-
est on all states parties to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer and even to 
resort to countermeasures.581 The decision, particularly of the EEC member 
states, to suspend all treaties concluded with Iran after November 1979 seems to 
fall within the category of third-state countermeasures as implying their intention 
to take action that may be in violation of specifi c commitments under interna-
tional law and, for this reason, it is regarded important for the purposes of the 
current examination.582 
581 See in this regard Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95. 
582 For the view that the EEC measures did not amount to countermeasures, see Dawidowicz, op. 
cit., 402–403.
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5.2.15 Imposition of martial law in Poland and Soviet involvement (1981) 
When in December 1981 the Polish government ordered, with the alleged encour-
agement, advice and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the application of 
martial law in the country for the repression of trade unions, political dissidents and 
civil rights, the United States expressed its profound condemnation and concern for 
the situation that emerged as a result. Immediately after the decision of the Polish 
government, President Ronald Reagan, in the absence of a Security Council resolu-
tion, gave instructions for the suspension of the most signifi cant elements of the 
country’s economic relationships with Poland. The decision was justifi ed as a reac-
tion to the violation of the UN Charter (although not specifying which principles 
exactly had been violated), the Helsinki Final Act (not a legally binding instrument 
although, in certain cases, it refl ects customary norms of international law) and the 
Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1980 with the leaders of the Solidarity move-
ment.583 At the same time the US government called on Poland to release all the 
political dissidents whose only offence was to exercise their civil and political rights 
‘enshrined in many international documents to which [Poland] was a party’.584 
While the shipment of food aid continued on the condition that this was received by 
the Polish people themselves, all shipments of agricultural and dairy products were 
suspended until their distribution could be monitored by independent agencies. 
Furthermore, the United States stopped the renewal of the Export-Import 
Bank’s line of export credit insurance to Poland; opposed the extension of any new 
credits and Poland’s membership of the International Monetary Fund; and rec-
ommended allying countries to impose restrictions on their high technology 
exports to Poland. These measures, however, did not contravene specifi c treaty or 
other obligations of the United States towards Poland and, therefore, they do not 
fall within the category of countermeasures. In exchange for the lifting of these 
measures, President Reagan called on the Polish government to release all those 
arbitrarily held in prison, to cease the violence against the Polish population, to lift 
martial law and to restore the internationally recognized and protected, inalien-
able rights of the Polish people to freedom of speech and association. 
In addition to this action, the US government announced that it would suspend 
aviation privileges in the United States to Polish airlines and that it was in the 
process of suspending the fi shing rights of Poland within American waters. With 
respect to Poland’s civil aviation privileges the United States announced the sus-
pension of the 1972 US–Polish Air Transport Services Agreement on 26 December 
1981.585 The Civil Aeronautics Board informed LOT (Polskie Linie Lornicze) 
about the suspension of the foreign air carrier permit issued to LOT. LOT pro-
tested against the suspension on the ground that the President’s decision was in 
583 Economic Sanctions – Invasion of Afghanistan (1979); Polish Repression (1981), Cumulative Digest of 
International Law (1981–88) III, 2967–2979.
584 Keesing’s (1982) 31454.
585 For a list of all the measures adopted by the US government see Export Administration Act of 
1979 and Arms Export Control Act, 23 UST 4269, TIAS No. 7535.
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violation of the 1972 Agreement, which did not permit of its immediate suspension 
or termination and which was effective until March 1982. More specifi cally, the 
Agreement provided that the operating permission granted to the airlines of the 
two parties could be withheld, suspended or revoked on the ground that the tar-
geted airline did not satisfy the standard procedures of the aeronautical authorities 
of the state applying the suspension. Moreover, the Agreement could be suspended 
or denounced on the ground that the airline failed to comply with the regulations 
of the suspending state regarding admission and departure of air services or that 
the suspending state believed that the designated airlines of the other party were 
not owed or controlled by it. It can, therefore, be seen that the Agreement permit-
ted no suspension or termination on grounds other than the ones provided by it 
and made no specifi c reference to human rights violations. Furthermore, the sus-
pension or termination of the Agreement could take effect only after the consultation 
with the other party, with the exception of Article IV(A)(2) of the Agreement relat-
ing to entry and exit regulations, something that the United States had failed to do. 
It is noted that the state of emergency as a result of the imposition of martial law 
did not seem to provide a satisfactory legal ground for justifying the United States 
in suspending the Agreement without satisfying the condition of consultation, nei-
ther did it directly affect US interests.586 Moreover, under the Agreement 
denunciation could only take effect after giving 12 months’ notice.
The suspension of the Polish civil aviation rights by the United States had a 
great economic impact on Polish tourism. If justifi cation of the US decision within 
the Agreement cannot be supported, it is necessary to determine whether such 
action could be justifi ed under any other legal ground of general international law. 
While consideration was given to circumstances that could render the Agreement 
void, such as being in violation of a jus cogens norm, it was concluded that no such 
grounds could be proven as existing in the particular case. Furthermore, it was 
noted that the suspension of the Agreement could not rely on a material breach or 
fundamental change of circumstances recognized under the general law of treaties 
as valid reasons for the suspension of a treaty.587 The US decision should, there-
fore, be examined in the context of the general law on state responsibility and, in 
particular, countermeasures. The diffi culty in this regard would be to identify the 
internationally wrongful act committed by Poland for which the United States, as 
a non-directly injured state, would be entitled to complain, either by resorting to 
countermeasures or otherwise. 
In justifying its decision, the US government pointed to the ‘exceedingly serious 
world events’. In particular:
Clearly, under such circumstances, there resides in the President and the 
Executive [b]ranch of the U.S. Government ample authority to suspend 
586 M. Malamut, ‘Aviation: Suspension of Landing Rights of Polish Airlines in the United States – 93 
CAB Reports 479 (1981)’ 24 Harvard International Law Journal (1983) 190, 191–3.
587 Ibid, 196–7.
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application of an Executive Agreement between the United States and a 
foreign country, whether or not such suspension is provided for under the 
specifi c terms of the Agreement.588
Other states such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom also ceased perfor-
mance of their respective aviation agreements with Poland, a measure that again 
was not justifi ed under any of the provisions of these agreements.589
In 1982, and following the adoption of further repressive measures by the Polish 
government, the United States suspended Poland’s most favoured status on the 
ground that it failed to meet the import percentage required under the GATT. 
President Reagan stressed that the United States would not remain passive to 
Poland’s ‘outrages’, adding that ‘their crime will cost them dearly in their future 
dealings with America and free peoples elsewhere’.590 He further stressed that, by 
these measures, the US government intended ‘to put powerful doubts in the minds 
of the Soviet and Polish leaders about this continued repression … The whole 
purpose of our actions is to speak for those who have been silenced and to help 
those who have been rendered helpless.’591 
The imposition of martial law in Poland and the suspension of human rights 
caused reaction in Europe as well. In a statement issued in January 1982 by the 
Foreign Ministers of the European Community member states, the situation was 
condemned as an infringement of the ‘most elementary human and citizens’ 
rights, contrary to the Helsinki Final Act, the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’, the signifi cance of which went beyond merely 
Polish borders.592 However, in announcing the steps it was ready to take the 
European Community adopted a more careful approach limiting measures on 
considering credit, economic and food assistance to Poland.593 Due to disagree-
ments among the member states, the measures were limited to the import of 
luxury goods and thus expected to have only symbolic signifi cance.594 Despite this, 
it was made clear that the EC countries would seek consultation and close coop-
eration on developments with the United States. When examining at a later stage 
what further action to take they requested the Permanent Representatives 
Committee and the Commission to study the economic measures already resorted 
to by the United States, their scope and the impact on the economy and trade of 
588 United States–Poland: Suspension, Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law (1981–88) II, 2180, 
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EC member states.595 Moreover, the European Council announced the termina-
tion on the basis of special terms of foodstuff sales to Poland while the exports 
under normal terms would remain unaffected.596
At a NATO level, it was stressed that the massive violations of human rights 
and fundamental civil liberties were in breach of the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.597 
The problematic aspects in this case arise not only as to whether the United 
States and other countries possessed the right to resort to countermeasures in 
response to a violation of international law not injuring them in their individual 
rights, but also because it could be argued that Poland’s actions did not amount to 
a breach of obligations erga omnes. As already stressed, one of the legal conditions 
of third-state countermeasures is that they must come in response to a previously 
committed internationally wrongful act concerning the violation of collective or 
community interests. 
Accordingly, the US action in particular must be looked at in the light of 
Poland’s obligations while answer must be given to the question as to whether, by 
imposing martial law in the country, Poland was acting in violation of norms pos-
sessing an erga omnes character that could trigger the invocation of its responsibility 
by any other state. While it is true that in contemporary international law human 
rights violations do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, it has already 
been argued in Chapter 1 that not all human rights obligations have an erga omnes 
character. Accordingly, not all human rights violations would entitle all states to 
invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer, unless, of course, otherwise provided. 
This is refl ected in the reference in the Barcelona case to ‘basic’ human rights having 
an erga omnes nature, as distinguished, as already suggested, from other human 
rights not possessing such qualifi cation.598 It could, therefore, be argued that the 
infringement of trade union rights could not give rise to any entitlement on the 
part of the United States unless they were in breach of international obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole or established for the collective 
good of a group of states. France, for instance, was reluctant to follow suit in this 
instance, claiming that the situation in Poland was an internal matter.599 However, 
it could be argued that the serious repression and extinction of fundamental 
human rights such as the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial are ‘basic’ 
human rights establishing obligations erga omnes. 
It is true that this incident lacks clarity in respect of the legal ground on which 
Poland’s violations would have infringed an interest owed to the international 
community as a whole. Nevertheless, this example may substantiate the claims 
that these rights had already become part of customary international law and that 
595 State Trading Countries – Poland, Bulletin of the EC (1982: 1) 2.2.38.
596 Ibid.
597 Malamut, op. cit., 197, fn 41.
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the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression and to liberty all establish a legal 
interest owed to the international community as a whole.600 This conclusion can 
also be inferred from the reliance on the Helsinki Final Act and the Universal 
Declaration, two non-legally binding instruments, for justifi cation of the action 
taken against Poland. 
In conclusion, the action against Poland offers important evidence that the 
gross and systematic violation of fundamental human right elements create a legal 
interest to all states in their protection. 
In parallel with the measures adopted against Poland, the United States 
called on the Soviet Union to allow the restoration of basic rights in Poland 
and warned it that the United States would ‘have no choice but to take further 
concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship’601 in the 
event that the repression in Poland continued. Several days later, the United 
States announced that it would extend the economic measures to the Soviet Union 
for its role and interference in the situation in Poland. In a statement issued on 
29 December 1981, it was pointed out that:
The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in 
Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such 
a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear through now-public let-
ters to the Polish leadership, military manoeuvres and other forms of intimi-
dation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued.602
According to the United States, the Soviet Union was in breach of its obligations 
under the Helsinki Final Act (although this is not a legally binding instrument) and 
the UN Charter, without, however, expressly clarifying the legal principles or pro-
visions violated as a result.603 
Among the fi rst steps taken was the suspension of landing rights in the United 
States by the Soviet airline, Aerofl ot. Aerofl ot had at the time been granted per-
mission under Section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to conduct two 
roundtrips a week between Moscow and New York/Washington, DC. This was 
made conditional on ‘all applicable provisions of any treaty, convention, or agree-
ment affecting international air transportation now in effect or that may become 
effective during the period this permit remains in effect, to which the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. shall be parties’.604 The two countries were bound by a bilateral 
agreement, namely the US–USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement of 1966 that 
required a 6-month notice for its suspension. According to the Agreement, the 
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service to be operated by designated carriers should be approved by both parties. 
Although numerous intergovernmental agreements had taken effect since the 
conclusion of the 1966 Agreement in order to determine the service levels, the last 
of these intergovernmental agreements had expired in 1979 with the common 
understanding that future agreement would determine the acceptable pattern of 
service. However, these negotiations never took place. It was, therefore, the posi-
tion of the US government that since no further agreement existed on the 
schedules, frequency and capacity of fl ights conducted by Aerofl ot, the latter was 
conducting its fl ights at the discretion of the US government.605 As noted, the 
suspension of Aerofl ot’s fl ights in response to the Soviet Union’s involvement in 
the situation in Poland was not in violation of the Aviation Agreement as there 
was no guaranteed level of service under the agreement at that moment. At the 
same time, reference was made to the world events that preceded the decision 
on the suspension of Aerofl ot’s rights that, as noted, were of compelling 
signifi cance.606 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the permission granted under 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provided an extension of the agreement 
between the two states and, therefore, the US restrictions were in breach of its 
treaty commitments towards the Soviet Union. In this regard, the determination 
of a third state, in this instance of the United States to respond with coercive 
action against involvement in the serious suppression of fundamental human 
rights enhances further the argument in support of a general rule permitting 
solidarity measures.
Other measures decided against the Soviet Union included the suspension of 
issuance or renewal of export licences for high tech items such as electronic equip-
ment and computers, the closure of the Soviet Purchasing Commission offi ce in 
New York and the suspension of negotiations on the extension of the grain agree-
ment between the two countries. Also, the suspension of negotiations for a new 
maritime agreement and the imposition of stricter requirements for port access to 
all Soviet vessels in the light of the forthcoming expiration of the US–USSR bilat-
eral maritime trade agreement and as from that day. The United States also 
decided on the expansion of restrictions and controls on the export of oil and gas 
equipment and pipe layers to the Soviet Union, initially imposed in 1978 in 
response to human rights violations, to include commodities and technical data 
for transmission or refi nement of petroleum or natural gas for energy usage. 
Finally, the United States announced their intention not to renew ending 
US–Soviet agreements, as for example the agreements on energy, science and 
technology.607 To the extent that these measures were not in violation of the 1972 
Trade Agreement between the two countries noted earlier, they could be catego-
rized as retorsion, although it may be that at least some of the export restrictions 
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At the same time, the United States put pressure on the countries participating 
in the construction of a new natural gas pipeline to withhold their cooperation 
with the USSR. However, France, Japan and West Germany refused to suspend 
the project.608 In January 1982 the United States ceased export licences for the 
export of components for gas compressor turbines needed for the construction of 
a pipeline deal between the Soviet Union and western European fi rms.609 It seems 
that some European states were reluctant to proceed with more determinative 
measures against the Soviet Union not on legal concerns, but rather on economic 
considerations.610 This conclusion is rather strengthened by the fact that not only 
did certain European states, including France and West Germany, not suspend 
already existing agreements with the USSR, they also proceeded with the conclu-
sion of new ones.611 
In addition to these measures, in February 1982 the European Council decided 
to reduce its imports from the Soviet Union.612 This took effect with Council 
Regulation 596/82 with which the Council decided to suspend the preferential 
treatment of goods imported from the USSR that were exempted from quantita-
tive restrictions according to previous Council regulations, because Community 
interests required so, although no further explanation was given.613 However, it 
needs to be noted that this concession had previously been unilaterally granted to 
the Soviet Union and, therefore, it could be argued that with its suspension no 
international obligations were infringed on the part of the European Economic 
Community. The EEC member states based their action on former Article 113. 
Greece, for political reasons denied participating in any kind of trade and other 
measures against the USSR. Accordingly, the regulation noted that Greece was 
not to join in the implementation of the measures against the USSR on grounds 
referring to economic and trade diffi culties faced by it.614 Furthermore, it is noted 
that the EEC action against the USSR did not entail the violation of trade agree-
ments within GATT context.615 
The United Kingdom, by way of contrast, announced restrictions on the move-
ment of Soviet and Polish diplomats and that there would be no new fi nancial aid 
to Poland, measures that were not however inconsistent with international law. 
The UK government commented that these measures ‘are not really sanctions as 
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such but a signal to the Polish and Soviet authorities of Allied disapproval. We 
believe this is just as strong a signal as the US measures.’616 
In spite of action taken, particularly that of the United States, countries includ-
ing France, Italy and West Germany continued their agreements with the Soviet 
Union. As a result, and by the summer of 1982, the US government announced 
the extension of the ban on oil and gas equipment sales to foreign subsidiaries of 
US fi rms and foreign companies that produced equipment under US licence.617 
This decision, which was criticized by many European states as having extrater-
ritorial effect,618 need not be examined here as it falls outside the scope of this 
book. 
While the action taken against both Poland and the former Soviet Union show 
the willingness of states to resort to unilateral coercive action in protection of com-
munity interests, caution must be exercised so that any action taken by third states 
is the response to a breach of an obligation erga omnes. In these cases, the wrongful 
acts committed by the two states, particularly those by the Soviet Union, that 
empowered states not directly affected to react were not clearly identifi ed. 
However, particularly in the case of Poland, the reaction was the result of serious 
human rights violations after the imposition of martial law in the country. 
Accordingly, the suspension of its aviation rights in violation of the 1972 Agreement 
binding between the United States and Poland constitutes countermeasures 
taken by a non-injured state for the purpose of safeguarding fundamental 
community interests, namely, the protection of human rights possessing an 
erga omnes character.
5.2.16 US action against Nicaragua (1982) 
From the beginning of the 1980s, relations between the United States and 
Nicaragua were strained because of the alleged intervention of Nicaragua in the 
domestic affairs of neighbouring countries by providing military equipment to 
rebel groups and by trying to destabilise foreign governments. The United States, 
in particular, accused Nicaragua of intervention in neighbouring countries and of 
aggressive policies aimed at destabilizing the governments in Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.619
In 1981 the United States government, in response to these violations, con-
fi rmed the indefi nite suspension of all economic aid to Nicaragua provided under 
an economic aid package concluded between the two states in 1980.620 This spe-
cifi c measure, however, was not held by the ICJ, in the proceedings initiated by 
Nicaragua against the United States, to be in violation of the 1956 Treaty of 
616 Washington Post, 16 February 1982, A1 in Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 689.
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Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Protocol binding on the two states 
and, therefore, it could not be characterized as a countermeasure.621 
A year later, the United States, by Proclamation No. 4941 established a quota 
on the import of sugar, a measure that had a direct impact on Nicaragua’s exports 
of the product to the American market.622 This came in response to Nicaragua’s 
alleged interference in the sovereignty of neighbouring countries that constituted 
a serious violation of a fundamental obligation.623 In 1984 a GATT panel was 
invited to look at Nicaragua’s claims that the US action was in violation of its 
GATT obligations as it was taken for political rather than economic reasons and 
therefore it was unjustifi ed as discriminatory. Not only did the United States not 
attempt to rebut Nicaragua’s allegations, but also confi rmed that its decision, 
although it had trade implications, was not taken for trade considerations. It 
refused to justify its action under any exception clauses or in the context of GATT. 
It rather stressed that the specifi c dispute could not be resolved in the context of 
GATT, without producing further arguments for this purpose. It is merely 
noted that the United States only contested that ‘its action was fully justifi ed in the 
context in which it was taken’.624 The panel, restricted by its own terms of refer-
ence, found it suffi cient to examine the dispute on the basis of GATT, accepting 
Nicaragua’s claims, without, however, looking into the question of whether the 
US conduct could be justifi ed under a right to countermeasures for the protection 
of fundamental interests of the international community.625 
This example clearly falls within the concept of solidarity measures and, there-
fore, within the scope of this examination, as the United States did not hesitate to 
violate its trade obligations under GATT in response to violations that fell outside 
the GATT system. Nevertheless, it is necessary to establish that Nicaragua’s 
actions constituted a serious breach of fundamental interests. This is an essential 
condition for the legality of countermeasures in order to remedy the fears of vul-
nerable states that such measures will not be subjected to abuse. Before one can 
therefore incorporate this example as indicative of state practice in support of 
third-state countermeasures, it must fi rst be determined whether Nicaragua had 
infringed its international obligations and, if so, whether the infringed obligations 
had an erga omnes character. 
It seems that the United States was particularly concerned about the increasing 
Soviet infl uence over Nicaragua,626 which by itself would not involve a violation of 
an interest owed to the international community as a whole. This is particularly so 
in view of fundamental international law principles according to which states are 
entitled to non-interference in their domestic affairs, with the exception of serious 
621 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (1986), op. cit., 138, (276).
622 Keesing’s (1982) 31570. 
623 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 379.
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violations of human rights and free enjoyment of the political, economic and social 
system they wish to establish. However, the US action was a response to unlawful 
use of force by Nicaragua and, therefore, the imposition of quota on the import of 
sugar establishes another precedent in support of countermeasures by states other 
than the injured in response to a serious violation of international law that affected 
the legal interests of all states. 
US reaction, however, did not cease there. In 1985 the US government issued 
Executive Order No. 12513 entitled ‘Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other 
Transactions Involving Nicaragua’. The Order was justifi ed on grounds of the 
unusual and extraordinary threat to national security and foreign policy as a result 
of Nicaragua’s aggressive policies in Central America of subverting its neighbour-
ing countries, destabilizing military buildup and enhancing its military and security 
ties with Cuba and the USSR. The Order prohibited all imports of goods and 
services from and all exports to Nicaragua. At the same time, all Nicaraguan air-
carriers were banned from engaging in any transportation from or to the United 
States, while all vessels of Nicaraguan registry were prevented from entering US 
ports.627 Moreover, the United States gave 12 months’ notice for the termination 
of the 1956 US–Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and 
Protocol between the two states, a measure, however, that was in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaty and in particular with Article XXVI, para 3.628 
Nicaragua, for its part, argued that the trade embargo was in violation of the 
UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States, GATT and the 
1956 US–Nicaraguan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and 
Protocol. This was terminated by the United States, invoking arguments that the 
policies and actions of the Nicaraguan government were incompatible with normal 
commercial relations between the two countries. The treaty excluded from its 
scope conduct taken in the light of ‘essential security interests’ and, thus, the US 
action could be justifi ed on express treaty provisions. The United States was react-
ing to Nicaragua’s use of force in violation of the UN Charter against its neighbours, 
Costa Rica and Honduras, by entering their territory and supporting armed bands 
and rebels. 
In a subsequent complaint fi led by Nicaragua against the United States within 
the GATT context concerning the trade embargo, a GATT panel was actually 
unable to examine the merits of the case because the United States had invoked 
the security clause under Article XXI. However, the panel, not really convinced 
by the US justifi cation, noted in its 1986 report that irrespective of whether the 
US action was justifi ed under Article XXI, such boycotts contradicted the very 
purposes of GATT for non-discriminatory treatment and freedom from obstacles 
627 Economic Sanctions – Nicaragua, Cumulative Digest of International Law (1981–88) III, 2979.
628 United States Diplomatic Note concerning economic sanctions, 24 ILM (1985) 811–816; United States notifi ca-
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by the Panel, L/6053, 13 October 1986, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/
gattpanels/nicembargo.pdf. Also see Guttry, op. cit., 173. 
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to trade practices.629 It is true that the national security clause must comply with 
the principle of good faith.630
The US embargo was further condemned as violating the Declaration on 
the Friendly Relations among States and the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States. Nicaragua also found support from the Coordinating Bureau 
of the Non-Aligned Countries, the member states of the Latin American Economic 
System and the member states of the Caribbean Community, 631 although 
Denmark was one of the very few states that stressed that ‘unilateral economic 
sanctions do not violate general international law’.632 Furthermore, at a UN 
level the Security Council and the General Assembly characterized the US 
action against Nicaragua as an unlawful exercise of economic coercion in 
violation of the Declaration on Friendly Relations and of GATT,633 although 
as Dawidowicz notes, there was no claim that such measures could only be 
resorted to by the UN.634
It is remarkable that when the dispute was brought by Nicaragua before the 
ICJ, the Court failed to examine the US termination of the 1956 Treaty on 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the context of the law of countermea-
sures. That was despite the fact that the Court acknowledged Nicaragua’s own 
wrongful acts and, in particular, the use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter. Instead, the Court stressed that a state was entitled to cease trade rela-
tions with a certain state only insofar as there was no treaty or other commitment 
under international law.635 Examining further whether the US decision to termi-
nate the treaty could be justifi ed under Article XXI of GATT, the Court held that 
in the absence of evidence from the United States, the embargo did not fulfi l the 
condition of necessity for the protection of essential security interests as provided 
under that provision.636 
The trade embargo, viewed in the context of general international law rather 
than that of a regime lex specialis such as the GATT, has legal signifi cance for the 
purposes of the current examination. Although the US government did not rely in 
this instance on a right to respond to serious violations of collective interests by 
way of countermeasures, but rather on grounds of national security as it was 
already entitled to do under GATT, many states considered its action as unlawful 
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economic coercion.637 This is further evidenced by GATT panel’s report of 1986 
that viewed the US trade embargo as an infringement of the US obligations under 
GATT. This may offer yet another example of third-state countermeasures 
although some authors have concluded that the ‘motivation’ behind the imple-
mentation of the embargo excludes this incident as a measure of this nature.638
5.2.17 The Falklands crisis (1982)
When in April 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, the Security Council, 
acting on its Chapter VII powers, described Argentina’s action as a breach of the 
peace and demanded it to cease hostilities immediately and to withdraw from the 
islands, while it called on the two countries involved in the confl ict to resolve 
their differences by diplomatic means.639 However, no compulsory, military or 
economic action under Chapter VII was authorized. The United Kingdom, 
which was directly injured, called on other states to respond to this violation and, 
indeed, members of the European Economic Community, Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand implemented a number of economic measures such as the ban on 
all imports of Argentinean products. 
In this regard, the EEC Council determined that the serious situation created 
by the invasion of the Falkland Islands required immediate and uniform response 
by all member states of the Communities. As a result, with Regulation 877/82 
and later with Regulations 1176/82 and 1254/82, it decided on 16 April 1982 
to suspend the import of all products originating from Argentina, including the 
suspension of two agreements regarding textiles and mutton and lamb, invoking 
both former Articles 113 and 224.640 Article 113 provided for a common com-
mercial policy, while Article 224 imposed a duty on member states to consult one 
another for the purpose of preserving the common market, particularly when 
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doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/500/29/pdf/NL850029.pdf?OpenElement; by Bolivia, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar and Ukraine in United Nations doc. S/PV 2579, (10 May 1985), (24), (47), (61), 
(75), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/500/15/pdf/NL 
850015.pdf?OpenElement; by Argentina and Guyana in United Nations doc. S/PV 2580 
(10 May 1985) (40), (44), (96), (147), available at http://document-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NL8/500/32/pdf/NL850032.pdf?OpenElement. For detailed analysis on this, see 
Dawidowicz, op. cit., 381.
638 Dawidowicz, ibid, 382–3.
639 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Security Council res. 502 (1982).
640 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 877/82 in OJ (1982) L/102/1 (16 April 1982); Council Regulation 
1176/82 in OJ (1982) L/136/1 (18 May 1982). The treaties can be found in OJ (1979) L/298/2 
(26 November 1979), Treaty concerning textiles, and Arrangement in the form of an exchange of 
letters between the European Economic Community and the Argentine Republic on trade in 
mutton and lamb, OJ (1980) L/275/14 (14 October 1980); Council Regulation (EEC) extending 
the suspension of imports of all products originating in Argentina, No. 1254/82, OJ (1982) L/146, 
1–1 (24 May 1982).
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affected by measures taken by a member state in compliance with its obligations 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.641 As noted in the pream-
bular paragraph of the regulation: ‘[T]he interests of the Community and the 
Member States demand the temporary suspension of imports of all products 
originating in Argentina.’642 These measures were in violation of obligations 
emanating from GATT but also in violation of the two agreements regarding 
textiles and mutton and lamb that required a notice of 3 and 12 months respec-
tively for their suspension. They were, however, required because as noted a 
territory associated with the Community had been occupied by the use of force.643 
Accordingly, their sole aim was to compel the withdrawal of Argentinean forces 
from the Falklands.644
With a subsequent decision of the representatives of the governments of the 
member states of the European Coal and Steel Community, the imports of all 
Argentinean products falling under the specifi c agreement were also suspended.645 
On no occasion did the EEC Council express hesitation about the legitimacy of 
such action in international law, in contradiction to their stand towards the regime 
of Idi Amin only a few years earlier. 
Nevertheless, some member states distanced themselves from the implementa-
tion of the measures provided for under these regulations. Denmark seemed to 
oppose the idea that trade means could be used for political purposes on the basis 
of Article 113. Instead of challenging the regulations before the ECJ, the judg-
ment of which could undermine signifi cantly such EEC measures, it preferred to 
announce that since it lacked the legal basis for implementing this form of action 
it was imperative to enact national legislation giving effect to the measures against 
Argentina.646 Ireland and Italy, by way of contrast, relied on former Article 224 
not to apply the measures.647 Zoller, in particular, comments that this fact is 
641 Former Article 113 (now Article 133) constitutes the legal basis for the uniform commercial policy 
of the EC member states, while former Article 224 (now Article 297 of the EC Treaty) in particu-
lar attempts to reconcile obligations falling under the EEC and obligations arising under the UN 
Charter. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ (2006) C 321 E/37 (29 December 
2006); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 877/82 of 16 April 1982 suspending imports of all products 
originating in Argentina, OJ (1982) L102/1. For the text of these agreements see Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2557/79 of 30 October 1979 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the EEC and the Argentine Republic on trade in textile products, OJ (1979) No. L298/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2642/80 of 14 October 1980 laying down conditions for the 
application of protective measures in the sheepmeat and goatmeat sector, OJ (1980) L275/4.
642 In Kuyper (1982), op. cit., 142.
643 Ibid, 152.
644 Community solidarity in the Falklands Confl ict, Bulletin of the EC (1982) No. 4, 7.
645 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 877/82 of 16 April 1982 suspending imports of all products orig-
inating in Argentina, OJ (1982) L102/1, 3.
646 Kuyper (1982), op. cit., 149–50.
647 Ibid. Former Article 224 has been invoked by member states to justify not only the imposition of 
sanctions against a third state, but also unilateral deviations from sanctions taken on the basis of 
former article 113 EC, such as was the case of Ireland and Italy in the EC sanctions against 
Argentina. For a European law perspective, see analysis by P. Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and 
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evidence that the EEC measures were not adopted by the Community as an inter-
national organization or by a Community institution, but rather as a result of the 
collective decision of the member states.648 
Argentina, for its part, claimed that the EEC action against it was in violation 
of the UN Charter, the GATT and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. The EEC’s action was also criticized by other GATT parties,649 which 
argued that the measures were taken for political reasons and not on bona fi de 
economic grounds.650 With respect to the argument that the EEC measures were 
in violation of the UN Charter this rests on the incorrect assumption that the 
implementation of economic measures, such as in the case of authorization of 
the use of armed force, falls within the monopoly of the Security Council.651 
Regarding Argentina’s claims that the EEC measures were in violation of 
GATT,652 it was argued that such measures could fall under the security clause 
according to which action could be justifi ed for the protection of essential security 
interests, the determination of which is left to the member states. In fact, the 
European Economic Community and the other states imposing trade sanctions 
on Argentina claimed that while these measures affected the latter’s rights under 
GATT, they were justifi ed by reference to the national security exception under 
Article XXI GATT. Nevertheless, according to Dawidowicz, Article XXI did not 
apply in this particular instance and therefore, the EEC measures were in viola-
tion of this agreement.653 More specifi cally, the justifi cation of the suspension of 
the two agreements between the European Economic Community and Argentina 
on the trade of textile products, on the one hand, and of mutton and lamb, on 
the other, under the security exceptions of GATT was rather tense. While the 
fi rst treaty was concluded on the basis of Article 4 of the Multi-Fibre Agreement 
within the GATT, the relationship was more tenuous concerning the second 
agreement on mutton and lamb. As noted: ‘[T]hough it is a type of self-limitation 
Defence in EU Constitutional Law: The Legal Regulation of Sanctions, Exports of Dual-use Goods and Armaments 
(Hart Publishing: 2001) 86.
648 E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Transnational Publishers, Inc., 
Dobbs Ferry: 1984) 104. It is argued by White and Abass that the confusion between state and 
institutional practice, namely measures taken by international organizations such as the EEC/
EU, on third- state countermeasures does not corroborate the existence of a right to third-state 
countermeasures. White and Abass, op. cit., 526–7.
649 GATT Communique – Trade Restrictions affecting Argentina applied for Non-economic Reasons, 18 May 1982, 
GATT doc. L5319/Rev.1; Trade Restrictions affecting Argentina applied for Non-economic Reasons, 
30 April 1982, GATT doc. L5317; also see the position of Spain and Brazil, Minutes of Meeting, 
22 June 1982, GATT doc. C/M/157, 5–6.
650 See Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, adopted on 29 November 1982, L/5424, 
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supplement No. 29, 9. Also in Keesing’s (1983) 
32169A.
651 Kuyper (1982), op. cit., 152.
652 See GATT Communique, op. cit.; Trade Restrictions affecting Argentina applied for Non-economic Reasons, 15 
June 1982, L/5336; Position taken by Spain and Brazil, Minutes of Meeting, 22 June 1982, GATT doc. 
C/M/157, 5–6; Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, 12 November 1982, L/5414, 17.
653 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 368. 
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agreement which is common in the framework of GATT, it does not fi nd a legal 
basis within GATT itself or in any instrument based on the GATT’.654 Furthermore, 
it was stressed that the security exceptions did not necessarily apply to all agree-
ments concluded within GATT as an organization and that in any case the 
European Economic Community could not be regarded as the injured party to 
the dispute.655 
Signifi cantly, in a joint statement made by EC member states, Australia and 
Canada, it was noted that their action was justifi ed by their ‘inherent right of 
which Article XXI of the General Agreement is a refl ection’, while the European 
Community representative argued that ‘inherent rights constituted a general 
exception to the GATT’.656 This suggests that states assumed a right existing 
under general international law to resort to the action they did irrespective of the 
national security exceptions provided under GATT. It is suggested by Dawidowicz, 
in particular, that the reference to ‘inherent rights’ extends to a customary right to 
third-state countermeasures that amounts to a general exception to GATT.657
Other commentators concluded that the EEC action did not constitute a coun-
termeasure. Kuyper, in particular, examining whether the EEC measures could 
be justifi ed as reprisals or countermeasures, is not convinced beyond any doubt 
that there exists a right on states not directly injured by a certain wrongdoing to 
violate their own international obligations in the form of reprisals. He bases 
his view in the light of the ILC’s conclusions at the time, according to which 
preference was given to the collective protection of fundamental community 
interests rather than to allowing states or a group of states acting unilaterally to 
enforce international law.658 According to him, third-state reprisals tend to 
disregard the role of the UN system in the maintenance of international peace 
and security and entail risks for the European Economic Community itself regard-
ing similar situations against which it does not wish to bring any collective action.659 
As Kuyper points out, the entitlement of the European Economic Community 
to resort to reprisals against Argentina created diffi culties not only because 
‘the EEC would set itself up as some minor policeman of this world’ but also due 
to the fact that: 
[T]hird party reprisals are looked at askance in international law, although it 
has been shown above that there are indications in state practice and in the 
doctrine which tend to support a right to reprisal by third states, if the target 
654 Kuyper (1982), op. cit., 154.
655 Ibid.
656 Joint statement by the European Community, Australia and Canada, ‘Trade Restrictions 
Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons’, GATT doc. L 5319/Rev. 1 (5 May 
1982) (1) (b) and GATT doc. C/M/157, 10, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/
SULPDF/90440042.pdf.
657 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 370.
658 Kuyper (1982), op. cit., 158.
659 Ibid, 159, 162–3.
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state has infringed very fundamental rules of international law, such as the 
prohibition of the use of force.660
He thus takes the view that the EEC action was justifi ed under the right of collec-
tive self-defence contained in Article 51 of the UN Charter, since the United 
Kingdom had an established right to individual self-defence as the victim of the 
unlawful military conduct of Argentina. According to him, this solution is more 
preferable as it incorporated the EEC action within the UN system and did not 
alienate it from it.661 Zoller also suggests that the EEC action relied rather on a 
right to collective self-defence. She justifi es this by the fact that when addressing 
the issue before GATT, the measures were referred to as measures taken by the 
Community and its member states on the basis of their ‘inherent rights’, a phrase 
used in Article 51 to refer to the right to self-defence.662 However, it is signifi cant 
to note that the notion of collective self-defence was never expressly referred to 
within the debates in GATT and was not relied on as justifying the action taken 
against Argentina.663
In addition to the EEC measures, West Germany imposed a trade embargo 
against Argentina and suspended its civil aviation agreement a move it justifi ed 
not on collective self-defence but rather on a general right to suspend the treaty 
even if this was not expressly provided for under the treaty.664 This justifi cation 
provides yet another clear example of third-state countermeasures. Norway, for its 
part, prohibited imports from the targeted state,665 while Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and West Germany banned arms sales to Argentina. Belgium, in 
particular, affi rmed the right of individual states to resort to unilateral peaceful 
coercive measures outside the framework of the UN whenever a grave breach of 
the United Nations Charter occurs.666 Canada, greatly concerned by the use of 
force by Argentina as a means for settling a dispute over a territory, recognized 
the United Kingdom’s right to self-defence. It was on this basis that Canada 
decided to impose a ban on exports of war material and on all military shipments 
to Argentina and introduced restrictions on the import of Argentinean goods to 
Canada.667 New Zealand, for its part, announced an import and export ban and 
the suspension of a civil aviation agreement with Argentina.668 
660 Ibid, 165.
661 Ibid, 158.
662 Zoller, op. cit., 104–5.
663 Tams, op. cit., 216.
664 Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 718; Dawidowicz, op. cit., 373.
665 Financial Times, Latin American Markets, 10 May 1982, 3; Financial Times, 13 July 1982, 14 in 
Hufbauer, ibid, 719.
666 See Belgium’s statement on behalf of the European Community, UN doc. S/PV 2363, 
23 May 1982, (131–32), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
NL8/200/43/pdf/NL820043.pdf?OpenElement.
667 Argentina – Attack on Falkland Islands, House of Commons Debates (Canada), CYIL (1983) 359–60.
668 Keesing’s (1982) 31533; Also see A. de Mestral, ‘Canadian Practice in International Law during 
1982’ 21 CYIL (1983) 337 and ‘Australian Practice in International Law, 1981 to 1983’, 10 AYIL 
(1983) 573. 
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More interestingly, the United States, like Argentina a member of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), decided on the implementation of numer-
ous measures with considerable economic and political effects that contributed to 
the outcome of the dispute.669 Apart from the logistical and material assistance it 
was providing to the United Kingdom, the United States suspended all military 
exports and security assistance to Argentina, withheld the certifi cation of 
Argentina’s eligibility for military sales, suspended the Export-Import Bank credits 
and guarantees and suspended the Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees. 
The US government justifi ed its position by reference to the principles of law and 
the peaceful settlement of disputes in consequence of Argentina’s refusal to accept 
a compromise. The US Secretary of State, in particular, referred to the need to 
take action in the light of the use of unlawful force for the resolution of disputes, 
rejecting at the same time that the US military would engage in the hostilities.670 
This has legal signifi cance for the question of solidarity measures as the US mea-
sures did not rely on a self-defence argument and, therefore, they could only fi nd 
justifi cation in general international law.
Many states, however, especially within the inter-American system, viewed these 
measures as in violation of the OAS principles and international law. By Resolution 
I adopted during the 20th Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and by a great 
number of OAS member states a few weeks only after the dispute, the EEC and US 
measures were deplored since they were neither authorized by the Security Council 
nor were they consistent with the UN and OAS Charters or the GATT. The United 
States was called on to lift the coercive measures and to cease any material assistance 
to the United Kingdom in conformity with the principle of solidarity recognized 
under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.671 In another resolution 
adopted by the OAS Inter-American Economic and Social Council it was declared 
that the economic measures against Argentina were in breach, inter alia, of Article 19 
of the OAS Charter. Article 19 provides that: ‘No state may use or encourage the use 
of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sov-
ereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.’672 
Acevedo takes the view that the US decision to implement unilateral withdrawal 
of benefi ts from Argentina was unlawful on the grounds on which it relied, namely, 
to force Argentina to accept contrary to its own wish a compromise on the confl ict 
and which was punitive in nature.673 Furthermore, Acevedo points to the justifi ca-
tion used for the suspension of the Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees in 
669 A. Acevedo, ‘The U.S. Measures against Argentina Resulting from the Malvinas Confl ict’ 78 
AJIL (1984) 323.
670 See Haig’s Statement, Secretary of State, 30 April 1982, New York Times, 1 May 1982, 8, col.5 in ibid, 
340. Also see Keesing’s (1982) 31709.
671 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio) (modifi ed by the 1975 Protocol of San 
José), 2 September 1947, 21 UNTS 77, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
Treaties/b-29.html; in Acevedo, ibid, 338.
672 In Acevedo, ibid, 331, fn 23.
673 Ibid, 337–8, 341.
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Public Notice 805, which relied on the US policy and national interest.674 Yet, at 
the OAS Economic and Social Council meeting held in October 1982, the US 
government rebutted the suggestion that it had been involved in the adoption of 
coercive measures against Argentina. As noted: 
The United States had no legal obligation to keep up the benefi ts that it with-
drew from Argentina, nor did it violate any existing agreement with that 
country. The measures the United States adopted were not intended to obtain 
advantages of any kind; quite to the contrary, their purpose was to demon-
strate the consistency of the United States vis-à-vis the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes. The measures taken by the Government of the United 
States demonstrated the United States’ adherence to the basic principles of 
international law and were fully in keeping with its international obligations, 
and particularly with the pertinent resolution adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council.675
According to Acevedo this legal argumentation seemed contradictory in many 
respects.676 More specifi cally, it denied the existence of US coercive measures 
against Argentina, something that went beyond the statement of the Secretary of 
State on the matter. It further contradicted the purpose of Public Notice 805, the 
purpose of which was to advance US policy and national interests and, lastly, it 
denied that there had been any violation of an agreement existing between the 
two states, thus implying that the UN and OAS Charters and GATT were not 
agreements between Argentina and the USA.677 
Indeed, the US measures were in violation of the obligations of the United 
States under GATT. It is relevant here to note the US reliance on the Security 
Council resolution passed on the dispute to justify its action. The Security Council 
had adopted no mandatory resolution on the matter and, therefore, the US action 
lacked legal basis in that respect. Accordingly, their effort to safeguard fundamen-
tal interests of international law could only rely on solidarity measures. The action 
decided against Argentina reveals, therefore, the determination on the part of the 
US government to respond with economic and other measures to a serious viola-
tion of the international legal order, even if no direct injury was sustained by it. 
With respect to the EEC collective non-forcible measures, these offer another 
example of peaceful coercive remedies taken outside the context of a Security Council 
mandate and in violation of specifi c treaty obligations. This was made in an acknowl-
edgment that the unlawful use of force could not leave other states unaffected, even if 
674 Ibid, 341.
675 See Piedra’s Statement, US Representative to the Inter-American and Social Council (translated by 
Acevedo from the Spanish version as reported by the Associated Press on 21 October 1982), 
reproduced in OAS Department of Public Information, Servicio Informativo, 22 October 1982, 
at 1 in ibid, 342.
676 Acevedo, ibid, 342.
677 Ibid, 342.
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again the EEC and its member states, with the exception of the UK, were not the 
direct victims of attack by Argentina. The EEC action has nevertheless raised ques-
tions as to whether it could be justifi ed as countermeasures or as part of the exercise of 
the right to collective self-defence, making the distinction between them necessary.678 
It can be deduced that while the legal basis of particularly the European 
Community action is not entirely clear, moving between a claim of collective self-
defence and solidarity measures, the reaction of the OAS and GATT indicates that 
the action could not be justifi ed under a right to self-defence or under the national 
security clause. Signifi cantly, the reaction of OAS member states in support of 
Argentina did not rely on a general objection of countermeasures of this nature, 
but rather on the support given by American states to the Argentinean territorial 
and sovereign claims over the Falklands. This is of legal importance as the stance 
that these states have taken does not refl ect their protest against a rule permitting 
solidarity measures, but even in the unlikely case that it did, it would not by itself 
be suffi cient to prevent the formulation of a customary rule to that effect.679 
5.2.18  Non-forcible action against the Soviet Union for the destruction 
of a civil aircraft in fl ight (1983)
In September 1983 the USSR shot down and destroyed a South Korean aircraft 
that had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing all the people on board, which 
included nationals of several states. The USSR justifi ed its act by the allegation 
that the aircraft had been involved in spying against it, although later it was proved 
that the aircraft was a civilian and unarmed Korean Airlines plane. 
The United States responded to this ‘heinous’ act with a number of measures 
concerning aviation rights of Aerofl ot in the United States. In particular, the gov-
ernment announced the suspension of Aerofl ot’s right to sell tickets, the prohibition 
of US airlines from selling tickets for transportation with Aerofl ot and the prohibi-
tion of US airlines from carrying traffi c to, from or within the United States where 
an Aerofl ot fl ight is on the ticket. Moreover, the government instructed US air-
lines to suspend any interline service arrangements with Aerofl ot and decided on 
the prohibition of American Airlines from accepting tickets issued by Aerofl ot for 
air travel to, from or within the United States. According to the US government, 
since there were no agreed services under the 1966 US–USSR Civil Transport 
Agreement the USSR had no right to have the Aerofl ot services in the United 
States maintained. This legal justifi cation is similar to the one advanced previously 
by the United States in relation to the action taken against the USSR for its 
involvement in the repression in Poland in 1981.680 
678 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 373.
679 For the role of dissidence in the formation of customs see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, 
South West Africa cases (Second Phase), op. cit., 291. 
680 United States–USSR: Suspensions, Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law (1981–88) 
II, 2190.
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While there were American nationals among the passengers killed, thus enti-
tling the United States to action as an aggrieved state, the US government placed 
particular emphasis on the fact that the Soviet action was in violation of funda-
mental community interests. In particular, it was stressed that the shooting was a 
violation of both general international law concerning the prohibition of the use 
of force and also of the ICAO concerning the signal, warning and guidance pro-
cedures for the interception of civilian aircrafts.681 President Reagan demanded 
that the Soviet Union give a full explanation of the circumstances of the shooting, 
an apology and reparations for the families of the victims. He further stressed that 
the intention was not to take vengeance against the Soviet Union but rather to 
ensure non-repetition of such act.682 
For its part the USSR did not deny the existence of a rule prohibiting the use of 
force, but rather attempted to justify its action on the basis of another customary 
norm, in particular the norm concerning the treatment of aircraft that were 
involved in an espionage mission.683 
In a draft resolution by the Security Council, subsequently vetoed by the USSR, 
it was stated that the Soviet action was in violation of ‘elementary considerations 
of humanity’.684 Moreover, the ICAO Council referred to the shooting as a seri-
ous violation of international law.685 However, in the absence of collective action 
at a UN level, certain other states including Canada, Japan, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany and other NATO countries (with the exception of 
France, Greece and Turkey) announced a 2-week prohibition on all Soviet 
Aerofl ot fl ights from and to their territories.686 The suspension of civil aviation 
rights was initially based on a recommendation made by the International 
Federation of Airline Pilots in the light of which a number of national pilot 
associations suspended fl ying to the USSR for a period of up to 60 days.687 While 
this decision was not taken directly by state authorities, the suspension was 
attributed to the states of the national pilot associations taking part in the 
action.688 Moreover, this decision was in violation of specifi c aviation agree-
ments with the Soviet Union. France and Germany for instance acknowledged 
681 The Legal Analysis of Soviet Actions, prepared by Patrick J. Norton, Assistant Legal Adviser for East 
Asian Affairs, and by Mary Beth West, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, 15 September 
1983, in Destruction of Civil Aircraft in Flight, Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law 
(1981–88) II, 2199–2209.
682 Washington Post, 6 September 1983, A4 in Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 740.
683 Legal Argumentation in International Crises: The Downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007, 97 HLR (1984) 
1198.
684 In M. Kido, ‘The Korean Airlines Incident on September 1, 1983, and Some Measures Following 
it’ 62 Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1997) 1049, 1052. Also see Petman, op. cit., 362.
685 International Civil Aviation Organization Consideration 22 ILM (1983) 1149–51.
686 Hufbauer et al. (1985) op. cit., 739, 741.
687 Action taken by the International Federation of Airline Pilots, 6 September 1983, 22 ILM (1983) 
1218–19. Also see Dawidowicz, op. cit., 374.
688 Dawidowicz, ibid, 374. Also see Keesing’s (1983) 32513–16.
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that such suspension of their respective bilateral aviation agreements with the 
USSR was not provided for.689 
While some of the states that supported the suspension were injured states, 
such as Canada, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and therefore justifi ed in taking countermeasures, other states such 
as Finland, France, Germany, Spain and Switzerland had suffered no direct 
injury. Therefore, their action could only be justifi ed in the context of solidarity 
measures.690 Moreover, their action came despite continuing debates to resolve 
the dispute at a UN level. Importantly, in 1984, the ICAO Council, making 
particular reference to the shooting incident highlighted that ‘such use of force 
constitutes a violation of international law, and invokes generally recognised 
legal consequences’.691 
It can be concluded from the analysis just undertaken that the suspension of 
aviation rights decided at least by some of the states mentioned in that analysis, 
amounted to countermeasures taken in response to a serious violation, namely the 
unlawful use of force, by states that were not directly affected by the violation. 
5.2.19  Countermeasures against the apartheid regime in South Africa 
(1960–64 and 1986)
5.2.19.1 INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The problem of race segregation in South Africa had extensively occupied the 
discussions at the UN in the 1960s resulting in the adoption of several resolutions, 
especially by the General Assembly, in condemnation of the racial policies of the 
South African regime. Many states also insisted on a harsher reaction with the 
implementation of several economic and trade measures against the country. In 
1977, amid growing international unrest concerning apartheid, the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter imposed a mandatory 
embargo on arms, ammunitions, weapons and military equipment to South 
Africa. The embargo was imposed as a reaction to the apartheid policies of South 
Africa that imposed a threat to international peace and security.692 Apartheid was 
also a violation of the right to self-determination, later incorporated in the 1970 
General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, according to which people 
have a right to be ruled by a government without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.693 While the Declaration does not create legally binding effects, the right 
to self-determination not only fi nds expression in customary international law, but 
689 Dawidowicz, ibid, 375.
690 Ibid. Also see Keesing’s (1983) 32514; ‘National Actions Taken in Response to the Destruction of 
the Korean Air Lines Aircraft’, 22 ILM (1983) 1197, 1199, 1201, 1205, 1218.
691 Resolution adopted by ICAO Council on 6 March 1984, 23 ILM (1984) 937, (4).
692 South Africa Security Council Res. 418 (1977). 
693 See Ferguson-Brown, op. cit., 61–2.
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it also establishes obligations erga omnes as the ICJ ruled in the Barcelona Traction 
case. According to the fi ndings of the ICJ, the South African practices of racial 
segregation and the denial of fundamental human rights were ‘a fl agrant violation 
of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter’.694
The following sections consider in some depth the international reaction against 
apartheid and the efforts made to bring such policies to an end. It will be shown 
that states supported not only in words but also in practice unilateral coercive 
peaceful measures against South Africa, responding not as injured states but rather 
as states that were upholding fundamental interests of the international commu-
nity as a whole. 
5.2.19.2 THE INDIAN REACTION (1946)
In 1946, immediately after the end of World War II, India was the fi rst state to 
take the path of trade measures against South Africa for its apartheid policies and 
for what it characterized as an issue that touched the conscience of the world.695 It 
raised the matter before the General Assembly, arguing that with the 1946 Asiatic 
Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act passed by the South African govern-
ment imposing complete segregation on trade and residence, South Africa had 
repudiated the Capetown Agreement between the two countries.696 South Africa, 
in response, argued that since the question concerned not Indian nationals but 
rather Indian nationals of South Africa, the issue fell within its domestic jurisdic-
tion allowing for no outside interference. However, reference was also made to the 
Capetown Agreement whose object according to South Africa was to encourage 
emigration back to India and to improve the life of those who remained.697 It has 
not been possible to assess the nature of the measures imposed by India and, in 
particular, whether they were in violation of international law. However, from 
South Africa’s response it may be deduced that India was a third party as the 
discriminatory measures were imposed against South African citizens, even if they 
were of Indian origin. Unfortunately, no more information could be obtained on 
this incident and therefore the legality of the Indian response and its categoriza-
tion as a solidarity measure could not be confi rmed.
694 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, op. cit., 57, (131).
695 L. de Villiers, In Sight of Surrender: The US Sanctions Campaign against South Africa, 1946–1993 (Praeger: 
1995) 1.
696 Capetown Agreement, 1927, Joint Communiqué issued by the South African and Indian Governments, February 
21, 1927, available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/gandhi/appendix.htm. In 
an exchange of letters between representatives of the Indian and South African governments, it 
was pointed out that Indians and their successors would be able to live and trade freely in South 
Africa, in the areas in which they were living. See Letter dated J7 uly 1914, from Gandhi to 
Gorges, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/gandhi/appendix.htm
697 Letter of Indian Government of 22 June 1946 to be discussed in fi rst session by General Assembly, UN Yearbook 
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5.2.19.3 REACTION OF AFRICAN STATES
In the conference conducted by independent African states in Addis Ababa in the 
summer of 1960, African states were called on to react to the ‘shameful’ racial 
discrimination policies of South Africa and to take various measures in response. 
These included the imposition of trade embargoes on all African products, the 
closure of their ports to all South African vessels, the prohibition of vessels carry-
ing their fl ags from using South African ports and the refusal of landing and 
overfl ight rights to aircraft owned by South Africa. The decision taken is signifi -
cant as it establishes the legal belief of the African states that they could enforce 
the protection of fundamental human rights even by violation of their treaty and 
other obligations under international law. A month after the adoption of this reso-
lution, Ghana was the fi rst state to implement the decision by imposing a total 
embargo on all South African products and to close its ports and airports to South 
African planes and ships. It even required South Africans entering its territory to 
declare their opposition to apartheid and, if refused, denied them entry.698 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika and 
Uganda also decided on the implementation of a trade embargo in 1960, while 
some of these states also imposed an air ban and restrictions on port use against 
planes and vessels with a South African fl ag.699
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) extended these measures in 1963 
recommending the termination of diplomatic and consular relations, port and 
airport closure and prohibition of South African aircraft from using the air space 
of African states.700 Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Libya and Sudan, for instance, closed 
their ports and airports to Portugal and South Africa. Uganda, in addition to 
those countries, announced the ban on the export of goods to South Africa.701 The 
General Assembly also reacted to the apartheid policies through the adoption of 
Resolution 1761 in 1962 according to which South Africa was declared to be in 
serious violation of international law and recommended the implementation of a 
trade embargo against it.702 
Hungary, for its part, announced in July 1963 the cessation of trade relations 
with South Africa, India imposed a ban on landing and related facilities to 
South African aircraft, Indonesia decided on closure of its ports, a measure fol-
lowed by Kuwait, while the Philippines imposed a ban on the import of 
mahogany.703 Sierra Leone also announced a trade and commerce ban on 
698 See New York Times, 25 June 1960, col. 6; 30 July 1960, 1 col. 1.
699 Keesing’s (1963–64) 19699.
700 Ibid, 19463, 19468. Also see Resolution of Organization of African Unity on Apartheid and 
Racial Discrimination, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/
hog/aHoGAssembly1963.pdf.
701 Keesing’s (1963–64) 19699.
702 On South Africa (Apartheid) General Assembly Resolution 1761 (6 November 1962). 
703 Keesing’s (1963) 19757.
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South Africa together with a prohibition of all South African vessels and aircraft 
from entering its jurisdiction.704
As many of these states, including South Africa, were members of GATT, any 
trade restrictions would have to be justifi ed in the light of one of the saving clauses 
of GATT and, in particular, under Articles XIX–XXI. However, none of these 
states tried to justify its action in the light of any of these provisions and, therefore, 
their actions could not be justifi ed under GATT, but rather as third-state counter-
measures.705 
5.2.19.4  CALLS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF AN OIL EMBARGO 
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA
Despite the mandatory Security Council Resolution 418 (1977) authorizing the 
implementation of an arms ban against South Africa, the Security Council fell 
short of authorizing a mandatory oil embargo against the regime. The reluctance 
for such further action was due to the opposition of mainly western European 
states that were mainly concerned about the interests of their oil industries,706 
rather than the unlawfulness of such measure under international law. Such an oil 
embargo was regarded as complementary to the arms ban and as essential for 
coercing the regime into ceasing its discriminatory policies. Despite the reluctance 
of western states, the Arab states were determined to implement an oil embargo 
against South Africa. Therefore, in the Summit Conference of Arab States held in 
Algiers in 1973 a total oil embargo was decided on. This was followed by calls 
made by the Special Committee against Apartheid for national parliaments to give 
effect to such an embargo against South Africa.707 The General Assembly had on 
a number of occasions called on UN member states to implement a petroleum ban 
against the country.708 In December 1975, the General Assembly reinforced its call 
on all states ‘to take the necessary measures’ for an embargo in the supply of petro-
leum and petroleum products and raw materials to South Africa.709 
The same call was repeated in 1976, 1977 and 1979.710 In 1980 the General 
Assembly, while urging the adoption of a mandatory Security Council resolution, 
positively commended those states that had already implemented such an oil 
embargo even in the absence of a Security Council resolution. It also urged other 
704 Keesing’s (1961) 18186.
705 Tams, op. cit., 90; Dawidowicz, op. cit., 353.
706 E.S.Reddy, ‘A Review of United Nations Action for an Oil Embargo against South Africa’, with 
special reference to the work of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Director, United 
Nations Centre against Apartheid, Brussels, 30–31 January 1981, available at http://www.anc.
org.za/un/reddy/oilembargo.html.
707 Ibid.
708 See, in this regard, General Assembly Resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963.
709 General Assembly Resolution 3411 G (XXX) of 10 December 1975.
710 General Assembly Resolution 31/6 of 26 October 1976; General Assembly Resolution 32/105 of 
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states ‘to take effective legislative and other measures to ensure the implementa-
tion of such an oil embargo against South Africa as well as embargoes already 
imposed by States, individually or collectively’.711 The resolution demonstrates 
support for unilateral coercive measures taken by third states in the name of com-
munity interests. It was adopted by 123 states, including many members of GATT 
such as Egypt, Finland, Haiti, Norway, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Sweden. Attempts 
at implementing an oil embargo were also taken at the level of the OAU.712 
Interestingly, Nigeria proceeded to the nationalization of the assets of British 
Petroleum that was providing South Africa with oil, a measure commended by the 
Special Committee against Apartheid.713
The calls for the implementation of an oil embargo against South Africa show 
a general acceptance of unilateral coercive measures in the absence of mandatory 
Security Council resolution to that effect. In conclusion, these attempts can be 
used as further evidence of both state practice and opinio juris in recognition of a 
right to solidarity measures.
5.2.19.5 US REACTION
In an in-depth examination of the US policy on the apartheid regime in South 
Africa it is observed that never before had the United States been so successful in 
protecting human rights abroad and leading the racist regime to its slow death. 
This was achieved by means of both sustaining regional diplomacy and taking into 
consideration strategic interests in the African continent and adopting a more 
dynamic approach through the implementation of unilateral coercive peaceful 
measures. It is argued in this regard that nothing was as effective as a threat to the 
structures of apartheid policies as the economic measures taken by the United 
States alone in the mid-1980s, not even the multilateral oil and arms embargoes 
against South Africa imposed by the UN in the 1960s and 1970s.714 Only when a 
fi rmer approach was adopted by the United States, at the time one of the closest 
trading partners and major investors in South Africa and in combination with 
the formulation of strong opposition within South Africa itself, was the regime 
induced to bring these policies to an end.715 The US decision to take action infl u-
enced other economic powers such as Japan and the United Kingdom to do the 
same. Similarly, other smaller states followed with the adoption of what they 
described as ‘symbolic gestures’.716 The incentive behind the American measures 
711 General Assembly Resolution 35/206 of 16 December 1980.
712 Reddy, op. cit. 
713 Ibid. 
714 P. Baker, ‘Getting It Right, U.S. Policy in South Africa’ in Liang-Fenton D. (ed.) Implementing U.S. 
Human Rights Policy (2004) 86.
715 Baker, ibid 93.
716 Villiers, op. cit., xiv.
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was not to overthrow the regime but rather to reinforce domestic forces fi ghting 
apartheid.717 
Nevertheless, the US government was not always in favour of a stronger line 
with measures of an economic character against South Africa. When in 1976 the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 392 calling on the South African govern-
ment to cease the violence against the African majority and to eliminate its 
apartheid policies that were in fl agrant violation of human rights, the United 
States supported the resolution in the context of Chapter VI rather than the man-
datory powers provided under Chapter VII. At the same time, the US government 
made clear that it could not support enforcement action in what they regarded at 
the time under consideration as a matter falling within the domestic jurisdiction of 
another state.718 
Ten years later, with the strengthening at a domestic level of the voices in sup-
port of action against South Africa and with the United Kingdom proceeding with 
limited sanctions in response to more extensive measures announced by the 
Commonwealth countries, the US Congress in an overwhelming vote overturned 
President Reagan’s veto against the implementation of economic measures in 
response to these discriminatory practices. In this way, the US Congress went 
beyond its mere role of review in the formulation of foreign policy and South 
Africa received ‘the strongest psychological and economic blow it had ever 
received from the international community’.719 
With the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,720 direct air fl ights 
between the United States and South Africa ceased, in violation of the Agreement 
between the two countries relating to Air Services between their Respective 
Territories signed in 1947.721 More specifi cally, the right of any South African 
designated aircarrier to provide services under the 1947 Agreement was revoked 
whilst all US aircarriers were prohibited from continuing their services to South 
Africa. The American decision was taken pursuant to Article XI(B) of the 
Agreement, which established the right of any party to request consultation with 
the other party at any time. Accordingly: ‘[W]hen the procedure for a consulta-
tion provided for in paragraph (B) … has been initiated, either contracting party 
may at any time give notice to the other of its desire to terminate this agreement.’722 
Article XI further established that the termination of the agreement would take 
effect only 1 year after the date of receipt of the notice of termination. However, 
several days after the US government announced its intention to terminate the 
717 Baker, op. cit., 104.
718 Racial Discrimination, US Representative Albert Sherer, Digest of US Practice in International Law 
(1976) 163–66, 165.
719 Baker, op. cit., 89.
720 Anti-Apartheid Act, The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-440, 100 Stat. 
1086, 22 U.S.C. 5001 et seq., enacted 2 October 1986.
721 Petman, op. cit., 371.
722 See United States–South Africa: Termination, Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law 
(1981–88) II, 2183–2189.
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Agreement, it revoked the operating permit of South African Airways and 
restricted the operating service of US aircarriers with South Africa in accordance 
with Section 306 of the Act. This decision was accordingly in clear violation of the 
12-month notice requirement established under Article XI of the Agreement 
between the United States and South Africa. 
In contesting the lawfulness of the US action, South African Airways fi led a 
petition before the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
arguing that Section 306 did not authorize immediate revocation of its permit. It 
also argued that in any event, no revocation could be permitted before the end of 
the 1-year period after the notice for termination had been given. It was thus the 
submission of the South African airline that the Final Order authorizing these 
measures against it was, inter alia, in violation of the 1947 Agreement. In making 
its case before the Court the US government argued that the Court should refrain 
from adjudicating the case before it because the dispute involved the implementa-
tion of international agreements and a foreign policy issue that fell within the 
powers of the Executive Branch. The Court held that the Congress intended to 
give Section 306 immediate effect and priority over the 1947 Agreement or any 
other confl icting domestic law. It further stressed that the Congress had the right 
to denounce international treaties.723 It can be deduced from this analysis that the 
suspension of the 1947 Agreement was in violation of the United States’ obliga-
tions under international law, providing yet another signifi cant example of state 
practice in support of solidarity measures.
With respect to the other measures adopted under the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act, new investments in South Africa were banned with the excep-
tion of investments made in fi rms owned by blacks. Loans going to the private 
sector and to the South African government were also prohibited except for those 
needed for humanitarian purposes. Imports from South Africa to the United 
States were prohibited while the US government was banned from buying South 
African goods and services and from promoting tourism to South Africa. There 
was also a prohibition against the export of products while US nationals 
were banned from making new investments in South Africa either directly or 
indirectly.724 
This example provides strong evidence that human rights concerns gained 
primacy over economic and geostrategic interests.725 The only way for the 
723 South African Airways case (South African Airways v Dole) 817 F. 2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. Den., 
108 S.CT. 229. Also see United States–South Africa: Termination, Cumulative Digest of US Practice 
in International Law (1981–88) II, 2185–7. It needs to be said that in opposing the inclusion of 
aviation sanctions in the Anti-Apartheid Act, the American administration drew the attention to 
the fact that such decision would be in violation of the 1947 Agreement with South Africa, and 
that as a result the United States would have to solve the dispute through arbitration. In that case, 
it was mentioned, the US would be in danger of being obliged to award damages. 
724 Law Restatement, Restatement of the Law. The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
Vol. 1 (American Law Institute Publishers: 1987) 382. 
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South African government to escape from its economic isolation was by complying 
with the requirements of the Act or, even more remotely, with a decision by both 
Houses of the US Congress. The lifting of these measures was made conditional 
on the release of Nelson Mandela from jail, the repeal of the state of emergency 
and the release of all detained persons. The Act also provided for the enhance-
ment of the democratic process with the participation of the political parties 
banned by the regime, the repeal of the Great Areas Act and the Population 
Registration Act and the initiation of good faith negotiations with genuine repre-
sentatives of the black population.726 In the event that no compliance had occurred 
within a period of 12 months, additional sanctions could be imposed such as the 
banning of importation from South Africa of strategic materials, steel, diamonds, 
food, agricultural products and giving military assistance to countries violating the 
arms embargo against South Africa. 
The diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries, however, 
were not terminated. On the contrary, the US government continued diplomatic 
negotiations with South Africa with the aim of encouraging and infl uencing it 
towards ultimate change.727 
The contribution of the US sanctions towards political change and reform in 
South Africa with the fi nal abolition of the apartheid regime is not without merit 
and for this reason it constitutes a signifi cant example of state practice in support 
of a right to solidarity measures. If none of these measures had been taken, the 
apartheid regime would most possibly still be in place or have ended in violence.728 
While the intention of these measures was not to overthrow the regime but rather 
to reinforce domestic forces fi ghting apartheid, it was pointed out that, ‘Even the 
law’s most ardent supporters pointed out that there was no precedent for a ruling 
elite relinquishing power without force and that sanctions rarely are enough to 
dislodge a regime that is militarily secure.’729 
Although the South African example must be viewed in the framework of the 
surrounding circumstances and its specifi c characteristics due to both the external 
and internal changes occurring at the time, it remains undisputed that if no eco-
nomic measures had been taken this would have allowed the racist regime to 
continue to commit its atrocities with impunity.730 In his conclusion about the 
effect of US sanctions on the historic regime transformation that would follow in 
the next years, de Villiers argues that: ‘US and other punitive measures signifi -
cantly dictated the form, substance, timing, and pace of these reforms.’731 
For his part, Nelson Mandela, in his fi rst speech before the US Congress after 
his release from prison, took the opportunity to express his gratitude for the 
726 Villiers, op. cit., 125–6.
727 Baker, op. cit., 94.
728 R. Mullerson, Human Rights Diplomacy (Routledge: 1997) 114.
729 Baker, op. cit., 98, 104.
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adoption of the ‘historic’ Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, ‘which made such 
a decisive contribution to the process of moving our country forward towards 
negotiations’.732 He insisted that the measures should remain in place until the 
goals of the Act, namely the abolition of apartheid, were met. 
The measures continued until 1993 when relations between the United States 
and South Africa were fi nally restored with the signature of the National Peace 
Accord between the government of South Africa and opposition groups, following 
which the conditions for the termination of the sanctions were fi nally met. 
In a concluding note, it has been remarked that:
South Africa was not invaded by an outside power and did not descend into 
full-scale internal war, but it underwent a political transformation from apart-
heid to democracy that was every bit as radical as that of Afghanistan after the 
Taliban and that of Iraq after Hussein. The South African state could have 
collapsed but did not. It thus presents a rare instance of regime change – indeed, 
it was a system change – that resulted in a dramatic improvement of human 
rights. Critical external intervention was applied successfully and in a timely 
way, without the use of military force.733
This quotation is a representation of the power of unilateral coercive peaceful 
measures as a remedy for serious infringements of interests in which all states have 
a legal interest. It is also a refl ection of the necessity of enforcing such fundamental 
interests by means short of armed force and, therefore, of the necessity to recog-
nize a right to solidarity measures in international law. 
5.2.19.6 REACTION OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT
When the Dutch government recommended a number of measures concerning 
oil supplies to, imports from, and investments in South Africa, the Advisory 
Committee on Questions of International Law was requested to examine the 
lawfulness of these measures within the UN Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States. According to the report of the Committee prepared in 1982 and entitled 
‘Measures against South Africa and the Non-intervention Duty’, the duty of non-
intervention should not be viewed in isolation but, on the contrary, should 
be examined in the light of other rules of international law. Since apartheid was 
regarded by an overwhelming majority of states as a fl agrant violation of the 
human rights of the non-white population of South Africa, it could not be pro-
tected within the ambit of the rule of non-intervention. 
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The report further examined the question as to whether intervention needed to 
be at the initiative of the international community as a whole or whether it could 
be resorted to by individual states. In the light of the Committee’s conclusions: 
[I]t can be established that the Charter was never intended to confer exclu-
sive powers upon the Security Council. Although binding decisions in respect 
of (military) enforcement measures are a prerogative of the Security Council 
in the Charter, it does not follow that the general rules of international law 
relating to the right to take measures against unlawful acts are thereby invali-
dated. Clear proof of this can be found in the right, also recognized by the 
Charter, of individual and collective self-defense.734
Here no clear distinction is made between retorsion and countermeasures. 
However, it could be implied from the Committee’s conclusions that economic 
and trade restrictions such as those recommended by the Dutch government 
would not be unlawful in such circumstances. This may refl ect a certain legal 
belief that even if such measures were in violation of specifi c obligations, they 
would nonetheless be justifi ed under international law as countermeasures. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that if the measures recommended by the 
Dutch government were of a retorsive character then the government would be 
under no need to consider their lawfulness since retorsion by defi nition consists of 
measures that infringe no rules of international law. The reference in the 
Committee’s report must accordingly relate to third-state countermeasures 
that under other circumstances would entail a breach of the principle of non- 
intervention in the affairs of another state, yet are justifi ed here as a response to a 
gross violation of interests owed to all states. This is further evident from the fact 
that the Committee supported unilateral coercive measures in the absence of 
Security Council authorization and of direct injury, a reference that would not be 
necessary had the action recommended against South Africa involved no viola-
tion of international law. 
These fi ndings are further enhanced by the fact that in the Memorandum of 
Reply to the First Chamber concerning the Bill on the application of sanctions 
against states and territories,735 it was recognized that special circumstances could 
exist to justify measures other than those authorized by the Security Council for 
the protection of the international legal order.736 Interestingly, in a note sent by 
the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Second Chamber in 1979 relating 
to the question of the oil embargo against South Africa, it was noted that the obli-
gations of the Netherlands under the EEC, the Benelux Economic Union and 
734 Measures against South Africa and the Non-intervention Duty, Advisory Committee on Questions of 
International Law, 14 NYIL (1983) 246, 248.
735 Memorandum of Reply to the First Chamber Concerning the Bill on the Application of Sanctions against States and 
territories, 8 NYIL (1977) 205.
736 Intervention and Self-help, 12 NYIL (1981) 168–170.
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GATT posed an obstacle to its taking unilateral commercial action against South 
Africa. The only exception referred to was the existence of a mandatory Security 
Council resolution in which case the Netherlands, according to the note, would 
be entitled to derogate from its other treaty obligations.737 However, it seems to be 
also suggested that in the case of a possible consent of the other parties to the treaties 
just mentioned, the imposition of measures, even third-state countermeasures, 
would be feasible. As already noted in section 3 of this chapter, the Sanctions Bill 
introduced in 1976 to enable the Dutch government to conform with its obliga-
tions at the international level did not differentiate between lawful measures, on 
the one hand, and countermeasures, on the other. It could, therefore, be implied 
that the possibility of even third-state countermeasures was not excluded. 
The note concludes that what has just been mentioned should be taken into 
consideration for an evaluation of the ‘political effect of an oil embargo by the 
Netherlands’, making no reference, however, to the legitimacy of a unilateral deci-
sion of the Netherlands to proceed with the imposition of the oil embargo in 
general international law. In other words, what is examined in the note is the 
justifi cation for the Dutch action under specifi c treaty regimes but not under the 
general law on state responsibility and the rules concerning the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of third-state countermeasures. 
Furthermore, the possibility of the imposition of measures in accordance with 
the Netherlands’s obligations under the EEC and its other obligations is left open. 
More notably, this is confi rmed in the Statement of the Dutch prime minister in 
the Second Chamber of 26 June 1980, which stressed that any action against 
South Africa, although desired, would have to be in concordance with the coun-
try’s obligations towards its economic treaty partners.738 
5.2.19.7 CANADIAN MEASURES AGAINST APARTHEID
The Canadian government, in spite of initial hesitation towards economic action, 
announced a number of measures to oppose apartheid, including measures of an 
economic character. These included cessation of offi cial trade support and invest-
ment, cessation of the Program for Export Market Development and the global 
insurance policies written by the Export Development Corporation concerning 
South Africa and broadening of the UN arms embargo in order to include high 
technology items. Quite signifi cantly, the government announced abrogation of 
the double taxation agreements, and introduction of a voluntary ban on loans to 
South Africa and its agencies. Moreover, Canada announced a voluntary ban on 
the sale of crude oil and refi ned products by asking Canadian companies not to 
sell these products to South Africa, while it imposed an embargo on air transport 
between Canada and South Africa although there was no bilateral agreement on 
which previous traffi c rights were based. On the contrary, direct air transport 
737 The Question of a Netherlands Oil Embargo against South Africa, 12 NYIL (1981) 240–41. 
738 Ibid, 242–43. 
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between the two countries was limited to occasional charters. With this measure 
reciprocal air service of charter fl ights ceased until apartheid was abolished.739 It 
seems that with the exception of the abrogation of the double taxation agreements 
all the other measures decided by the Canadian government were not in contra-
vention of international law.
5.2.19.8 OTHER ACTION
European Community member states imposed unilateral coercive measures against 
South Africa that did not rely on a Security Council resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus giving another example of state practice in 
support of third-state countermeasures. In particular, the Foreign Ministers decided 
to impose among others an arms embargo, freezing of international security and 
sporting agreements and cessation of oil exports.740 These measures were extended 
to a ban on the import of iron, steel and gold coins.741 As far as the export and 
import restrictions were concerned, these amounted to third-state countermeasures, 
particularly in the absence of a Security Council resolution authorizing them.
Furthermore, at a Commonwealth level, at the meeting of heads of govern-
ments in Nassau in 1985 special attention was given to the discriminatory practices 
in South Africa. It was agreed during the session that the continuation of apart-
heid, the unlawful occupation of Namibia and South Africa’s aggressive policies 
posed ‘a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth’.742 
In view of these developments, it was decided to impose a ban on oil sale and 
export, a ban on aviation links, a prohibition on the import of agricultural prod-
ucts, the termination of double taxation agreements and cessation of all trade with 
South Africa. The same call was made a year later at the meeting of the 
Commonwealth in London in 1986. In the light of Commonwealth calls, Australia 
announced the suspension of its aviation agreement with South Africa in violation 
of an express requirement to provide a 12-month notice, providing another 
example in support of third-state countermeasures.743
The measures authorized at a Commonwealth level, intended to coerce the 
South African regime into compliance, even in breach of specifi c obligations ema-
nating from international law, provide evidence of state practice and opinio juris 
that such measures were lawful or were becoming lawful under international law 
by way of countermeasures. The calls to impose aviation and trade restrictions 
739 For the measures against South Africa see Apartheid, 24 CYIL (1986) 407–12.
740 Political and Institutional Matters, European Community Bulletin (1985) No. 9, para. 2.5.1 
(10 September 1985).
741 Political and Institutional Matters, European Community Bulletin (1986) No. 9, para. 2.4.2 
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742 The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa (Nassau, 20 October 1985) reproduced in Keesing’s 
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Countermeasures and community interests in state practice 177
reveal the position of states that in the absence of effective institutional action, 
unilateral peaceful coercive measures against serious violations of international 
law are permissible under the right to third-state countermeasures.744 
5.2.19.9 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that in many instances going back to the 
1960s states did not hesitate to authorize coercive measures against South Africa in 
response to discrimination against the black population in the country, even in the 
absence of a Security Council resolution. Most signifi cantly, states have resorted to 
specifi c action that was in contravention of international law, which offers more 
evidence that state practice and opinio juris support the existence of a right to solidar-
ity measures. The examination also included calls and recommendations made at 
various institutional, regional and international levels for the strengthening of eco-
nomic coercion against South Africa, even in breach of international obligations. 
Apartheid was a practice strongly deplored and condemned by the vast majority 
of countries. At the same time, it is also important to note that in international poli-
tics often other interests, mainly of an economic nature, come into play, resulting in 
inaction even in response to the most serious violations of international law. This 
element should not be ignored when examining whether or not states support a right 
to react when the most valued principles of the international community as a whole 
are endangered. In any event, the silence or inaction of states should not be consid-
ered as evidence against a right in the name of fundamental community interests.
5.2.20 US action against Panama (1988) 
After a military coup in Panama in 1988, the United States responded to the 
human rights crisis in the country and the abolition of democratic rule, by ceasing 
military and economic aid to Panama. Since there were no express treaty obliga-
tion imposing upon the United States a duty to continue such assistance, this 
decision constituted an act of retorsion rather than a countermeasure.745 In April 
1988 however, the United States further extended its action against Panama by 
declaring that the situation in Panama amounted to an extraordinary threat to the 
national security of the United States. This was achieved through the freezing of 
all assets belonging to Panama in the United States, but also through the suspen-
sion of payment of an amount of $7m to the Panama Canal Commission in the 
light of the Panama Canal Treaty between the United States and Panama.746 
Both measures were in violation of specifi c obligations, the former relating to 
the prohibition of interfering with the property of a foreign state and the other 
744 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 377.
745 Ibid, 383. Also see M. Nash, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law’, 82 AJIL (1988) 566–69, 571–77.
746 Panama Canal Treaty, 1280 UNTS 3 (1 October 1979); Keesing’s (1980) 30047–48.
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relating to the non-performance of obligations undertaken by the United States 
under the Panama Canal Treaty. 
It is now well established that serious violations of fundamental human rights no 
longer fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of states as the preceding analysis has 
shown. States have often exerted economic pressure in violation of international 
law on recalcitrant states for the purpose of safeguarding community and collec-
tive interests. Nevertheless, questions remain in relation to the right of third states 
to react in order to restore or to induce democratic governance in another state. In 
the author’s opinion, this remains a highly controversial issue in the light of the 
principle in customary and UN Charter law that states are entitled to choose 
among others their own political system and also of the number of states that 
adhere to authoritarian rule, such as many African and Arab countries.747 For this 
reason, unilateral coercive measures taken for the purpose of overthrowing foreign 
governments or for imposing a certain political system must be treated with cau-
tion. This is because states must not be given an opportunity to abuse the law on 
countermeasures by using them as a mechanism of imposing their values on the 
rest of the world. Countermeasures must then be applied only after the most strin-
gent conditions are met, namely that there has been a breach of genuinely erga omnes 
legal interests owed to a group of states or to the international community as a 
whole, something disputed in relation to the right to democratic governance.
To the extent that the action taken by the United States was a response to serious 
human rights violations, then this can qualify as countermeasures taken in the name 
of collective interests. In any event, this incident provides further evidence of state 
practice and opinio juris that third states may respond to serious violations of funda-
mental community interests by implementing coercive, yet peaceful measures. 
5.2.21 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and EEC response (1990)
The next example from state practice in support of a right to countermeasures by 
states other than the injured concerns the action authorized by several states as a 
result of the Iraqi aggression and invasion in Kuwait in the summer of 1990. On 
2 August 1990 the Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers of the 
UN Charter adopted Resolution 660 by which it demanded Iraq’s immediate 
withdrawal from Kuwait and decided to meet again for the determination of fur-
ther action that might prove necessary, although no concrete action was decided 
at that point. 
In the light of these developments, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs representing 
the member states of the European Community met on 4 August 1990 in the 
context of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), where they condemned Iraq 
in the strongest terms, demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
its troops from the territory of Kuwait. They rejected as unfounded the grounds on 
747 On arguments supportive of a right to democratic governance in international law see 
T.M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86 AJIL (1992) 46; G.H. Fox, 
B. Roth. Democratic Goverance and International Law (Cambridge University Press: 2000).
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which Iraq based its military aggression against Kuwait and emphasized that they 
would work towards a consensus within the Security Council for the imposition of 
mandatory and comprehensive sanctions should Iraq fail to comply with Resolution 
660. In addition, they decided to impose an embargo on all oil imports from Iraq 
and Kuwait, to freeze Iraqi assets existing in the territories of Community member 
states, to place a prohibition on arms and other military equipment sales to Iraq, to 
suspend all technical and scientifi c cooperation with Iraq and to suspend the appli-
cation of generalized preferences to Iraq.748 This decision came while negotiations 
within the Security Council were still ongoing and even before a formal Security 
Council resolution authorizing any kind of sanctions was adopted,749 although it 
actually took effect after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) of 
6 August.750 With this resolution, the Security Council authorized economic, trade, 
fi nance and arms sanctions. The EEC measures, and in particular the freezing of 
Iraqi assets, were in violation of international law and, therefore, qualify as unilat-
eral peaceful measures taken in the name of international peace and security.
In compliance with the EPC’s decision, on 8 August the Commission presented 
to the Council various proposals for the adoption of measures against Iraq and for 
their extension to Kuwait with the aim of preventing the aggressor from benefi ting 
from its unlawful actions. The proposals concerned the prohibition of the import 
into Community territory of crude oil and refi ned petroleum products coming 
from either Iraq or Kuwait. Moreover, they provided for the suspension of the 
generalized tariff preferences for products coming from Iraq in accordance with 
Council Regulations No. 3896/89, No. 3897/89 and 3898/89, and for the suspen-
sion of Council Regulation No. 3899/89, concerning levy reductions. It is 
noteworthy that these proposals do not rely for their legitimacy on Security Council 
resolution 661. Rather, in the explanatory memorandum emphasis is given to the 
statement of 4 August made by the Community and its member states in the frame-
work of political cooperation. The memorandum also took notice that: 
[T]he serious situation caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resulted in 
Resolution 660 (90) of the United Nations Security Council and led to the 
statement by the Community and its Member States of 4 August 1990 
which unreservedly condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and called for 
748 European Political Cooperation – Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Bulletin of the European Communities 
(1990) No. 7/8 (1.5.11). The EPC provided merely coordination among the member states to the 
EC on matters of foreign relations, for which the member states retained their full sovereign pow-
ers and did not transfer such competences to the European institutions like they did with a wide 
number of economic issues. See Title III of Single European Act, OJ (1987) L169/1. For more 
information on the EPC, see T. Stein, ‘European Political Cooperation as a Component of the 
Foreign Affairs System’ 43 ZaoRV (1983) 49;  J.S. Nuttall, ‘Interaction between European Political 
Cooperation and the European Community’ 7 Yearbook of European Law (1987) 211. The EPC was 
replaced by Title V of TEU which provided for a CFSP.
749 S. Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community’ 4 
EJIL (1993) 256, 258. See European Political Cooperation – Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, EC 
Bulletin (1990) No. 7/8 (1.5.11).
750 Iraq–Kuwait, Security Council Resolution 661 (6 August 1990).
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the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait’s 
territory, and also led to the decision to take economic action against Iraq, 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties of the 
Communities.751
Following the Commission’s recommendations, the EU Council decided the same 
day to prohibit trade between the Community, Iraq and Kuwait with Regulation 
2340/90. Taking cognizance of Security Council Resolutions 660 and 661 and of 
the sanctions authorized therein, the Regulation aimed to ensure the uniform 
implementation of the trade measures against Iraq and Kuwait.752 Consequently, 
all trade with Iraq, including imports and exports, and all activities and commer-
cial transactions were banned. It is important to point out that the Regulation, 
although aiming to comply with the Security Council decisions, did not rely on 
Article 224 concerning united action by the Community member states in compli-
ance with their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
but rather on Article 113 concerning a common commercial policy.753 This could 
be perhaps interpreted as revealing the intention of the Community to take action 
irrespective of Security Council authorization. 
Moreover, with Regulation 3155/90 the European Community imposed 
restrictions on air services, while there was a prohibition on commodities covered 
under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).754 In this way, the 
member states of the European Community decided on the uniform application 
of economic and other measures against Iraq and Kuwait, measures that were 
decided at a Community level and not unilaterally by individual states.755 
In addition to the measures decided at a European Community level, the 
United States announced on 2 August 1990, that is 4 days before the adoption of 
Security Council Resolution 661, a trade embargo against Iraq and the freezing 
of its economic assets. During the same period, Japan and Switzerland also 
751 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) prohibiting the introduction into the territory of the 
Community of crude oil and refi ned petroleum products or their derivatives originating in or last 
exported from Kuwait, COM (90) 375, Brussels, 8 August 1990; Proposal for a Council Regulation 
(EEC) prohibiting the introduction into the territory of the Community of crude oil and refi ned 
petroleum products or their derivatives originating in or last exported from Kuwait, COM (90) 
376, Brussels, 8 August 1990; Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) suspending for 1990 the 
levy reductions for certain agricultural products originating in Iraq, COM (90) 391 fi nal, Brussels, 
8 August 1990; Draft for a decision of the representatives of the governments of the member 
states meeting within the Council suspending for 1990 the generalized tariff preferences for cer-
tain iron and steel products originating in Iraq, COM (90) 391 fi nal, Brussels, 8 August 1990.
752 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2340/90 of 8 August April 1990 preventing trade by the 
Community as regards Iraq and Kuwait, OJ (1990) L213/1.
753 Chinkin (1996) op. cit., 199.
754 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2340/90, op. cit.; Council Decision of 8 August 1990 prevent-
ing trade as regards Iraq and Kuwait (90/414/ECSC), OJ (1990) L213/3.
755 Chinkin (1996), op. cit., 198.
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announced the freezing of Iraqi assets while Japan also banned the export of prod-
ucts coming from Kuwait and Iraq.756 
The states resorting to such measures did not rely on their right to collective 
self-defence, implying that they were acting in accordance with a right to third-
state countermeasures. The fact that these states were acting in the light of 
Kuwait’s consent as injured states, while important, it is not a determinative factor 
as there may be instances where no injured state exists. Moreover, in cases where 
fundamental interests are owed to a group of states or to the international com-
munity as a whole, it may be questioned whether the consent of the injured state 
is a necessary requirement at all.757 
5.2.22 EC measures against Haiti (1991)
The next example relevant to the scope of this examination relates to the 
military coup that took place in Haiti in 1991, which resulted in the ousting of the 
democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The OAS responded 
immediately by requesting its member states to impose economic sanctions. In 
May 1992 the OAS decided to step up the trade sanctions against Haiti and, in 
particular, to ban from all ports in the hemisphere ships delivering oil and other 
commercial cargoes to Haiti, to ban commercial fl ights from transporting goods 
and to cease the issuing of travel visas.758 These restrictions were also in violation 
of GATT to which Haiti has been a member since 1950.
In another context, the Committee of Ministers of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacifi c Group of States recommended that states parties to the Lomé IV 
Convention suspend trade with Haiti, also a party to this Convention, although 
there was initial hesitation as to the legality of such action under the Convention.759 
EC states, in the context of EPC, decided, in the absence of any Security 
Council authorization, to impose a trade embargo in infringement of the Lomé 
Convention, which, although it made reference to human rights, did not incorpo-
rate a right to democracy. 
This case has been criticized not so much regarding whether such action with-
out Security Council authorization was permissible or not but, rather, as in the 
case of Panama, because the violation of an international obligation having an erga 
omnes character on Haiti’s part was doubtful. According to this position military 
756 Letter dated 6 August 1990 from the Charge d’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, United Nations doc. S/21444 (6 August 1990); Letter dated 5 
August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 
United Nations doc. S/21449 (5 August 1990); Transmitting note from Switzerland concerning measures 
to implement Security Council resolution 661 (1990) on sanctions against Iraq, United Nations doc. S/21585 
(7 August 1990); cited in Dawidowicz, op. cit., 385.
757 For a different view, see Dawidowicz, ibid, 386.
758 See Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota Charter), 30 April 1948, 119 UNTS 
3; Keesing’s (1992) 38905.
759 Keesing’s, ibid.
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coups fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states and, while the Lomé Convention 
made reference to human rights, it is diffi cult to fi nd that a right to democracy was 
also incorporated under this provision.760 This incident, however, provides evi-
dence that the notion of third-state countermeasures for the purpose of protecting 
fundamental community interests, is not as controversial as concluded by the 
ILC in the Final Articles. Quite signifi cantly, this incident is signifi cant in so long 
as it provides evidence of third-state action in response to serious human 
rights violations, which, as noted elsewhere, give all states a legal interest in their 
protection.
5.2.23 Countermeasures against Yugoslavia (1991)
In many of the cases considered so far, apart from measures resorted to by indi-
vidual states there have been measures decided at an institutional level such as 
international and regional organizations. The next example concerns unilateral 
economic countermeasures against Yugoslavia imposed by the EU among others 
and discusses the legal basis on which such measures are decided on. 
With the outbreak of the ethnic confl ict in the former Social Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia the international community was faced with one of the worst humani-
tarian crises ever since the end of World War II. In a statement issued in July 1991 
in the context of the EPC, the EC and its member states expressed their deep con-
cern for the increasing violence in Yugoslavia and called for the immediate 
initiation of negotiations between the confl icting parties.761 It was made clear in 
the statement that any peace effort should give due respect to human rights includ-
ing the right of minorities and the right of people to self-determination and full 
consideration of the UN Charter principles and other norms of international law 
relating to the territorial integrity of states. 
Prior to and in the absence of any Security Council authorization,762 
the Community and its member states agreed to apply an embargo on armaments 
and military equipment that would have effect in the whole of the territory 
of Yugoslavia and called on other states to do the same. This did not preclude 
the possibility of military action in the event of any further breach of the 
ceasefi re. It was also decided to suspend the second and third fi nancial 
protocols with Yugoslavia for so long as there was no normalization of the 
situation.763 
The fi rst Security Council resolution on Yugoslavia was not passed 
until September 1991 which confi rmed and approved the Community action.764 
760 Chinkin (1996), op. cit., 201.
761 European Political Cooperation – Yugoslavia, Bulletin of the EC (1991) No. 7/8, Vol. 24 (1.4.3) .
762 Bohr, op. cit., 256–8.
763 European Political Cooperation – Yugoslavia, EC Bulletin (1991) No. 7/8, Vol. 24, (1.4.3).
764 The term ‘Yugoslavia’ is used in the text of all the Security Council resolutions from September 
1991 until May 1992.
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More specifi cally, in Resolution 713 the Security Council expressed its full sup-
port for the efforts already made by the member states of the EC along with the 
states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe for 
a peaceful and comprehensive settlement in Yugoslavia. The Security Council 
also commended the decision to suspend the delivery of all military weapons and 
equipment to Yugoslavia. This is signifi cant as it indicates the Security Council’s 
approval of unilateral coercive measures taken in the absence of UN authoriza-
tion. At the same time, the Security Council acting within its powers under 
Chapter VII authorized an embargo on all military material and equipment to 
Yugoslavia.765 Quite signifi cantly, Resolution 713 concerned only authorization 
for the imposition of an arms embargo rather than the imposition of trade restric-
tions in contravention of the 1983 Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia as will 
be analyzed in the subsequent paragraphs.766 
The embargo, however, did not prevent the worsening of the situation and for 
this reason in November 1991 the EC and its member states decided to proceed 
with further coercive action. Highlighting the seriousness of the crisis with the 
‘indiscriminate bloodshed’ and ‘the unacceptable threats and use of force against 
the population of Dubrovnik’, the EC adopted the so-called ‘Yugoslav counter-
measures’. In the midst of the worsening situation EC member states announced 
a number of measures including the restoration of quantitative restrictions for 
textiles; the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the generalized system of preferences; 
and the suspension of benefi ts under the Phare Programme, a measure that 
was not, however, inconsistent with any treaty.767 Furthermore, the EC expressed 
its determination to work for consensus within the Security Council for the 
imposition of an oil embargo. These measures were given effect by a number 
of regulations and decisions passed by the EU Council within the scope of the 
EEC and the ECSC. 
In particular, on the basis of Regulation No. 3300/91, the EU Council decided 
to suspend the trade concessions under the 1983 Cooperation Agreement between 
the EEC and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This decision was 
made giving cognizance to the radical change of circumstances as a result of the 
hostilities taking place in the territory of Yugoslavia and their impact on trade and 
economic relations. With Council Decision 91/586/ECSC, the 1983 Cooperation 
Agreement and its Protocols, in addition to the Agreement concerning the ECSC 
existing between them, were suspended with immediate effect. 
The denunciation of the Agreement between the member states of the ECSC 
and Yugoslavia came with Council Decision 91/587/ECSC while the denuncia-
tion of the 1983 Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia came 
with Council Decision 91/602/EEC. The trade concessions granted under the 
ECSC were suspended with Decision 91/588/ECSC with reference made to 
765 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Security Council Res. 713 (1991) (6).
766 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 406.
767 European Political Cooperation – Yugoslavia, EC Bulletin (1991) No. 11, 91, (1.4.4).
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Resolution 713 and to the peace threat as a consequence of the situation in 
Yugoslavia. The country was also expelled from the list of benefi ciaries of the 
Community’s generalized tariff preferences scheme in 1991, on the ground that 
‘the situation which obtains in Yugoslavia no longer enables this country to remain 
on the list of benefi ciaries of generalized tariff preferences’.768 With Regulation 
No. 3301/91, the EU Council decided to impose quantitative restrictions on 
textile products originating in Yugoslavia.
In the period from April to May 1992 the Commission, on request from the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, decided on a number of measures to be taken against 
the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and sent the list with the suggested mea-
sures to the Council.769 On 27 May the member states agreed to impose a total 
trade embargo against Yugoslavia, a prohibition on all export credits and the sus-
pension of scientifi c and technical cooperation, while disagreement occurred with 
respect to an air transportation moratorium and an oil embargo. It was only 2 days 
later that the Security Council passed Resolution 757 (1992) by which it decided to 
ban all imports and exports, air transport from and to Serbia and Montenegro, 
transport and fi nancial services and scientifi c, technical and cultural cooperation. 
The decision of the EC member states to authorize such trade measures even before 
Security Council authorization refl ects the determination of states to take unilateral 
coercive peaceful action in the protection of fundamental community interests. 
In this regard, while the Community action taken in this instance in the form of 
legally binding instruments referred to relevant Security Council resolutions, the 
legal justifi cation on which the regulations and decisions rely seems to vary. 
Although no express mention is made in the regulations just discussed, decisions 
and statements by EC policymakers to the right of third-state countermeasures, it 
768 Council Decision of 11 November 1991 suspending the application of the agreements between 
the European Community, its member states and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(91/586/ECSC, EEC), OJ (1991) L315/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3300/91, OJ (1991) 
L 315/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3301/91 of 11 November 1991 on the arrangements for 
imports of certain textile products originating in Yugoslavia, OJ (1991) L315/3; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 1155/92 of 28 April 1992 amending Regulation No. 3301/91 on the 
arrangements for imports of certain textile products originating in Yugoslavia, OJ (1992) L122/1; 
Council Decision of 11 November 1991 denouncing the Agreement between the member states 
of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(91/587/ECSC), OJ (1991) L315/48; Council Decision of 11 November 1991 suspending the 
trade concessions provided for by the Agreement between the member states of the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (91/588/ECSC), 
OJ (1991) L315/49; Council Decision of 11 November 1991 withdrawing Yugoslavia from the 
list of the benefi ciaries of the Community generalized tariff preferences scheme for 1991 (91/589/
ECSC), OJ (1991) L315/50; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3302/91 of 11 November 1991 
withdrawing Yugoslavia from the list of benefi ciaries of the Community generalized tariff prefer-
ences scheme for 1991, OJ (1991) L315/46; Council Decision of 25 November 1991 denouncing 
the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(91/602/EEC), OJ (1991) L325/23.
769 Agence Europe No. 5728 of 13 April 1992, 3; Agence Europe No. 5734 of 22 May 1992, 6; cited 
in Bohr, op. cit.
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is clear that the action taken did not rely on such a resolution, as Resolution 713 
only authorized the imposition of an arms embargo. On the contrary, the 
Community action at times even precipitated UN action. 
Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the Community institutions 
acted in accordance with the Security Council resolutions because they had a 
legal obligation to do so. It is thus suggested that the EC is only legally bound by 
the UN Charter to the extent that it codifi es general rules of international law.770 
The possibility of a confl ict between an obligation under Community law and 
under the UN Charter to which all EC member states are parties is intended to 
be resolved by the inclusion in the Treaty of Rome of Article 297 (former Article 
224). According to this provision, derogation from the EC Treaty is permitted ‘in 
order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace 
and international security’. Therefore, EC member states can take economic or 
other measures in compliance with their other obligations under international law 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, after consultation 
between them in order to ensure that the common market will not be adversely 
affected by measures taken by a member state unilaterally. However, Article 297 
does not preclude Community action in the form of sanctions within its exclusive 
competences on common commercial policy.771 Since the EC is not the addressee 
of Security Council resolutions neither does it take over the obligations of its 
member states under other international legal instruments such as the UN 
Charter, Article 297 ensures the compliance of EC member states with other 
international responsibilities, which the EC cannot disregard.772 Furthermore, 
Article 307 of the Treaty of Rome (formerly Article 234) aims to remedy a confl ict 
between Community law and public international law with the cooperation 
between the EC and its member states. 
As already explained, the immediate suspension of the 1983 Cooperation 
Agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia concerning trade and cooperation 
was justifi ed on the ground of a ‘radical change’ to the conditions of the agree-
ment.773 Subsequently, the EC member states decided on the denunciation of the 
agreement despite the fact that 6 months’ notice was required.774 
In the Racke case brought before the ECJ, the lawfulness of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 3300/91 of 11 November 1991 with which the trade concessions 
770 Bohr, ibid, 264–5.
771 Ibid, 266.
772 Ibid, 268.
773 Council Decision of 11 November 1991 suspending the application of the Agreements between 
the European Community, its member states and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(91/586/ECSC, EEC), OJ (1991) L315/47.
774 The Cooperation Agreement can be found in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 314/83 of 24 
January 1983, OJ (1983) L 41/1. For the decision on suspension and termination see Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 3300/91 of 11 November 1991, OJ (1991) L 315/1; Decision of the 
Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 11 November 
1991, OJ (1991) L 315/47; and Council Decision of 25 November 1991, OJ (1991) L 325/23.
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established by the Cooperation Agreement were suspended with immediate effect, 
was put into question.775 The Agreement provided, inter alia, the reduction of 
custom duties on imports into the Community of wine of fresh grapes not exceed-
ing a specifi c tariff quota. Although the force of the Agreement was to have an 
unlimited period, it was also agreed that it could be denounced by giving 6 months’ 
notice to the other party. It was mainly argued by the applicants that the 
Cooperation Agreement contained no human rights clauses and, therefore, it had 
no non-execution clauses, as a consequence of which its suspension could not be 
justifi ed. The Community, by way of contrast, argued that the suspension of the 
Agreement was justifi ed under customary international law on the ground of rebus 
sic stantibus (fundamental change of circumstances). 
The Racke case highlights the diffi culties that arise as a result of the non-
execution of an agreement between two states, irrespective of the reasons behind 
it. This is because the pacta sunt servanda rule constitutes one of the most fundamen-
tal principles of international law.776 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the lawfulness 
of the Council regulation in dispute regarding the unilateral suspension of the 
Cooperation Agreement on the ground of fundamental change of circumstances. 
More specifi cally, the Court pointed to the wide-ranging objectives of the 
Cooperation Agreement, including, among other things, the promotion of eco-
nomic and social development and the welfare of the populations of the contracting 
parties, fi nally holding that the maintenance of peace in Yugoslavia constituted an 
essential element of the consent of the parties when concluding the Agreement. As 
a consequence, the disintegration of the country created a fundamental change of 
circumstances that justifi ed the suspension of the Agreement in question.777 
While some reference was made to the right of retorsion confusing the notion 
with that of countermeasures, the Community institutions did not rely on the 
concept of third-state countermeasures as a circumstance precluding the wrong-
fulness of their decision.778 The reliance on the concept of fundamental change of 
circumstances could possibly weaken the argument that the Community at the 
time was acting with the concrete belief that it possessed a right to resort to coun-
termeasures in response to a situation that raised concerns in the international 
community as a whole, even if it were not directly affected. 
However, questions arise as to whether the requirements of fundamental change 
of circumstances were indeed satisfi ed in this instance. As Chinkin points out, it 
would be diffi cult to prove in this case the existence of the two elements necessary 
to establish fundamental change of circumstances as a valid ground for the sus-
pension or denunciation of the treaty under consideration. More specifi cally, 
775 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, Judgment of 16 June 1998, Case C-162/96, European Court Reports 
I (1998) Part 6, 3655.
776 B. Brandtner and A. Rosas, ‘Trade Preferences and Human Rights’ in Alston (1999) op. cit., 699, 
703–704.
777 P.J. Kuijper, ‘The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969’ 25 Legal Issues of European Integration (1998) No. 1, 20.
778 See Dawidowicz, op. cit., 406.
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while it would be possible to argue that peace in Yugoslavia constituted a precon-
dition for the continuation of the Cooperation Agreement, it would be diffi cult to 
prove that the internal hostilities radically changed the EC’s obligations under the 
treaty. She notes, in this regard, that: ‘Under the Vienna Convention impossibility 
of performance is more generally seen as applicable to situations where the subject 
matter of the treaty has ceased to exist rather than loss of political authority by one 
of the treaty parties.’779 Moreover, and irrespective of whether or not in the pres-
ent case there indeed existed such a change of circumstances as to justify the 
denunciation of the agreements, one wonders whether this could be used as an 
excuse for any threat to the peace and security and any humanitarian crisis. It fol-
lows that any discussion on the law on countermeasures would become pointless 
and there would not even be a need to rely on such justifi cation since treaties would 
be able to be denounced or suspended on the ground of fundamental change of 
circumstances. The author is, therefore, of the view that the claim of fundamental 
change of circumstances must be used with constraint and that acceptance of such 
justifi cation must meet some very strict legal conditions. It is thus imperative that 
the international legal order fi nds appropriate means to address humanitarian 
crises within the law on state responsibility itself and especially through resort to 
countermeasures even by states that have not themselves suffered any direct injury. 
In conclusion, legitimate questions emerge in relation to whether the suspension of 
the 1983 Agreement could not qualify as a solidarity measure.
At a GATT level, Yugoslavia argued that the EC sanctions imposed against it, 
by not applying uniform treatment to the entire territory of Yugoslavia infringed 
the most favoured nation treatment clause under GATT and, as a consequence, 
it requested the establishment of a panel to look into the case. EC member states, 
however, invoked Article XXI regarding national security as justifi cation for their 
decision to suspend and denounce the 1983 Cooperation Agreement with 
Yugoslavia.780 The GATT Council declined to look into the substance of the 
claim as it found that FRY could not automatically be regarded as having suc-
ceeded the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a contracting party.781 It 
could be argued that in the light of the fact that the EEC member states had suf-
fered no direct injury in this instance, their reliance on the argument of national 
security would be weak, thus enhancing again the argument that their action 
amounted to solidarity measures. 
The economic measures adopted by both the Security Council and the EC 
from 1992 to 1995 aimed at inducing Yugoslavia to accept a settlement in Bosnia. 
The responsibility for the enforcement of the measures adopted by the EC, the 
West European Union and other institutions was given to the Sanctions Assistance 
Mission established for this purpose. The fi nal result of this coordinated action 
779 Chinkin (1996) op. cit., 197.
780 Trade Measures Taken by the European Community against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – 
Communication from the European Communities, 2 December 1991, GATT doc. L/6948.
781 Paasivirta and Rosas, op. cit., 212.
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was the termination of support for Bosnian–Serb forces by the regime under 
Slobodan Miloševič. It is often argued that the sanctions imposed against 
Yugoslavia during that period played a signifi cant role in the decision of the ‘most 
immoderate leadership’782 under Miloševič to enter into negotiations.
This incident offers another signifi cant example of the determination of third 
states to respond to serious violations of fundamental community interests through 
the enforcement of unilateral peaceful coercive measures, even though EC 
member states did not unequivocally rely on a justifi cation of third-state counter-
measures. The reluctance of the EC in this regard has been criticized as the legal 
justifi cations it relied on, particularly that concerning the fundamental change of 
circumstances, did not really meet the requirements of international law.783
Quite distinctive from the EC action, on 11 November 1994 the United States 
decided unilaterally to refuse compliance with Security Council Resolution 713, 
which it itself had voted for and which provided for a weapons embargo against 
Yugoslavia.784 In this regard, they ceased the arms embargo against Bosnia-
Herzegovina causing the concern of other NATO allies such as the United 
Kingdom.785 Some months later, and in particular in August 1995, Congress voted 
in favour of a cessation of the arms embargo against Bosnia, ‘an unambiguous 
de jure violation of the UN Charter and the relevant resolutions’.786 This action 
came several months before the Security Council decided to lift the arms embargo 
against the former Yugoslavia in November 1995.787 This the United Kingdom 
and France described as ‘worrying’.788 At a NATO level there was a call to ‘con-
tinue to enforce fully and totally all UN Security Council resolutions which form 
the basis of [NATO’s] involvement in former Yugoslavia’. 789 A similar call was 
made by members of the Western European Union.790 
It is most interesting that the United States refused to comply with clear legal 
obligations emanating from a mandatory Security Council resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, and in particular from Resolution 713. The 
lifting of the arms embargo may provide yet another example of countermeasures 
taken in the name of collective interests, provided that the US decision relied 
on the gross violations of human rights, such as genocide, taking place in the 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also on a serious threat to international 
782 E. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’ 74 Foreign Affairs (1995) No. 3, 109, 118; D. Cortright, 
‘Powers of Persuasion: Sanctions and Incentives in the Shaping of International Society’ 38 
International Studies (2001) No. 2, 113, 119.
783 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 407.
784 Security Council Resolution 713, 25 September 1991. See Keesing’s (1994) 40287.
785 Simons, op. cit., 103. As noted by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, this was ‘the fi rst time 
that a country like the United States has unilaterally exonerated itself from a United Nations 
Security council resolution that it has voted for’. Sunday Times, 13 November 1994.
786 Simons, op. cit., 104.
787 Security Council Resolution 1021, 29 November 1995.
788 Keesing’s (1994) 40287.
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid.
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peace and security. At the vote before the United States Senate for the unilateral 
breaching of the arms embargo it was pointed out that the embargo was in breach 
of Bosnia’s right under article 51 of the Charter to self-defence.791 However, it is 
not entirely clear whether the United States justifi ed their decision on a claim to 
third state countermeasures or as part of their own right to assist Bosnia-
Herzegovina to defend itself. In view of the other states’ objection and negative 
reaction to the decision of the United States to proceed to the unilateral lifting of 
the arms embargo an argument could be made to the effect that these states 
did not consider that the specifi c measure could be justifi ed under the right to 
individual or collective self-defence. 
5.2.24 Peaceful coercive measures against Nigeria (1995)
When the democratic elections held in Nigeria in 1993 were invalidated as a result 
of which the military regime of General Abacha came to power, there was blood-
shed between political activists and the regime with serious violations of human 
rights and the execution of prominent fi gures opposing the regime. The United 
States and member states of both EC and Commonwealth resorted to a number 
of retorsive measures such as travel and arms restrictions.792 In addition to these 
measures, EC member states decided to freeze Nigerian assets without, however, 
giving effect to this decision in the light of the fact that such assets had already 
been transferred to Swiss banks.793 Similarly, member states of the Commonwealth 
discussed the freezing of assets and the imposition of aviation restrictions, although 
again, no actual decision was taken to this effect.794 The US Congress, for its part, 
proposed a fl ight ban although, again, it did not implement this decision. Calls 
and the recommendations decided at these institutional levels against Nigeria, 
even if not actually given effect, may be expressive of the determination of states 
to resort to coercive measures in violation of their international obligations in 
order to protect fundamental human rights norms and interests owed to the inter-
national community as a whole.795 
Moreover, the decision of the Commonwealth in 1995 to suspend Nigeria from 
the Commonwealth, arguably adversely affected its voting rights. In the light of 
the fact that the Commonwealth could be considered as an international organi-
zation, the decision to suspend Nigeria amounted to a violation of the 1971 
Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles and the 1991 Harare 
Commonwealth Declaration.796 This could provide another example of state 
791 Ibid, 40017.
792 See Dawidowicz, op. cit., 387.
793 Keesing’s (1995) 40758.
794 Commonwealth Proposes Further Measures against Military Regime in Nigeria, 2 Commonwealth Currents 
3 (1996); and also 3 Commonwealth Currents 7 (1996).
795 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 387.
796 For more information on the legal status of these declarations, see Duxbury A., ‘Rejuvenating the 
Commonwealth – the Human Rights Remedy’, 46 ICLQ (1997) 344, cited in ibid, 388.
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practice and opinio juris in support of a right to solidarity measures and, therefore, 
it is necessary to include it within the scope of the present examination.
5.2.25 Unilateral coercive action against Burundi (1996)
Following the assassination of the fi rst democratically elected president of Burundi 
in 1993 after a military coup, civil war broke out, as a result of which many people 
died. The international community, while deploring the situation, avoided any 
coercive action at an institutional level. However, the worsening of the crisis in 
1996 led some African states to impose trade restrictions against Burundi. These 
restrictions were decided at the second Arusha Summit that took place in July 
1996 for the purpose of restoring democratic rule in Burundi.797 Among the states 
that imposed a trade embargo Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, like 
Burundi, were members of GATT and consequently, these measures were in vio-
lation of their obligations arising from GATT.
These states did not rely on any of the saving clauses provided under Article 
XXI of GATT to justify their action.798 
At the same time Rwanda and Zaire were bound by the 1976 Convention 
establishing the Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries and, accord-
ingly, the measures against Burundi could amount to a violation of the obligations 
arising from this Convention.799 While the Convention provided for a 3-year 
notice for its denunciation, this condition was not satisfi ed before the imposition of 
the measures taken by these two states. Burundi, for its part, claimed that the 
action against it was in violation of the UN Charter, the Charter of the OAU and 
general international law.800 According to Tams and Dawidowicz, this is yet 
another example of state practice in support of third-state countermeasures in 
international law.801
5.2.26 US action against Sudan (1997–2005)
The United States, through the adoption of Executive Order 13067 in 1997, 
announced trade restrictions and an investment ban as a result of Sudan’s interfer-
ence in Uganda and also, in the light of the worsening human rights situation in 
Sudan, with allegations of slavery and religious repression.802 While Sudan was 
797 Joint Communiqué of the Second Arusha Summit, United Nations doc. A/51/264-S/1996/620; cited in 
Dawidowicz, ibid, 389.
798 Dawidowicz, ibid, 389.
799 1092 UNTS 49 (17 April 1978) in ibid, 390.
800 Letter dated 25/09/96 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, United Nations doc. S/1996/788 and Letter 
dated 25/08/96 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, United Nations doc. S/1996/690.
801 Tams, op. cit., 222; Dawidowicz, op. cit., 390.
802 This example is cited in Dawidowicz, ibid, 391.
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not a member of GATT, and therefore these measures did not amount to a viola-
tion of specifi c treaty commitments, the freezing of Sudanese assets was in violation 
of general international law.803 Sudan complained against these measures, which 
it described as ‘unjust’.804 It is of signifi cance that since the asset freezing was not 
included in the mandatory sanctions imposed against Sudan by Security Council 
Resolution 1054 adopted in 1996, the United States freezing was in violation 
of international law, thus offering further evidence of the existence of a right to 
solidarity measures.805 The asset freezing continued until 2005 when the Security 
Council adopted another resolution imposing further sanctions against Sudan and 
authorizing, inter alia, the freezing of its assets.806
5.2.27 Coercive action against Burma/Myanmar (1997–2005)
In the light of the serious human rights crisis in Burma/Myanmar as a result of the 
long-established military rule in the country and the oppression of political dissi-
dents, and parliamentary results, the international community responded with a 
number of measures against the regime. While many of the restrictions imposed 
such as the travel bans and the suspension of the generalised system of prefer-
ences807 were acts of retorsion, the decision of the EC to proceed in 2000 with the 
freezing of Burmese assets, a decision supported by 21 further states, was in viola-
tion of international law.808 As noted in earlier cases, the freezing of assets is 
conduct in violation of international law and therefore the action resorted to in 
this instance is another example of third-state countermeasures.809
5.2.28 Collective action against Yugoslavia (1998)
Following further worsening of the humanitarian situation in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1998 the Security Council decided to impose an arms embargo 
under its Chapter VII competence, while not excluding the possibility of additional 
measures should a peaceful settlement of the confl ict in Kosovo fail. The EU Council, 
through common positions and regulations decided to implement additional measures 
803 Dawidowicz, ibid, 391. Also see Keesing’s (1997) 41900.
804 Keesing’s, ibid.
805 Security Council Resolution 1054 adopted on 26 April 1996.
806 Security Council Resolution 1591 adopted on 29 March 2005.
807 Common Position on Burma/Myanmar 96/635/CFSP (28 October 1996), OJ L 287/1 (8 
November 1996); and European Community Bulletin No. 12 (1996), para. 1.4.40; Council 
Decision of 27 April 1998 concerning the further extension of Common Position 96/635/CFSP 
on Burma/Myanmar, OJ L 138/5 (9 May 1998).
808 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1081/2000 of 22 May 2000, prohibiting the sale, supply and export 
to Burma/Myanmar of equipment which might be used for internal repression or terrorism, and 
freezing the funds of certain persons related to important governmental functions in that country 
OJ L 122/29 (22 May 2000).
809 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 392.
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in order ‘to obtain from the Government of the FRY the fulfi lment of the require-
ments of UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998) and of the said common positions’.810 
Resolution 1160 did not, however, authorize states to resort to such additional mea-
sures in order to bring about the compliance of the FRY with its international 
obligations, other than the arms embargo.811 Russia was against any proposals for the 
imposition of economic measures on the country. As a consequence, Canada, the 
EU, Japan and the United States decided to apply unilateral measures.812 
The EU Council, with common positions adopted on 7 May and 29 June 1998 
within its powers under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, decided to 
freeze all Yugoslav assets abroad and to impose a fl ight ban, which for some states, 
such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, meant violation of their bilat-
eral aviation agreements with the targeted country.813 This was implemented by 
Regulation 1901/98 where the Council noted that the FRY had not stopped its 
indiscriminate violence and brutal repression against its own population. The 
Council further emphasized that the situation in Kosovo amounted to serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and that the gov-
ernment had failed to take steps towards a settlement and regional peace and 
security.814 The regulation provided that any aircraft operated directly or indi-
rectly by a Yugoslav carrier or a carrier which had its main place of business or 
810 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98 of 7 September 1998 concerning a ban on fl ights of 
Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community, 
OJ (1998) L248/1; Common Position of 19 March 1998 defi ned by the Council on the basis of 
Article J. 2 of the Treaty on European Union on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, OJ (1998) L95/1; Common Position of 7 May 1998 defi ned by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the freezing of funds held abroad 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian Governments, OJ (1998) L143/1; Common 
Position of 8 June 1998 defi ned by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on 
European Union concerning the prohibition of new investment in Serbia, OJ (1998) L165/1; 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 926/98 of 27 April 1998 concerning the reduction of certain eco-
nomic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ (1998) L130/1; Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1295/98 of 22 June 1998 concerning the freezing of funds held abroad by the govern-
ments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, OJ (1998) L178/33; 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1607/98 of 24 July 1998 concerning the prohibition of new invest-
ment in the Republic of Serbia, OJ (1998) L209/16. 
811 Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998). 
812 See UK Parliament Kosovo Crisis, ‘The Kosovo Crisis after May 1997 – Sanctions’, Fourth 
Report, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2809.htm
813 Common Position of 7 May 1998 defi ned by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty 
on European Union concerning the freezing of funds held abroad by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Serbian governments, OJ (1998) L143/1; Common Position of 29 June 1998 
defi ned by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning a 
ban on fl ights by Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European 
Community, OJ (1998) L190/3.
814 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98 of 7 September 1998 concerning a ban on fl ights of 
Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community, 
OJ (1998) L248/1.
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registered offi ce in the FRY would be banned from fl ying between the latter and 
the EC, thus revoking all existing and new operating authorizations to Yugoslav 
carriers. This prohibition was limited to landing and taking off rights. With a sub-
sequent Council Regulation the ban was expanded to cover the takeoff or landing 
in the territory of an EC member state of any civil aircraft that had taken off from 
or was going to land in the territory of the FRY.815 The implementation of the 
fl ight ban was later challenged in the Bosphorus and Ebony cases, thoroughly exam-
ined within the scope of the last chapter, as infringing fundamental human rights 
such as the right to property. 
The Regulation raised signifi cant issues of the legality of the measures under 
international law, especially in view of existing Air Services Agreements between 
EU member states and the FRY. One such example relates to the Air Services 
Agreement concluded in 1959 by the government of the United Kingdom and 
the then government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.816 The 
Agreement specifi cally provided that, in the event of any dispute relating to its 
interpretation or application, it should fi rst be attempted to resolve such dispute 
with negotiation between the parties. Should such negotiations fail then the par-
ties were entitled (‘may’) to request the resolution of the dispute by an arbitration 
tribunal. Even more signifi cantly, Article 17 of the Agreement allowed the termi-
nation of the treaty by either party by giving notice to the other party. In such an 
event, the termination of the treaty would become effective only 12 months after 
receipt of the notice. 
There apparently existed a real impediment concerning the lawfulness under 
international law of possible implementation by the UK government of Council 
Regulation 1901/98 through the adoption of the UK Yugoslavia (Prohibition of 
Flights) Regulations 1998 that was passed a few days after the Council Regulation 
was entered into force and which gave immediate effect to it.817 The requirement 
815 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1064/1999 of 21 May 1999 imposing a ban on fl ights between the 
European Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and repealing regulation (EC) 
No. 1901/98, OJ (1999) L129/27; Council Regulation (EC) No. 2151/1999 of 11 October 1999 
imposing a ban on fl ights between the territories of the Community and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia other than the Republic of Montenegro and the Province of Kosovo and repealing 
regulation (EC) No. 1064/1999, OJ (1999) L264/3.
816 UK–FPRY Agreement of 1959, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia concerning Air Services, London, February 1959, Treaty Series No. 10 (1960) 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 
March 1960. This Agreement continued to be binding between the UK and the FRY and was the 
subject of a meeting between representatives of the two countries which took place on 14 October 
1996 for the purpose of considering the position of their bilateral agreements. See Command Paper, 
First Supplementary List of Ratifi cations, Accessions, Withdrawals etc. for 1998, Treaty Series No. 28 (1998), 
Command Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998, Stationery Offi ce.
817 The Yugoslavia Regulations 1998 were later revoked with Yugoslavia Regulations 1999, Statutory 
Instrument 1999 No. 2018, available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1999/19992018.
htm in accordance to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1064/1999 of 21 May 1999 imposing a 
194 The problem of enforcement in international law
of 12 months’ notice was indeed a matter of concern for the British government as 
is revealed by the response given by the Secretary of State to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs enquiry on the matter. Initially, the UK government was very 
reluctant to introduce the ban on fl ights conducted by Serbian airlines immedi-
ately as required by the Council regulation.818 In a confi dential memo sent to all 
EU member states, the UK government contended that it possessed no right 
under international law to resort to ‘reprisals’ and, in particular, not to comply 
with existing treaty obligations due to the fact that the human rights violations in 
Kosovo did not affect EU member states directly.819 However, in the light of fi erce 
criticism, especially from its European partners, the UK government reversed its 
decision and decided to enforce the ban immediately. The Secretary of State, 
while acknowledging the legal implications of giving immediate effect to the ban 
in contravention of the Air Service Agreement, especially Article 17, pointed out 
that the continuing repression in Kosovo and the humanitarian crisis justifi ed the 
immediate ban of fl ights.820 Asked about the legal grounds on which the 1959 
Agreement was to take precedence over the Council Regulation imposing the air 
ban, the Secretary of State replied that the agreement between Yugoslavia and the 
United Kingdom, which preceded the former’s accession to the EC, had not been 
left unaffected. While accepting that the UK government still had a legal obliga-
tion to abide by its obligations under the agreement, it was stressed that: 
There was always a balance to be struck between our legal obligation under 
the 1959 ASA … and the need to bring Milosevic to comply with his obliga-
tions. That balance had tilted sharply by September given the worsen-
ing humanitarian situation on the ground in Kosovo, and in particular the 
reports of serious human rights abuses committed by the FRY and Serbian 
security forces. As my statement of 16 September makes clear, I concluded 
that, on moral and political grounds, Milosevic had forfeited the right to the 
12 months’ notice period which would normally apply under the terms of 
the ASA.821
ban on fl ights between the European Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
repealing regulation (EC) No. 1901/98, OJ (1999) L129/27. 
818 UK Secretary of State’s statement, House of Commons Debates, 24 July 1998, c. 184. The UK govern-
ment was faced with the possibility of proceedings before the ECJ in the event that it declined to 
conform with its obligations under Community treaties. See article by Butler in The Independent, 
16 September 1998.
819 K. Butler ‘Cook reviews “unethical” policy on Serbia after EU outrage’; The Independent, 16 
September 1998.
820 UK Foreign Policy Report, First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998–99, 
Foreign Policy and Human Rights, Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, EU Ban on Yugoslav Flights, Cm 4229, 6 available at http://www.fco.
gov.uk/Files/kfi le/FACresponse 019899,0.pdf.
821 Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Foreign Secretary on the Yugoslavia Flight 
Ban, 30/11/1998, Appendix 32 (emphasis added), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/100/100ap46.htm.
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It is signifi cant to highlight the fact that in this instance the UK government seems 
to have taken the view that there does not exist in international law a legal right of 
states not directly injured by a certain breach to resort to countermeasures, no 
matter if the breach may affect fundamental interests of the international com-
munity as a whole. Nevertheless, as noted, the United Kingdom’s position in this 
instance seems to be at odds with its decision to impose a freeze on Yugoslav 
assets, a move in contravention of international law, but also with the position it 
held in several other cases examined earlier in which it had no hesitation in imple-
menting countermeasures as an indirectly injured state.822
Similar concerns were also expressed by Greece, which invoked its bilateral 
agreement with Yugoslavia for its failure to give immediate effect to the decision 
of the EU Council, as refl ected in its common positions and subsequently in the 
Regulations.823 Irrespective of the legal debate as to the legal force of common 
positions adopted under Title V TEU, especially when these are vaguely phrased, 
it was pointed out that sanctions decided at a Community level are required to be 
uniformly applied by all members of the EC. As noted by President Santer: 
‘[D]ecisions taken by the fi fteen Member States have to be applied by fi fteen. If 
one or more countries refuses to play the game, it strips the decision to impose 
sanctions of any meaning.’824 
Despite these diffi culties it was argued that the EU, by resorting to the fl ight 
ban, despite the fact that in this way many bilateral agreements existing between 
the FRY and individual member states would be affected, ‘broke new ground’.825 
When the fl ight ban and, in particular, Council Regulation 1901/98, was chal-
lenged before the Belgian Cour d’Appel de Bruxelles, the latter ruled in favour of 
the legality of the regulation on the following grounds:
- ces mésures respondent à une violation antérieure du droit international;
- cette violation autorisé les contre-mesures;
- ces contre-mesures ne sont pas d’une illicité absolue;
- elles sont proportionnées à la violation initiale du droit international;
- leur mise en oevre est précédé d’une sommation adressé à l’État responsi-
  ble de mettre fi n à la violation initiale du droit international.826
Despite some states’ reluctance, the reaction against Yugoslavia particularly 
through the freezing of assets but also through the immediate suspension of bilat-
eral agreements concerning aviation rights provides further evidence of state 
practice and opinio juris of a right to unilateral coercive action for safeguarding 
fundamental community interests. 
822 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 393.
823 See Agence Europe, 7286, 25–26 August 1998, 2; The European, 14–20 September 1998, 6. 
824 European Voice, 17–23 September 1998, 15 in Koutrakos, op. cit., 88.
825 Paasivirta and Rosas, op. cit., 214.
826 Jugoslovenski Aerotransport v l’État Belge, Cour d’Appel de Bruxelles (9ème Chambre), decision of 10 
June 1999 (No. 1998/KR/528) [1999] J.T. 693 in ibid, 215. 
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5.2.29 Legal issues arising from extradition agreements (1989 and 1991)
Not infrequently many European and other states, including the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the Netherlands, have been faced with questions of confl ict between 
two international, conventional or customary, norms of international law, one of 
which relating to human rights considerations. 
The issue was raised among others in the well-known Soering case where the 
applicant, a German national who was accused of murder in the United States, 
had been arrested in the United Kingdom and was due for extradition to the 
United States in order to stand trial there. However, the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that there were substantial cumulative reasons to believe that 
should the extradition be carried out, the applicant faced a real risk of exposure to 
an infringement of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
regarding the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment. Hence, although the 
prohibition of extradition to a place where an individual would be subjected to 
torture was not specifi cally spelled out in the Convention, this did not mean that 
such a prohibition was not inherent in Article 3. Judge De Meyer, in his concur-
ring opinion said that extraditing an individual to a place where they would be 
exposed to torture or to the death penalty would be ‘repugnant to European stan-
dards of justice and contrary to the public order of Europe’.827 
The signifi cance of this case lies in the fact that the United Kingdom and the 
United States were bound by the 1972 Extradition Treaty and should extradition 
be refused the United Kingdom would be acting in violation of its treaty obliga-
tions, giving rise to its international responsibility. The United Kingdom was thus 
confronted with the dilemma of whether to implement one international commit-
ment while violating another. In the end, the United Kingdom sought and received 
assurances from the United States that Soering would not be tried on capital 
murder charges and subsequently extradited Soering to the United States.828 In 
this instance, the claim before the European Court of Human Rights was that 
compliance with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 1972 Treaty would 
result in the risk of subjecting the individual to torture, the prohibition of which is 
a peremptory norm of international law. Moreover, the prohibition of torture 
holds prominent place in the European Convention on Human Rights, which as 
analyzed earlier establishes an objective legal regime. As noted by Orakhelashvili: 
‘[T]he Court upheld the overriding effect of Article 3 and by implication tolerated 
some dangers to legal stability and the routine expectations of the States 
concerned.’829 This was particularly so in view of the fact that the 1972 Treaty was 
not in itself in violation of peremptory norms of international law, however, its 
implementation would be a violation of a prohibition of ‘superior limitation’.830 
This example seems to provide further support, of a judicial nature, for a right to 
827 Soering v UK, 11 EHRR (1989), 439.
828 R. Lillich, ‘The Soering Case’ 85 AJIL (1991) No. 1, 128, 141.
829 Orakhelashvili, op. cit., 32–3.
830 Ibid, 32–3.
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countermeasures in the sense that states are entitled to refuse performance of their 
treaty and customary obligations in order to uphold a norm of fundamental char-
acter of international law.
Similar questions were raised in the case Short v Netherlands where the applicant, 
an American citizen, was wanted by the US authorities for murder. The United 
States and the Netherlands were bound by the NATO Status of Force Agreement 
regarding extradition issues. However, the Netherlands was also bound by the 
Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights under which the 
death sentence was prohibited. Refusing to extradite Short, the Netherlands 
justifi ed its decision on the ground that: ‘[I]n view of the great importance which 
must be attributed to the right not to suffer the death penalty, the weighing of 
the various interests in this case must inevitably result in a decision in Short’s 
favour.’831 
The signifi cance of the questions that these cases raise is invaluable. This is 
because both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while acting in agreement 
with specifi c treaty obligations, namely those arising from the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, did so even though their action would be in 
contravention of another treaty obligation. In both the last cases, the two coun-
tries required to fulfi l their extradition obligations towards the United States were 
third countries, not directly injured by a certain infringement or even by the pos-
sibility of an infringement. Rather, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
were acting for the protection of collective interests that had been established 
within the context of the Council of Europe and also under customary interna-
tional law (prohibition of torture), upholding in this way the public order even in 
disregard of other treaty commitments. 
5.2.30 Unilateral coercive action against Zimbabwe (2002–2008) 
In the last few years, the Zimbabwean regime of Robert Mugabe has been engaged 
in serious human rights violations repressing political activity and opposition in 
the country through a wave of killings and intimidation.832 As a result, many coun-
tries at regional and universal level decided to implement a number of measures 
against Zimbabwe in response to these serious human rights violations. In particu-
lar, at an EU level it was decided in 1998 to impose an arms embargo and to 
introduce a travel ban, measures which, in the absence of specifi c treaty commit-
ments, constitute only acts of retorsion. Moreover, the EC decided to suspend 
fi nancial and development assistance provided under the Cotonou Agreement, 
which replaced the Lomé Conventions.833 The Cotonou Agreement makes express 
reference to the ability of member states to resort to appropriate measures in the 
831 C.D.S v The State of the Netherlands, Supreme Court, 30 March 1990, RvdW (1990) No. 76, MRT 
(1990) 225; NJ (1991) No 249; also cited in NYIL (1991) No. 22, 433.
832 Keesing’s (2002) 44600.
833 Keesing’s, ibid.
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event of violation of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law.834 
Accordingly, these restrictions were justifi ed within the scope of the Convention 
and, therefore, they did not amount to countermeasures.
In addition to these measures, it was decided to freeze Zimbabwean fi nancial 
assets, a measure in violation of international law. This was followed by the major-
ity of central and eastern European states with links to Cyprus, the EU, Lichtenstein 
and Malta.835 This measure infringed Zimbabwe’s rights under general interna-
tional law rather than under the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Group Agreement 
(ACP Agreement) and, therefore, it could be justifi ed as a third-state countermea-
sure.836 At a Commonwealth level, it was decided that Zimbabwe should be 
expelled from the Commonwealth, a measure that arguably amounts to suspen-
sion of membership rights such as voting as already seen in the case of Nigeria.837 
The United States followed suit by also freezing Zimbabwean assets in 2003 and 
the same example was followed by the United Kingdom.838 These measures were 
later extended by EC member states and the United States amid further deterio-
ration of the situation in Zimbabwe.839
5.2.31 US action against Syria (2003–2004)
In the light of Syria’s occupation of the Lebanon and its alleged support of terror-
ism, the United States imposed through the adoption of the Syria Accountability 
and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, economic measures against Syria. 
These entailed the right to prohibit aviation rights, an export embargo and the 
freezing of Syrian assets.840 
While the export embargo did not infringe specifi c treaty commitments as Syria 
is not a member state to GATT, the freezing of its assets was in contravention 
of its rights under international law and, as such, it falls within the category of 
solidarity measures.841
834 Partnership Agreement between the ACP and the European Community of 23 June 2000 
(Cotonou Agreement), OJ (2000) L 317/3 (15 December 2000). For the EC measures, see Council 
Common Position of 18 February 2002, 2002/145/CFSP (18 February 2002), OJ (2002) L 50/1; 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 310/2002 of 18 February 2002, OJ (2002) L 50/4.
835 See analysis in Dawidowicz, op. cit., 394–5.
836 Tams, op. cit., 224–5.
837 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 396.
838 ‘Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe’, 
Executive Order 13288, 6 March 2003 Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 46; Keesing’s (2002) 44541.
839 Council Common Position 2006/51/CFSP of 30 January 2006 renewing restrictive measures 
against Zimbabwe, OJ (2006), L 26/28 (31 January 2006); Council Decision of 17 February 2005, 
extending the period of application of the measures provided for by Decision 2002/148/EC 
concluding consultations held with Zimbabwe under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement OJ (2005) L 48/28 (19 February 2005).
840 See Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, HR 1828, 12 April 
2003, Public Law 108-175 (12 December 2003) cited in Dawidowicz, op. cit., 396–7.
841 Dawidowicz, ibid, 397.
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5.2.32 Action against Belarus (2004–2006)
The human rights crisis that prevailed in Belarus resulting in the repression of 
political opponents and forced disappearances provoked international condemna-
tion and criticism. The European Parliament deplored the situation calling on the 
Council and EU member states to freeze the assets of President Lukashenko.842 
The Council of Ministers for its part reiterated the call for the freezing of eco-
nomic assets.843 While no such decision to freeze assets was given effect at an EU 
level, the incident is signifi cant as it reveals the determination of states to proceed 
with third-state countermeasures in response to serious violations of human 
rights.844 In parallel to the EU activity, the United States announced in 2006 the 
freezing of assets, a measure that amounts to a third-state countermeasure.845 
5.2.33 The ruling of the ECJ in Kadi and Al Barakaat (2008) 
The recent rulings of the ECJ in Kadi and Al Barakaat concerning EU action taken 
in compliance with UN law but nevertheless in violation of fundamental human 
rights, and therefore community interests, are of particular relevance to the ques-
tion of countermeasures by states not directly affected and therefore require 
special attention. The conclusion of the Court that the regulation adopted to give 
effect to relevant Security Council resolutions was in violation of fundamental 
human rights norms may imply a right of EU member states and institutions not 
to comply with these resolutions whenever such compliance would be tantamount 
to the breach of fundamental collective interests protected under EU law. 
The applicants claimed that freezing their assets without allowing the possibility 
of their challenging the decision made against them was in violation of their right 
to property, their right to be heard and their right to judicial review.846 The Court 
was called on to consider whether the obligations emanating from the UN Charter 
prevailed over all other obligations, including those arising from EU law and 
human rights norms (whether treaty or customary in nature). The question is 
particularly relevant for the purposes of this examination relating to whether states 
could refuse to comply with Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter in order to uphold fundamental community interests such 
as the protection of human rights. In such a case, the decision could offer another 
example of solidarity measures.
842 European Parliament Resolution on Belarus, European Union Bulletin No. 3, 10 March 2005, 1.2.4. 
843 General Affairs and External Relations, 2687th Council Meeting, Council of the European Union, 
External Relations, Brussels, 7 November 2005, 13622/05, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/86850.pdf.
844 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 398.
845 Executive Order ‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or 
Institutions in Belarus’, US Department of the Treasury, available at http://www.treas.gov/
offi ces/enforcement/ofac/programs/belarus/belarus.pdf. Also see ibid, 398.
846 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Judgment 3 September 2008. 
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The diffi culty with these cases relates to the prima facie confl ict between two 
essential community interests, the protection of international peace and security, 
on the one hand, and the protection of fundamental human rights, on the other. 
However, such confl ict seems to be at best fi ctitious, as the Security Council, in 
fulfi lling its primary responsibility under the UN Charter, must abide by its prin-
ciples, one of which is the protection of human rights.847
For the purposes of the current examination, and in the light of settled law, 
conduct that infringes fundamental principles of Community law should be 
annulled.848 The growing expansion of Security Council powers in maintaining 
international peace and security may in practice entail a risk to fundamental 
human rights. The Advocate-General stressed that, in his opinion, the powers of 
the Security Council in this regard should not be used to ‘silence’ the protection of 
human rights as embodied in Community law. Quite signifi cantly, the Advocate-
General pointed out that the rules of public international law would determine 
the legal consequences to emerge as a result of implementation of Community 
principles at the expense of a Security Council resolution.849 This would unavoid-
ably suggest that the lawfulness of a Community act would have to be determined 
also in the light of any general international rules concerning the right of third 
states to impose countermeasures by way of non-performance of other interna-
tional obligations in response to a violation of a fundamental community right.
The Court itself upheld in the cases under consideration the principle that 
Community acts should still be subjected to judicial review even if taken in com-
pliance with Security Council resolutions and emphasized that because of the 
autonomous character of the EU, its principles could not be disregarded on the 
ground of compliance with obligations arising from other international agree-
ments.850 This could imply a right of the EU member states to countermeasures 
for protecting fundamental community interests, in violation of obligations arising 
from a given Security Council resolution, and even in the absence of direct injury. 
Ultimately the Court, while acknowledging that its limited competences did not 
allow it to exercise judicial review over Security Council resolutions, stressed that 
implementing such resolutions should not ignore the fundamental principles on 
which the EU is founded.851 
Having established the unlawfulness of the contested regulation with human 
rights principles safeguarded under Community law, the Court ordered the 
847 For relevant bibliography, see Katselli, op. cit., 301; G. Verdirame, ‘Breaches of the European 
Convention on Human Rights resulting from the conduct of international organizations’, 
2 EHRLR (2008), 209; F. Megret and F. Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? 
Some Refl ections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’, 25 HRQ 
(2003) 314. 
848 Germany v Council, Case C-122/95 (1998) ECR I-973.
849 Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of Advocate 
General Mr Maduro, 16 January 2008, Case C-402/05 P, (34) and (39).
850 Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission, (3 September 2008), op. cit., (303).
851 Ibid, (305).
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substitution of the contested regulation with another regulation that would ensure 
respect for individual human rights. 
The ruling of the Court is signifi cant as it implies that Community principles 
should prevail over other obligations emanating from other international agree-
ments. While the Court’s ruling was an attempt to reconcile the implementation 
of Security Council resolutions with fundamental Community interests, the ques-
tion remains as to what will be the outcome if no such reconciliation can be 
achieved. The Court’s ruling seems to imply violation of obligations emanating 
from Security Council resolutions, in an effort to protect essential collective prin-
ciples protected under EU law. Although the Court made no express reference to 
the concept of countermeasures by states other than the injured, its decision could 
provide further support for the existence of state practice and opinio juris in favour 
of measures of this nature.
6 Legal assessment of state practice and opinio juris
There is little doubt that the problem of enforcement of international norms raises 
signifi cant questions that lie at the heart of the nature and function of interna-
tional law. This is particularly so with respect to interests the preservation and 
respect for which are fundamental for a group of states or the international com-
munity as a whole. The problem of implementation of these norms was central to 
this study, owing to the different views expressed within the ILC regarding the 
recognition of a rule permitting countermeasures taken in the collective interest by 
states that are not directly injured. In the absence of a treaty rule establishing a 
general right to resort to countermeasures for the protection of collective interests 
and interests owed to the international community as a whole, attention in this 
chapter was unavoidably turned to whether state practice and opinio juris establish 
the existence of a customary rule of international law to this effect. 
Signifi cantly, the ILC, in a fi nal attempt to conclude the codifi cation of the law 
on state responsibility that had been pending for more than four decades, held 
that there was no suffi cient support relating to a customary rule permitting third-
state countermeasures. According to its conclusions, the existing practice of states 
was selective and not of a general character and, therefore, it could not provide 
adequate evidence for the establishment of a customary rule. The decision of the 
ILC, however, not to incorporate the concept of solidarity measures in the Final 
Articles came somewhat as a surprise. This is very much due to the fact that under 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted in the fi rst reading in 1996 all 
states were entitled to resort to countermeasures as a means of reaction to the 
commission of international crimes.852 Moreover, during the discussions in the 
ILC there was never a general or strong opposition to the concept with many states 
providing their support for the recognition of the right of states not directly injured 
to exercise unilateral coercive peaceful measures for inducing the wrongdoer to 
852 See analysis in Chapter 2, Section 4.
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comply with its international obligations.853 Signifi cantly, the ILC’s conclusions 
relied on a very limited number of cases and its study lacked the depth and detail 
that were imperative in the light of the signifi cance that the enforcement of funda-
mental collective and community interests has in international law. 
The analysis in this chapter has sought to demonstrate that the fi ndings of the 
ILC did not conclude or exhaust the subject, which reveals many examples of 
conduct resorted to by third states in violation of international law, justifi ed by the 
protection of obligations owed to a group of states or the international community 
as a whole. Furthermore, the analyses here have shown that, in a signifi cant 
number of cases in which states did not proceed with the actual implementation 
of measures of this nature, they demonstrated an intention to do so, through calls 
and recommendations particularly at a regional and international level. 
This section will, therefore, provide some general conclusions that can be drawn 
from this analysis, but fi rst attention will be turned to a consideration of the two 
basic elements required for the creation of custom, namely state practice and opinio 
juris. This is necessary to establish whether the examples discussed earlier in the 
chapter meet these requirements and therefore support a conclusion in favour of 
solidarity measures.
6.1 Elements of customary rules of international law 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ refers to custom as ‘evidence of a general prac-
tice accepted as law’. Custom therefore consists of two interdependent elements: 
state practice, that is what states do, and opinio juris sive necessitatis, that is their belief 
that they have an obligation to behave in a certain way.854 
For state practice to exist there must be some form of continuity, consistency, 
generality and repetition, although practice need not be uniform or prolonged. In 
the Asylum case, the ICJ ruled that practice must be ‘constant and uniform’, short 
of any uncertainty and contradiction, fl uctuation, discrepancy or inconsistency.855 
This was later upheld in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, according to which 
practice must be uniform and extensive.856 In view of the diffi culty of achieving 
uniformity in state affairs, the ICJ modifi ed this requirement in its ruling in the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case so that state practice 
need not be uniform but must be consistent.857
State practice can be refl ected in treaties, in the decisions of national and inter-
national judicial bodies and in diplomatic correspondence or protests. It can also 
be found in national legislation, in the practice of international organizations, in 
853 See analysis in Tams, op. cit., 244, 247–8. 
854 Shaw, op. cit., 72 et seq.
855 Asylum case (Colombia/Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports (1950) 266, 277. 
856 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands), ICJ Reports 
(1969) 3, (74).
857 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (1986), op. cit., 98 (186).
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policy statements, press releases, executive decisions and also in the comments of 
states made in various international fora, including the ILC.858 
State practice alone, however, is not suffi cient to satisfy the requirements of 
custom, as it must always be accompanied by opinio juris.859 The ICJ has defi ned 
the psychological element as the belief of states that certain practice is ‘obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it’.860 Diffi culties may arise in relation to 
proving the existence of opinio juris, that is, the belief that a certain state activity is 
in accordance with the law. For practical reasons, the opinio juris requirement has 
been expanded to include not only the belief that a certain conduct is required by 
law but, also, that it is becoming law.861 This element differentiates custom from 
moral or political principles, as it requires ‘an aspect of legality about the behav-
iour and the acting state will have to confi rm that this is so, so that the international 
community can easily distinguish legal from non-legal practices’.862
Evidence of the essential state practice and opinio juris can also be established 
through General Assembly resolutions. This is because such resolutions constitute 
‘collective pronouncements of States’,863 and provide support for the existence of 
state practice and also for the legal belief of states on international legal principles 
and rules.864
In the light of these preliminary observations, it will now be considered whether 
the examples analyzed in this chapter satisfy the requirements for the establish-
ment of a customary norm that confers a right on states to exercise unilateral 
coercive peaceful action in response to serious violations of collective interests, in 
the absence of individual injury. 
6.2 Some conclusions from the analysis of state practice
This last consideration has dealt with a number of cases that, in the author’s opin-
ion, establish that the question of solidarity measures is not a newly conceived 
issue in the practice of international law and that such practice and opinio juris sup-
port the existence of a customary rule that permits enforcement of collective and 
community interests by such means. The study has not been confi ned to the 
examples referred to by the ILC in its commentary on countermeasures by states 
other than the injured and in recent academic commentary but, rather, it has 
tried to complement these by reference to some more examples not previously 
considered. The preceding discussion did not aim to exhaust the topic, a task 
almost impossible in view of the plurality of the actors and the multilevelled nature 
858 Harris, op. cit., 23.
859 Shaw, op. cit., 75.
860 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (1986), op. cit., 108–9, (207); 
Case concerning North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969), 44, (77).
861 Shaw, op. cit., 87.
862 Ibid, 88.
863 Harris, op. cit., 55.
864 Ibid, 57.
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and depth of international state relations. Nevertheless, it has been shown through 
detailed analysis of national legislation, offi cial statements, debates and discussions 
taking place in national parliaments and also before international organizations, 
national and international decisions and statements, that there is ample evidence 
of state practice and opinio juris that confi rms the existence of a customary norm on 
solidarity measures. The signifi cance of enforcement of such essential interests, 
but also the window of opportunity left open by the ILC’s reference to the pro-
gressive development of international law on the matter make such detailed 
analysis necessary. 
Truly, the preceding analysis has at times revealed the reluctance of states to 
resort to third-state countermeasures in the absence of relevant authorization by 
the Security Council. Such was the case when, for instance, US Congress decided 
to impose aviation restrictions against South Africa in response to apartheid. In 
that particular case, the US government was concerned that such a measure 
would be in violation of its obligations towards South Africa and for this reason 
tried, unsuccessfully, to block Congress from applying such countermeasures. The 
EEC had similar reservations in violating its commitments towards Uganda, 
despite the international outcry regarding the atrocities taking place in that coun-
try in the 1970s. The same scepticism was expressed by the EEC in relation to the 
situation in Greece, although this did not eventually prevent the Community from 
taking action in response to the human rights violations there. The UK govern-
ment itself, in fi nally consenting to join other EU member states in taking coercive 
action against the FRY stated that its decision was based on ‘moral and political 
grounds’, implying that it was not acting in the belief that it was acting in accor-
dance with the law, as required by opinio juris. At the same time, the analysis has 
shown that states have often opted to implement coercive but nonetheless lawful 
measures in response to serious violations of fundamental collective interests as 
opposed to countermeasures.
Given this analysis, some concerns exist as to whether certain cases were indeed 
a response to a previous violation of international law and, if so, whether such 
violation concerned an obligation in which a group of states or all states had 
a legal interest. White and Abass have observed in this regard that the state 
practice on which the ILC based its conclusions regarding the lawfulness of 
countermeasures of collective interests does not in all cases reveal a response to a 
violation of an erga omnes obligation.865 Such concerns have been expressed in rela-
tion to the action taken against Poland and the Soviet Union as a result of the 
implementation of martial law in Poland in 1981 or against Haiti in 1991. 
Having said that, the examination provides compelling evidence that in many 
situations states not only did not hesitate to resort to countermeasures in protec-
tion of fundamental collective and community interests, even if no direct injury 
were involved, they also held the belief that this was the only way to induce the 
wrongdoing state to comply with international law. The measures adopted 
865 White and Abass, op. cit., 520.
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against the Dominican Republic, the oil embargo imposed by Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia against the United States for its support to Israel and its aggressive policies 
and the embargo against Uganda provide but a few examples of solidarity mea-
sures. Similarly, the action taken against the Soviet Union for its invasion in 
Afghanistan, the trade restrictions imposed against Nicaragua and the US lifting 
of the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina, provide further evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris in support of the right to solidarity measures. Such 
measures were given effect in violation of specifi c treaty and customary obliga-
tions and in the absence of Security Council authorization. While the consideration 
did not focus on early examples of state practice, the reference to the seizure of 
American vessels engaged in slavery and the freeing of slaves by British authorities 
in the 19th century highlights the point that such practices were not unknown in 
international law and that solidarity measures may already have been recognized 
as a customary right. Similarly, the coercive measures taken by the United States 
against Japan in the early 1940s in response to the latter’s aggressive policies further 
illustrate the point that the concept of solidarity measures is not a contemporary 
development and that practice is not confi ned to that evolved after the end of World 
War II. This is something that is worth further exploration in future studies. 
With the emphasis placed, however, on practice after World War II, it has been 
established that states have frequently resorted to action amounting to counter-
measures in response to serious violations such as the commission of genocide, 
torture, apartheid, terrorism, hostage taking and aggression. While doubts remain 
with respect to the entitlement of states to impose countermeasures in response to 
violations of the right to democratic governance as the analysis concerning the 
action against Haiti has shown, it has been demonstrated that systematic and 
gross violations of fundamental human rights through the abolition of democratic 
rule have given rise to measures of this nature. This is evident from the action 
taken among others against Greece, the Central African Republic, and Liberia. 
Countermeasures have also been resorted to in protection of the right to self-
determination such as the action taken against Portugal and South Africa. In 
addition, reference has been made to instances where states were faced with the 
dilemma of respecting their obligations emanating from fundamental human rights 
norms even in violation of other treaty obligations, such as in cases regarding the 
extradition of individuals to countries where they faced a risk of being subjected to 
torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment. Particularly relevant for the subject 
under consideration is the confl ict that may arise between the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions and obligations concerning the protection of human 
rights, as evident from the recent ruling of the ECJ in Kadi and Al Barakaat. This is 
further illustrated from the United States’ refusal to comply with the Security 
Council mandatory arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The analysis has further demonstrated numerous other instances where states, 
through statements before regional and international bodies, have called for or 
recommended the implementation of countermeasures, even if in the end no action 
were taken to that effect. This has been evident, for instance, from the repeated 
calls made by the General Assembly and the OAU for the implementation of an 
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oil and a total trade embargo against South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Also 
signifi cant are the General Assembly’s calls to impose a trade embargo against 
Portugal and the calls of the EEC to implement a total trade embargo against Iran 
in the Teheran hostage crisis and against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. Evidence 
of state practice and opinio juris can further be deduced from the Bonn Declaration 
concerning action against states that failed to prosecute or extradite individuals 
responsible for aircraft hijacking. The legal signifi cance of these examples should 
by no means be ignored as they support the argument that states have demon-
strated both practice but also their legal belief that such conduct is in accordance 
with the law or is becoming law.866 
Signifi cantly, in many of the cases where states resorted to countermeasures, 
such as when the EEC decided in the 1980s to take action against Argentina, 
Poland or the Soviet Union, the issue of legitimacy under international law was 
never raised as an obstacle by the states resorting to such action. 
An additional factor that needs to be taken into consideration when legally 
assessing these examples is that often the human rights or foreign policy of states 
was drafted in the light of their economic, political or geostrategic interests. This 
consideration has frequently contributed to the reluctance of states to protect 
community values by unilateral peaceful means when these were threatened by 
intransigent states and therefore it should not be construed as evidence of opinio 
juris against the existence of a right to third-state countermeasures.
Moreover, it has been shown that even in those cases where states restricted 
their action to coercive but not unlawful measures, they did so not necessarily 
because they opposed the notion of third-state countermeasures. The legal signifi -
cance of these examples is invaluable as they demonstrate the determination of 
states, even if third parties, to interfere against serious violations of obligations in 
the protection of which they possess a legal interest. States have often resorted to 
retorsion together with countermeasures, resorting to all means at their disposal 
for the safeguard of such fundamental interests. 
In some of the cases referred to earlier, states did not rely on a right to solidarity 
measures but instead used other justifi cations such as fundamental change of cir-
cumstances or national security clauses provided under specifi c treaty arrangements 
such as GATT. It has been shown, however, that, at least in some of these cases, 
a justifi cation on third-state countermeasures was more appropriate. 
Quite signifi cantly, during the discussions before the ILC, the Czech Republic 
pointed out that although institutionalised responses were preferable, it recog-
nized that such was unrealistic for the time being, leaving open the question of a 
unilateral right to third-state countermeasures. 867 Similarly, the Nordic countries 
866 Harris, op. cit., 55–6.
867 On the position of the Nordic Countries see state comments on Draft Article 47 in State 
Responsibility, Comments and Observation received from Governments, ILC, Fiftieth Session, 
A/CN.4/488, 134. Also see Spinedi (1989) op. cit. 70. Interestingly, in 1981 the Federal Republic 
of Germany made the following statement: ‘if rules of international law are violated in the obser-
vation of which the community of States as a whole has a vested interest, third States, although 
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expressed no reservations concerning a right to third-state countermeasures. Quite 
notably, during the early debates concerning the inclusions of the notion of state 
crimes, Australia, the United States, Bulgaria, Indonesia and the Federal Republic 
of Germany did not object the admissibility of countermeasures taken in response to 
violations of this nature.868 
It can therefore be concluded that the state practice as analyzed here is not 
isolated but, on the contrary, has fl ourished through the years, particularly after 
the incorporation of the concept of obligations erga omnes in international legal 
thinking revealing consistency and repetition.869 Accordingly, state practice is nei-
ther ‘sparse’ nor ‘embryonic’. Moreover, it has been illustrated that often such 
practice has been supported by developed as well as developing countries estab-
lishing the general acceptance of a norm permitting for third-state countermeasures. 
This is illustrated by decisions and recommendations of the OAS, by the OAU, by 
the EU and by the League of Arab States.870 Such general and consistent practice 
is evident, for instance, from the numerous occasions of freezing of foreign assets, 
which have also been accompanied by the required opinio juris. Only in a few 
exceptional circumstances have states, when resorting to countermeasures, tried 
to justify their conduct on moral or political reasons and not on legal grounds. On 
the contrary, in most cases states acted bearing in mind that such action would be 
in contravention of their international commitments under GATT, EEC law, 
general international law such as the prohibition of interfering with another state’s 
property or bilateral trade and aviation agreements. It is also not without legal 
signifi cance that in many of the cases discussed earlier, there was no general pro-
test from other states, with few exceptions such as for instance in relation to the 
coercive measures imposed against Argentina during the Falklands. As noted, 
however, such protest was due to the fact that other American states considered 
that Argentina had valid territorial claims over the islands and not because they 
opposed a customary rule on solidarity measures. As noted in this regard, the 
absence of protest is indicative of the legal belief held by these states that such 
conduct was required by law.871 
In conclusion, our analysis has demonstrated extensive evidence of state prac-
tice and opinio juris in support of a right to take countermeasures by states other 
than the injured as an integral part of customary international law. 
not immediately involved, might well be entitled to take countermeasures or to participate in such 
measures.’ Comments of Governments on part 1 of the draft articles on State responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts, YbILC (1981), vol. II, Part One, 71, 75.
868 State comments on Draft Article 47, ibid, 135.
869 In support of this conclusion, see Tams, op. cit., 232–40; Dawidowicz, op. cit., 408–415.
870 Also see Dawidowicz, ibid, 409–15.
871 Ibid, 358. Furthermore, according to MacGibbon, ‘a protest constitutes a formal objection by 
which the protesting state makes it known that it does not recognize the legality of the acts against 
which the protest is directed, that it does not acquiesce in the situation which such acts have cre-
ated or which they threaten to create, and that it has no intention of abandoning its own rights in 
the premises.’ See, in this regard, I.C. MacGibbon, ‘Some Observations on the Part of Protest in 
International Law’ 30 BYIL (1953) 293, 298.
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7 Conclusion
The concept of solidarity measures has emerged through the necessity of enforc-
ing fundamental interests of international law owed to a group of states collectively 
or to the international community in its entirety.872 Unlike national law where the 
enforcement of its rules is achieved through central institutions and procedures, 
restricting the entitlement of individuals to resort to private means of self-help, the 
international legal order is reliant on such means of self-help, particularly so for 
the protection of interests that it regards as important. Yet, the necessity of enforc-
ing such fundamental interests has stumbled on the admittedly justifi ed fears that 
recognition of a right to countermeasures by states other than the injured will be 
open to abuse.873 Such fears, however, should not be allowed to suppress contem-
porary developments on the matter, as the fear of arbitrary use of international 
law is inherent in all aspects of state affairs without placing a halt on the creation 
of new norms. Moreover, any discussion on solidarity measures must take into 
account the conditions of their lawfulness and, therefore, any claim of a state that 
it is acting in protection of collective and community interests must always be 
assessed within that legal framework. Accordingly, the state that abuses the right 
to solidarity measures will be itself the subject of international responsibility, with 
all the legal consequences that this entails. 
Quite signifi cantly, the practice examined in this chapter has demonstrated that 
states have on numerous occasions responded to serious violations of obligations 
with an erga omnes and erga omnes partes effect, an important requirement for the 
lawfulness of conduct of such nature.874 Nevertheless, while this element is neces-
sary to prevent abuse and further confl ict in interstate relations, it is submitted 
that it is inherent in some types of wrongful act, such as those concerning the vio-
lation of peremptory norms of international law, including, for instance, the 
commission of genocide, aggression, slavery and apartheid.875 The seriousness of 
a wrongful act will, however, be necessary to ensure that states do not resort 
872 K. Frahm, ‘Comment: The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights’, 30 ARV (1992) 34; 
G. Gaja, ‘Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of 
Three Related Concepts’ in Weiler, Cassese and Spinedi (1989) op. cit., 155–6; Elagab, op.cit. 
T. Meron, ‘International Law in the age of Human Rights’, 301 RdC (2003) 296; Annacker, op. 
cit., 160; J. Delbruck (ed.), ‘The Impact of the Allocation of International Law Enforcement 
Authority on the International Legal Order’ in Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International 
System (1995) 152–3. 
873 D.N. Hutchinson, ‘Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties’, 59 BYIL (1988) 151, 202.
874 Dawidowicz, op. cit., 347. Also see, in this regard, J. Frowein, ‘Collective Enforcement of 
International Obligations’, 47 ZaoRV (1987) 77; C. Dominice, ‘The International Responsibility 
of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations’, 10 EJIL (1999) 360–61; C. Hillgruber, ‘The 
Right of Third States to take Countermeasures’ in C. Tomuschat and J.M. Thouvenin (eds) 
The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (2006) 268; 
Sicilianos (2002), op. cit., 1127; Alland, op. cit., 1221. 
875 Also see discussion in Chapter 2. 
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to such powerful means whenever isolated violations of fundamental interests 
occur. 
The analysis in the preceding sections has demonstrated that a customary 
rule concerning a right to countermeasures by not directly injured states for the 
protection of collective interests has evolved in international law. This has been 
achieved through general, consistent and continuous practice, accompanied by 
the necessary opinio juris, opening the way for the effective enforcement of funda-
mental collective legal interests. While the foregoing analysis does not exhaust the 
topic, it provides concrete evidence, contrary to the conclusions of the ILC, that 
states have often exerted economic, trade and other non-forcible pressure against 
those that have infringed obligations owed either to a group of states collectively 
or to the international community as a whole. This work comes to complement 
the existing literature on the matter and also to enrich this with further analysis 
and more examples that give rise to a claim regarding the customary character of 
the right to solidarity measures.
While the analysis so far focused on the emergence of fundamental interests in 
international legal theory, practice and the jurisprudence, attention will next focus 
on the interrelationship between the right to solidarity measures and obligations 
arising from other legal, so-called special and self-contained regimes.
4 Self-contained regimes, 
solidarity measures and 
the fragmentation of 
international law
1 Introduction
The discussion so far has demonstrated that the recognition of fundamental com-
munity interests and interests owed to a group of states has been closely interlinked 
with issues relating to their enforcement, either through initiating proceedings before 
judicial bodies or through the implementation of countermeasures. Having estab-
lished in particular the existence of a customary rule that permits the enforcement of 
such interests through countermeasures by states that have suffered no direct injury, 
it will be considered next whether such right may be imperilled by alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms provided under specifi c treaties or so-called self-contained regimes. 
In other words, this chapter will consider the question of whether states may contract 
out from the enforcement of obligations erga omnes under general international law by 
concluding special agreements that preclude the intrusion of enforcement mecha-
nisms other than those, and for the reasons, specifi cally provided under them.
In recent years, international law has come face to face with a wide, both in 
scope and content, expansion of primary and secondary norms, a proliferation of 
general and special legal regimes and a growing number of international judicial 
bodies entrusted with the duty to resolve disputes arising in the international legal 
arena. In a highly anarchical society such as the international one, such growth of 
norms, regimes and institutions could not but be welcomed as promoting and 
enhancing the rule of international law. Yet the ability of these special or self-
contained regimes, to promote through their own institutions and mechanisms 
respect for their own norms, has not toned down voices of concern and scepticism 
with respect to their position in the framework of general international law. 
In the course of this analysis, it will be shown that states may be faced with a 
confl ict of norms or a confl ict of enforcement mechanisms emanating from differ-
ent legal regimes, restricting their ability to implement countermeasures under 
general international law and, subsequently, their ability to safeguard community 
and collective interests. 
The scope of the present chapter is accordingly focused on the relationship 
between lex specialis and lex generalis enforcement regimes, with particular emphasis 
placed on the position of self-contained regimes within the general system of inter-
national law viewed from two different perspectives. 
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First, whether such self-contained regimes preclude totally or partially the 
application of the general rules on state responsibility for the violation of their 
rules, thus permitting only the remedies expressly provided for by such regimes. 
Second, and more signifi cantly, whether a violation of a rule of general interna-
tional law, for example, a violation of a jus cogens norm or an obligation erga omnes, 
may justify countermeasures through the non-performance of obligations estab-
lished within such specifi c regimes. As already seen in Chapter 3, concerning state 
practice in support of solidarity measures, states have frequently disregarded their 
obligations emanating from specifi c agreements or self-contained regimes in 
response to serious violations of community and collective interests. This has often 
been the subject of criticism as endangering the unity and coherence of interna-
tional law. The dilemma for the state here is clear: to observe its legal undertakings 
under a specifi c agreement at the expense of fundamental community interests or 
interests established for the collective good of a group of states or to infringe its 
treaty commitments for the purpose of safeguarding such interests. In the former 
case, the state is in compliance with international law; in the latter, it is at least 
prima facie, in apparent violation of it.
The question gains particular signifi cance in the context of the WTO due to 
the rapidly and widely increasing trade areas covered by its agreements, thus 
leaving little space for the application of countermeasures under general interna-
tional law. Similarly, questions are raised with respect to the integrity of the 
international legal system as such since while a certain conduct may be justifi ed 
under general rules, it may be prohibited under others. International judicial 
bodies may also reach, as they have done so in the past, different legal conclusions 
on similar facts threatening in this manner legal security, but also consistency 
in terms of equal application of the law. Finally, states may be faced with interna-
tional responsibility for conduct that while unlawful under one set of rules, it is 
justifi ed under others. 
In the light of the signifi cance of countermeasures in general, but also of coun-
termeasures in the collective interest in particular as means of international legal 
enforcement, the interrelationship of secondary rules emanating from different 
legal regimes is of great relevance and, therefore, it will be considered thoroughly 
in the following sections. 
However, before looking in depth into the question of the relationship between 
specifi c and general enforcement legal regimes, it is necessary to examine the 
interaction, if any, between the law on state responsibility and the law on treaties 
as both constituting leges generales. This consideration will assist in the comprehen-
sion of how the legal consequences that arise from the law on state responsibility, 
such as countermeasures complement the rules emanating from the law of 
treaties. It will further clarify the legal basis on which state action may rely on 
enhancing in this way the integrity of the rule of law. This is particularly so since, 
as the analysis in the previous chapter has shown, states have often attempted to 
justify their conduct on grounds emanating interchangeably from the law on trea-
ties and the law on state responsibility. It is, therefore, timely to consider the 
interaction between these two fi elds of international law and to consider under 
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what circumstances state responsibility, and countermeasures in particular, may 
be resorted to as opposed to consequences emanating from the law of treaties.
2  Relationship between the law on treaties and the law 
on state responsibility 
The relationship between the law on treaties and the law on state responsibility 
was thoroughly dealt with in the dispute that broke out between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case.876 The dispute evolved around 
claims concerning the implementation of an agreement entered by the two states 
in 1977 for the construction and operation of a system of barrage and locks on that 
part of the Danube shared by them as both international river and boundary.877 
The project provided for the construction and installation of two hydroelectric 
power plants on the Hungarian Nagymaros sector, on the one hand, and on the 
Czechoslovakian Gabčikovo sector, on the other, and consisted of a large indivis-
ible complex of installations and structures that had to be implemented in an 
integrated and joint manner. In view of increasing environmental concerns at a 
domestic level, the Hungarian government decided in May 1989 to suspend and 
fi nally abandon the works at the Nagymaros sector and those works at Gabčikovo 
attributed to it, notwithstanding that, by that time the works at Gabčikovo had to 
a great extent been completed, the works at Nagymaros had hardly begun.878 
In 1991 Czechoslovakia, in response to Hungary’s decision adopted an alterna-
tive project known as ‘the provisional solution’, otherwise known as Variant C. This 
latter plan provided for the diversion of the River Danube within Czechoslovakia’s 
boundaries without Hungary’s consent. As a result, in 1992, before the actual oper-
ation of Variant C, Hungary announced the termination of the 1977 Treaty existing 
between the two countries. The work on the damming of the Danube was com-
pleted a few months after Hungary’s denunciation of the Treaty, resulting in 
signifi cant reduction of water fl ow.879 
The fact that Hungary and Czechoslovakia were not legally bound by the 1969 
VCLT when they signed the 1977 Treaty notwithstanding, and in the absence of 
specifi c provisions under the latter treaty concerning denunciation or withdrawal, 
the Court held that the conduct of the two parties should be evaluated under the 
scope of Articles 60–62 of the VCLT. These articles refl ect existing customary 
rules of international law and they are therefore binding on the two states. At the 
same time, the Court called for consideration of the two parties’ conduct under 
the law on state responsibility.
876 Case Concerning the Gabč ikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997) op.cit., 7.
877 Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros System of 
Locks, 16 September 1977, 32 ILM (1993) 1247. 
878 D. Reichert-Facilides, ‘Down the Danube: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
the Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project’ 47 ICLQ (1998) No. 4, 837, 838–9.
879 Ibid, 839–40. 
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Hungary’s unwillingness to comply with some of its treaty obligations unavoid-
ably made the completion of the project impossible,880 however, it was justifi ed on 
reasons of ecological necessity that had forced Hungary to initially suspend and 
abandon certain works of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project and fi nally terminate 
its treaty with Czechoslovakia. In this regard, the Court held that this ground 
should be viewed under the scope of the law on state responsibility according to 
which necessity, if proven as existent, would preclude the responsibility of the 
defaulting state on the international plane. Nevertheless, since this ground was 
invoked in an attempt to justify the suspension and termination of the 1977 treaty, 
reference to the law of treaties was unavoidable. 
Concerned about a possible misconception between the two branches of inter-
national law when evaluating the legality of the suspension or termination of a 
treaty as in the present case, the Court wished to draw a distinguishing line 
between the law on treaties and the law on state responsibility. 
Accordingly, while the law on treaties determines, inter alia, whether a treaty is in 
force and the grounds on which a treaty may lawfully be suspended or terminated, 
the law on state responsibility evaluates the legal consequences to derive as a result 
of unlawful suspension or termination of the treaty,881 in the absence of any agree-
ment to the contrary. In other words: ‘[W]hile once conduct incompatible with the 
law of treaties has been established, potential ensuing responsibility should be 
assessed according to the law on state responsibility.’882 This is in accordance with 
Article 73 of the 1969 VCLT according to which ‘the provisions of the present 
Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty 
from a succession of States or from the international responsibility of a State or from 
the outbreak of hostilities between States.’ While the 1969 VCLT is concerned with 
the genesis of a treaty obligation, its very existence, content and its subjects, it does 
not provide rules concerning compliance with it. Rather, the issue of conformity 
with customary or conventional rules is covered by the general rules on state respon-
sibility. As Professor Crawford concludes, the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
provide ‘the general secondary law of international obligations, in the same way 
that the Vienna Convention provides the general secondary law of treaties’.883 
Against this background and with respect to Hungary’s claim for the existence 
of environmental necessity, the Court highlighted that necessity, falling within the 
scope of state responsibility, could not validly be invoked as a reason for the sus-
pension or termination of the 1977 Treaty. In this regard, the Court stressed that 
a treaty may only be terminated or suspended for one of the reasons referred to 
in Articles 60–62, namely, for material breach, impossibility of performance or 
880 Case Concerning the Gabč ikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997), op.cit., (48). 
881 Ibid (47). 
882 K. Wellens, ‘The Court’s Judgment Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia): Some preliminary refl ections’ in Wellens (1998), op. cit., 768.
883 Crawford (2000), op. cit.
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fundamental change of circumstances.884 These articles provide an exhaustive list 
of the circumstances under which a treaty may be lawfully terminated or sus-
pended. Possible acceptance of additional grounds for the lawful suspension and 
termination of treaties other than those already provided could put at risk ‘the 
security of treaty regimes’.885 Consequently, Hungary could not invoke necessity 
as a ground for the termination or even suspension of the 1977 Treaty and, as a 
result, this ground was dismissed. 
A justifi ed invocation of a state of necessity could, however, be used as a ground 
for precluding state responsibility for the temporary non-performance of treaty 
obligations and for as long as necessity existed. Accordingly, the only effect that 
necessity may have is that it makes the treaty ineffective and ‘dormant, but – 
unless the parties by mutual agreement terminate the Treaty – it continues to 
exist. As soon as the state of necessity ceases to exist, the duty to comply with 
treaty obligations revives.’886 Accordingly, although non-performance of a treaty 
obligation may look like suspension, it is not. 
While Hungary’s suspension or termination of its treaty with Czechoslovakia 
could not rely on necessity, its decision to suspend certain works of the project 
could be justifi ed under the state of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrong-
fulness provided under the law on state responsibility. Nevertheless, Hungary 
would still be legally bound to perform its treaty obligations as soon as the state of 
necessity ceased to exist.887 
This is the main difference between suspension and termination of a treaty, on 
the one hand, and non-performance of treaty obligations, on the other. In the 
former case, the treaty ceases to have legal effects and to be in force, whereas in the 
case of non-performance the treaty remains legally binding on all the parties 
involved that still have to resume their obligations as soon as the ground precluding 
wrongfulness vanishes. As Professor Crawford noted on the matter, the existence of 
circumstances precluding the international responsibility of a state, such as neces-
sity or countermeasures, render, for as long as they persist, the international 
obligation ‘inoperative’.888 Yet, the obligation does not cease to exist, a point that 
has often been highlighted as of great signifi cance. In the words of Fitzmaurice:
some of the grounds justifying non-performance of a particular treaty obliga-
tion are identical with some of those causing or justifying the termination of a 
treaty. Yet … the two subjects are quite distinct, if only because in the case of 
termination … the treaty ends altogether, while in the other [case] … it does 
not in general do so, and (if a paradox is permissible) the non-performance 
884 Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997) op. cit., (47). 
885 P. Okawa, ‘International Court of Justice: Recent Cases, Case concerning the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)’ 47 ICLQ (1998) 688, 692.
886 Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997) op. cit., (101). 
887 Ibid. 
888 Second Report on State Responsibility (Crawford) Addendum 2, op. cit., (222)
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is not only justifi ed, but “looks towards” a resumption of performance so soon as 
the factors causing and justifying the non-performance are no longer present.889
Zoller observes in this regard that while suspension or termination has, as a result 
the cessation of the legal effects of the treaty (and in the case of suspension for as 
long as this situation is persistent), non-performance does not result to the same 
effect. She illustrates this difference with an example. Accordingly, whenever a 
treaty is suspended the interest stops running, while in non-performance the inter-
est continues to be calculated.890 
Moreover, it has been very characteristically pointed out that: 
by confi rming that the consequences of illegal termination, and in particular 
whether they could be excused, had to be determined by reference to the law 
of State Responsibility, the judgment implicitly lays to rest some of the argu-
ments that had been advanced in the literature that States parties to the 
Vienna Convention had forfeited the right to rely on the broader excuses 
precluding wrongfulness under the law of state responsibility.891
In addition to this, the 1969 VCLT confi rms, rather than deviates from, customary 
international law and, consequently, a state may still rely on principles of customary 
international law, complementary to any other treaty provisions that may be appli-
cable, and even if such principles are not expressly provided by a given treaty. This 
can take the form of retaliatory measures such as the temporary non-performance 
of specifi c treaty obligations, by reference to the rules on state responsibility.892 
It can therefore be concluded that the law on treaties and the law on state 
responsibility, although different in nature and different in scope, are not com-
pletely unrelated. More specifi cally, the two branches of international law, the 
rules of which are ‘of the utmost signifi cance for the overall functioning of inter-
national law’, should not be interpreted in a ‘counterproductive way’, but on the 
contrary, must be construed as coexisting in harmony.893 
In this regard, the Court should follow an integrative approach in relation to 
these different branches of law and such an attempt should not be rendered 
impossible by the mere existence of Article 73 of the VCLT. In support of this 
position and as evident from the analysis in Chapter 3, states often try to justify the 
breach of their international obligations in the light of the law on treaties and 
the law on state responsibility.894 Accordingly, it seems that it is not really possible 
889 Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties (Fitzmaurice), op. cit., 41 in Second Report on State 
Responsibility (Crawford) Addendum 2, op. cit.,(224).
890 Zoller, op. cit., 89.
891 Okawa (1998), op. cit., 692.
892 Zoller, op. cit., 92–3.
893 Wellens, ‘The Court’s Judgment Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia): Some preliminary refl ections’ in Wellens (1998), op. cit., 793.
894 Ibid, 794. 
216 The problem of enforcement in international law
to separate the law on treaties from the law on state responsibility. With this 
in mind:
the law on State responsibility not only ‘touches and interacts’ with other 
branches of general international law, but constitutes the decisive body of 
rules governing non-compliance with any other legal obligation, and thus 
‘permeates’ all sets of general, conventional and customary primary rules. 
The law on state responsibility occupies a quasi-constitutional place in the 
international legal order.895
Furthermore, the fact that two (or more) states decide to conclude a treaty means 
that this treaty will apply in their relations as lex specialis, regulating their rights and 
their obligations. Nevertheless, the existence of a treaty between two parties does 
not exclude the application of other branches of international law. As the ICJ held 
in its 1971 Namibia Opinion, ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and 
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of 
the interpretation … the corpus iuris gentium has been considerably enriched, and 
this the Court, if it is faithfully to discharge its functions, may not ignore.’896 This 
is further explored later. 
Nevertheless, according to some authors, the decision of the Court in the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case to adopt a strict interpretation in relation to the grounds 
allowed for the suspension or termination of a treaty sacrifi ced ‘substantive justice’ 
over ‘legal security’. The former may call for the possibility to introduce new 
grounds under which a treaty may be suspended or terminated other than those 
already provided in Articles 60–62 of the Convention. As the supporters of this 
opinion argue, this becomes even more compelling in cases where the continu-
ance of a treaty imposes a particularly heavy burden on the treaty parties.897
Nevertheless, the analysis here illustrates that the two branches of international law 
complement one another, creating legal harmony and outlining clearly the legal 
boundaries of state conduct. This is particularly signifi cant in evaluating the legality 
of certain state action that amounts to countermeasures under the law on state respon-
sibility and which must be distinguished from other possible legal justifi cations.
3  Lex specialis, self-contained regimes 
and general international law
Now that the interrelation of the law on state responsibility and the law on treaties 
has been clarifi ed, it is imperative to examine the interrelation between the law on 
state responsibility and the law on treaties as leges generales, on the one hand, and 
specifi c legal regimes, on the other. 
895 Ibid.
896 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, op. cit., 31–32 (53).
897 Reichert-Facilides, op. cit., 842; Okawa (1998), op. cit., 692.
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The issue raises interesting questions since the incorporation of collective and 
community interests in the main body of international law, as elaborated in 
Chapters 1 and 2 has not prevented states from still possessing a pivotal role in the 
formulation of international norms, including rules on enforcement. As already 
noted in Chapter 1 in this regard, ‘international law is a law of cooperation, not 
subordination’ founded on state consent. Since each state determines what the law 
binding on it will be the international legal system consists of multiple legal rela-
tionships that vary in scope and content according to the states involved.898 
In an inherently pluralistic society such as the international one, seeking ulti-
mate unity in the law generally and in the law of enforcement particularly is 
perhaps an untenable goal.899 For this purpose, the system has enacted procedures 
of dispute resolution and interpretative methods whenever a confl ict between 
norms or obligations occurs, such as the general principle that the posterior rule 
prevails over an earlier one. What is more, in this system, states are entitled to 
enter into specifi c agreements in deviation from the general rules of international 
law, such as the law on state responsibility or the law on treaties, and which 
although may reinforce and strengthen the rights of states, they may often create 
a legal regime that essentially affords states weaker protection. It is therefore well 
established in international law that even though such agreements may not infringe 
jus cogens norms, the lex specialis rule will prevail over the lex generalis.900 
Often, the specifi c rule is seen within the general legal framework within which 
it exists and as an elaboration of the general rules. At other times, however, the 
specifi c rule is incompatible with the general rules that it sets aside.901 
It has, therefore, long been recognized that states, when entering into agree-
ments may choose to specify the legal consequences to derive from the infringement 
of their obligations under such agreements or even to set up their own dispute 
settlement procedures and establish their own enforcement mechanisms. This 
may be so even in derogation not only of the general rules of the law on treaties 
concerning the suspension and termination of treaties, but also of the general rules 
of the international responsibility of states. Therefore, these specifi c regimes, irre-
spective of whether customary or conventional, often complement, substitute or 
depart from general provisions.902 
The lex specialis maxim has its roots in the widely consensual structure of 
international law and on the fact that general international law is ‘dispositive’, 
898 J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we go?’ 95 AJIL 
(2001) 535, 536.
899 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006), op. cit., (16).
900 Ibid. (56).
901 Ibid, (56–7).
902 Pellet, op. cit., 56. Obligations of a specifi c character are usually established by treaties, although 
even a special custom could prevail over a general rule established by treaty. See, in this regard, 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-sixth Session, 3 May to 
4 June and 5 July to 6 August, 2004 (A/59/10), 288 (313).
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construed as meaning that it can largely be derogated from.903 The lex specialis has 
also been used as a means for the resolution of norm confl icts904 and as a ‘tech-
nique of legal reasoning’ that aims to bring legal certainty and clarity into the 
relations among states.905
The lex specialis rule raises signifi cant questions as to how it relates with general 
rules of international law. This is particularly important as international law con-
sists of several general and specifi c legal regimes establishing certain rights and 
imposing specifi c obligations that are often independent from one another and 
which stand autonomously in the international legal order. While the norms of 
these separate legal regimes frequently interact and seem to be complementary, 
sometimes they collide. Of course, specifi c rules do not exist in a legal hole, on the 
contrary, they must be interpreted taking into consideration the legal framework 
within which they exist and operate.906 
Yet, there is little said about the possible dangers from confl icts arising with 
respect to irreconcilable norms of international law belonging to different legal 
regimes and on which different legal consequences may apply. 
Within the deliberations of the ILC on the codifi cation of state responsibility, 
Mr Riphagen made the point that international law is separated between various 
interrelated subsystems in accordance to the function that each one of them fulfi ls. 
A treaty may establish a distinctive subsystem with its own secondary rules to be 
set in motion whenever its provisions are infringed by any of the parties and which 
cannot be overruled by other subsystems. The existence of such a treaty subsys-
tem, however, does not necessarily preclude the application of the rules of 
customary international law regarding the international responsibility of states. 
This is so because the treaty subsystem may itself collapse, ‘in which case a fall-
back on another subsystem may be unavoidable’.907 
On the same footing, the study group looking into the question of fragmenta-
tion of international law, discussed further later, described general international 
law as ‘omnipresent’ existing behind special rules and regimes.908 Nevertheless: 
the interrelationship between the subsystems may be complicated by the 
fact that a particular set of actual circumstances may be relevant for more 
than one subsystem. Here the measure of organization of the relationship 
becomes particularly important: if it is not possible to allocate the situation 
to one or the other system, the more organized system prevails until it fails 
as such.909
903 Report of the International Law Commission (2004), ibid, 286 (309).
904 Ibid, 285 (305).
905 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006), op. cit., (119).
906 Ibid, (120).
907 Third Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen) op. cit., 30–31, (54).
908 Report of the International Law Commission (2004) op. cit., 287 (311).
909 Third Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen) op. cit., 30–31 (54).
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While it is possible that the same wrongful act violates rules belonging to different 
subsystems and therefore a combination between these subsystems and their legal 
consequences may be unavoidable,910 diffi culty seems to arise whenever a specifi c 
conduct is lawful under a certain legal regime or subsystem and unlawful under 
another. It is to the interrelationship of the various legal systems existent in the 
international arena and the various legal consequences to emerge therefrom that 
attention is next turned to, with particular emphasis given on the implementation 
of countermeasures under the general law on state responsibility within specifi c or 
self-contained regimes. 
First, however, it is essential to consider what ‘self-contained’ regimes are. The 
term, which is understood to express a subcategory of lex specialis,911 appeared in 
the ruling of the ICJ in the dispute that broke out between Iran and the United 
States in relation to the seizure of the US Embassy and its diplomatic and consular 
staff in Teheran. In the proceedings initiated by the United States before the 
Court, the Iranian government tried to defend itself and justify the events in the 
embassy by relying on alleged previous interventions in Iranian internal affairs by 
the United States, such as the latter’s involvement in the coup d’état of 1953 and the 
overthrow of the lawful national government. Nevertheless, the Court rejected 
this argument, stressing that no countermeasures were permissible in the fi eld of 
diplomatic relations for the violation of a norm of the same kind. The only coun-
termeasures that could be resorted to were those provided for by diplomatic law 
itself and, in particular, that of declaring a diplomat or a consular offi cial as persona 
non grata, the breaking off of the diplomatic relations and the closure of the 
mission. While the sending state has an obligation under general international law 
to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and not to interfere in its 
domestic affairs, the violation of these obligations does not justify a similar response 
in disregard of the privileges and immunities accorded by diplomatic law by the 
receiving state. According to the Court:
[T]he rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime 
which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving State’s obligations regarding 
the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions 
and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission 
and specifi es the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any 
such abuse. These means are by their very nature, entirely effi cacious.912
Here, the notion of self-contained regimes is understood as a set of specifi c legal 
consequences applicable in the relations between two (or more) states as opposed 
to the general consequences provided under the law on state responsibility. 913 
910 Ibid, 32 (69).
911 Report of the International Law Commission (2004), op. cit., 288 (314).
912 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, op. cit., 40.
913 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006) op. cit., (124).
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The same holds true in relation to human rights treaties according to which one 
state cannot rely on human rights violations committed by another member state 
as justifi cation for its own failure to meet its human rights commitments.
According to the classical perception of international law regarding ‘self-contained’ 
regimes, a regime is autonomous from international law if it meets two conditions. 
First, that its norms should not be applied or relied on by other institutions existing 
outside the regime and, second, that it is ‘self-suffi cient’ in the sense that it does not 
need to rely on any other rules apart from the ones incorporated in it.914 This seems 
to refer to a wider understanding of self-contained regimes as providing a thorough 
system of primary and secondary rules, with their own dispute settlement bodies and 
procedures.915 Whether, however, a truly self-contained regime, in total indepen-
dence from general international law may exist will be questioned. 
The term appeared also in the work of the ILC on the codifi cation of the law on 
state responsibility. Mr Riphagen, who often used the terms self-contained and 
objective regimes or subsystems in parallel, made a distinction between general 
consequences of internationally wrongful acts and those included within special 
regimes. The legal consequences emanating from the law on state responsibility, 
including the right to countermeasures would be applicable to every internation-
ally wrongful act, ‘except to the extent that the legal consequences of such a breach 
are prescribed by the rule or rules of international law establishing the obligation 
or by other applicable rules of international law’.916 The lex specialis would prevail 
over the lex generalis, leaving only a residual role for the latter, meaning that in the 
event that the subsystem collapses or does not contain an adequate regime of legal 
consequences, the general rules will take over.917 
Simma, on his part, describes a self-contained regime as one that precludes 
‘more or less totally the application of the general legal consequences of wrongful 
acts, in particular the application of the countermeasures normally at the disposal 
of an injured party’.918 
If this is the case, then the need to narrow down as much as possible the exis-
tence of such regimes becomes apparent as the enforcement of international law 
would otherwise be severely jeopardized, especially with respect to violations that 
do not fall within the scope of these specifi c regimes. Moreover, the need to resort 
to unilateral measures provided by general international law becomes even more 
pressing in the event that the wrongdoer fails to comply with the decisions of the 
institutions provided under the ‘special regime’ or where the violation persists 
despite the initiation of the regime’s proceedings. 
914 T. Melescanu, ‘The European Union and the General International Law’, available at http://
ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiintePOL/recenzie/7.htm
915 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006) op. cit., (128).
916 Third Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 27.
917 In B. Simma, ‘Self-contained Regimes’ 16 NYIL (1985) 111, 116.
918 Ibid, 117 (emphasis added). Also see L. Bartels, ‘Article XX of GATT and the Problem of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights’ 
36 (2) Journal of World Trade (2002) 394, fn 160.
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In such an event, the affected state will be able to resort to action permitted 
under international law in order to secure and protect its rights and legal interests. 
Nevertheless, according to Mr Arangio-Ruiz, such ‘external’ measures not pro-
vided under the regime should be regarded as exceptional and to be only directed 
against wrongful acts of such gravity that put in danger principles highly valued.919 
Due to these considerations, Mr Arangio-Ruiz, adopting a different line from the 
former Special Rapporteur Mr Riphagen, preferred not to include in the draft 
articles on state responsibility ‘special’ restrictions on measures affecting obliga-
tions deriving from self-contained regimes. The general principles regarding the 
legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act should be able to resolve any 
issue to be arisen from treaties establishing ‘self-contained’ regimes. This was 
even so, whenever the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act 
‘were determined by other rules of international law’.920 Mr Arangio Ruiz 
defended this position on the ground that states, by introducing such special 
regimes aimed not to diminish the already existing mechanisms of protection, but 
rather to reinforce them. 921
The ability of states still to rely on the general rules on state responsibility, 
including their right under customary international law to resort to countermea-
sures, even if they conceded their sovereign rights in the interest of specifi c or 
self-contained regimes, is of particular signifi cance for the purposes of this exami-
nation. It has been demonstrated earlier that the establishment of such regimes 
cannot entirely extinguish the general framework of international law and the 
general rules on state responsibility, which remain in the background.
It is for this reason that the term ‘self-contained regimes’ has been criticized as 
imprecise as no regime can be seen in isolation from general international law as, 
fi rst, the latter plays a determinative normative role in the creation of such regimes 
and, second, it becomes active again whenever the special regime collapses.922 
Professor Dupuy supports the view that the doctrine about self-contained 
regimes is misleading.923 Okafor-Obasi adds that a self-contained regime is a 
system created by a group of sovereign states in terms of full equality, which pro-
vides its own rules concerning implementation, enforcement and other remedies. 
Due, however, to the equality of treaty and customary norms, states may resort to 
measures provided under either fi eld, namely conventional or customary interna-
tional law in order to remedy a violation. Even more so, a state may eventually 
resort to general international law if such system fails. For these reasons, no system 
under international law can genuinely be regarded as ‘self-sustained’.924 The 
Study Group itself proposed the substitution of the term ‘self-contained’ regimes 
919 Fourth Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz), op. cit., 41 (116).
920 Ibid, 42 (123).
921 Ibid, 42 (123)–(124).
922 Report of the International Law Commission (2004), op. cit., 290 (318–9).
923 M.P. Dupuy, ‘The Danger of Fragmentation or Unifi cation of the International Legal System 
and the International Court of Justice’ 31 N.Y.U.J.Int’l L. & Pol. (1999) 791, 797.
924 Okafor-Obasi, op. cit., 36.
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with that of ‘special’ regimes.925 However, for the avoidance of confusion, the 
analysis that follows refers to such regimes both as ‘self-contained’ and ‘special’, 
highlighting at the same time that they can never be completely detached from the 
general body of international law.
3.1  Application of countermeasures and principles under 
general international law within self-contained regimes 
The analysis that follows aims to highlight how general rules of international law, 
including the rules on state responsibility and countermeasures, may ‘intrude’ self-
contained regimes. Following Simma’s footsteps, the examination focuses on the 
application of general rules by reference to the law on diplomatic immunities, the 
EU and human rights treaties.
3.1.1 The law on diplomatic immunities
It has been noted already that in the Teheran Hostages case, the ICJ precluded the 
implementation of countermeasures within the law on diplomatic immunities. 
Having concluded that the rules on diplomatic immunities established a self-
contained regime, the Court held that the infringement of diplomatic immunities 
and privileges could not be remedied by infringement of the same rules. This con-
clusion was criticized by Simma, according to whom diplomatic law is all about 
reciprocity. Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that the regime on diplomatic 
immunities does not allow their violation by way of countermeasures in response 
to a similar breach nothing can preclude countermeasures in the form of non-
performance of obligations emanating from other fi elds. Consistent with this view, 
diplomatic law can be construed as a self-contained regime only in a narrow sense, 
since it does not preclude the application of other remedies provided under gen-
eral international law but only imposes certain limitations ratione personae and ratione 
materiae.926 As a result, a violation of diplomatic immunities would still entitle a 
state to resort to countermeasures insofar as these are limited by the principle of 
proportionality and they do not violate norms of jus cogens character or humanitar-
ian obligations.927 
3.1.2 The EU as a self-contained regime
It is a common position today that the law under the EU is an autonomous 
legal order that arguably establishes a self-contained regime with its own effective 
925 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006) op. cit., (152) (5).
926 Simma (1985), op. cit., 121.
927 Ibid, 120–1; Also comment by Reuter, Summary Records of the Meetings of the Thirty-sixth 
Session, YbILC (1984) Vol. I., 264 (30); K. Zemanek, ‘The Unilateral Enforcement of International 
Obligations’ 47 ZaoRV (1987) 32, 40.
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judicial and to some extent enforcement mechanisms to deal with violations.928 In 
this context, the ECJ has rejected a right ‘on the part of member States from 
taking justice into their own hands’ through resort to countermeasures by not 
fulfi lling their Community obligations.929 More specifi cally, it has been the persis-
tent position of the ECJ that the member states have forfeited their right to take 
unilateral measures under general international law.930 
Yet, EU treaties do not cease to constitute treaties under international law. 
Therefore, the applicability of the general rules of international law on state 
responsibility and the rules on the law on treaties cannot be entirely precluded 
even with the express will of the member states participating in the Community 
structure. This will gain particular signifi cance in the event that this structure col-
lapses or its own remedies are inadequate to respond to persistent violations of 
Community law. Accordingly, there are authors who support the view that the 
faculté of states to resort to countermeasures under general international law 
remains if the EU enforcement mechanism has been used to no avail. As noted: 
‘Through such a fundamental change of circumstances any treaty system exclud-
ing the applicability of certain general legal consequences and/or countermeasures 
will fall back on the general regime.’931 
As further pointed out by Mr Arangio-Ruiz it should not be concluded that 
whenever a state avails itself of remedies in the context of such self-contained 
regimes, it permanently abandons its rights and faculties of unilateral reaction 
under general international law. Although the state concerned will have primary 
responsibility to use the means awarded to it by the specifi c regime, it will still be 
entitled to utilize the measures provided under general international law. The 
extent to which it may be able to do so will be determined in the light of ‘availabil-
ity and effectiveness of the remedies envisaged by the treaty-based “regime”’.932 
Accordingly, the Community legal order remains part of general international 
law.933 Moreover, the right to countermeasures provided under customary inter-
national law does not cease to exist, particularly whenever the Community 
mechanisms fail to resolve the dispute.934 Consequently, general international law 
in relation to legal consequences is not entirely precluded from applying at a 
928 See, for example, the powers of the Commission under Articles 226–228 EC Treaty and the 
suspension measures against the member state that fails to comply with its Community obliga-
tions under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union; Article 7 (ex Article F.1) of TEU. Treaty 
on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 7 February 1992, 31 ILM (1992) 247.
929 See Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Commission v Kingdom of Belgium, Cases 90 and 
91/63, European Court Reports (1964) 625.
930 See analysis in Fourth Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz) op. cit., 35–6 (98).
931 Simma (1985), op. cit., 127. 
932 Fourth Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz) op. cit., 40 (114).
933 A. Rosas, ‘The European Union and International Dispute Settlement’ in L. Boisson de 
Chazournes, C. Romano and R. Mackenzie (eds) International Organizations and International Dispute 
Settlement: Trends and Prospects (Transnational Publishers, Inc.: 2002) 49, 51.
934 Fourth Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz), op. cit., 36 (100).
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Community level, at least whenever all the other remedies provided for by the 
system have been exhausted without success. 
The fact that the European treaties are not to be read in isolation of general 
international law is further refl ected in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) that now falls within the jurisdiction of the ECJ. More particularly, 
Article 6(1) provides that the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, common to all the member 
states, constitute the foundation of the EU. Paragraph 2 of the same article pro-
vides that the respect of human rights as safeguarded by the European Convention 
on Human Rights and, by the common constitutional principles of the member 
states, constitute general principles of Community law. Hence, it is demonstrated 
that EU law is not to be read in isolation from other fundamental principles of 
general international law. The signifi cance of this provision, especially of para-
graph 1, is further refl ected in Article 7 TEU, which provides that if the principles 
covered under paragraph 1 are infringed by any member state then the European 
Council may decide to suspend some of the rights deriving from the TEU. Some 
authors have argued that this enhances the argument regarding the ‘self-
containment’ of the Community legal order. Nevertheless, the connotation of 
Article 7 with Article 6(1) is of great signifi cance since it reveals that the action taken 
by member states is not monitored ‘solely within the context of Community law, 
but against the broader background of international human rights principles’.935
As the analysis in Chapter 3 reveals, the EU on a number of occasions has 
reacted to ‘external’ violations, such as the violation of the rule prohibiting the use 
of armed force or the violation of human rights commitments, through non-
performance of obligations emanating from Community law. Such was the case 
against Argentina in the 1980s, Greece in the 1970s and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
The intrusion of secondary rules under the general law on state responsibility at 
Community level is further evidenced from the measures implemented by the 
United Kingdom against Argentina during the Falklands crisis. In this instance, 
while the UK action was in violation of obligations arising under Community law, 
none of the other member states protested or claimed that such obligations pre-
vailed over a right to self-defence, or even countermeasures, under general 
international law. This weakens the argument that the application of countermea-
sures other than those expressly provided under the EU or for reasons that fall 
outside the Community context is entirely excluded 
A state party to a self-contained regime, such as the EU, cannot be expected to 
continue performance of its obligations towards a wrongdoing state on the ground 
that the regime provides only for limited justifi cations of non-performance or sus-
pension relating only to violations of obligations arising under that specifi c regime. 
Alternatively, this would amount to imposing a duty to that state to trade with the 
935 A. Rosas, ‘The European Union and International Human Rights Instruments’ in 
V. Kronenberger (ed.) The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? 
(T.M.C. Asser Press: 2001) 53, 60.
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occupier of its territory or with the violator of its rights and its interests as these are 
widely construed. 
Finally, the intrusion of general international law, including customary rules, 
into Community law was clearly indicated in the Racke case.936 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the ECJ relied on the customary rule of fundamental change of cir-
cumstances to justify a Community regulation that was in violation of the 1983 
Agreement concluded between the EEC and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
3.1.3 Human rights treaties
While certain human rights treaties provide adequate enforcement mechanisms 
to remedy any violation of their provisions, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights offers one such example, most treaties, especially those in the UN 
context, lack a compulsory sanctioning or enforcement mechanism. Hence, the 
implementation of such treaties relies on the discretion of their member states. 
Quite distinct is the problem of enforcement of human rights norms through 
the implementation of countermeasures by non-performance of rights and obliga-
tions emanating from such human rights regimes. The European Convention on 
Human Rights, for instance, makes clear that countermeasures of reciprocal 
nature are precluded as the Convention creates a series of objective obligations.937 
This would apply to most human rights treaties that establish integral obligations 
owed to all the other states parties and, therefore, their violation is precluded. 
Accordingly, if countermeasures by not performing obligations arising from such 
human rights treaties are precluded, the question arises as to whether the violation 
of such rules would permit the implementation of remedies that fall outside the 
closed ‘circuit’ of self-contained regimes, and are provided under the law on state 
responsibility. 
Even if such human rights regimes provide for their own secondary rules and 
enforcement mechanisms in the event of violation of their norms, the applicability 
of general enforcement mechanisms would still not be entirely precluded. Simma 
is of the view that if the mechanisms provided in such specifi c regimes, which have 
to be given priority, have been exhausted without the compliance of the violating 
state, then the general rules on state responsibility will come into play to fi ll the 
legal gap. He says in this regard:
It has yet to be proved that such a ‘decoupling’ of human rights treaties from 
the enforcement processes of general international law was actually intended 
by the negotiating States. As long as such proof is not furnished one has to 
stick to the premise that multilateral treaties for the protection of human 
rights, like all other treaties, embody correlative rights and duties between the 
936 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, (1998), op. cit.
937 Pfunders case, op. cit., 140. 
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contracting parties ut singuli, resulting in a duty on each party to fulfi ll its obli-
gations vis-à-vis all the others, and conversely, in a right for each party to 
demand compliance from every other party and, if necessary, to enforce it 
through countermeasures.938
Similarly, Cassese notes that: 
It would be contrary to the spirit of the whole body of international law on 
human rights to suggest that the monitoring systems envisaged in the Covenant 
and the Protocol should bar States parties from ‘leaving’ the self-contained 
regime contemplated in the Covenant and falling back on the customary law 
system of resort to peaceful countermeasures.939
Consequently, states are not prevented from resorting to the general mechanisms 
of enforcement in relation to human rights treaties, even if these establish ‘self-
contained’ regimes. This is particularly so if under a specifi c regime there is no 
provision for remedies. In such an event, the rules of general international law will 
once again take over.940 However, even when specifi c remedies are provided, the 
specifi c rule does not extinguish the general rule but rather makes it ‘temporarily’ 
and as long as there is agreement to, inoperative. It suspends its effects but only for 
as long as the special rule has not successfully been challenged or disputed. 
Furthermore, Pauwelyn notes in this respect that while states may ‘“contract out” 
of one, more or, in theory, all rules of international law (other than those of jus 
cogens) … they cannot contract out of the system of international law’.941
It was in this context that the PCIJ ruled in the Chorzow Factories case that the 
omission of the parties to a specifi c convention to include an obligation to make 
reparation in the event of an infringement did not preclude such right, as it consti-
tuted a ‘principle of international law’. The Court went further to add that: 
‘Reparation therefore, is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a con-
vention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.’942 
A similar approach was adopted in the Advisory Opinion on the Namibia case 
where the ICJ held that in relation to the right to terminate a treaty nothing could 
preclude the application of a general rule of international law unless specifi cally 
938 Simma (1985), op. cit., 133.
939 A. Cassese, International Law (OUP: 2001) 208.
940 Pauwelyn (2001), op. cit., 541, fn 44. Also, Lauterpacht noted as early as 1949: ‘It is the treaty as 
a whole which is law. The treaty as a whole transcends any of its individual provisions or even the 
sum total of its provisions. For the treaty, once signed and ratifi ed, is more than the expression of 
the intention of the parties. It is part of international law and must be interpreted against the 
general background of its rules and principles’. H. Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and 
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’, 26 BYIL (1949) 48, 76.
941 J. Pauwelyn (2003) Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (CUP: 2003) 37.
942 Chorzow Factories, (Merits), op. cit., 29 P. Mavroidis, ‘Remedies in the WTO Legal System: 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ 11 EJIL (2000) No. 4, 763, 764.
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precluded by a specifi c treaty.943 This position was reaffi rmed in the ELSI case.944 
The Iran–US Claims Tribunal confi rmed this approach by stating that although 
lex specialis would prevail over lex generalis, ‘the rules of customary law may be useful 
in order to fi ll in possible lacunae of the law of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning 
of undefi ned terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and imple-
mentation of its provisions.’945 
The European Court of Human Rights itself has, in many instances, relied on 
general principles of international law in order to fi ll in the legal lacuna and to 
harmonize, to the extent possible, the obligations emanating from the European 
Convention on Human Rights with such rules and principles.946 
In conclusion, human rights treaties, even if they set up their own primary and 
secondary rules and provide for their own dispute settlement and enforcement 
mechanisms, cannot be read in isolation of general international law that continues 
to surround them. This has particular relevance in relation to their enforcement 
through the implementation of countermeasures provided under general interna-
tional law. This is particularly so whenever a state party to such treaties continues to 
engage in gross human rights violations in which case resort to general international 
law is necessary for the cessation of such conduct provided of course that the human 
rights obligations of the state remain intact.947
3.2  Application of countermeasures and principles under 
general international law within the WTO
3.2.1 The WTO example
Compliance with the rules of general international law and the relationship 
between special regimes, on the one hand, and countermeasures, on the other, 
also gains signifi cance in another context, that of the WTO. 
The WTO, a system that provides for specifi c rules and sets up its own dispute 
settlement mechanisms, may deviate, by common agreement of its member states, 
from the 1969 VCLT and the rules on state responsibility. While reliance on non-
WTO law by the WTO judicial panels when interpreting the meaning of 
WTO rules or fi lling procedural gaps is quite a common phenomenon, the 
position differs with respect to the legitimacy of countermeasures within the 
WTO system for violations of obligations outside the system, such as for instance 
943 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, op. cit., 47 (96).
944 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy), Judgment of 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports 
(1989) 15, 47, (96) in Pauwelyn (2001), op. cit., 542.
945 Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v Iran, 15 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports (1987) 189, (112) in Pauwelyn, 
ibid, 541–2, fn 48.
946 See McElhinney v Ireland, No. 31253/96,  Judgment of 21 November 2001, ECHR (2001) XI, (36); 
Al-Adsani v United Kingdom,  No. 35763/97,  Judgment of 21 November 2001, ECHR (2001) XI, 
(55); Fogarty v United Kingdom, No. 37112/97,  Judgment of 21 November 2001, ECHR (2001) XI, 
(36). Also cited in ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006) op. cit., (161–64).
947 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, ibid, (190).
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jus cogens norms or obligations erga omnes. This is specifi cally so in view of the fact 
that a WTO member state may only deviate from its obligations under that treaty 
on grounds of national security and the general exceptions provided under Articles 
XX and XXI of GATT. Otherwise, the uniformity and effectiveness of trade 
regulations would arguably be endangered if member states were entitled to refuse 
to comply with their treaty commitments under the WTO. Counter to this lies the 
view advocated in this book that the effectiveness of enforcement of international 
law in general and of community and other collective interests in particular would 
be substantially undermined if states were not allowed to cease performance of 
their obligations emanating from lex specialis or self-contained regimes. 
Accordingly, controversy exists in relation to whether countermeasures for vio-
lations that fall outside the WTO system by not performing WTO obligations 
should be permissible and could be used as justifi cation. Some authors have 
argued that such countermeasures would be unlawful.948 Others, including this 
author, would argue that such countermeasures would be in accordance with gen-
eral international law and therefore justifi ed. The division in opinion, nevertheless, 
highlights the problem that depending on the forum before which a claim is raised 
the wrongfulness of a certain act, and therefore the responsibility of the state will 
vary, threatening the integrity of the international legal order. 
It must be noted in this regard that the WTO, like other special or self-
contained regimes, is not isolated from the general body of international law, as it 
will be explored further later. Quite signifi cantly, with the increasing competences 
of the WTO in a wide number of areas, precluding resort to countermeasures in 
response to violations not concerning WTO obligations would imperil substan-
tially the enforcement of international law. As already discussed, in a largely 
decentralized legal order such as the international one, countermeasures come as 
a means of private justice and self-help to ensure the compliance of the wrongdo-
ing state with its international obligations. This is of particular gravity whenever 
community and collective interests are at stake.
It remains, therefore, to examine whether the WTO treaty indeed bans the 
application of countermeasures provided under general international law taken 
either in addition to other remedies already provided for by the covered agree-
ments or as an instrument of political and economic coercion for achieving goals 
outside the limited scope of the WTO. For this reason, it is imperative to under-
stand the legal nature of the WTO, its competences and jurisdiction but also the 
enforcement mechanisms provided therein. This will be examined in view of the 
applicable law within the WTO.
3.2.2 Legal nature and jurisdiction of the WTO
The WTO, apart from containing a body of legal rules indicating the rights and 
obligations of its member states, sets up its own enforcement mechanisms and 
948 See analysis in J. Pauwelyn (2003) ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO 
Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ 14 EJIL (2003) No. 5, 907, 945, fn 135.
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dispute settlement procedures. These procedures are contained in the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(hereinafter DSU) and are to be distinguished from those mechanisms that were 
provided under the GATT. In particular, the WTO gives the right to all member 
states to have automatic recourse to the ad hoc judicial panels and the standing 
Appellate Body. These bodies have the power to make legally binding recommen-
dations and suggestions of the way that the state found to be in breach of its WTO 
obligations could bring its acts in conformity with its treaty undertakings and the 
recommendations made by the adjudicating bodies.949 The conclusions of these 
panels may then be veiled with legal effect once they are referred to and adopted 
by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
The DSB is the body before which parties can raise issues relating to the 
implementation of the panels’ reports. The establishment of the panels, the 
adoption of their reports by the DSB and the authorization of retaliation by 
means of trade sanctions have an automatic effect ‘unless there is a consensus 
against it’.950 In other words, the consensus of the member states is not a precondi-
tion for initiating the dispute settlement mechanism. This is considered granted, 
if no state expressly indicates its view to the contrary, thus deviating from 
the regime under GATT which was structured on the basis of the positive consen-
sus rule. 
Furthermore, the DSU makes the dispute settlement mechanism under the 
WTO of a compulsory nature. While under the GATT it was provided that, 
member states ‘may’ authorize the ‘appropriate’ suspension of concessions on the 
ground of the ‘seriousness’ of the circumstances, under Article 22.6 of the DSU 
the DSB is obliged (‘shall’) to grant such authorization for the suspension of con-
cessions or other obligations. This is particularly so whenever the defaulting state 
has failed to comply with and implement the recommendations and rulings 
within the set time limits. Such authorization is not conditional on the ‘serious-
ness’ or the ‘appropriateness’ of the situation, provided that the suspension is 
‘equivalent to the level of the nullifi cation or impairment’ in accordance with 
Article 22.4.951 Furthermore, whenever an infringement is found and no agree-
ment for compensation is reached, the complaining state may seek the 
authorization of the DSU to ‘suspend concessions or other obligations under the 
covered agreements’952 or, in other words, to have recourse to countermeasures 
although this term nowhere appears in the DSU. Once again, the authorization 
to resort to countermeasures (which in the context of the WTO can only be bilat-
eral) is automatic and may only be refused if there is an agreement by the member 
states against such measures.
949 Mavroidis, op. cit., 788.
950 J. Pauwelyn, ‘Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Toward a 
More Collective Approach’ 94 AJIL No. 2 (2000) 335, 336.
951 S. Charnovitz, ‘Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions’ 95 AJIL (2001) Vol. 95 No. 4, 792, 803.
952 Ibid, 792.
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With the inclusion of specifi c procedures and remedies for dealing with viola-
tions of its rules with the ultimate purpose of inducing conformity (as opposed to 
any concept of punishment),953 the WTO is arguably signifi cantly strengthened 
and re-enforced as an autonomous legal order that exists in parallel with other 
regimes provided under international law. 
It is, therefore, not without logic that Article 3.2 of the DSU regards the WTO 
dispute settlement system as a ‘central element in providing security and predict-
ability to the multilateral trading system’, one that protects the rights and 
obligations of its member states. 
Yet different opinions exist in relation to whether WTO member states may 
only resort to the measures provided under the WTO agreements in response to 
violations that incur within the WTO legal order or as to whether WTO member 
states may also resort to measures provided under the law on state responsibility. 
This is distinct from the question of whether states are entitled to take WTO coun-
termeasures in response to external violations, such as for instance the commission 
of genocide, examined later. 
As noted earlier, some authors believe that unless a multilateral treaty sets up a 
self-contained regime or specifi cally provides so, a state is not limited to the mea-
sures and mechanisms provided under the infringed treaty, but may also apply 
‘extra-contractual’ measures. Other authors, contrariwise, reject the idea of imposi-
tion of measures outside the scope of the infringed multilateral treaty. Sachariew, 
for instance, opposes the possibility of application and implementation of measures 
outside those already provided by the infringed treaty as he fi nds it diffi cult to 
understand how such measures would be able to be applied without, or even against, 
the consent of the other members to the treaty. Furthermore, he believes that such 
a possibility would be diffi cult to reconcile with the principle of proportionality if 
each state to the multilateral treaty decided to apply countermeasures ut singuli.954 
With respect to the nature of the WTO, and its relation to other rules of inter-
national law including those concerning enforcement, it has been argued that:
WTO law is a specifi c subsystem of international law with specifi c rights and 
obligations, specifi c claims and causes of action, specifi c violations, specifi c 
enforcement mechanisms and specifi c remedies in case of their violation. The 
WTO dispute settlement system is also concerned with the distinct but paral-
lel question of the limited jurisdiction and incapacity of the WTO adjudicat-
ing bodies to apply and enforce norms other than those of the WTO.955
Therefore, the WTO entitles the judicial panels to adjudicate only on those matters 
specifi cally defi ned and included in the covered agreements thus granting them 
limited jurisdiction, while in a case of confl ict with other norms of international 
953 Ibid, 794.
954 Sachariew, op. cit., 286.
955 G. Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’ 13 EJIL (2002) No. 4, 753, 755.
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law, to give priority to the rights and duties deriving from these agreements as a 
regime of lex specialis. The WTO judicial panels have jurisdiction to examine com-
plaints made by a member state that a certain benefi t afforded to it directly or 
indirectly under the WTO agreements ‘is being nullifi ed or impaired’ by the 
action of another member state that fails to meet its treaty commitments.956 At the 
same time, in considering whether a state is in compliance with its obligations 
emanating from the WTO, the WTO judicial panels are not entitled to take into 
account justifi cations that may exist under general international law. This may 
place a state in a diffi cult situation where its conduct may be unlawful under 
WTO, but lawful under general international law.
Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction of the WTO judicial panels does not limit 
the applicable law for the determination of the issues before them. On the con-
trary, and in the absence of an express provision, the DSB, the judicial panels and 
the appellate body can resort to and rely on all sources of international law in 
determining the cases brought before them. This is, however, conditioned on the 
requirement that reliance on general international rules does not add or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements (Articles 3.2 and 
19.2 of DSU respectively). Accordingly, whenever the rights and obligations pro-
tected under the WTO agreements are threatened by such other rules of 
international law that are applicable in the WTO dispute settlement procedure, 
then priority should according to WTO law be given to an interpretation in agree-
ment with the WTO treaty as establishing a regime lex specialis. This would be the 
case even if doing so would effectively mean an interpretation in violation of the 
obligations arising from other international legal instruments.957 While the WTO 
judicial panels often refer to other rules of international law, they have never given 
them priority over the rules provided under the WTO covered agreements.958
In consequence, the agreements establishing the WTO provide for limited 
jurisdiction while the DSU provides for specifi c remedies that the panels and the 
appellate body are entitled to recommend and suggest (Article 19 of DSU). Hence, the 
WTO adjudicating bodies do not have the authority to examine claims that fall 
under another system of international law, such as, for example, claims concern-
ing the violation of human rights or other obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole.959 
It can be concluded then that international law consists of various legal systems 
that are not necessarily linked between them. While a measure may be unlawful 
in one of these systems, it may be lawful in another. Although states members to 
the WTO will always be responsible for fulfi lling their obligations under other 
956 Article 1.1 of DSU.
957 L. Bartels, ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ 35 (3) Journal of World Trade 
(2001) 499, 518–9. See Hormones Case – EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, January 1997, (125). 
958 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006), op. cit., (444).
959 Marceau, op. cit., 762–3.
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systems of international law, ‘they cannot use the WTO remedial machinery to 
enforce them’.960 It is accordingly argued that: ‘The drafters of the WTO treaty 
never wanted to provide non-WTO norms with direct effect in WTO law, nor 
allow states to benefi t from free use of the WTO remedial mechanism to enforce 
rights and obligations other than those of the WTO treaty.’961 
One must also not forget that under Article 23, regarded one of the fundamen-
tal provisions of the DSU, the power to determine a violation of the covered 
agreements under WTO and to decide on countermeasures rests on the WTO 
judicial bodies.962 This provision prohibits unilateral action in response to viola-
tions of obligations provided under the WTO treaties. Instead, this competence 
and the competence to deal with WTO violations is transferred to the WTO adju-
dicating bodies, precluding the application of the general rules of international 
law on countermeasures.963 
Furthermore, Article 23 restricts the use of countermeasures as follows:
(7) The necessary prior authorization of the membership before the (winning) 
Members can use retaliatory sanctions (Article 22(2)–22(6) of the DSU) once 
all the prior procedural safeguards have been respected.
…
(9) The level of countermeasures is also regulated and WTO arbitrators are 
given exclusive jurisdiction to determine a level of suspensions of obligations 
having trade effects equivalent to the level of nullifi cation of benefi ts (a crite-
rion distinct from the ‘appropriate’ or ‘proportionate’ benchmark under gen-
eral international law).
It thus seems so far that the remedies permitted under the WTO treaty concern the 
obligation for cessation, non-repetition and satisfaction only with very strict condi-
tions on the right to countermeasures. This suggests according to many that the 
member states wanted to preclude an open-ended right to countermeasures and 
wanted to transfer to the settlement mechanisms the responsibility to do so.964 
960 Ibid, 775.
961 Ibid, 778.
962 Article 23 reads as follows: ‘(2) Members shall: (a) not make a determination to the effect that a 
violation has occurred, that benefi ts have been nullifi ed or impaired or that the attainment of any 
objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settle-
ment in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such 
determination consistent with the fi ndings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report 
adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding.’
963 The issue was addressed in the Panel Report in US-Certain EC Products para. 6.133: ‘In short the 
regime of counter-measures, reprisals or retaliatory measures has been strictly regulated under the 
WTO Agreement. It is now only in the institutional framework of the WTO/DSU that the United 
States could obtain a WTO compatible determination that the European Communities violated the 
WTO Agreement, and it is only in the institutional framework of the WTO/DSU that the United 
States could obtain the authorization to exercise remedial action.’ In Marceau, op. cit., 760, fn 22.
964 Ibid, 773.
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Distinct to the restriction of responses for violations that occur within the WTO 
lays the question of responsibility for temporarily ceasing the performance of 
obligations provided under the WTO in response to external violations. From 
what it has been discussed earlier, it becomes evident that the WTO judicial 
panels will hold that state responsible irrespective of any other justifi cations that 
may be present under general international law. 
In a recent dispute between Mexico and the United States brought before the 
WTO panels, Mexico justifi ed its decision to introduce tax on soft drinks and 
other beverages in order to secure the compliance of the United States with its 
obligations under a distinct international agreement, that of NAFTA.965 In par-
ticular, Mexico relied on Article XX(d) of GATT 1994 that allowed a WTO 
member state to maintain measures that are necessary to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations not inconsistent with GATT, but, importantly, on the basis of 
countermeasures under general international law. The WTO judicial panel, how-
ever, rather than considering whether Mexico’s action could be justifi ed under the 
general law on countermeasures used the ILC’s conclusions on the question of 
countermeasures in order to interpret Article XX(d) of GATT and in order to 
determine whether that Article allowed action on the grounds put forward by 
Mexico. Having found that Article XX(d) did not allow such action, the panel 
found Mexico as responsible for violating its trade commitments towards the 
USA. 966 In addition to that, the judicial panel pointed out that the notion of coun-
termeasures under general international law was not unknown to the drafters of 
the trade organization. It referred in this regard to India’s proposal when negotiat-
ing the International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter to include a provision 
allowing discriminatory measures when ‘this is the only effective measure open to 
it to retaliate against discrimination practiced by that Member in matters outside 
the purview of the [International Trade] Organization’. 967 This proposal was, 
however, never accepted. 
Accordingly, with the expanding competences of organizations such as the 
WTO, the right to countermeasures under general international law, either in 
response to ordinary breaches or in response to violations of a more fundamental 
nature, is seriously imperilled. Although the principle that international agree-
ments must be respected holds prominent place in international law, it is equally 
imperative to protect the right of states to resort to countermeasures, especially in 
a decentralized legal order whose Achilles’ heel lies on the lack of means of enforce-
ment and implementation of its rules. 
The judicial bodies of such special regimes, due to their restricted powers and 
jurisdiction, will have primary responsibility to apply the law of the specifi c regime. 
Koskenniemi and Leino, therefore, believe that it cannot be asked by specifi c 
965 United States v Mexico, WT/DS308, Report of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft 
Drinks and Other Beverages, 6 March 2006.
966 Ibid, (77).
967 Ibid, (175).
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bodies such as the WTO bodies to expand their competences in order to enable 
them to adjudicate on matters of general international law. Rather, this will only 
be accomplished with the establishment of strong institutions to represent non-
economic interests.968 However, although the establishment of such institutions 
would be most welcomed, it is unlikely that states are willing to entrust such insti-
tutions with enforcement powers. This, in turn, reveals once again the necessity of 
unilateral countermeasures under general international law, particularly for the 
protection of fundamental community interests.
The preceding observations notwithstanding, the WTO remains a treaty under 
international law and, as such: 
[T]he WTO agreement cannot, therefore, be applied in isolation from other 
rules of international law. Just as private contracts are automatically born into 
a system of domestic law, so treaties are automatically born into the system of 
international law. Much the way private contracts do not need to list all the 
relevant legislative and administrative provisions of domestic law for them to 
be applicable to the contract, so treaties need not explicitly set out rules of 
general international law for them to be applicable to the treaty.969
The WTO stands in the international legal order as an integral part of general 
international law and it is thus infl uenced and developed by its rules and princi-
ples, including those concerning state responsibility and countermeasures.970 As 
noted, the relationship between the WTO and general international law consti-
tutes a mutual relationship of enrichment.971 Consequently, even if the WTO 
judicial bodies’ competences are limited by the covered agreements, in assessing 
the content of such rights and obligations emanating from the agreements they 
must take due regard to the overall normative context of general international 
law.972 
The impact of the general rules on state responsibility on specifi c legal regimes 
was also examined by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. This ruling has often been 
criticized due to the Court’s failure to determine what the United States as a third 
state could do in view of the recognition that Nicaragua had frequently violated 
international law by militarily incurring into the territory of neighbouring coun-
tries (Costa Rica and Honduras) and by supporting armed bands and rebels. 
While the Court did not accept that Nicaragua’s action amounted to an armed 
attack that would justify the right to collective self-defence, it held that the trade 
968 M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2002) 553, 574.
969 J. Pauwelyn (2003(c)), ‘How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World 
Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits’ 37 (6) Journal of World Trade 
(2003) 997, 1001. 
970 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006), op. cit., (169).
971 Pauwelyn (2001), op. cit., 552. Also see ibid, (169).
972 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, ibid, (170).
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embargo imposed by the United States against Nicaragua infringed the 1956 
Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded between the two 
countries. By this determination the Court, as noted in Chapter 3, left no room for 
examining the US action in the light of Nicaragua’s own wrongdoing and, in par-
ticular, the violation of its obligations under the UN Charter. In considering Article 
XXI of GATT as a possible justifi cation of the US measures, the Court emphasized 
that the party should prove that such action was necessary to its essential security 
interests. The Court went on to conclude that from the circumstances of the par-
ticular case no such necessity emerged.973 However, this conclusion also received 
criticism, as according to one view the Court should have examined the trade 
embargo in the light of the law on countermeasures. As noted in this regard:
It cannot be correct, it is submitted, to exclude all those treaty commitments 
from a possible application of the right of reprisals which are conditioned by 
specifi c exception clauses, as the security clause in the respective Treaty. It 
would be going much too far to see this as a self-contained regime in the sense 
the International Court of Justice has used this notion in the Tehran Hostages 
case. Trade agreements in the widest sense are the area where peaceful repri-
sals must apply in the fi rst place if this area of law on State responsibility 
should not become obsolete.974
The problem grows in signifi cance since, in most cases, treaties allow derivations 
from the treaty obligations only for reasons closely associated with and established 
by the treaty, restricting in this manner the general use of countermeasures. Zoller, 
in particular, argues that precluding states parties to a certain treaty from respond-
ing to an external violation by violating their obligations under the treaty would 
render international law ineffective. If one construed treaties, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, as ‘locked circles’ that prohibit both measures outside the treaty for 
violations within the treaty and measures within a treaty for violations occurring 
outside such treaty, this would amount to the alienation of international law by 
creating several legal regimes existing in parallel but with absolutely no relation-
ship between them. As she rightly remarks, treaties ‘would have a legal life of their 
own independent of their surroundings. States after being their creators, would 
become their prisoners, the Pygmalions of international law.’975 Zoller continued 
that irrespective of their nature, customary or conventional, international rules 
are interrelated and together form the existing international legal order. To 
demand states to refrain from resorting to countermeasures for the violation of 
any of their rights would not only endanger the unity of the international legal 
order as the treaty would become unconnected with the rest of the corpus of inter-
national norms, but it would also remove ‘the indirect guarantee of compliance 
973 For an analysis of the ruling, see Frowein (1994), op. cit., 372.
974 Ibid, 376 and 426.
975 Zoller, op. cit., 85–6.
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which the treaty embodied. Such a situation would be detrimental to both 
customary and treaty law’.976
In 1977, US Representative Pease was arguing, in support of US measures 
against Uganda even in violation of the country’s obligations under GATT, that 
there existed ‘higher principles involved than blind adherence to free trade dogma’ 
and that this agreement should not be deemed as ‘sacrosanct and inviolable’.977 The 
position that state action cannot be confi ned within a specifi c treaty is also refl ected 
in the statement of the French Prime Minister Briand who, rejecting Germany’s 
arguments that France could not resort to sanctions outside the Versailles Treaty, 
said that there still existed other sanctions under international law.978 
This view seems to also apply, as noted earlier, with respect to other international 
agreements such as those concerning the protection of human rights. Thus, accord-
ing to the conclusions of the American Law Institute, a state party to an international 
human rights agreement has at its disposal not only the remedies provided under 
these agreements but also the remedies provided under general international law in 
the event of the commission of an internationally wrongful act.979 Frowein says, in 
this respect, that to preclude action other than that provided under a specifi c treaty 
would be to afford weaker protection when needed, especially regarding human 
rights violations.980 Of course, such action would not be possible to entail non-
performance of obligations arising from human rights treaties themselves, due to 
the special character of such treaties as establishing integral regimes and due to the 
erga omnes character of the obligations protected under them.981
At the WTO level, this position is refl ected in the Gasoline case according to 
which ‘the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public 
international law’.982 As Pauwelyn observes:
It is true that the DSU has to be considered as lex specialis and that it can – and 
in certain areas, does – deviate from general international law. If any ambiguity 
were to persist in the DSU, however, as to whether a breach of WTO rules 
activates the secondary obligation of cessation, recourse should be made to 
residual international law rules. These rules make clear beyond doubt that 
in case wrongful act is found, the state concerned has to stop that conduct. 
The DSU determines, in turn, the means by which the prevailing WTO 
976 Ibid, 87.
977 Pease’ Statement at the US House of Representatives, H.R. Con. Res. 426, 95th Cong., 1st Session (1977) 
in Fredman, op. cit., 1162.
978 See Briand, Repert. Prat. Française, I, No. 235, 131 in Zoller, op. cit., 88.
979 Law Restatement, Restatement of the Law. The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. 2, 
1987, 174 in Frowein (1994), op. cit., 399–400.
980 Frowein, ibid, 400.
981 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006), op. cit., (154) and (248)–(249).
982 Gasoline case – United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
20 May 1996, 17. 
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member is authorized to obtain fulfi llment of that secondary legal obligation of 
cessation.983
In addition to this, the WTO judicial bodies have themselves many times referred 
to the general principles of international law and customary international law, and 
to other treaties, while Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the agreements under 
the WTO must be interpreted ‘in accordance with customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law’. Furthermore, the power of the WTO panels to refer to 
other sources of international law for an objective application of the agreements 
under the WTO is safeguarded under both Articles 11 and 7.2 of the DSU. 
In the light of this, the WTO is not strictly speaking a self-contained regime as 
other rules of international law such as the rules on state responsibility, rules relat-
ing to the judicial settlement of disputes, the rules regarding the conclusion, 
termination, suspension or application of treaties and the rules on how to resolve 
confl icts between legal norms are applicable. 
In conclusion, to say that the WTO law precludes the application of rules of general 
international law would amount to saying that the WTO is viewed as ‘a self-contained 
regime’ while general public international law is viewed, according to Pauwelyn ‘as a 
fragmented system with sealed-off compartments’.984 In addition, even self-contained 
regimes do not totally and permanently deviate from the general legal regime, but only 
to the extent that there is express agreement to the contrary. As Simma points out:
[T]he general regime of State responsibility can only be again called to the 
foreground after all remedies provided in the ‘subsystem’ have been exhausted 
without any positive results and when further tolerance of the imbalance of 
costs and benefi ts caused by non-performance can no longer bona fi de be 
expected from an injured party.985
It can be concluded from these considerations that general international law con-
stitutes a reference point on which self-contained regimes or other specifi c rules 
always rely. While states may agree, by entering into specifi c agreements or estab-
lishing self-contained regimes, to deviate from general international law, they 
cannot deviate from the system of international law in its entirety that remains in 
the background. This is signifi cant as the rules of general international law and, in 
particular, the rules on enforcement remain active, especially when the remedies 
provided under such regimes fail to meet their objectives. This is even more so 
when the obligations breached concern legal interests owed either to the interna-
tional community as a whole or to a group of states. To prohibit states from 
ceasing the performance of their obligations emanating from such specifi c regimes 
would be to deprive them of a powerful tool to effectively secure the compliance 
983 Pauwelyn (2000), op. cit., 341.
984 Pauwelyn (2003 (c)), op. cit., 1029.
985 Simma (1985), op. cit., 128–9.
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of the wrongdoing state with its international commitments. Nevertheless, it has 
been shown that reliance on the customary right to countermeasures may cause 
friction in relation to obligations emanating from other legal regimes. This may 
have the effect of incompatible or inconsistent solutions threatening as a result the 
integrity of the international legal order. 
3.2.3 The general and security exceptions under Articles XX and XXI of GATT
Article XX of GATT exempts from the prohibition of trade restrictions among 
others measures taken for the protection of human life or health. While such mea-
sures are justifi able for the protection of human life or health within the territory 
of the responding state, this becomes less clear with respect to measures taken to 
protect human life or health in another member state’s territory.986 The latter 
requires a distinction between restrictions of products themselves produced in a 
manner contravening human rights and measures taken against products that, 
although not produced in a manner violating human rights, are produced by a 
member state that violates human rights generally. It is suggested that in this latter 
category one should speak about ‘sanctions’ and not about ‘trade restrictions’ as 
provided by Article XX.987 
As noted earlier, countermeasures by way of not performing WTO obligations 
in response to a wrongful act under general international law such as genocide are 
not permitted within the WTO context and they seem to be precluded from the 
blessing of Article XX.988 This was also confi rmed in a Ministerial Declaration 
made in 1982 according to which GATT contracting parties undertook the com-
mitment to ‘abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a 
non-economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement’.989 
While Article XX safeguards trade restrictions on products that have been pro-
duced in a process and method that infringes human rights or health, it exempts 
from its scope the enforcement of trade measures that take the form of counter-
measures. Such countermeasures are not allowed within the context of the WTO, 
even if these are to be permitted under the general rules on state responsibility. 
This is qualifi ed by the condition that there has not been an agreement to autho-
rize such countermeasures on the basis that such an agreement does not put at risk 
the rights and obligations of third parties. 
Article XXI, by the same token, allows exceptions from the obligations arising 
under the WTO treaties on grounds of national security. While WTO member 
states enjoy discretion when invoking security reasons to justify conduct irrecon-
cilable with their obligations, in the sense that the judicial panels are not entitled 
to look into whether a threat to national security interests indeed existed and the 
986 Bartels (2002), op. cit., 355.
987 Ibid, 357–8.
988 Ibid, 361.
989 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, adopted on 29 November 1982, L/5424, Basic 
Instruments and Selected Documents, Supplement No. 29. Also in Keesing’s (1983), 32169A.
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justifi ability of the measures taken in response to the threat, states need to exercise 
their discretion in good faith.990 In the light of the wide scope of the notion of ‘essen-
tial national security’ emerging ‘in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations’ it could be claimed that serious violations of human rights such as geno-
cide fall within the ambit of this provision.991 As the analysis in the preceding 
chapter demonstrated, WTO states have often invoked this provision in justifi cation 
of trade restrictions imposed in response to serious violations of community and 
collective interests, even if there existed no threats to national security stricto sensu. 
Despite the signifi cance of these issues arising from a possible confl ict between 
an entitlement to respond to serious violations such as genocide and specifi c agree-
ments that preclude the general regime of responsibility, it seems that in the 
context of the WTO judicial panels the specifi c rules will prevail. 
Having considered extensively how the relationship between specifi c and gen-
eral legal consequences is dealt with within special or self-contained regimes, the 
examination is next turned to how this issue is addressed within the Final Articles 
on State Responsibility. 
4  Lex specialis and self-contained regimes in the 
2001 Final Articles on State Responsibility
In its commentary on Article 50 of the Final Articles entitled ‘Obligations not 
Affected by Countermeasures’, the ILC recognizes the right of states to enter into 
specifi c agreements to preclude countermeasures, as a regime lex specialis. Reference 
is made to this end to the WTO and to the fact that under Article 23 of the DSU 
a member state may suspend concessions or other obligations under the WTO 
agreements only with the prior authorization of the DSB. It is pointed out that:
This has been construed both as an ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’ and 
as a clause ‘preventing WTO members from unilaterally resolving their dis-
putes in respect of WTO rights and obligations’. To the extent that deroga-
tion clauses or other treaty provisions (e.g. those prohibiting reservations) are 
properly interpreted as indicating that the treaty provisions are ‘intransgress-
ible’, they may entail the exclusion of countermeasures.992
This found expression in Part 4 under Article 55 according to which the articles 
on state responsibility:
[D]o not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence 
of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the 
990 See D. Akande and S. Williams, ‘International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What 
Role for the WTO?’ 43 VJIL (2003) No. 2, 365, 386 and 389.
991 Brandtner and Rosas (1999), op. cit., 706.
992 Crawford (2002), op. cit., 290–91.
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international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of interna-
tional law.
The ILC, in its commentary on this provision, acknowledges the right of states to 
enter into specifi c agreements that will depart from other applicable rules of inter-
national law concerning the legal consequences arising from the violation of a 
primary rule. It seems from this, that the ILC precludes the application of the 
general rules on the law on state responsibility whenever specifi c rules precisely 
and expressly determine the legal consequences to derive as a result of their 
breach. 
Article 55, however, remains silent with respect to the application of the 
general law on state responsibility within a specifi c regime in response to a viola-
tion of an obligation that exists outside that regime. More specifi cally, Article 55 
does not prohibit the non-performance of WTO obligations, for instance, in 
response to gross human rights violations or violations emanating from other 
agreements. All Article 55 restricts is the implementation of countermeasures 
by ceasing the performance of obligations within a specifi c regime, in response 
to violations of other obligations emanating from the same regime, unless other-
wise provided. Yet as already explained, even in this instance states will still 
be able to resort to general international law should all other remedies specifi cally 
provided for fail. 
From a general international law standpoint, the violation of obligations deriv-
ing from special regimes by way of countermeasures in response to a violation that 
occurred outside such regimes will be lawful. This coincides with the concept of 
countermeasures that have an inherent element of unlawfulness although, due to 
certain circumstances, the wrongfulness of the act and the responsibility of the 
implementing state will be precluded. However, the preceding analysis has shown 
that particularly the judicial bodies provided under the WTO have been reluctant 
to give way to a right to countermeasures under general international law. This 
approach entails the danger of upgrading the lex specialis to superior law in which 
the intrusion of general international law is totally precluded, thus endowing the 
specifi c legal regime with absolute nature. 
If countermeasures for reasons falling outside a specifi c treaty are precluded 
then there would be a confl ict between the notion of countermeasures, which 
by defi nition permits as lawful the violation of any obligation (with limited 
exceptions) of international law, and Article 55 of the Final Articles. How could 
countermeasures ever be applied if prevalence is unequivocally always given to 
the self-contained regime? 
This point gains particular signifi cance in light of the increasing competences in 
trade matters of the WTO. Hence, the argument according to which WTO rules 
have an impact ‘on almost all other segments of society and law’993 could not be 
more relevant, especially in the light of the effects of liberalization of trade on 
993 Pauwelyn (2001), op. cit., 539.
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environmental or human rights concerns. If the entitlement of states to resort to 
countermeasures in the form of trade restrictions is taken away, even for the most 
serious internationally wrongful acts, then states are left with few powers to enforce 
international law and such fundamental community or collective interests. 
This, however, has signifi cance not only whenever a breach of a jus cogens norm 
is involved, but also for breaches of a less serious nature. If it is recognized that the 
WTO in particular imposes uniform state behaviour in more and more trade 
areas, then it diminishes signifi cantly the sphere of state action. The same applies 
if one accepts that the WTO obligations can only be suspended, terminated or not 
performed in response to the violation of another WTO obligation and only under 
the procedures provided by the WTO agreements. In such an event, the role of 
countermeasures under the general rules on state responsibility becomes mean-
ingless, with the enforcement of international law signifi cantly weakened. 
5 On the risk of fragmentation of international law
One of the increasingly interesting areas that has recently attracted the attention 
of the ILC, and which will be at the scope of the current section, is that of frag-
mentation of international law. In the absence of a clear separation of powers in 
the international legal order, international law comprises several autonomous 
legal regimes and norms that, as discussed already, may at times clash between 
them, endangering the integrity of international law. 
The fragmentation of international law is not a new phenomenon. The confl ict 
between west and east during the Cold War period prevented the development of 
the international legal order into a coherent system of norms. Although aspira-
tions about the ‘completeness’ of international law revived with the abolition of 
the walls between the two worlds, international law was once again faced with 
fragmentation, but this time because of a new enemy, namely the rapid prolifera-
tion of independent legal systems.994 
In its 52nd session held in 2000, the ILC decided to include within its long-
term work the problem of fragmentation of international law, acknowledging its 
increasing importance for the consistency and unity of international law.995 In the 
study pursued by Mr Gerhard Hafner annexed to the 2000 ILC report,996 the 
problem of fragmentation appeared as the result of the lack of homogeneity and 
organization of international law that until the present day consists of several 
‘erratic’ legal regimes, systems and subsystems. Despite the contribution of these 
regimes to the progression of the international legal order, they may also cause 
friction among norms belonging to different legal systems, often having the effect 
994 Koskenniemi, and Leino, op. cit., 559.
995 Report of the International Law Commission (2000), Annex, op. cit., 143.
996 G. Hafner, ‘Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’ ILC Report on the Work of its 
52nd Session, Offi cial Records of the General Assembly, 55th session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/55/10), Annex.
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of creating obligations on states that are incompatible and irreconcilable between 
them.997 This unavoidably raises the responsibility of a state that, unable to 
conform to its parallel obligations, is caught up between several international 
rules and legal systems that most of the times lack of a hierarchical nature.998 In 2002 
the study group established by the ILC during its 54th session to investigate the 
scope of the question under consideration defi ned the term ‘fragmentation’ as indic-
ative of the effects of the ‘expansion and diversifi cation of international law’.999 
Such fragmentation may be owed to the lack of central instruments of dispute 
resolution threatening in this manner the integrity of international law, the emer-
gence, in addition to the synallagmatic obligations provided under traditional 
international law, of obligations owed to individuals and the international com-
munity as a whole and the existence of competitive rules. Moreover, the widening 
of the scope of international law with the increase of the actors in the international 
arena but also of enforcement mechanisms especially provided for under specifi c 
regimes, the existence of several parallel secondary norms that often prevail over 
the general rules on state responsibility or even the law on treaties, may also cause 
confl ict.1000 In addition, the lack of both a clear hierarchy of norms and homoge-
neity in the international legal order, the proliferation of international judicial 
bodies often having jurisdiction over the same matters, the parallel development 
of often confl icting legal norms and the emergence of a pluralism of legal regimes 
also exacerbate the problem.1001 Furthermore, the accommodation of new prin-
ciples and new ideas of a ‘constitutional’ nature in the body of international law 
has only added to the confusion. 
Such inconsistency has appeared for instance within the context of the ad hoc 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and the ICJ. In this 
regard, there has been different approach in the rulings of the ICJ and the ICTFY 
on specifi c questions of law. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ ruled that armed reprisals should be proportion-
ate. However, not long after this ruling the ICTFY was concluding that such 
reprisals were entirely prohibited.1002 Problems may also be created as a result of 
 997 Ibid, 321–2.
 998 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-fourth Session, 29 April–7 
June and 22 July–16 August 2002 (A/57/10) 240/(506).
 999 See Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI), 24th Meeting, 
Bratislava, 9–10 September 2002 on the ILC Report on the Work of its 54th Session (29 April–7 
June and 22 July–16 August 2002). Prepared by Professor Bruno Simma, (61).
1000 Hafner, op. cit., 326–31.
1001 Koskenniemi and Leino, although not rejecting the problem, very pointedly argue that interna-
tional law has never been unifi ed so that to risk a possible fragmentation at this instance. 
However, the term ‘fragmentation’ should be construed as revealing the situation where there 
exist confl icting legal norms that may undermine the coherence of international law. See 
Koskenniemi and Leino, op. cit., 576.
1002 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., 246 (46); The Prosecutor v Martič, Decision of 
8 March 1996, Case No. IT-95-11-R61, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Trial Chamber I in Koskenniemi and Leino, op. cit., 562–3.
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hierarchy between international judicial bodies, as evidenced from the Čelebiči 
case. In this case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTFY highlighted that there 
was no hierarchy between itself and the ICJ and that it was autonomous from 
the ICJ.1003 
Furthermore, in the Belilos case, the European Court of Human Rights gave 
prevalence to the specifi c provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on the issue of reservations over the provisions of general international law 
on the same matter.1004 In the Lockerbie case, the ICJ said that Libya should comply 
with its obligations under Article 103 of the UN Charter even if these were in 
contravention with other obligations and, in particular, with the 1971 Montreal 
Convention. 
As discussed thoroughly in earlier sections, a confl ict may appear with respect 
to both primary norms, if there are more such norms regulating the same subject, 
and secondary norms, if an internationally wrongful act incurs several conse-
quences existing in various systems and subsystems of international law. 
Undoubtedly, the existence of multiple enforcement mechanisms, each one of 
which claims to be the most appropriate for the resolution of a given dispute on 
the basis of the rules within which it exists and is structured on, tends to enhance 
rather than diminish the already ‘disintegrated nature of international law’.1005 
However, problems emerge when competing enforcement mechanisms diminish, 
as explained, the protection of international law.
 In its 2002 report, the Study Group highlighted that among other things 
further consideration should be given to the function and scope of lex specialis 
norms and the problem of self-contained regimes, but also the interpretation of 
treaties in the light of other relevant rules of international law in view of contempo-
rary developments and the concerns of the international community.1006 In its 2003 
report the Study Group highlighted the need to investigate the conditions of the 
establishment of self-contained regimes, their scope of application towards general 
international law and the circumstances under which there is a ‘fallback’ to the 
general rules.1007 
Against this notion, there are arguments supporting the idea that the plethora 
of specifi c legal regimes contributes to the enhancement of the international 
legal order, whose main defect has always been its unenforceability. A study under-
taken in 1996 by the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law concluded 
that such specifi c systems, with their own rules and mechanisms, strengthened 
1003 Čelebič i case, The Prosecutor v Delalič  et al., Decision of 20 February 2001, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber.
1004 Belilos v Switzerland, No. 10328/83 Judgment of 29 April 1988, 1988 ECHR, (Ser. A) No. 132.
1005 Hafner, op. cit., 332.
1006 Report of the International Law Commission (2002) op. cit., (512).
1007 Report of the International Law Commission (2004) op. cit., 290 (319).
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compliance with the primary rules they establish.1008 As Koskenniemi and Leino 
point out:
The ICJ, a human rights body, a trade regime or a regional exception 
may each be used for good and for ignoble purposes and it should be a matter 
of debate and evidence, and not of abstract ‘consistency’, as to which institu-
tion should be preferred in a particular situation. The universalist voices of 
humanitarianism, human rights, trade or the environment should undoubt-
edly be heard. But they may also echo imperial concerns, and never more 
so than when they are spoken from high positions in institutions that admin-
ister fl exible standards that leave the fi nal decision always to those speakers 
themselves.1009
Along the same lines and in relation to the proliferation of international judicial 
bodies, Professor Abi-Saab remarks that it constitutes a ‘healthy phenomenon … 
in a system that has notoriously suffered, throughout its existence, from the dearth 
(not to say lack) of objective determinations’.1010 However, he also highlights the 
necessity to preserve the unity of the overall system within which special regimes 
are conceived and created. He thus precludes that there can exist entirely self-
contained regimes as otherwise such regimes would not be part of the general 
legal system, but rather they would themselves become legal orders of their own, 
‘a kind of legal Frankenstein, or Kelsen’s “gang of robbers”’.1011 
Indeed, in the extensive report prepared by the study group and fi nalized by 
Professor Koskenniemi in 2006, it is stressed that: 
Fragmentation moves international law in the direction of legal pluralism, 
but does this … by using the resources of general international law, especially 
the rules of the VCLT, customary law and ‘general principles of law recogn-
ised by civilised nations’.1012
Kirchner, on his part, identifi es two dimensions of confl ict resolution in interna-
tional law. The fi rst, which the 1969 VCLT seems to follow, relates to a confl ict 
of laws approach. The second concerns a public law approach that aims to 
bring coherence in the process of ‘constitutionalization’ of the international legal 
order by reconciling the phenomena of fragmentation, on the one hand, and 
constitutionalization, on the other, with a view of establishing ‘an overall public 
1008 K. Wellens, ‘Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Refl ections 
on Current Trends’ in L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn and K. Wellens, Diversity in Secondary Rules and the 
Unity of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff: 1995) 3, 28.
1009 Koskenniemi and Leino, op. cit., 578–9.
1010 G. Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unifi cation: Some Concluding Remarks’ 31 N.Y.U.J.Int’l.L. & 
Pol. (1999) 919, 925.
1011 Ibid, 926.
1012 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006) op. cit., (492).
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law approach’.1013 He believes that this reconciliation can be achieved with the 
incorporation in the corpus of international law of constitutional notions such as jus 
cogens norms and the moving away from a dogmatic perception of international 
law as being of a contractual nature merely involving public entities.1014 
At the same time, the rules of interpretation provided under the 1969 VCLT, 
and in particular under Article 31(3)(c) and refl ected in customary international 
law, play a determinative role in the resolution of confl icts. This was recently raised 
before the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case.1015 In this case, the ICJ was called to exam-
ine the lawfulness of certain forcible measures taken by the United States against 
Iran with the 1955 Treaty of Amity concluded between these two states. As the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ relied on a compromissory clause provided under the 
Agreement, the question raised was whether the ICJ should confi ne its examination 
on the specifi c terms of the treaty or whether it could also rely on the general rules 
on the use of force. This ruling allowed placing the 1955 Agreement in the general 
context of international law and not in isolation from it. This is particularly impor-
tant as the ICJ was able, in interpreting the Agreement, to take into consideration 
a fundamental principle of international law widely acknowledged as possessing the 
character of jus cogens, that of the prohibition of the use of armed force. The applica-
tion of Article 31(3)(c) has, therefore, been described by some authors as a bridge 
connecting different international legal regimes, arguably offering a remedy to the 
emerging risk of compartmentalization of international law.1016 
Undoubtedly, the problem of fragmentation of international law will only 
increase in signifi cance, especially with the awarding of more contractual freedom 
to states in the absence of a unifi ed code of conduct in the event that a confl ict 
between two or more specifi c and general legal regimes occurs. 
This gains particular signifi cance for the enforcement of international law, 
especially through countermeasures by states other than the injured. While states 
may deviate from general rules through the adoption of specifi c agreements or 
even through the creation of self-contained regimes, these should not be construed 
as totally independent from the normative environment in which they inescapably 
exist. As seen, countermeasures constitute a powerful tool of implementation of 
international rules, particularly those of great signifi cance for the international 
community, since they aim to protect community and collective interests. 
Consequently, to restrict the right to countermeasures by ceasing performance of 
obligations under specifi c agreements or even self-contained regimes, as states 
have many times done in the past, would be tantamount to preventing states from 
using the only means at their disposal, in the absence of any other means, to 
1013 Kirchner, op. cit., 54.
1014 Ibid, 63–4.
1015 Case Concerning Oil Platforms, op. cit.
1016 For a thorough analysis of the position of self contained regimes within the framework of inter-
national law see B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained 
Regimes in International Law’, 17 EJIL (2006) No. 3, 483.
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secure respect for the rule of international law. For these reasons, the right to 
countermeasures constitutes an integral part of the international legal order that 
is essential for the implementation of its rules, particularly so when community 
interests are at stake. 
6 Conclusion
The notion of self-contained regimes has often been used to describe the existence 
of autonomous legal regimes that establish their own primary and secondary 
norms conferring rights and obligations on states and providing for their own 
legal remedies in the event of a breach. Moreover, this term has been used to 
indicate legal regimes that set up their own dispute settlement bodies and enforce-
ment mechanisms in independence of the rules of general international law. 
However, as the preceding analysis established, no such regime can be seen in 
total isolation from the general body of international law to which it continues 
to be an integral part. 
The issue becomes relevant for the purposes of this book as it reveals the exis-
tence of a rather strenuous relation between obligations emanating from such 
self-contained regimes and countermeasures provided under general international 
law, particularly those taken in the name of fundamental community interests. As 
the emphasis is increasingly placed on the prevalence of the rules emerging from 
such regimes, the scope and content of countermeasures generally and solidarity 
measures particularly becomes diminished. This is even more so in the context of 
the WTO the competences of which are rapidly expanding to a wide range of 
trade areas, precluding at the same time the implementation of countermeasures 
under general international law. 
However, the ‘exclusivity’ of such regimes in relation to the other rules of inter-
national law and in terms of international enforcement has frequently been called 
into question. This is due to the fact that specifi c norms evolved within such spe-
cifi c regimes are formed between certain states to serve certain purposes – and 
those purposes only. This means that the organs, judicial or other, provided under 
these self-contained regimes are not empowered to resolve a dispute arising before 
them by reference to other applicable rules of international law existing outside 
such legal regimes. This makes the application of international law fragmented, 
while it signifi cantly weakens its effective enforcement. 
Nevertheless, it has been established that no regime is truly self-contained nei-
ther can it ‘stand’ on its own, as it never ceases to be part of the general international 
legal system that remains in the background. In the light of the proliferation of 
self-contained or special regimes, general international law still plays a fundamen-
tal role and exercises a huge impact on such regimes or obligations emanating 
from lex specialis. This is so since general international law not only remains in the 
background by providing the principles on which a special regime is founded, but 
by also fi lling the legal gaps whenever such special regimes fail or collapse. 
Furthermore, the need to implement general international law, even when this 
is explicitly prohibited by specifi c rules, becomes apparent whenever the only 
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means of protection available to a state injured by a certain wrongdoing or even a 
state acting in the name of community and collective interests lie in the context of 
such special regimes. In this respect, the rules on state responsibility as refl ected in 
customary international law, and particularly the right to resort to countermea-
sures, still infl uence the relations of states even if these are regulated by such special 
regimes.1017 
As already explained, to suggest that the obligations emanating from special 
regimes will prevail, leaving no room for the application of other means of 
enforcement provided under general international law, would be tantamount to 
endowing such specifi c obligations with a peremptory character. This would result 
in diminishing signifi cantly, to the extent of extinction even, the application of 
countermeasures under general international law. 
In addition to this, the practice of states reveals that, most of the time, counter-
measures taken in response to a given wrongdoing involve violations of obligations 
arising from such specifi c rules. This issue becomes particularly relevant in the 
context of the current examination. More specifi cally, the right to solidarity mea-
sures would become devoid if states were precluded from not performing 
obligations that derive within the context of specifi c legal regimes. This is because 
it is usually with the non-performance of obligations falling within such regimes 
that countermeasures become more effective. 
The aforegoing arguments notwithstanding, the diffi culties that may arise from 
a situation where certain conduct may be lawful under one legal regime but 
unlawful under another raise separate questions that must not be undermined or 
ignored. It has, therefore, been shown in this chapter that it is essential that these 
legal concerns are addressed in a manner so that the unity of international law, 
whether always existent or just starting to emerge, is not to be impaired. 
In their recent article, Simma and Pulkowski, giving cognizance to the increas-
ing role of self-contained regimes in the international legal system have described 
such regimes as planets that exist in the universe. According to them: ‘Life on the 
planet becomes more interesting than the fate of the universe’. However, in the 
author’s view, while the signifi cance of self-contained or special regimes in enhanc-
ing the rule of law must not be undermined, it is important that the emphasis is 
placed on the universe, to use Simma and Pulkowski’s words, and on the universal 
justice of general international law.
With these conclusions, attention is next turned on the legal restrictions of 
countermeasures and, in particular, on the principle of proportionality as a means 
of restricting abusive exercise of such measures.
1017 ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Report (2006), op. cit., (194).
5 The principle of 
proportionality
1 Introduction
It has been stressed throughout this work that in a decentralized legal system in 
which, as a general rule, no compulsory enforcement mechanisms are available, 
countermeasures become important because they enable the state whose rights 
and interests have been infringed to remedy the violation and its unlawful conse-
quences. This is achieved by inducing the wrongdoing state to cease its wrongful 
conduct and to offer reparation for the injury suffered. This is even more so for 
securing compliance not only with the rules of general international law, but also 
with fundamental community interests. However, the fact that the determination 
of whether a violation that would justify countermeasures in the fi rst place has 
indeed occurred is made unilaterally by the state resorting to them makes counter-
measures vulnerable to abuse. For this reason, the international legal system has 
attached certain conditions for the lawfulness of countermeasures, examined in 
section 5.2 of this chapter. In this framework, proportionality, which is at the focus 
of examination of this last chapter, comes as one condition of lawfulness, among 
others that intend to restrain the powers of states when resorting to countermea-
sures. Proportionality fi nds proper application regarding violations of customary 
international law as in treaty law states can agree to anything, provided, of course, 
that this is not in confl ict with jus cogens norms.1018 
In domestic law, when a state takes action in order to prevent or punish the 
commission of a certain criminal act, it must ensure that its organs abide by spe-
cifi cally defi ned rules and principles. The aim of such rules extends primarily to 
the protection of fundamental, inalienable human rights and the observance of 
the rule of law applicable in a just state. Such action must not be taken arbitrarily 
or in abuse of powers entrusted by law and it must be the result of pressing neces-
sity without which the legitimate objective cannot be achieved. However, the fact 
that certain action was necessary does not mean that the specifi c action fi nally 
chosen was also proportionate. Proportionality possesses a prominent position in 
national legal systems where the state and the individual stand in an apparent 
1018 Fourth Report on State Responsibility (Arangio–Ruiz), op. cit., 40 (113).
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relationship of inequality. The notion has developed out of the need to regulate 
and restrict as much as possible the interference of state mechanisms in the sphere 
of individuals concerning their rights, whether deriving from the private or public 
sector and with the purpose of balancing individual freedoms and community 
interests.1019 
In international law, by the same token, proportionality may arise in three con-
texts: as an integral element of the primary norm, in the law of the use of force and 
in the law of state responsibility. Since the current work is focused on the second-
ary rather than the primary rules of international law, the fi rst category regarding 
proportionality as part of the primary rule will be excluded from the scope of the 
current examination. 
Having clarifi ed that, proportionality in the international legal system derives 
its signifi cance from the principle of sovereign equality of states and plays a crucial 
role not only in the law concerning the use of force (  jus ad bellum and jus in bello) 
but also in the law of countermeasures. Proportionality, therefore, becomes rele-
vant in international law whenever the legal balance in the relationship between 
states has been disturbed because of a certain wrongdoing. Proportionality is used 
as a means of evaluation of whether the response to the wrongful act, forcible or 
not, fulfi ls specifi c standards of legality or whether it is excessive. Since often, both 
the initial wrongful act and the response concern the violation of different interna-
tional legal norms, the function of proportionality lies in the sphere of balancing 
different confl icting legal interests.1020 In that sense, proportionality does not 
resemble reciprocity in that the legal balance cannot be regained by mere applica-
tion of equivalence because the rights and obligations in question are different in 
kind.1021 At the same time, proportionality seems to have been increasingly infl u-
enced by current trends regarding humanitarian considerations. 
Although proportionality is synonymous to something that is balanced, equi-
poise, measured, reasonable and symmetrical, there is ambiguity regarding its 
exact scope and content.1022 Despite the fact that proportionality is not a notion 
independent from the intensity, means, objectives, degree, extent, legal conse-
quences, seriousness and the principles at stake as a result of the initial act and the 
act taken in response, different opinions remain regarding how proportionality 
should be assessed. This is particularly so with respect to the concept of proportion-
ality in the law of countermeasures especially in response to violations of collective 
and community interests. While considerable attention has been given over the 
years to the content of proportionality when applied in the law of use of force lato 
sensu, the principle of proportionality in relation to the law of countermeasures has 
1019 D. Feldman, ‘Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in E. Ellis (ed.) The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart: 1999), 117, 118.
1020 W. Van Gerven, ‘The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the European 
Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe’ in E. Ellis, op. cit., 37, 58.
1021 Zoller, op. cit., 50.
1022 Van Gerven, op. cit., 47–8.
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signifi cantly remained underdeveloped. Much of the expressed hesitation, for 
example, in recognizing a right to states other than the injured to resort to coun-
termeasures is the fear that their use may lead to abuses. 
In the light of the thesis advanced in this book that customary international law 
recognizes a right to third-state countermeasures, it is imperative that the legal 
standards by which proportionality is determined are clearly defi ned. By contrast, 
the lack of consensus with respect to proportionality in this fi eld makes the search 
for predictability much more diffi cult and subjective, while it endangers not only 
the feeling of justice but also these basic values of international peace and security 
as it leaves the door wide open to more arbitrary and unjustifi ed violations of 
international law.1023 The degree of control and review of the legitimacy of coun-
termeasures depends on how precisely the principle of proportionality is 
formulated,1024 particularly in the absence of central compulsory institutions and 
mechanisms for their review.
Accordingly, the crucial question that one needs to address is what countermea-
sures must be proportionate to. Several theories have been developed in this 
regard, with some placing emphasis on a strict relation between the breach and 
the response and with others turning their attention to the aims pursued or the 
interests at stake in each case. Bearing in mind the observations made thus far, this 
chapter will attempt to shed some light on the various conceptions formulated 
regarding the content of proportionality. Brief consideration will be given on how 
proportionality is understood in the context of the EU and national legal systems, 
as this is essential for comprehending the substantive elements of the notion gener-
ally. The examination will, however, primarily concentrate on proportionality as 
applied in the law of the use of force and the law of countermeasures and on the 
question of whether proportionality does or should coincide in these two areas of 
international law. Moreover, this chapter will attempt to touch on the question as 
to whether the nature of the infringed obligation and, more specifi cally, whether 
of a bilateral nature or erga omnes, has, or should have, any bearing on the assess-
ment of proportionality. This is essential in the light of the position that 
contemporary international law recognizes a right to solidarity measures. 
2 The principle of proportionality in the law of the EU
The question of proportionality was not excluded from the context of the EU. 
Although the Treaty of Rome makes only a brief reference to the principle, pro-
portionality was subsequently developed through the case law of the ECJ as a 
1023 Bowett observes, in this regard that: ‘The principle that, while the critical decision to act 
must be subjective, the legality of the action must be subsequently evaluated by objective and 
impartial standards, applies in the case of a State resorting to self-defense and ought to be of 
general application to any form of coercion’. D. Bowett, ‘International Law and Economic 
Coercion’ in R. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order (Mitchie Company: 
1976) 87, 98.
1024 Van Gerven, op. cit., 61.
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general principle of law.1025 Proportionality in European law is used as a tool of 
judicial review concerning not only Community but also national measures of 
administrative and legislative character.1026 In applying the proportionality rule, 
the Court has identifi ed three elements, in particular the suitability and the neces-
sity of the measure under review and the absence of a disproportionate character. 
A measure meets the requirement of suitability whenever the means employed are 
suitable for the fulfi lment of the legitimate goal, while it is necessary whenever the 
adverse consequences of the measure on a legally protected interest are justifi ed in 
the light of the importance of the pursued goal.1027 
The criterion of proportionality varies according to whether the Court is called 
to review the proportionality of a specifi c Community measure or the proportion-
ality of a certain national measure. In the former case, what is under review is a 
private vis-à-vis a public interest and, in particular, the rights of the individuals 
affected by the Community measure, on the one hand, and Community interests, 
on the other. In this event, and although proportionality seeks to protect the rights 
of individuals, the proportionality of the measure is weighted on the basis of 
whether it is manifestly inappropriate to achieve its objectives or not. Whenever, 
however, it is the compatibility of a national measure with the fundamental free-
doms established under Community law that is under scrutiny, in the balance of 
proportionality there exists a national vis-à-vis a Community interest. The test in 
this case is much stricter and proportionality is measured by way of necessity. 
What matters here is whether the less restrictive measure has been opted for 
or not.1028 
Although there are several factors taken into account when determining pro-
portionality, such as the nature of the action taken, the degree of discretion of the 
authority taking the decision, the effects of the action and the type of the interests 
affected, the objective of the measure and the interests the measure aims to pro-
tect, the existence of alternative measures and the urgency of the situation, what is 
essentially in the focus of the ECJ is a balance between the objectives sought and 
the impact of the measure on individual rights. Tridimas notes in this regard that 
‘in Community law, far from dictating a uniform test, proportionality is a fl exible 
principle which is used in different contexts to protect different interests and entails 
varying degrees of judicial scrutiny’.1029 
1025 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfür- und Vorratsstelle Getreide, Case 11/70, European Court 
Reports (1970), Part II, 1125; Nold v Commission, Case 4/73, European Court Reports (1974), 
Part I, ECR 491, 513–14; United Kingdom v Council, Case C-84/94, European Court Reports I 
(1996), Parts 11–12, 5755; Hauer v Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, European Court Reports (1979), 
Part 3, 3727.
1026 F.G. Jacobs, ‘Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community 
Law’ in Ellis, op. cit., 1, 2–3; T. Tridimas, ‘Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for 
the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny’ in Ellis, op. cit., 65, 66.
1027 Tridimas, ibid, 68.
1028 Ibid, 66.
1029 Ibid, 69. 
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The issue of proportionality was also raised in the light of UN sanctions 
imposed against Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the Bosphorus case, one of the main 
concerns raised was whether the measures taken by Ireland in compliance with 
Regulation 990/93 were in violation of fundamental Community interests.1030 
The dispute arose as a result of an Irish ministerial order in the light of which one 
of two aircraft belonging to JAT, the Yugoslav national airline, but leased, fully 
managed and controlled by the Turkish Bosphorus Airline was impounded. When 
the case was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, Bosphorus Airline, which 
had agreed the payment of the rent into blocked accounts in order not to circum-
vent the sanctions, argued that the Regulation infringed its right to peaceful 
enjoyment of its property and its freedom to contact commercial activities and 
that it was disproportionate and manifestly unnecessary. 
The ECJ, having concluded that the rights in question did not have an absolute 
character, held that the essential interests of the international community to cease 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina supervened over the rights of Bosphorus. In any 
event, the impounding of the aircraft was neither inappropriate nor dispropor-
tionate.1031 
Similar questions were raised in the Ebony Maritime case.1032 The case in ques-
tion concerned a tanker, Lido II, fl ying the Maltese fl ag that had left Tunisia 
having as its destination Rijeka in Croatia and carrying a cargo of petroleum 
products. When, due to bad weather, the vessel decided to change its destination 
to Montenegro, it was coerced by NATO and WEU forces to sail back to Brindisi 
where it was handed to the Italian authorities. The latter ordered the impounding 
of the vessel and the confi scation of its cargo in compliance with the national mea-
sures taken to give effect to EC Regulation 990/93. The ECJ, while stressing that 
it belonged to the discretion of the member states to choose the penalties to be 
imposed for the violation of the regulation, emphasized that a penalty had to be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. It was accordingly up to the national court 
to decide whether the confi scation of the cargo irrespective of the degree of 
involvement fulfi lled these conditions. To determine this due consideration should 
be given to the objective of the regulation, which, in this case, was to bring to an 
end the humanitarian crisis caused by the war in the region. 
1030 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney-General, Case 
C-84/95, European Court Reports I (1996), Part 1, 3953.
1031 Ibid (67) and (69). A similar approach was taken by the ECtHR when the case was brought 
before it. In particular, the Court found that the protection of human rights within the European 
Union was ‘equivalent’ to the protection offered under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and agreed with the ECJ that the interference with the complainant’s right to property 
was not manifestly ‘defi cient’. On the question of proportionality, the Court held that the means 
used and the general interests pursued were not disproportionate. Accordingly, the interference 
with the applicant’s right to a peaceful enjoyment of its property was not in violation of article 1 
of Protocol 1 of ECHR. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, Application 
No. 45036/98, Grand Chamber Judgment, 30 June 2005, (149–50) and (155–57).
1032 Ebony Maritime and Boden Navigation v Prefetto della Provincia di Brindisi and Others, Case C-177/95, 
European Court Reports I (1997), Parts 1–2, 1111.
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The two cases reveal that the ECJ, in assessing proportionality, gave signifi cant 
weight to the public interest at stake. Proportionality was, therefore, assessed on 
the basis of the objective of the restrictive measures under scrutiny, on the one 
hand, as opposed to the interests and rights affected, on the other. 
3 The concept of proportionality in national law
This section will briefl y consider the elements taken into consideration for assess-
ing proportionality under French, German and UK law. While this examination 
is by no means exhaustive, it intends to show some of the fundamental aspects of 
the notion of proportionality that may be useful for the application of this princi-
ple in the international legal context.
German law has infl uenced the development of proportionality under EU law. 
In particular, German law associates proportionality with the suitability of the 
measure for the fulfi lment of the pursued objective, its necessity in the absence of 
other means available for the achievement of the pursued objective, and the lack 
of excessiveness/disproportionality with regard to the negative effects the measure 
creates.1033 More precisely, in order to evaluate whether the measure under scru-
tiny is necessary and proportionate, there is fi rst a weighing of the means used, the 
aims pursued and the interests the measure seeks to protect and, subsequently, 
these are weighed towards another interest that is safeguarded by another rule. The 
means used for the achievement of the specifi c objective are then examined with 
respect to whether they impose an excessive burden on that other interest.1034 
In France, proportionality gradually developed as a notion that takes into con-
sideration the motives, the purpose and the content of administrative action along 
with the balancing of interests, the existence of any discretionary powers and the 
importance of the protected interests.1035 
British courts, by way of contrast, rely on the test of unreasonableness accord-
ing to which the court will only interfere with a decision if no reasonable public 
authority could have adopted it.1036 The problem with this approach is that it is 
equally applicable to all cases irrespective of the nature of the rights involved in 
each particular case.1037
Despite this general approach, British courts are required to apply proportion-
ality in cases where an issue under Community law arises or whenever a right 
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights is involved. With 
the coming into force of the 1998 Human Rights Act, UK courts must refer 
to Strasbourg case law, although they are not obliged to follow it.1038 As far as 
1033 Van Gerven, op. cit., 44–5.
1034 Ibid, 45.
1035 Ibid, 51–2.
1036 The Rt Hon. Lord Hoffmann ‘The Infl uence of the European Principle of Proportionality upon 
UK Law’ in Ellis, op. cit., 107, 109.
1037 P. Craig, ‘Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law’ in Ellis, ibid, 85, 99–100.
1038 Feldman , op. cit., 121. Human Rights Act, Section 2.
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proportionality is formed in the light of the Strasbourg decisions, then the assess-
ment of proportionality will rely on three factors. The fi rst relates to the nature of 
the right to be affected with the interference: while some rights can be restricted, 
others cannot. The second has to do with the justifi cation, in other words the rea-
sons of the interference. Such reasons may vary from protection of the public 
order to protection of morals. The third factor concerns the source and form of 
the interference.1039 
With these considerations in mind, attention is next turned on the role of pro-
portionality in the law of use of armed force.
4 Proportionality in jus ad bellum and jus in bello
4.1 Introduction
There was a time in history when a state possessed a ‘right to every thing that can 
secure it from such a threatening danger, and to keep at a distance whatever is 
capable of causing its ruin’.1040 As Dinstein put it: ‘Once it was believed that when 
the cannons roar, the laws are silent.’1041 Nevertheless, the adoption of the UN 
Charter together with the formulation of international humanitarian law not only 
restrict the circumstances under which the use of force is justifi ed, but also regu-
late the conduct and the means allowed during an armed confl ict. 
It is necessary, however, to make a clear distinction between the law of the 
use of force (  jus ad bellum) and the law of armed confl ict (  jus in bello). While the 
former relates to whether a state possesses a right to use force against another 
state, the latter concerns the rules applicable in war and more precisely the manner 
in which a war can be conducted. Both fi elds are restricted by the principle 
of proportionality, although in each case proportionality is assessed based on 
different criteria. 
The resort to force (  jus ad bellum), whether taken in self-defence or after Security 
Council authorization, must not be disproportionate to the ‘legitimate ends of 
force’.1042 Proportionality, in this case, is determined based on the reasons of using 
armed force, in other words, whether or not a specifi c forceful response is for 
repelling an armed attack. Here the purpose of proportionality is to allow a state 
to defend itself while eliminating to the extent possible the adverse effects to inter-
national peace and security and to the international community as a whole.1043 
Proportionality in jus in bello, by way of contrast, is related to the rule that during 
an armed confl ict the parties involved do not have unlimited freedom as to the 
1039 Ibid, 137–9.
1040 E. Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Sections 16–18 in K.R. Stevens, Border 
Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod Affairs in Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1837–1842 
(University of Alabama Press: 1989) 25. 
1041 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Confl ict (CUP: 2004) 1.
1042 J.G. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (CUP: 2004)10–11.
1043 Ibid, 16.
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means and methods they may use and the injury they may infl ict on the enemy.1044 
Here, instead, proportionality is built on humanitarian considerations and a 
further distinction is made according to which proportionality is viewed under 
a different lens when concerning combatants and civilians.1045 Quite signifi cantly, 
the fact that proportionality is consistent with jus ad bellum does not preclude 
responsibility if a response is not at the same time proportionate in jus in bello and 
vice versa.1046 
The determination of proportionality in the law of the use of force and the law 
of armed confl ict gains all the more signifi cance, especially in view of the risks 
envisaged from a possible escalation of the confl ict and its tragic effects in respect 
of loss of lives and destruction caused. Proportionality in this context aims to for-
mulate the scope and intensity of, and the effects to derive from, the use of force 
in general.
4.2 Jus ad bellum
The right to self-defence does not give unlimited powers to the state invoking it. 
The fact that a state has been the victim of an armed attack does not entitle it to 
resort to more force than necessary to achieve the lawful objective, namely the 
repeal of the attack. That the use of force must comply with the principle of pro-
portionality is a principle well established in international law. Proportionality in 
this respect is not confi ned to the context of a strict relationship between initial 
attack and response, since there may be occasions where an equivalent or even 
identical use of force may not suffi ce to bring termination of the wrongful act.1047 
In addition, proportionality looks at what is necessary to secure the objectives 
pursued, namely to halt and repel the attack.1048 In this regard, the proportionality 
of a given forcible conduct will be assessed in light of its ability to bring about the 
desired result.1049 
Accordingly, any action taken in response to an unlawful attack must be 
restricted in terms of both intensity and magnitude to what is necessary for the 
fulfi lment of the set objectives. It may also be argued that the injured state may 
1044 Ibid, 17.
1045 Ibid, 14, 16–17. 
1046 Ibid, 11. Also see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., 245 (42).
1047 K.H. Kaikobad, ‘Self-defence, Enforcement Action and the Gulf Wars 1980–88 and 1990–91’ 
63 BYIL (1992) 299, 316.
1048 Eighth Report on State Responsibility (Ago) Addendum, YbILC (1980), Vol. II, Part One, 69. 
Also see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua, (1986), op. cit., 367 (212). 
1049 Eighth Report on State Responsibility (Ago) Addendum ibid, 69. This view is endorsed by Greig 
(1976) op. cit., 887 in Kaikobad, op. cit., 316–7; M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, The International 
Law of War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order (Martinus Nijhoff: 1994) 241–42.
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take such action as necessary to guarantee that its territorial integrity is not threat-
ened again in the future.1050 
Yet, no unanimity exists on the matter as some authors place the emphasis on 
the initial danger,1051 while others on the injury infl icted.1052 Kaikobad suggests 
that evaluating proportionality is not an easy task. This is because there are a 
number of other factors to be taken into consideration such as the nature and scale 
of the attack but also the ‘vital interests’ at stake, thus giving a certain degree of 
relativity and subjectivity to the notion of proportionality.1053 
4.3 Jus in bello
Otherwise known as international humanitarian law, jus in bello comprises norms 
the purpose of which is to balance the military necessity, on the one hand and 
humanitarian considerations, on the other. While jus in bello has been formulated 
out of the need to restrict to the extent possible human suffering during an armed 
confl ict, it has also been accustomed to the realities that emerge during war.1054 
The requirement of proportionality as an essential component of the law of 
armed confl ict can be traced not only in customary international law but also in 
conventional law, in particular in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I adopted in 1977.1055 
According to this provision, an attack expected to cause incidental loss of, and 
injury to civilian life and which would be excessive in relation to the military 
advantage anticipated will be disproportionate.1056 
Three factors seem to be relevant in determining the content of proportionality 
in jus in bello, namely, the selection of the target, the means and methods of the 
attack and whether unnecessary loss of civilian life has been carried out in com-
parison to the military advantage pursued. Yet, the weakening of the military 
advantage of the enemy may not be an adequate or satisfactory criterion in deter-
mining proportionality. It is noted in this respect that short-term effects may 
arguably not be suffi cient to lead to the conclusion that a certain response was 
proportionate or not. On the contrary, long-term effects on population or envi-
ronment must also be taken into consideration while proportionality should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis rather than cumulatively.1057 
1050 C. Wicker, ‘The Scope of Proportionality in the Right of Self-defence and in the Law of 
International Counter-measures’, A dissertation submitted to the University of Durham for the 
degree of LLM in International and European Legal Studies (2002) 18.
1051 D. Bowett, Self-defence in International Law (Manchester University Press: 1958) 269.
1052 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How to Use It (Clarendon: 1994) 231.
1053 Kaikobad, op. cit., 317.
1054 Dinstein (2004), op. cit., 17.
1055 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Confl icts (Protocol I) 1977, Laws of Armed Confl icts 423, 
430–1.
1056 Ibid.
1057 J.G. Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ 87 AJIL (1993) No. 3, 391, 409.
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4.4 Proportionality in state practice and judicial review
The dispute between the United States and Great Britain over the Caroline Incident 
is considered to have set the structures for the development of the principles of 
necessity and proportionality under the UN Charter.1058 The incident was evoked 
in 1837 when British forces set the Caroline, an American vessel that was docked 
in American waters, on fi re. The vessel had been allegedly involved in providing 
war assistance to rebels who were at the time fi ghting against British colonialism 
in Canada. As a consequence, one American citizen lost his life. Although the US 
president described the incident as a serious violation of American territory, he 
confi ned action to strengthening border controls and to seeking reparation.1059 
When, however, a British subject was later arrested by the state of New York for 
his involvement in the incident, the British government responded immediately 
demanding for his release. It was specifi cally noted that the act with which he was 
charged had a public character and it was necessary to defend the territories and 
the subjects of Great Britain.1060 
In its response, the US government asserted that the principle of the inviolabil-
ity of the territory of a foreign state could only be legitimately violated and 
therefore justifi ed, if it were the result of ‘absolute necessity’. Although the 
American government clearly questioned the necessity of the British response, it 
demanded the British government to show that it had done nothing ‘unreasonable 
or excessive’, in other words, disproportionate and that its action was not only 
necessary but it also did not go beyond that necessity.1061
Although the two notions of necessity and proportionality are closely related, 
they are two separate and independent concepts. Accordingly, as already pointed 
out, the fact that the necessity for certain action is proved does not automatically 
mean that the action is also proportionate either to the injury suffered or to the 
aim pursued. The British government was requested to demonstrate that the 
attack on the vessel was justifi ed, in other words, that it was necessary to use force. 
It was also required to show that the action taken was the most appropriate for 
achieving its purpose, which is associated with the question as to whether the force 
used were proportionate. From the US response, it can also be inferred that there 
was some reference to jus in bello as questions emerged regarding the manner in 
which the attack was carried out, as to whether alternative action was unavailable 
and the fact that it was indiscriminate. 
The British government responded that its action was necessary and limited to 
that necessity.1062 However, and although the necessity for action has also been 
1058 The Caroline Incident, 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1840–41) 1129 and 30 British and 
Foreign State Papers (1841–42) 195. Also see Gardam (2004) op. cit., 40.
1059 Stevens, op. cit., 1372–3, 1376–7.
1060 Correspondence of Mr Fox to Mr Webster, March 1841 in British and Foreign State Papers 
(1840–41) Vol. 29, 1127.
1061 Ibid, 1138.
1062 Lord Ashburton to Mr Webster in British and Foreign State Papers (1841–42) Vol. 30, 196.
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disputed,1063 the question that remains is whether the particular action taken, in 
its extent and severity, was the most appropriate under the circumstances in order 
to cease the aggressive activities in which the vessel was allegedly engaged and as 
to whether alternative milder means would not be suffi cient. 
In the Corfu Channel case, which concerned a dispute between Albania and the 
United Kingdom, Albania argued that minesweeping undertaken by the British 
Navy without its consent was a violation of its sovereignty. The minesweeping 
took place a few weeks after the explosion of two mines in the North Corfu 
Channel resulting in the destruction of two ships belonging to the British Navy 
and the loss of many lives.1064 Although the ICJ refused to recognize a right of 
intervention in the territory of another state for collecting evidence, it held that the 
way with which the operation for the minesweeping was carried out was not ‘out 
of proportion to the requirements of the sweep’.1065 It seems that the Court, in its 
consideration of the British action and as to whether it conformed to the require-
ment of proportionality, took into account the objective of the operation, namely 
the minesweeping of the area. 
In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 
the ICJ was called to consider, among other things, whether American military 
assistance to groups acting in and against Nicaragua was proportionate.1066 
Having rejected that the US action was carried out in self-defence in the absence 
of an armed attack on Nicaragua’s part, the Court concluded that, in any event, 
such action, including the mining and attacking of Nicaraguan ports and 
oil installations was neither necessary nor proportionate.1067 As the Court acknowl-
edged, the exercise of the right to self-defence must be subject to proportionality 
and necessity, ‘a rule well established in customary international law.’1068 The 
Court therefore upheld that proportionality in self-defence is linked to what is 
required to repel the attack and that, accordingly, the US action was not in pro-
portion to the act that provoked it, namely, the aid and assistance provided by 
Nicaragua to the Salvadorian contras.1069 
1063 Stevens, op. cit., 35–6.
1064 Corfu Channel case, Merits, op. cit., 4. 
1065 Ibid, 35.
1066 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1984), op. cit., 392; Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (1986), op. cit., 14. 
1067 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (1986), ibid, 122 (237). 
According to the Court the alleged support of the armed opposition in El Salvador, Honduras 
and Costa Rica by Nicaragua could not justify countermeasures by a third state, neither did it 
amount to armed attack to justify collective self-defence. Further, the US action could be justi-
fi ed in response to Nicaragua’s intervention in the internal affairs of states other than the United 
States. In responding further to the US allegations that that there were extensive human rights 
violations in Nicaragua the Court dismissed the use of force as being an appropriate means to 
address such violations. See paras 249, 268. 
1068 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (1986), ibid, 94 (176). 
1069 Also see analysis in Gardam (2004), op. cit., 158.
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Concerns were further expressed with respect to the conformity of the use 
of nuclear weapons with the principle of proportionality, a question raised before 
the ICJ in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case.1070 In its Advisory 
Opinion, the Court, having concluded that there was no customary or conven-
tional rule of international law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 
focused its attention on the law of the UN Charter and the law of armed confl ict. 
In its view, these were the most relevant fi elds for the determination of whether 
the use or threat of nuclear weapons was permitted, in view of the particularly 
catastrophic consequences to derive therefrom. 
Reaffi rming the principle that the right to self-defence was subject to the rules 
of proportionality and necessity as ruled in the Nicaragua case, the Court stressed 
that proportionality, by itself, did not outlaw the use of nuclear weapons as the 
response should be viewed in the light of the armed confl ict (  jus in bello). With 
specifi c reference to international humanitarian law, the Court highlighted that 
this fi nds expression in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which include 
the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and the 
Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949 and the Additional Protocols 
of 1977. 
These instruments make clear that the right of belligerents to infl ict injury on 
the enemy is signifi cantly restricted with as a result the limitation of the means that 
can be used during armed confl ict, while the civilian population is immune from 
acts of reprisal. It is derived from these instruments that certain types of weapons 
are prohibited if they infl ict unnecessary suffering in comparison to the pursued 
legitimate military objectives and make diffi cult the distinction between combat-
ants and non-combatants. For the Court, the prohibition of superfl uous injury or 
unnecessary suffering on combatants constitutes a ‘cardinal principle’, which, as 
a consequence, bans certain weapons, irrespective of whether this is specifi cally 
provided under a treaty or not.1071 
The Court deduced that the body of rules of international humanitarian law 
and the obligations arising therefrom applied also to the use or threat of nuclear 
weapons (  jus in bello) and that the use or threat of nuclear weapons should comply 
with Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter (  jus ad bellum). However, the Court felt 
unable to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would be 
incompatible with the rules of humanitarian law (  jus in bello), although it did rec-
ognize that nuclear weapons bore such characteristics that made them ‘scarcely 
reconcilable’ with the rules prohibiting unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate 
attacks. At the same time, the Court highlighted the right of each state to protect 
itself, thus leaving it to be inferred that the right to self-defence would prevail over 
humanitarian law should the need emerge. 
Undoubtedly, the Opinion left a feeling of disappointment since it did not miti-
gate the fears of a possible nuclear war by setting the most stringent conditions for 
1070 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit. 
1071 Ibid, 257 (78), (79). 
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the permissibility of nuclear weapons in the light of the considerations and prohi-
bitions under the law of armed confl ict. As Dinstein further observes, the inability 
of the Court to resolve the matter as to whether the use of nuclear weapons ‘in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would 
be at stake’1072 would be permissible is diffi cult to accept. This is because ‘it appears 
to be utterly inconsistent with the basic tenet that LOIAC (  jus in bello) applies 
equally to all belligerent States, irrespective of the merits of their cause pursuant 
to jus ad bellum’.1073 
The use of nuclear weapons raises concerns both in respect of unnecessary 
suffering but also of indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian losses. 
Most important, the Court with its opinion leaves a legal gap with which the 
requirement of proportionality, so important in both jus ad bellum and, especially, 
in jus in bello, is circumvented.1074 Although one can see the justifi cation of nuclear 
weapons under certain circumstances in the law of the use of force where propor-
tionality is measured in accordance with the military objective to repel the initial 
attack, it is diffi cult to see how their use can be reconciled with the law of armed 
confl ict. This is particularly so as many of the rules provided under humanitarian 
law are considered to have a peremptory character.
5 Proportionality in the law of countermeasures
5.1 In search of international enforcement
The general prohibition of the use of force as a means of settling state disputes has 
not eliminated the threats and dangers with which the international community 
is faced. Countermeasures, in particular, may become such a strong weapon in 
the hands of those states using them that the imposition of the most stringent 
conditions regarding their use is an essential prerequisite if they are not to become 
an instrument of vengeance. This is particularly so since as noted the main char-
acteristic of the international legal community is the non-existence of central 
compulsory judicial and enforcement mechanisms. It was acknowledged by 
Mr Arangio-Ruiz that: 
[T]he matter has been rightly recognized as also being of great importance in 
legally controlling resort to non-forcible measures. Although less dramatic 
1072 See in this regard the conclusions of the Court, ibid, 263 (97). 
1073 Dinstein (2004), op. cit., 78.
1074 On indiscriminate attacks see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., 586 and 588 (17) and (24). For the position that contemporary interna-
tional law does not provide for an exception when the life of the nation is threatened, see 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
op. cit., 377 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
op. cit., 556, 560–3. 
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and harmful, such measures can be equally detrimental to the preservation of 
friendly relations and the development of cooperation among States.1075 
In a community structured on the basis of sovereign equality of states no state can 
claim that it has been entrusted with world enforcement and punitive powers as 
against the rest. The notion of proportionality comprises an integral part of the 
law of countermeasures. No response can be regarded as lawful if it is dispropor-
tionate, as with it the rights of the wrongdoing state and the international 
community as a whole are aimed to be protected. The wrongdoing state is pro-
tected because proportionality secures that there will be no violation of its own 
rights in respect of the aims set, the means used and the effects to be derived from 
the response. The international community is also protected because proportion-
ality provides an indication when a certain act ceases to be a reestablishment 
of legality, and seeks to achieve goals that are unlawful per se, for instance the 
punishment of the wrongdoer. The latter can never be a legitimate objective, nor 
can it safeguard international law, peace and security. Quite the contrary, as 
history has shown with Germany’s exclusion from the League of Nations and the 
imposition against it of heavy compensation demands and sanctions of a punitive 
character as a result of its role in World War I, the measures against it did not 
prevent it from further pursuing its aggressive policies. This led to yet more human 
suffering and devastation borne out of World War II. This is the reason that in the 
aftermath of World War II the objective was not the punishment but rather the 
rehabilitation of Germany. 
Furthermore, the varied interests of states in the international legal arena, but 
also the factual inequality of states, make the need for legal restraint even more 
compelling. This reality is best described in the words of McDougal and Feliciano, 
who pointed out that:
The ‘establishment of a civil society which generally administers the law’ has 
been described as ‘mankind’s most diffi cult problem’. In a community of 
States affl icted with clashing conceptions of the appropriate ends of law and 
civil society, whose largest arena is a military arena of multiplying devices that 
promise both infernal destruction and access to the heavens, the establishment 
of a society generally administering a law adequately expressing the deepest 
aspirations of the world’s peoples for freedom, security and abundance – the 
establishment, in other words, of a world public order of human dignity – is 
truly a problem of the most heroic proportions.1076
It is the varied perception of the world order by states that make them fear foreign 
intervention and strongly upkeep the notion of sovereignty that they refuse to 
abandon. It is for these reasons that contemporary international law confi nes itself 
1075 Third Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz), op. cit., 18 (52).
1076 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (YUP: 1961) 261.
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at establishing a minimum order that prohibits unauthorized coercion and vio-
lence. As early as 1958 Professor Brierly pointed out that what differentiated 
municipal from international law was not the lack of sanctions in international 
law, but the fact that the sanction mechanisms under municipal law are organized 
and systematic, while in international law there is a lack of an organized sanction-
imposing system. As a consequence: ‘The true problem for consideration is 
therefore not whether we should try to create sanctions for international law, but 
whether we should try to organize them in a system.’1077 
In the absence of such a centralized international legal system, states are 
empowered to become the guardians of their own rights and are entitled to resort 
to unilateral, peaceful measures in order to induce termination of the wrong com-
mitted against them and the compliance of the wrongdoing state with its obligations 
that derive as a result. Nevertheless, the international community is now called on 
to face new challenges with respect to serious violations of fundamental interests 
owed to the international community as a whole or to a group of states. The lack 
of compulsory judicial and enforcement mechanisms has put at risk the very effec-
tiveness of international law and has fed a controversial debate as to whether 
states not injured are or should be entitled to take action in the form of counter-
measures in order to bring to an end these violations. 
At the same time, the acceptance of a right to solidarity measures has not been 
without its sceptics. Professor Koskenniemi argues, for example, that in view of 
the unwillingness of states to commit themselves to clear-cut defi nitions of notions 
such as erga omnes obligations, serious breaches or the fundamental interests of the 
international community, which may in the future trigger ‘automaticity’ of action 
and their preference for fl exible terminology allowing them discretion for the pro-
tection of their national interests should such a need arise in the future, makes the 
danger of abuse of solidarity measures apparent. It is therefore imperative that 
resort to such measures is restricted.1078 
Undoubtedly, the entitlement of all states to resort to such measures raises sig-
nifi cant questions regarding proportionality. In the light of the ILC’s conclusion 
that there currently exists no rule allowing solidarity measures in international 
law, the question of proportionality of such measures was neglected. It is, thus, 
imperative, in view of the signifi cance of the matter, to consider whether the 
notion of proportionality as advanced in the Final Articles regarding countermea-
sures by injured states could apply to assess the proportionality of solidarity 
measures. It does not matter that the ILC did not acknowledge the existence of 
such a right, unlike the conclusions of this study. The fact that it left the subject to 
the progressive development of international law, but also the frequent resort to 
such measures by states, makes such consideration essential to ensure that the 
1077 J. Brierly, ‘Sanctions in International Law’ in H. Lauterpacht and M.H.C. Waldock (eds) 
The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers of the late James Leslie Brierly (OUP: 1959) 
202 in ibid, 296, fn 71. 
1078 Koskenniemi (2001), op. cit., 349–50, 355.
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dangers of abuse are eliminated. For this purpose, and in order to mitigate the 
fears of many states regarding authorization of countermeasures by states other 
than the injured, it is necessary to reduce, to the extent possible, the risks of abuse 
by those states that are favoured in terms of military and economic strength. 
5.2 Legal constraints of countermeasures
Leaving aside for the time being the question of whether countermeasures by a 
state other than the injured are permissible or not, it should not be forgotten that 
countermeasures, constituting an internationally wrongful act themselves, excep-
tionally entitle a state whose rights have been violated to suspend the performance 
of its own obligations towards the wrongdoing state. The purpose of such non-
performance is, according to Article 49 of the Final Articles, to induce the 
compliance of the wrongdoing state regarding cessation and reparation.1079 The 
Final Articles also acknowledge that countermeasures need not be reciprocal in 
character, deviating in this way from the maxim an eye for an eye, since reciproc-
ity, while it could at times comply with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, could also collide with them in given circumstances, thus endan-
gering fundamental principles of international law. 
Countermeasures, which must not involve the use of force, must be temporary 
in character, a principle affi rmed by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case. As 
already seen in Chapter 4, the Court in that case differentiated between the sus-
pension or termination of a treaty as a consequence of a material breach as 
provided under Article 60 of the 1969 VCLT, on the one hand, and suspension of 
the performance of obligations by way of countermeasures under the law on state 
responsibility, on the other. Countermeasures are therefore taken for the fulfi l-
ment of a certain aim and must be terminated as soon as this aim is accomplished.1080 
Furthermore, for the legality of countermeasures to remain uncontested, they 
must solely be directed against the wrongdoing state, they must not be aimed at 
infl icting punishment, while their effects must be reversible as far as possible. The 
latter means that if the state resorting to countermeasures has to select between 
many effective measures, it must select those that would allow resumption of the 
performance of the obligations once they are terminated.1081
Moreover, the Final Articles make clear that countermeasures are prohibited 
with respect to obligations arising from the UN Charter concerning the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force, obligations regarding the protection of fundamental 
human rights, obligations of a humanitarian nature banning reprisals and obliga-
tions arising from jus cogens norms.1082 The universal signifi cance of human rights, 
1079 Report of the International Law Commission (2000), op. cit., 51 (296).
1080 Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997) op. cit., (47); Crawford (2002), op. cit., 282–3.
1081 Ibid, 283.
1082 Ibid, 288.
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as this is refl ected from the several international instruments existing for their pro-
tection, could also not leave unaffected the development of countermeasures. 
Special Rapporteur Professor Crawford had also proposed a further provision 
prohibiting extreme political or economic coercion that aimed to endanger the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the wrongdoing state or which 
would amount to interference in its domestic affairs,1083 a proposition not fi nally 
followed by the ILC. Instead, in the commentary of fi nal Article 50(1)(b) concern-
ing the requirement of respect of international human rights, reference is made to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which pro-
vides for a distinction between exercising economic and political pressure for 
compliance with international law and infl icting suffering on vulnerable groups 
within the targeted state.1084 It can, therefore, be inferred from this that particu-
larly burdensome countermeasures will be assessed in the context of the obligations 
requiring respect for fundamental human rights. 
Article 50(2) of the Final Articles further provides that a state resorting to coun-
termeasures is still under a duty to fulfi l its obligations under any dispute settlement 
procedure existing between itself and the wrongdoing state that is related to the 
dispute in question and under diplomatic and consular law. 
It is within this context that proportionality should be assessed, as the consider-
ations just analyzed narrow signifi cantly what it may be done by way of 
countermeasures and they make the scope of proportionality very small. As it can 
be inferred, a state whose rights or legal interests have been violated is limited by 
certain conditions as to what it can do in response, excluding the restrictions men-
tioned earlier. Proportionality provides what the state is entitled to achieve and 
keeps the notion of countermeasures clear from punitive elements.1085 This is 
exactly where the principle of proportionality gains signifi cance. As Professor 
Crawford has pointed out, proportionality is the sine qua non of the legality of 
countermeasures,1086 while it serves to restrict the intensity and nature of unilat-
eral power that legitimizes what in other circumstances would be illegitimate and 
therefore safeguarding the own rights of the defaulting state.1087 At the same time, 
it aims to bring legal certainty and predictability in international relations by set-
ting the conditions with which excessiveness of a certain action can be measured 
and assessed. 
Furthermore, proportionality draws a line between the internationally wrongful 
act and the countermeasures resorted to, while it may be related to the purpose 
pursued by the latter. As the ILC observes in its commentary to Article 51 of the 
Final Articles a disproportionate response may have been unnecessary in inducing 
1083 Report of the International Law Commission (2000), op. cit., 52 (301).
1084 Crawford (2002), op. cit., 289.
1085 Zoller, op. cit., 135.
1086 Report of the International Law Commission (2000), op. cit., 53, (305).
1087 E. Cannizzaro, ‘The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures’ 12 
EJIL (2001), 889, 890.
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the compliance of the wrongdoer with its international obligations, namely cessa-
tion and reparation. Yet proportionality may render unlawful countermeasures 
that although necessary to bring the compliance of the defaulting state were not 
proportionate.1088 
One of the main concerns regarding countermeasures in general and propor-
tionality in particular is that they are assessed by the state resorting to such measures. 
The view has therefore been taken that proportionality should be more precisely 
formulated.1089 Here again emerges the question as to what countermeasures must 
be proportionate. While earlier sections dealt with an overview of proportionality 
in the context of EU, national legal systems and the law of armed confl ict, the 
following sections will focus on the content of proportionality in the law of coun-
termeasures. An additional question that will be raised is how proportionality 
would or should be assessed, in the context of solidarity measures. 
5.3 Concept of proportionality in the work of the ILC
The prohibition of the use of armed force as a means of resolution of international 
disputes, as refl ected in customary international law but also in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter and General Assembly Resolution 2625 on the Friendly Relations of 
States,1090 played a determinative role in the further development of the concept 
of countermeasures. One of the main concerns in view of the decentralized char-
acter of the international legal order, however, has been the outlining of the legal 
restraints of countermeasures. As pointed out by Mr Riphagen, no matter how 
serious the initial wrongdoing, the offender has certain rights that no one can 
violate in response. In his opinion, this rule constitutes a negative statement of the 
rule of proportionality according to which:
[T]he author state does not, by the mere fact of committing any breach of any 
obligation, become an ‘outlaw’. Rather, the rules of international law deter-
mine the legal consequences of the breach, i.e. the possible responses, including 
the new obligations of the author State. These responses are not necessarily 
strictly proportional to the breach. They may involve legal consequences 
having a serious impact on the sovereignty of the author State, as, for example, 
in the case of a response against aggression committed by the author State. But 
the point is that even the most serious ‘international crime’ (in the sense of 
art. 19 of part 1 of the draft) does not in itself – i.e. automatically – deprive the 
author State of its sovereignty as such.1091
1088 Crawford (2002), op. cit., 296.
1089 Report of the International Law Commission (2000), op. cit., 56 (333).
1090 General Assembly Resolution on Friendly Relations 2625 (1970), op. cit.
1091 Second Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 86 (60).
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At the ILC, it was acknowledged that the application of countermeasures as a 
response to a prior breach in order to preclude the wrongfulness and therefore the 
responsibility of the responding state should be commensurate to the injury suf-
fered by the initial offence.1092 
For Mr Riphagen, however, the source (i.e. customary, conventional or other), the 
content, the purpose and the object of an obligation that has been infringed cannot 
but infl uence the legal consequences of the breach (qualitative proportionality). 
Moreover, the factual circumstances under which a breach occurred are also rel-
evant for the response such as the seriousness of the wrongful act and its effects on 
the interests of another state. Such circumstances may aggravate or extenuate the 
responsibility of the author state, in other words, the legal consequences deriving 
from the wrongful act (quantitative proportionality). It is accordingly imperative to 
fi nd equivalence between the actual effects of the internationally wrongful act and 
the actual effects of the legal consequences. Therefore: 
A manifest ‘quantitative disproportionality’ between breach and legal conse-
quences should be avoided, but, while this principle can appear in a set of 
general draft articles on State responsibility, a further elaboration must be left 
to the States, international organizations or organs for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes which may be called upon to apply those articles.1093
Mr Riphagen further suggested that when assessing the lawfulness of specifi c 
countermeasures, it is important to take into account the seriousness of the viola-
tion, on the one hand, and the seriousness of the sanction taken, on the other, 
although there can be ‘no perfect correlation’ between breach and response in 
international law.1094 Nevertheless, ‘translating quantity in terms of quality and 
vice versa’, as characteristically was pointed out, is not an easy task. This is 
especially when the new legal relationship established because of the initial wrong-
ful act does not merely establish an obligation for restitutio in integrum, but 
also authorizes the injured state to resort to countermeasures or even creates 
a right or a duty for third states to adopt a non-neutral position towards the 
defaulting state.1095 
In 1969 the ILC identifi ed two factors that were signifi cant for determining 
proportionality. The fi rst related to the greater or lesser importance of the infringed 
norms to the international community, while the second concerned the greater or 
lesser seriousness of the breach.1096
It was suggested in this regard that in determining the legal regime of responsi-
bility, that is the legal consequences arising because of an internationally wrongful 
1092 Eighth Report on State Responsibility (Ago), op. cit., 40 (82).
1093 Third Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 46 (1). 
1094 Second Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 84–5 (49).
1095 Preliminary Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 128 (95).
1096 In Second Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 84 (47).
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act, it was not enough to draw a list of the new legal relationships and categorize 
such legal consequences in a scale of strength. Neither was it satisfactory when 
choosing which legal consequences are more appropriate in each particular case 
to merely draw proportionality in the light of the breach and the response. This 
led Mr Riphagen to propose that in addition to the scale of consequences in accor-
dance to their strength, a substantive criterion was also required and, in particular, 
a scale of values affected from both the breach and the response.1097 Nevertheless, 
a scale of values necessarily fell within the ambit of the primary rules, something 
that the Commission repeatedly precluded in Part 1 of its Draft Articles, with the 
exception, perhaps, of Article 19 and with what it named as ‘international crimes’. 
However, as Mr Riphagen noted, even in the case of international crimes 
there existed different legal consequences to be chosen from for each particular 
situation.1098 
For determining the legal consequences to be applied in a case of a violation 
and of estimating proportionality, Mr Riphagen recommended to do so by way of 
approximation taking into account a scale of possible responses, on the one hand, 
and the general rule of proportionality between the actual breach and the actual 
response, on the other. At the same time, he acknowledged that the seriousness of 
the situation created as a result of the violation might entail a stronger and more 
serious response. To achieve that, Mr Riphagen suggested three restrictions in 
relation to the protection given to the object of the response by the rules of inter-
national law; the connection between the object of the breach and the object of 
the response; and the existence of a form of international organization lato sensu 
covering the situation. According to him, these requirements provided for fl exibil-
ity when determining the question of proportionality. 
Nevertheless, it was also suggested that the wrongful act might, in fact, be 
of such negligible signifi cance so ‘its breach’ does not entail all the legal 
consequences provided by the secondary rules for that particular act. As 
Mr Riphagen remarked, ‘the mirror-image of this immediate appreciation of a 
particular set of factual circumstances is the principle of law called the principle of 
proportionality’.1099 
When Mr Arangio-Ruiz later examined the issue of proportionality, the atten-
tion was turned to the determination of the real objective of countermeasures in 
each particular case.1100 However, when defi ning the notion of proportionality in 
relation to countermeasures, Mr Arangio-Ruiz, unlike his predecessor, rejected 
that it was appropriate to refer to terms such as ‘manifestly disproportionate’, 
since there was a risk of introducing subjective and ambiguous elements into 
the notion. Instead, he opted for terms such as ‘out of proportion’ or simply 
1097 Preliminary Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit., 129 (98).
1098 Ibid. 
1099 Third Report on State Responsibility (Riphagen), op. cit.,32 (65).
1100 See in this regard Report of the Commission (1992), op. cit., 31 (215). Also see analysis in Third 
Report (Arangio-Ruiz), op. cit., (37) et seq.
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‘disproportionate’. As for the criteria required for the assessment of proportional-
ity Mr Arangio-Ruiz stressed that it would not suffi ce to take into account merely 
the damage caused by the wrongful act (quantitative element). An additional, 
qualitative element should also be taken into consideration and, more specifi cally, 
the importance of the interest/right protected by the infringed rule, and the seri-
ousness of the breach. As a consequence, Mr Arangio-Ruiz proposed Draft Article 
13 according to which: ‘Any measure taken by an injured State under articles 11 
and 12 shall not be out of proportion to the gravity of the internationally wrongful 
act and of the effects thereof.’1101 
The next Special Rapporteur, Professor James Crawford, turned his attention 
to the aims to be pursued by countermeasures ascertaining that it was necessary to 
legally restrict these. Emphasis was therefore given to the coercive character of 
countermeasures. Accordingly, the ILC accepted as lawful countermeasures 
whose purpose is strictly to bring compliance with the obligations of the wrongdo-
ing state borne out of its wrongful act. This view is refl ected in Article 49 of the 
Final Articles, according to which, an injured state is entitled to resort to counter-
measures only for inducing the wrongdoer to comply with its obligations, namely, 
the cessation of the wrongful act, the provision of safeguards of non-repetition and 
reparation for the injury caused (Part 2 of the Final Articles). 
Article 51 of the Final Articles provides that: ‘Countermeasures must be com-
mensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the 
internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.’ Cannizzaro notes, in this 
regard, that despite the change of perception regarding the nature of countermea-
sures, Article 51 does not correspond to this change because in effect it envisages 
a relationship between breach and response.1102 Therefore, if the ILC wished to 
focus on the coercive nature of countermeasures, then it should have defi ned pro-
portionality as a relation between the intensity of the constraint and the gravity of 
the initial breach. Moreover, Cannizzaro argues that it is improper to put all 
countermeasures under the same category, namely that they all aim at the coer-
cion of the wrongdoing party, as it does not give fl exibility or establish a link 
between the aim pursued and the means used.1103 
In addition to this, White and Abass note that, if proportionality were assessed 
on the basis of the injury caused, this would imply that the purpose of counter-
measures is to punish the recalcitrant state, something explicitly precluded under 
the Final Articles and that, as a result, there seems to be a contradiction in the 
position of the ILC.1104 Although the author shares these thoughts, it is also impor-
tant to stress that proportionality cannot be completely disassociated from the 
initial breach. 
1101 Fourth Report on State Responsibility (Arangio-Ruiz), op. cit., 35. 
1102 In Crawford (2002), op. cit., 294. Also see Bederman (2002), op. cit., 822.
1103 Cannizzaro (2001), op. cit., 893–4.
1104 White and Abass, op. cit., 516.
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5.4  Development of proportionality in the law 
of countermeasures 
Reprisals, as measures short of war taken by one state against another, made their 
appearance in the second half of the 19th century.1105 According to Oppenheim, 
reprisals constituted ‘such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of 
one State against another as are exceptionally permitted for the purpose of com-
pelling the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by 
its own international delinquency’.1106
The question of proportionality was discussed in the Naulilaa incident between 
Germany and Portugal in 1928, although the concept of proportionality as out-
lawing reprisals which were disproportionate to the act that provoked them was 
not previously unknown to academic commentary.1107 The Arbitration Tribunal 
established in this case with the agreement of the two states parties to the dispute 
was called to determine whether the reprisals taken in that course were grossly 
disproportionate. 
The incident between the two countries was evoked when, in October 1914, 
some members of a Portuguese frontier post in Naulilaa killed three German offi -
cers and wounded two others. In retaliation, the governor of German South-West 
Africa ordered German forces to attack and destroy forts and posts in the 
Portuguese territory that were as a result abandoned and later looted by the native 
population. The two countries reached an agreement for the establishment of an 
arbitration tribunal in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles to try 
claims concerning acts of the German government since July 1914 and before 
Portugal’s accession to the war. The Tribunal, having concluded that the Portuguese 
action to kill the German offi cers was a mistake and as a result did not constitute a 
wrongful act, held that reprisals constituted an act of self-help of the injured state 
in retaliation to a violation of international law and that it had to comply with 
proportionality. More specifi cally, the Tribunal stressed that reprisals:
[H]ave for object to suspend momentarily, in the relations between the two 
states, the observance of such or such a rule of international law. They are 
limited by the rules of humanity and good faith applicable in the relations of 
state to state….They tend to impose on the offending state reparation for the 
offence or the return to legality and avoidance of new offences. This defi ni-
tion does not require that the reprisal be proportioned to the offence.1108 
The Tribunal further noted on the question of proportionality that according 
to the German doctrine of reprisals, these did not need to be proportionate to 
1105 Gardam (2004), op. cit., 46.
1106 Cited in Gardam (2004), op. cit., 46.
1107 In Zoller, op. cit., 125.
1108 Case Concerning the Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese Colonies of South Africa 
(Portugal v Germany) – The Naulilaa Incident, op. cit., 951. 
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the offence. Nevertheless, the Tribunal did acknowledge an existing disagreement 
among authors on the issue and that the majority viewed that there needed to be 
a proportion between the offence and the reprisal as a condition of legitimacy.1109 
It went further to note that:
(2) The necessity of a proportionality between the reprisal and the offence 
appears to be recognized in the German reply. Even if one admits that 
international law does not require that reprisals be measured approximately 
by the offence, one must certainly consider as excessive, and consequently 
illicit, reprisals out of all proportion to the act which has motivated them. In 
the present case … there was an evident disproportion between the incident 
of Naulilaa and the six acts of reprisal which have followed it.1110
The emphasis placed by the Tribunal lies on the lack of equivalence between the 
initial wrongdoing and the reprisals. The conclusions of the Tribunal that propor-
tionality was a prerequisite for the legality of reprisals refl ected the opinion of 
writers of the time according to which ‘reprisals must be in proportion to the 
wrong done and to the amount of compulsion necessary to get reparation’.1111 
However, the state practice that followed the Naulilaa incident was not always 
consistent to this approach according to which proportionality had a restraining 
power. One of the reasons identifi ed for this was the lack of agreement regarding 
the aims of reprisals, ‘an established referent against which to measure the reprisal 
action’.1112 It is, therefore, observed that if what was aimed for by the reprisals was 
retribution then the gravity of the offence could be a relevant factor in evaluating 
proportionality. If, however, the aim of the reprisals were to induce the wrongdo-
ing state to offer reparation, then the injury suffered would be essential in assessing 
proportionality. 
Zoller has taken the view that proportionality becomes relevant whenever the 
response to the wrongful act goes beyond the suspension or termination of a right 
or obligation equivalent to the right or obligation that had initially been infringed. 
In this context, proportionality brings harmony which is not based as noted on 
mathematical approximation, but rather, on relative equality.1113
Proportionality in relation to countermeasures was the subject of examination 
by the Arbitration Tribunal established with the agreement of the United States 
and France in the Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946.1114 
1109 Ibid, 1026.
1110 Ibid, 953.
1111 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Opperheim’s International Law: A Treatise, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 
7th ed., 141 in Gardam (2004), op. cit., 47.
1112 Ibid, 48. 
1113 Zoller, op. cit., 131.
1114 Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France, 
Decision of 9 December 1978, ILR 54 (1979) 304.
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The dispute broke out between the parties when France refused to allow a PanAm 
aircraft travelling from the United States to Paris with change of gauge in London 
to disembark its passengers and freight, while suspending future PanAm fl ights 
to Paris. France argued, in particular, that the decision of PanAm to use smaller 
aircraft for the route from London to Paris was in violation of the 1946 Agreement. 
In response the USA, for as long as the French authorities enforced the restrictions 
against PanAm, ordered two French airlines to fi le the schedule of their fl ights. 
A few days later, they prohibited Air France from operating certain fl ights to the 
United States. Both orders were passed under Part 213 of the US Civil Aeronautics 
Board’s Economic Regulations. In the meantime, the two countries by common 
agreement submitted their dispute to an arbitration tribunal requesting it to deter-
mine, among other things, whether the US orders were lawful and proportionate. 
In assessing the lawfulness of the US action the tribunal noted that it would 
have to base its conclusions on the aim actually pursued and whether that was 
confi ned to reciprocity, quicker settlement of the dispute, or prevention of future 
violations by other states.1115 The tribunal reaffi rmed in this regard the rule that 
countermeasures should be equivalent to the breach although it acknowledged 
that proportionality could be assessed only by approximation. Signifi cantly, it was 
pointed out that it was not only necessary to consider the injuries suffered by the 
said companies but also ‘the importance of the questions of principle arising from 
the alleged breach’.1116 
The tribunal stressed that a mere comparison of the losses the parties in the 
dispute suffered or would have suffered did not suffi ce for the determination of 
whether the US action was proportionate. Rather, it gave emphasis to the inter-
ests and principles at stake by the initial action of France and its impact on the 
general air transport policy of the United States and on a large number of inter-
national agreements with states other than France concerning changes of gauge in 
third countries. What mattered in this regard was the proportionality between the 
effects of the initial wrongful act and the effects sought by the countermeasures. 
Zoller further illustrated this point by associating the case before the tribunal with 
the restriction of civil rights by police for the maintenance of public order. The 
determinative factor for proportionality in this latter case would be to balance the 
effects of the exercise of the civil rights and the effects of the implementation of 
the police measures. As Zoller very characteristically points out, this principle is 
refl ected in the ‘aphorism’ that: ‘The police may not use machine guns to kill 
birds.’1117 Subsequently, what proportionality measures is not the breach and the 
response, but whether the countermeasures resorted to are proportionate to the 
purpose aimed at and the means used in order to achieve it.1118 She also stresses 
1115 Ibid, 337 (78).
1116 Ibid, 338 (83).
1117 Zoller, op. cit., 135.
1118 Ibid, 135. 
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that equivalence may not always be the right answer since even an equivalent 
response may indeed be disproportionate and cause more harm.1119 
Should the US action have been evaluated in the light of measures aiming to 
compel France to lift the ban imposed on PanAm to land in Paris, the US mea-
sures, which resulted to the suspension of any fl ight between Paris and Los Angeles, 
would have been disproportionate to the purpose they wanted to achieve. Instead, 
the United States emphasized the effects of the action taken by it, which it claimed 
did not exceed the effects that derived as a result of France’s initial decision. 
According to the analysis made by the United States:
France has denied a U.S. carrier its right under the Agreement to provide 
a West Coast–Paris service; Air France’s Paris–Los Angeles service was 
approximately equivalent in law to the West Coast–Paris service Pan Am pro-
posed to resume. In fact, Air France operated its Los Angeles–Paris round 
trip service only three times a week while the Pan Am service would have 
been six times a week.1120
Viewed in this context the tribunal did not fi nd that the US response was dispro-
portionate in comparison to the French measures.1121 It needs to be noted, 
however, that in this case the countermeasures resorted to fell within the same 
fi eld and concerned the same routes as the ones affected by the initial measures 
to which they were a response, although their economic effects on the French 
airlines were more severe.1122 
The principle of proportionality was also examined in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
case.1123 As already seen in Chapter 4, when, in 1989, Hungary, due to environ-
mental concerns, decided to suspend and fi nally abandon the works of the project, 
Czechoslovakia responded by diverting the waters of the River Danube within its 
boundaries, which it justifi ed as a measure of ‘approximate application’ of the 
agreement between them. Looking at the arguments of both parties the Court 
stressed that with the conclusion of the 1977 Treaty, Hungary had accepted the 
damming of the Danube and the diversion of its waters but only on the condition 
of common operation and benefi t of the project. Consequently, it had not 
1119 Ibid, 136–7.
1120 Reprisals, Retorsion and Sanctions for Breach of Treaty, Digest of US Practice in International Law 
(1978) 770.
1121 In his dissenting opinion, Mr Reuter, although he agreed with the legal analysis of the Court on 
the issue of proportionality according to which this should be assessed not only on the basis of 
the facts but also in the light of the questions of principle to be born from the facts, added that 
these questions of principle should also be considered in view of their probable effects. Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Reuter, Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United 
States of America and France, Decision of 9 December 1978, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Volume XVIII, 417, 448.
1122 Crawford (2002), op. cit., 295.
1123 Case Concerning the Gabč ikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997), op. cit. 
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forfeited its rights for the equitable and reasonable sharing of the Danube as an 
international watercourse. The Court, therefore, reached the conclusion that 
Czechoslovakia, by diverting the waters of the Danube (but not by constructing 
the works which would put into operation Variant C during which Hungary suf-
fered no injury), had itself committed an internationally wrongful act. Assessing 
the lawfulness of Czechoslovakia’s response, as later succeeded by Slovakia, the 
ICJ confi rmed the principle that countermeasures should be commensurate to 
the injury caused with due consideration of the rights in question. The Court, with 
special focus on the right of all riparian states to enjoy in a regime of full and 
unqualifi ed equality in a commonly shared river, concluded that: 
Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and 
thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable 
share of the natural resources of the Danube – with the continuing effects of 
the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the 
Szigetkoz – failed to respect the proportionality which is required by interna-
tional law.1124 
The criterion adopted in both these two cases was of qualitative rather than 
quantitative character, placing the emphasis on the nature of the rights involved. 
Article 51 of the Final Articles is drafted in this framework. Accordingly, what 
matters for purposes of proportionality is not only the injury suffered and the 
losses, usually material, caused as a result (quantitative element), but also the sig-
nifi cance of the interests involved, not only of the injured state but also of the 
wrongdoing state, and the seriousness of the breach.1125 
Cannizzaro also distanced himself from the view that proportionality refl ects a 
quantitative relationship between the breach and the response. He believes that 
‘in a plurality of instruments and tools of self-redress’1126 in the international legal 
order deriving from the need of states to protect their legal rights and interests,1127 
emphasis must be placed on the function each response fulfi ls instead. This func-
tion can be normative, retributive, coercive or executive, in other words, different 
countermeasures, different functions, different measurement of proportionality. 
This conclusion relies on the proposition that in resorting to countermeasures, 
states do not pursue one and the same purpose and, in this sense, it is different 
from the opinion that regards countermeasures as having an instrumental role, 
namely, to bring compliance with the breached obligation or to obtain reparation. 
The instrumental perception of countermeasures would unavoidably be construed 
as a relation between the aims and the means of the action. This, according to 
Cannizzaro, entails the danger to justify excessive in relation to the original breach 
1124 Ibid (85). 
1125 Crawford (2002), op. cit., 295–6.
1126 Cannizzaro (2001), op. cit., 889.
1127 Ibid, 895.
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responses, if proven necessary for the accomplishment of the aim.1128 Furthermore, 
it rejects that countermeasures may seek other than a coercive aim, thus ‘wiping 
out the richness and variety of the different forms in which reactions to wrongful 
acts may materialize’.1129 
The proposition that countermeasures are multifunctional in nature seems to 
correspond with the conclusions of the arbitration tribunal in the Air Services 
Agreement case, according to which countermeasures may pursue a variety of aims. 
Accordingly: 
The scope of the United States action could be assessed in very different ways 
according to the object pursued; does it bear on a simple principle of reci-
procity measured in economic terms? Was it pressure aiming at achieving a 
quicker procedure of settlement? Did such action have, beyond the French 
case, an exemplary character directed at other countries and, if so, did it have 
to some degree the character of a sanction?1130
As a consequence of this mosaic of countermeasures, one should also think in 
terms of a mosaic of proportionality. Therefore, proportionality should not be 
conceived as a fi xed notion, unchangeable and infl exible, applicable to all situa-
tions no matter the differences between them. Proportionality must on the contrary 
be ‘built’ on a case-by-case basis. In this respect, the proportionality of a response 
to the infringement of a bilateral trade obligation cannot be compared with the 
proportionality required for the response to a violation of an obligation erga omnes. 
While in the former case, the reciprocal suspension of rights may suffi ce, in the 
latter, the reaction may aim at imposing the compliance of the defaulting state 
with the infringed rule. Furthermore, and despite the fact that the coercive ele-
ment may be apparent in both cases, it may have different signifi cance where 
a measure is taken in response to a violation of an erga omnes obligation.1131 
Professor Brierly, writing in 1925 on the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic jurisdiction of another state in accordance with Article 15(8) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, emphasized that a simple violation of immi-
gration law could not be placed on an equal footing with a state act that amounted 
to ‘a massacre on a colossal scale even though the victims may be its own nation-
als’.1132 Accordingly, the nature and function of countermeasures in each instance 
varies signifi cantly. 
Cannizzaro, therefore, suggests that the emphasis is placed on the appropriate-
ness of the aim/function of the response (external proportionality) and the 
1128 Ibid, 891–2.
1129 Ibid, 892.
1130 Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France, 
op. cit., (78).
1131 Cannizzaro (2001), op. cit., 896. 
1132 J.L. Brierly, ‘Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction’, 6 BYIL (1925) 8, 18.
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appropriateness of the adopted measures in light of the result they want to achieve 
(internal proportionality). He further proposes to divide the response to several 
bundles of measures and determine the objective pursued, individually rather 
than cumulatively, by each one of them. In this regard, if a state in response to a 
wrongful act proceeds to suspend its reciprocal obligations under the infringed 
treaty and at the same time freezes the assets and goods of the wrongdoing party, 
it is suggested that proportionality not be evaluated on the basis of the totality of 
the measures. Rather, it should be measured in the light of the objectives pursued 
by each measure. For this purpose, the suspension of the treaty will be judged 
based on the objective regarding the re-establishment of the legal balance dis-
turbed by the initial wrongful act, while the freezing of assets will be judged on the 
need for compliance or the obtaining of reparation. That proportionality should 
be evaluated based on the function of the action is refl ected according to 
Cannizzaro also in the ruling of the ICJ in the Gabč ikovo-Nagymaros case. In other 
words, had Slovakia’s action aimed at reversing the effects of the breach and at 
unilaterally bringing the benefi ts that would have derived from the completion of 
the project, its action would have been proportionate. However, the Court based 
its conclusion on a different legal explanation. More specifi cally, it judged 
Slovakia’s action in the light of the breached treaty and the proper function of the 
response. The purpose of the treaty was to create a project the benefi ts of which 
would be commonly shared by the two countries and not to grant a right for the 
unilateral implementation of the treaty and the unilateral exploitation of the river. 
In conclusion, the diversion of the Danube by Slovakia was not the proper func-
tion of the response, which should rather be to restore the balance between the 
parties and seek reparation.1133 
In accordance with these considerations, Cannizzaro suggests that the appro-
priateness of the aim be determined in the light of the infringed rule and the legal 
consequences of the breach, while the appropriateness of the measures adopted is 
judged on the basis of the result they want to achieve. 
With respect to the functions of countermeasures, Cannizzaro identifi es four 
possible functions: a normative, a retributive, a coercive and an executive function.
Countermeasures with a normative function aim to re-establish the legal balance 
of the parties involved. Here, the action under scrutiny aims to achieve a balance 
between the breach and the response and corresponds to the non-performance of 
the same or equivalent obligation. In a hijacking incident in 1971, India reacted by 
prohibiting the fl ying over its territory by Pakistani civil aviation, which resulted in 
damages greater than the damages caused by the initial infringement. According to 
Cannizzaro, India justifi ed its action by saying that its response was a reciprocal 
reaction to Pakistan’s action that amounted to the suspension of India’s fl ying rights 
over Pakistan. Similarly, in the Air Services Agreement case the USA justifi ed its response 
by saying that the services in question were equivalent in law and thus its action was 
proportionate. 
1133 Cannizzaro (2001), op. cit., 898.
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In the case of countermeasures with retributive function, there is an assessment 
of the effects of the breach and the response, with the intention of infl icting a cer-
tain cost on the wrongdoer for its breach. Retributive countermeasures arise in the 
case of unilateral obligations compliance with which does not rely on the perfor-
mance of a certain other obligation. 
In coercive countermeasures, the response aims at inducing the wrongdoer 
to reverse the effects of its wrongful conduct and to comply with its obligation. 
What matters here in respect of proportionality is the breach and the need to 
re-establish the pre-existing situation. Coercive countermeasures become relevant 
in relation to the violation of obligations owed to the international community. 
Proportionality is thus not assessed by comparison of the damages caused but 
rather by what is appropriate in order to bring to an end the violation, as the most 
fundamental interests of the international community are at stake. However, even 
countermeasures with this function are subject to limitations, especially whenever 
human rights issues are involved.1134 
Finally, with respect to the executive function of countermeasures, it is noted 
that this aims to secure the benefi ts that would derive from the infringed obliga-
tion even without the cooperation of the wrongdoing state. The injurious effects of 
the countermeasures must not supervene the benefi ts to be achieved while the 
means used must be necessary for the accomplishment of the aim.1135 
Cannizaro fi nally suggests that the function of proportionality is twofold. First, 
it serves as an indicator of the means and forms of the response and limits the 
power of the responding state in the selection of the objective of the response. 
Second, it restrains the power to select the measure of reaction and imposes a duty 
that the response is appropriate to the aim pursued and not disproportionate to 
the initial breach.1136
With these observations in mind, and with proportionality gaining different 
signifi cance in the different legal contexts to which it applies, the attention will 
fi nally turn to a critical assessment of the various positions on the scope and con-
tent of this principle. 
6  A critical assessment of proportionality in the law on 
countermeasures
In view of the great perplexity of the question of proportionality and the varied 
approaches taken in the matter, we will now make an attempt to clarify the main 
features of the principle in view of all earlier considerations. First, one needs to 
examine whether proportionality, as applied in the law of the use of force, can be 
‘transplanted’ to the law on state responsibility. 
1134 For a detailed analysis of the four functions of countermeasures see ibid, 910.
1135 Ibid, 911.
1136 Ibid, 916.
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It has already been pointed out that proportionality in the use of force is closely 
associated with the objective of the forceful response that in all cases must be con-
fi ned to repelling the initial attack. On the contrary, the law of state responsibility 
is built on the assumption that not all the wrongful acts short of the use of force are 
of the same gravity and seriousness and, thus, not all bear exactly the same legal 
consequences. Moreover, in the use of force, the seriousness and gravity of 
the initial wrongdoing, but also the interests at stake have a signifi cant impact on 
the determination of the response. This can be revealed from the fact that with the 
exception of authorization from the Security Council, a state may only resort to 
force in response to a breach of equal gravity, that of an armed attack, acting in 
individual or collective self-defence. In this sense, the response is reciprocal in kind 
to the original misdeed. This is owed to the fact that nothing can endanger interna-
tional peace and security and the international legal system in its entirety so directly 
as a state that uses armed force to pursue its policies. The attack of another state is 
by itself a very serious infringement of one of the most fundamental principles of 
international law that requires determinative action for its cessation, even if it is more 
intense and extensive than the initial wrongdoing. It is, therefore, suggested that due 
to the different objectives aimed at and interests at stake proportionality cannot have 
the same content in the law of armed force and the law of countermeasures. 
As to whether proportionality as applied in the law of armed confl ict regarding 
the means and methods of warfare should be applied in the law of countermea-
sures, one should not forget that jus in bello is not entirely autonomous from jus ad 
bellum. Even a proportionate response in respect of means and methods will give 
rise to responsibility if the resort to force was unlawful in the fi rst place or if the 
force used was disproportionate to the military objective pursued. Again, it is sub-
mitted, this criterion does not suffi ce for assessing proportionality in the law of 
countermeasures that remains a different branch of international law with differ-
ent objectives and that provides for different means of achieving such objectives. 
Nevertheless, the preceding analysis has helped to establish that proportionality 
may have different scope and content in the various contexts that it applies, in 
view of the objectives that a given response aims to achieve. Despite this, and as 
the analysis of how proportionality is viewed at national and EU law and also in 
the law on countermeasures, it can be concluded that there are certain features or 
factors that are common to all these different legal fi elds. Accordingly, the aims 
pursued and the suitability or appropriateness of the means used to accomplish 
the aims of the response characterize proportionality irrespective of the context 
within which it applies.
It is, therefore, now essential to evaluate more specifi cally the different positions 
formed in relation to the content of proportionality in the law of countermeasures. 
It has been discussed that the criterion used by the tribunal in the Naulilaa 
incident was one of comparison between the initial wrongdoing and the response. 
It is doubted, however, as to whether an assessment of equivalence between the 
breach and the response is preferable especially in light of the well-attested 
principle that countermeasures must not aim at the punishment of the defaulting 
state. In the author’s view, a mere comparison between the breach and the response 
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that is equivalent to the maxim an eye for an eye, attaches a punitive element to 
countermeasures and thus should be rejected. Furthermore, the position that pro-
portionality should be based on the equivalence between breach and response 
cannot lead to satisfactory results because, as rightly suggested, this would amount 
to imposing a heavy burden on the victim state that would be unable to take 
measures necessary to effectively protect its legitimate rights and interests.1137 
Nevertheless, the nature of the breach, its gravity and seriousness are factors that 
must be taken into consideration when determining whether certain conduct 
complies with the principle of proportionality. Such assessment becomes impor-
tant in relation to the aims pursued by the response in question but also in 
considering whether the means used can fulfi l these aims. 
McDougal and Feliciano noted in this regard that the coercion exercised by 
one state against another, its intensity and the consequences to derive therefrom 
are related to the nature and scope of the objectives it sets. In particular, they 
argued that the degree of coercion is equivalent to the scope of the objective set by 
the responding state and the value it attaches to this objective. Consequently, the 
limitation of the degree of the coercion relies on the limitation of the set objec-
tives.1138 Zoller, on her part, searched for proportionality in the aims pursued by 
the countermeasures and the means used to achieve them. Similarly, Cannizzaro 
placed all the attention on the appropriateness of the aim, not the subjective aim 
of the state making use of countermeasures but rather the ‘legal objective’1139 and 
on the appropriateness of the measures to accomplish this aim.
Although the author shares the concerns expressed by Professor Crawford who 
supported the limitation of the objectives of countermeasures, the approach pro-
posed by Cannizzaro is not without merit or signifi cance. In particular, his 
approach seems to turn the attention in the right direction as it establishes objec-
tive criteria for the determination of proportionality and, for this reason, it should 
have been refl ected in Article 51 of the Final Articles. However, and as already 
acknowledged, this by itself does not suffi ce since the more serious the initial 
wrongdoing the more serious and intensive the response may need to be for its 
cessation. Furthermore, the nature of the rights affected by a certain wrongdoing 
also needs to be taken into consideration. These elements will be particularly 
important when assessing the proportionality of countermeasures taken in response 
to particularly serious violations of international law such as jus cogens norms or 
obligations erga omnes, whether from the position of an injured state or a state other 
than that injured. 
In the author’s view, proportionality does not establish an infl exible standard 
that applies uniformly in all situations without a further distinction as to the nature 
of the wrongful act and the objectives of the response. In this respect, proportion-
ality is not entirely free from some subjectivity in the sense that it must be assessed 
1137 Ibid, 908.
1138 McDougal and Feliciano (1961), op. cit., 33–4.
1139 Cannizzaro (2001), op. cit., 896, fn 20.
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on a case-by-case basis. This is due to the fact that, as thoroughly argued through-
out this book, not all internationally wrongful acts bear the same gravity or 
signifi cance. This differentiation must be unavoidably refl ected on the principle of 
proportionality. However, despite this realization some objective standards must 
be drawn in order to narrow down the possibility of abuse by the state resorting 
to peaceful coercive action. In the author’s view, the aims and the means used 
to achieve such aims, the gravity and seriousness of the wrongful act, the injury 
suffered and the interests at stake should all be taken into account when deciding 
whether a certain action was proportionate or not. The theoretical analysis made 
by Cannizzaro establishes a reasonable approach to the question of proportional-
ity and therefore should be given the attention it deserves. 
However, uncertainty remains with respect to the proportionality of solidarity 
measures and as to whether this will be assessed on a case-by-case basis or whether 
it will be evaluated on a cumulative basis. Here, resort to such measures by various 
actors entails an apparent danger of infl icting particularly burdensome measures 
against the wrongdoing state. The assessment of the proportionality of such coun-
termeasures becomes particularly diffi cult and it is for this reason that the aim 
pursued, the gravity and seriousness of the wrongful act, but also the appropriate-
ness of the response to bring about the desired result must be relevant factors to be 
taken into consideration. This may require the assessment of each individual con-
duct in the light of the objective it intends to achieve, since a cumulative assessment 
will prove an untenable way of determining proportionality. In any event, it is 
worth pointing out that, even when a certain breach does not infringe community 
interests but affects the bilateral interests of several states, proportionality is 
assessed on the basis of the action taken by each state individually rather than 
cumulatively. 
Undoubtedly, assessing the proportionality of a response may be diffi cult and as 
in the case of the use of armed force, it may entail elements of subjectivity and 
relativity. Nevertheless, identifying from the outset the primary parameters within 
which proportionality must be evaluated will reduce the risk of abuse and it will 
strengthen legal certainty. While the adoption of an absolute uniform standard of 
proportionality may be impossible to achieve due to the varied nature of wrongful 
acts and objectives, it is important to assess the proportionality of individual mea-
sures in the general framework within which they are taken. For this purpose, and 
as explained in the preceding sections, it must always be borne in mind that, when 
resorting to countermeasures, states have a very tight legal framework within 
which they can move. In this regard, the responding state must safeguard, among 
other things, fundamental norms of international law such as respect for human 
rights and peremptory norms of international law. It is within this already narrow 
circle that the proportionality of a particular conduct will be examined.
7 Conclusion
The principle of proportionality has evolved out of the pressing necessity to 
restrain the use of countermeasures to the maximum extent possible and has 
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developed as an essential element of legality of such measures. However, propor-
tionality gains even more signifi cance in the light of an ‘anarchical’ society, such 
as the international one, which lacks the mechanisms necessary to monitor its cor-
rect implementation by individual states. This, along with the ongoing controversy 
as to the exact scope of the principle, which is only refl ective of the perplexity of 
the question, elevates proportionality as one of the most diffi cult problems when 
it comes to countermeasures. This is only aggravated by the recognition under 
customary international law of a right to resort to countermeasures in response to 
violations of obligations erga omnes and peremptory norms, the signifi cance of 
which extends beyond a merely bilateral relationship between two states since 
these norms have been established to protect community interests. The same applies 
with respect to countermeasures taken in response to violations of interests owed 
to a group of states collectively. The approach adopted by the ILC in Article 51 
does not seem to quiet these concerns and therefore reconsideration of the matter, 
in view of an established right to solidarity measures, may prove essential. 
The problem of enforcement of international law raises one of the most diffi cult 
challenges not only in international legal theory but also in international legal 
practice. In the light of the prohibition of the use of armed force as a means of 
settling state disputes, enforcement in international law may take the form of judicial 
proceedings or, quite signifi cantly, countermeasures through the non-performance 
of obligations arising from conventional or customary rules. Due to the decentral-
ized character of the international legal order and in the absence of institutions 
empowered to enforce international law generally, implementation, through the 
application of countermeasures, is entrusted to each state individually which is 
called, by its own means, to protect its rights. As noted in the preceding analysis, 
countermeasures constitute mechanisms of private justice according to which a state 
whose international rights have been infringed is entitled to respond by refusing to 
perform its own obligations under international law towards the wrongdoing state. 
In these circumstances, the wrongfulness of the conduct and as a consequence the 
responsibility of the responding state is precluded. 
The question of enforcement, however, becomes particularly problematic with 
respect to obligations owed to the international community as a whole and funda-
mental community interests in the observance of which all states have a legal 
interest. This gives rise to controversy as to the subjects entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongdoing state particularly in the absence of direct or indi-
vidual injury, but most importantly, to pursue their performance through the 
implementation of countermeasures. The unilateral assessment both in relation to 
whether an internationally wrongful act has been committed in the fi rst place and 
the legal requirements necessary for the lawfulness of countermeasures of this 
nature make them vulnerable to abuse. Moreover, the powerfulness of solidarity 
measures and their strong effects on legal stability but also on international peace 
and security and the friendly relations between states have raised concerns in rela-
tion to whether a right to countermeasures by states other than the injured should 
be recognized in international law.
The signifi cance of enforcement of community interests by way of solidarity 
measures lies at the heart of this book. This is owed to the fact that, without such 
enforcement, the protection of essential interests of the international community 
would be severely undermined, diminishing the effectiveness of international law 
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in its entirety. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi  Annan recently pointed out: 
‘[W]ithout implementation, our declarations ring hollow. Without action, our 
promises are meaningless.’1140 Indeed, the conclusion of an anti-apartheid treaty, 
a convention prohibiting genocide, torture and slavery or the development of a 
norm against aggression or a norm safeguarding fundamental human rights and 
freedoms or the right to self-determination provide no consolation to those racially 
being discriminated against, tortured or exterminated, if no effective enforcement 
mechanisms are in place. While no one can disregard the unique nature of the 
international legal order that is founded on state equality and state consent and 
the nature of which is still rudimentary, anarchical and primitive, such mecha-
nisms are essential to enhance the respect for the rule of law, particularly so 
whenever the most fundamental interests of the international community are con-
cerned. The recognition of community interests in international legal doctrine 
would become meaningless and international law would lose its credibility in the 
absence of appropriate mechanisms to ensure compliance with its norms. 
Hence, the necessity of enforcement is epitomized in Sophocles’ wise words 
‘Μή ’πíτασσ’ ά  μή κρατεı-ς’ as seen at the introduction to this volume.
While most of the times most states comply with most international norms,1141 
the book has attempted to establish that the international community now needs 
to turn its attention to the problem of enforcement, especially whenever its most 
fundamental interests are imperilled. Nevertheless, as the study in this book has 
demonstrated, there has been a certain degree of reluctance in entitling individual 
third states to implement international law and to induce the wrongdoing state to 
respect its international commitments. In this regard, many authors, in fear of ‘the 
unilateral, world-ordering politics of a self-appointed hegemon’,1142 placed their 
emphasis on collective, institutionalized action as the appropriate answer to the 
problem of enforcement, as opposed to unilateral coercive action resorted to by 
individual states. Along the same lines, Mr Annan stressed that states need to 
make a commitment towards ‘collective strategies, collective institutions and col-
lective action’.1143 According to this view, the goals of development, security and 
human rights cannot be advanced by states individually, but rather only as the 
result of concordant efforts, whilst the UN could play a signifi cant role to this 
effect. Even more progressively, Mr Annan emphasized the emerging need to 
establish an international legal duty and responsibility to protect. Although 
acknowledging that this position was, and still is, very much premature, he pointed 
1140 Report of the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi  Annan, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, 21 March 2005 (General Assembly, 
Fifty-ninth Session, A/59/2005) (130). 
1141 See T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (OUP: 1990).
1142 J. Habermas, ‘Interpreting the Fall of a Monument’ 4 German Law Journal (2003) 706 in 
Koskenniemi (2005) 118.
1143 Report of the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi  Annan, op. cit. (3). 
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to this direction in the future, where the international community will have the 
responsibility to protect people should the national authorities fail to do so.1144 
Nevertheless, these views unavoidably raise the question as to whether the UN 
as an international organization possesses the legal capacity and the mandate to 
assume the role of a supranational government, with the Security Council acting 
as a world police and the UN Charter being the constitution of the international 
legal community. The debate on this matter grows deeper as the Security Council 
assumes more responsibilities in a wide number of areas – terrorism, genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing to name but a few – and elaborates more coercive 
mechanisms against states in the last two decades than ever before in its entire 
history. Despite these signifi cant developments, however, the Security Council 
remains a political body with powers that are restricted to safeguarding interna-
tional peace and security, rather than the power to give effect to and enforce 
general international law and fundamental community interests.
While there has been a growing opinion in the literature, particularly after the 
cessation of the Cold War era, to attach a constitutional role to the UN, it must be 
stressed that the international legal order differs substantially from national legal 
systems where there are central institutions to observe the rule of law. While the 
entrustment especially of the enforcement of international law to independent and 
impartial international institutions and organizations would be the ideal solution 
in an ideal world, it is currently neither feasible nor desired by states. This is 
because states are very reluctant to concede too much of their sovereign powers to 
international institutions that could in the future turn against them with enforce-
ment action. The persistence of the fi ve permanent member states to the Security 
Council to uphold their veto powers constitutes perhaps the most prominent 
example illustrating the point under consideration. In consequence, if the Security 
Council is ever going to undertake a role to enforce international law, fundamen-
tal changes will be needed. Accordingly, there must be a legal authorization 
expanding the powers of the Security Council to that effect, but also, quite impor-
tantly, a change in the decision-making procedures so that the international 
community is equally represented and the UN institutions reinforced. Finally, 
there must be the determination and will to apply the law equally and to resort to 
coercive action whenever necessary, circumventing claims of selective enforce-
ment of the law. 
Furthermore, as the analysis in Chapter 2 revealed, there were suggestions before 
the ILC linking the question of enforcement of fundamental community interests 
with institutional responses and, in particular, with the establishment of an interna-
tional criminal court. Whilst the establishment of an international criminal court 
for the prosecution of individuals for the commission of serious violations of inter-
national law such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide is today a 
reality, the punishment of states remains a concept that has found no common 
ground in international legal doctrine. As thoroughly explained in Chapter 2, 
1144 Ibid (135). 
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states are reluctant to allow the intrusion of punitive elements in the interstate 
relations that are structured on equality. Quite signifi cantly, it was soon under-
stood that the receivers of such punishment would be innocent civilians, the 
nationals of the wrongdoing state, often victims of atrocities committed by their 
own government. As a result, these suggestions were not endorsed by the ILC in 
the conclusion of its work on the law on state responsibility.
This has still left a legal loophole in relation to the enforcement of such funda-
mental community interests. In this context, and as the book argues, unilateral 
and peaceful coercive measures by third states become important in the theory 
and practice of international law. The dilemma here is clear, as there is a need to 
strike a balance between the necessity not to use the concept of fundamental prin-
ciples owed to the international community as a shield for international injustice 
and the need to effectively and determinatively remedy serious infringements of 
international law that affect every state. 
The right of third states that have suffered no direct injury to resort to counter-
measures whenever community interests have been infringed has, therefore, been 
central to the scope of this book. In this regard, it was necessary fi rst to elaborate 
on how the concept of community interests infi ltrated international legal doctrine 
and introduced fundamental changes as to the nature and function of contempo-
rary international law. 
Chapter 1 focused on the development of the notion of peremptory norms of 
international law, as norms recognized as fundamental by the international com-
munity of states as a whole and from which no derogation is permitted unless with 
the development of a norm of the same character. It was argued in this respect 
that while the concept of peremptory norms fi nds expression in Article 53 of the 
1969 VCLT, this concept has become an integral part of customary international 
law and, therefore, no state can refuse compliance with norms that have acquired 
a peremptory character. 
This has caused scepticism among international lawyers and states that viewed 
the concept of peremptory norms as an attempt to circumvent state consent that 
lies at the structures of the international legal system. Reservations have also been 
expressed about compromising the neutral character of international law by intro-
ducing ambiguous concepts with moral connotations in an inherently pluralistic 
international society. The abstract and indeterminate content of these and other 
concepts such as the ‘international community as a whole’ have provoked suspi-
cion among commentators who have even seen in these attempts a new form of 
colonialism and a threat to legal stability.1145 
Hence, some states and commentators have been extremely reluctant to accom-
modate such notions as they raise signifi cant questions of international legitimacy: 
who decides which norms qualify as such and for what reasons? The diffi culties to 
be borne from these legal considerations are not to be underestimated. By the 
same token, there is still an ongoing theoretical debate on how and on what 
1145 Koskenniemi (2005) op. cit., 115.
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criteria one identifi es these ‘special’ primary norms as establishing more funda-
mental rights than others. 
Defi nitely, if the international legal community is to be construed to be based 
on state consent, then such concepts appear to go against the consensual character 
of international law and how international law has been traditionally perceived. 
Moreover, these principles are viewed as compromising state sovereignty since 
their violation is not anymore considered to fall within the exclusive domain of 
any state but, rather, it establishes a legal interest to all members of the interna-
tional community in their protection.
Nevertheless, as the analysis in Chapter 1 demonstrated, and the discussion in 
Chapter 2 corroborated, the realization that some interests are so essential for the 
existence of the international community that hold a superior character in inter-
national law has not been a new invention. Contrariwise, the passage from 
bilateralism to community interests is well rooted in international jurisprudence, 
the literature and state practice of international law, confi rming that international 
law has progressively developed into something more than just being ‘minimal 
law’. As Chapter 1 attempted to show, these concepts contributed to the progress 
of international law insomuch that it is now claimed that the international legal 
order has developed into something more than merely a voluntarist structure 
between absolute sovereigns. Rather, it seems to resemble more an international 
public order that is concerned, among other things, about interests intended to 
protect the common good of mankind. One could argue that some form of consti-
tutional status is now attached to certain rules, although acceptance of these 
contemporary ideas has not been free from criticism.
Moreover, the endorsement by the ICJ of the notion of obligations erga omnes in 
the Barcelona Traction case has signifi ed further developments paving the way to 
third states, not specially affected by a certain breach, to demand their perfor-
mance. However, one of the most controversial aspects of both the concept of 
peremptory norms and the concept of obligations owed to the international com-
munity as a whole is the fact that they remain silent as to the means of their 
enforcement in the event of their breach. The issue of enforcement of community 
interests has been at the focus of recent academic works. This book attempts to 
add to the existing literature on the matter placing the emphasis, however, on the 
enforcement of such interests by way of solidarity measures. By doing so, however, 
the foregoing analysis did not ignore other ways of implementation of fundamen-
tal community interests, particularly through the initiation of judicial and other 
proceedings. The analysis concluded that long before the obiter dictum of the ICJ on 
obligations erga omnes, there was recognition of the right of third states to seek com-
pliance with interests set to serve certain community and collective purposes 
establishing general standing in this regard. 
Having established the nature and scope of the concept of community interests 
as recognized in international law, the attention was then turned to the infl uence 
that this concept has exercised on the law on state responsibility and on the devel-
opment of the notion of solidarity measures. It was shown in this regard that the 
law on state responsibility is built on the understanding that the violation of a 
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primary, conventional or customary, norm providing what the obligations of 
states are, entails new obligations for the defaulting state like the obligation to 
cease the wrongful act and to offer reparation for the injury caused. 
When the ILC fi rst took up the task to codify the law on state responsibility in 
1953, it turned all the attention to violations of the primary rules on the treatment 
of aliens, thus restricting the scope and content of state responsibility to violations 
of this kind. Despite this initial approach, it was soon acknowledged that interna-
tional law consisted of other rules that called for attention and protection in the 
event of their violation and which incurred the responsibility of the state irrespec-
tive of the nature, origin, object or content of the infringed rule. Yet, and as the 
study on state responsibility progressed, a new concept started to make its appear-
ance in the debates of the ILC: that the violation of primary norms did not always 
have the same signifi cance, weight or effect due to the importance attached to and 
the nature of the rights certain primary norms sought to safeguard. 
As the concepts of peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes started to 
preoccupy international legal thinking, they could not leave unaffected the delib-
erations and the discussions taking place before the ILC on the codifi cation of the 
law on state responsibility. This was particularly so concerning violations of norms 
of this character. As the analysis in Chapter 2 illustrated, while the essential nature 
of many international norms did not extend beyond a relationship of a bilateral 
nature, others established collective interests, fundamental to the international 
community as a whole such as the prohibition of genocide. The ILC was, there-
fore, faced with the question of how to deal with violations of certain primary rules 
considered as being of a more serious nature due to the signifi cance and the ‘supe-
riority’ of the interests they seek to protect. It was accordingly essential to determine 
whether the legal consequences arising from the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act would be the same in all instances or whether a further distinction 
was required between legal consequences in the light of the seriousness of the 
wrongful act and the rights and interests protected by the infringed rule. This led 
to another signifi cant realization concerning the circle of states entitled to invoke 
the responsibility of the wrongdoing state and, most important of all, to resort to 
countermeasures in response to the wrongful act. 
The ILC, infl uenced by the developments concerning jus cogens norms and obli-
gations erga omnes, soon realized that not all internationally wrongful acts were of 
the same gravity or of the same signifi cance. It was in this context that the concept 
of state criminal responsibility, previously supported by what it seemed to be a 
minority of authors, re-emerged and fl ourished in the debates of the ILC. The 
ILC made a distinction between international delicts and international crimes 
refl ected in Draft Article 19 and which gave rise to penal sanctions against the 
recalcitrant state. Although the notion of criminal responsibility was not eventu-
ally sustained in the Final Articles, the understanding that not all violations bore 
the same gravity did not cease to constitute a common ground of understanding. 
As thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, this position is now refl ected in Articles 40 
and 41 of the Final Articles regarding the legal consequences to derive as a result 
of serious violations of peremptory norms. 
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Article 48 further confi rms that there exist certain interests, which, either 
because they are owed to the international community as a whole or because they 
are established for the collective interest of a group of states, entitle states other 
than those which have directly sustained an injury from a given wrongdoing to 
invoke the responsibility of the defaulting state. 
One of the most controversial considerations before the ILC, however, was 
what could a state other than the directly injured do in response to a violation of 
this kind, hence raising signifi cant questions of enforcement and implementation. 
The attention was subsequently turned to the notion of countermeasures that had 
emerged in the draft articles as a means of self-help taken in response to another, 
previously committed internationally wrongful act. However, states realized from 
the beginning the powerful effects of countermeasures and for this reason sought 
to restrict to the extent possible not only their content but also the states entitled 
to resort to such measures. As the analysis showed, the ILC itself, wishing to bring 
its work on state responsibility to completion and in the light of some concerns 
expressed by states regarding the incorporation of a right to third state counter-
measures in the Final Articles, opted not to take a fi nal position on the matter and 
left further developments in the fi eld open. Accordingly, Article 54 refers to ‘lawful 
measures’, a notion that provoked some reaction among commentators, rather 
than countermeasures by states other than the injured, while in its commentary on 
the article the ILC concludes that customary international law does not support 
such a right. Article 54 has accordingly failed to mitigate the concerns regarding 
the enforcement of fundamental community interests. 
Chapter 3 evolved around the fi ndings of the ILC concerning the existence of a 
right to solidarity measures and provided a critical assessment and detailed analy-
sis of state practice. This assessment led to the conclusion that the reference of the 
ILC to state practice was brief and inconclusive and that there was a wealth of 
evidence in support of such a right that had not been considered. The examina-
tion in this chapter started with an analysis of foreign policies of various states and 
the impact that fundamental community interests, such as respect for human 
rights, have on the formulation of such policies. Due regard was given on the use 
of economic coercion as a tool for the exercise of pressure against a wrongdoing 
state to comply with international law and that sometimes took the form of retor-
sive measures while others the form of countermeasures even if no direct injury 
existed. It was shown in this regard that states were often determined to respond 
to serious violations by way of countermeasures and, for this reason, they enacted 
domestic legislation that would enable them to do so as the examples of Canada 
and the Netherlands revealed. 
The study then proceeded to a consideration of some incidents that, although 
they did not involve state action in violation of international law, they are still 
signifi cant for the purposes of this work. Some of the cases discussed here refl ected 
the determination of states to respond to serious violations of fundamental com-
munity interests by all means at their disposal, while other cases such as the Bonn 
Declaration regarding the hijacking of aircraft refl ected the legal belief of states 
that resort to countermeasures even by third states was lawful or becoming lawful. 
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This analysis is signifi cant as it provides evidence for the existence of a certain 
opinio juris necessary for the creation of a customary norm of international law 
allowing solidarity measures.
The focus of this chapter however turned to evidence of state action in violation 
of specifi c legal commitments, supporting a right to solidarity measures in the 
name of community and collective interests. From the scope of this examination it 
could not preclude some reference, even if brief, to some early examples from 
state practice supportive of coercive unilateral action in response to violations of 
community norms. The decision of the British authorities to free slaves and to 
seize vessels taking part in slavery in the 19th century, but also the decision of the 
USA to freeze Japanese assets in response to aggression provide early examples of 
solidarity measures and perhaps evidence that a right to this effect was already 
recognized under customary international law. 
The examination, however, placed most of the emphasis on state practice as 
evolved after World War II, according to which, in numerous occasions states had 
called for the implementation of countermeasures and often had resorted to such 
measures even if they were not directly injured. That was the case in relation to 
action taken against the Dominican Republic and Greece, the imposition of the 
oil embargo against states supporting Israel in its aggressive policies in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the trade embargo and other coercive measures taken against the 
Central African Republic, Iraq, Uganda and Yugoslavia, to name but a few. In 
addition, the study included examples of state practice that although justifi ed on 
other legal grounds such as fundamental change of circumstances, they could 
qualify as third-state countermeasures providing further evidence for the existence 
of such a right under customary international law. At the same time, the study did 
not preclude from its scope some reservations expressed as to whether certain 
responses could qualify as solidarity measures. Such concerns were due to uncer-
tainty in relation to the legal grounds on which certain action relied and as to 
whether community interests had indeed been infringed, entitling third states to 
coercive measures. Such is the case in relation to the coercive action taken against 
Poland and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. It was stressed that for action to 
qualify as solidarity measures it must be a response to a breach of an obligation 
owed to the international community of states as a whole or to a group of states. 
Questions were also raised with respect to whether the abolition of democratic 
rule could give rise to a right to solidarity measures, as in the author’s view, demo-
cratic governance does not seem to currently establish a legal interest owed to the 
international community as a whole. Nevertheless, the preceding analysis has 
established that gross human rights violations entitle every state to invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongdoing state and to resort to countermeasures.
The analysis in Chapter 3 further demonstrated that the right to solidarity measures 
is not a new concept in international law. It was also established that the reluc-
tance of states to often resort to such measures was not owed to their belief that such 
measures were not allowed, but rather on other considerations such as economic 
or political interests. Such reluctance could not be taken as establishing an opinio 
juris against a right to third-state countermeasures. On the contrary, it is argued 
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that states have frequently resorted to such countermeasures and, therefore, state 
practice is neither sparse nor embryonic. As the author concludes, the right to 
solidarity measures has become part of customary international law, as an essen-
tial mechanism of enforcement of fundamental community interests such as the 
prohibition of genocide, slavery, aggression, torture and the right to self-determi-
nation and fundamental human rights. 
In the course of this analysis, it was also established that countermeasures by 
states other than the injured are not only supported by state practice, but they are 
also required as a derivative effect of the concept of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law. As particularly argued in Chapter 1, a state bound by a treaty the 
execution of which indirectly contributes to the breach of a peremptory norm has 
a legal obligation to cease the performance of the treaty concerned. While this does 
not lead to the suspension or termination of the treaty as the terms of the treaty do 
not call directly for a violation of the norm in question, the indirect effects to arise 
from the implementation of the treaty require its temporary non-performance. 
With these conclusions in mind, Chapter 4 dealt with another challenge con-
cerning the enforcement of general international law and community interests 
and emerging from the proliferation of lex specialis rules and, particularly, self-
contained regimes. The growing number of legal regimes that provide not only for 
primary rules but they also set up their own dispute settlement procedures, such as 
the EU and the WTO, and sometimes their own enforcement mechanisms, raise 
questions concerning the impact of these regimes on the right to countermeasures 
under the general law on state responsibility. While it is a well-attested principle of 
international law that specifi c rules take prevalence over general rules, questions 
arise whenever the enforcement mechanisms of a specifi c regime fail or they simply 
do not exist in the fi rst place. This issue, which lay at the heart of Chapter 4, has 
even wider ramifi cations with respect to whether the non-performance of obliga-
tions provided under a specifi c regime by way of countermeasures is permissible 
in response to violations not related to that specifi c regime. The signifi cance of the 
matter becomes apparent in relation to countermeasures, by way of not perform-
ing obligations arising under specifi c agreements such as GATT, in reaction to the 
violation of genocide or apartheid. 
As noted in this regard, if one accepts the view that such general legal consider-
ations do not fall within the jurisdiction of the specifi c regime and that as a result 
they cannot be taken into consideration as a defence, then the scope and content 
of countermeasures as a means of enforcement of international law is signifi cantly 
narrowed down. However, it was demonstrated that in the absence of other alter-
natives, resort to countermeasures by not performing obligations emanating from 
special or self-contained regimes falls at the heart of enforcement of international 
law generally and community interests particularly. Accordingly, countermea-
sures that by defi nition constitute conduct in breach of international law play a 
pivotal role in the protection of the international legal order. As the examination 
in Chapter 4 established, the traditional mechanism of enforcement of interna-
tional law by resort to countermeasures and especially to economic and trade 
measures cannot be paralyzed because of the existence of specifi c legal regimes. 
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As concluded, it is exactly in this context that countermeasures gain signifi cance 
and are effective in exerting pressure on the wrongdoing state. This is particularly 
important whenever the fundamental principles of the international community 
as a whole are endangered, even if that would seem to compromise interests in the 
economic or trade sphere. 
Nevertheless, as argued, the existence of parallel and often confl icting rules of 
international law belonging to various legal systems raises non-negligible concerns 
regarding the integrity of the international legal order. It was shown in this respect 
that while the proliferation of special legal regimes generally enhances the rule of 
international law, there are times that its coherence is seriously challenged, par-
ticularly insofar as certain state conduct may be lawful under certain rules but 
unlawful under others. 
According to the conclusions of the analysis in Chapter 4, however, to claim that 
the obligations emanating from self-contained regimes will prevail over all other 
rules would be tantamount to undermining enforcement in international law, while 
it would enhance these regimes with a quasi-peremptory character and give them 
prevalence over substantially ‘higher’ principles of international law. Finally, as 
noted, these special and self-contained regimes are not isolated from the body of 
general international law to which they continue to constitute an integral part. 
Having established that customary international law recognizes a right to third-
state countermeasures in protection of community and collective interests even in 
violation of obligations arising from specifi c agreements or self-contained regimes, 
Chapter 5 dealt with the legal constraints of countermeasures and the principle of 
proportionality. In realization of the inevitable danger of abuse of such measures, 
the analysis in this fi nal chapter turned to the legal confi nes of countermeasures, 
particularly whenever many states respond, individually or in agreement with 
other states, to the breach of community interests. It is because of these fears that 
the ILC decided not to include a right to solidarity measures in the Final Articles. 
The not so unrealistic fears of abuse of such a right by strong states with respect to 
whether a serious violation of a jus cogens norm or an erga omnes obligation has 
occurred and the limits of such reaction, request that the right to resort to coun-
termeasures is restricted.
As Chapter 5 intended to show, the right to countermeasures exists in a very 
tight legal framework that sets up numerous legal conditions and requirements for 
the justifi ability of such measures. It was emphasized that countermeasures are 
only allowed in response to a previously wrongful act for the purpose of inducing 
the wrongdoing state to cease the wrongful act and to comply with the new legal 
obligations arising as a result of its conduct, such as the duty to offer reparation. 
Moreover, as the analysis showed, countermeasures must have a temporary char-
acter and must not aim at the punishment of the wrongdoing state, a notion at 
odds with the nature of the international legal system. Quite signifi cantly, counter-
measures cannot entail the violation of peremptory rules of international law, the 
prohibition of the use of armed force or humanitarian rules. It is within these legal 
confi nes that the principle of proportionality has developed to ensure that what-
ever action is taken is not excessive.
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To this effect, proportionality plays an important role in limiting the power of 
states to resort to countermeasures, particularly in the event of solidarity mea-
sures. This fi nds justifi cation on the realization that the recalcitrant state, by 
committing a certain violation, no matter how gross this may be, does not cease to 
be a member of the international community with its own rights and obligations. 
It is, therefore, through proportionality that not only the rights of the defaulting 
state are guaranteed, but also that the right to countermeasures for the protection 
of common interests will not be manipulated by any state. 
It follows from the study in this chapter that proportionality should strike a bal-
ance between the initial wrongdoing – its gravity, its injurious consequences, and 
the nature of rights it affects, on the one hand, and the response – the legal aims it 
seeks to pursue and the means, methods and intensity used to fulfi l these aims, on 
the other. In the author’s view, proportionality should not merely be seen as a 
relationship between the breach and the response, as this would be equivalent to 
punishment. Instead, the emphasis must be placed on the aims to be accomplished 
by the countermeasures in question and the appropriateness of the means used to 
accomplish these aims. 
The principle of proportionality has developed through the literature, state 
practice and judicial review, as a legal instrument of constraint, a tool for deter-
mining the legality of a given action. Nevertheless, the proportionality test becomes 
even more compelling if, in seeking to protect interests owed erga omnes, several 
states decide to take action against the violator. The assessment of proportionality 
in this event unfolds to a challenging legal question that raises signifi cant legal 
considerations. This is due to the fact that, while a given state action examined in 
isolation may meet the requirement of proportionality, multiple independent state 
actions, if viewed in their totality, may be disproportionate, thus signifi cantly 
undermining the rights and interests of the wrongdoing state and seriously damag-
ing the rule of international law. Nevertheless, and as the analysis concluded, 
countermeasures must be assessed, within the already strict confi nes in place for 
their lawfulness on an individual basis in the light of the aim they intend to achieve 
and which, in any event, must not be the punishment of the wrongdoing state.
This volume has intended to show that without effective enforcement mecha-
nisms in place, the concepts of community and collective interests become devoid 
of meaning. While the book does not share the view that without enforcement 
international law is not real law, a view advocated by Austin as already noted at 
the beginning of this work, enforcement plays a signifi cant role in the realization 
of the objectives of the international legal system and the international commu-
nity, the existence of which can hardly be disputed. Taking into account the 
peculiarities of the international legal order as an order structured on the equality 
of states and consent, but also as an order that lacks centralized and compulsory 
enforcement mechanisms, this work has attempted to establish that entrusting 
states with the power to safeguard fundamental community interests through uni-
lateral peaceful coercive measures has become increasingly necessary. This is due 
to the fact that the distinction between serious and less serious violations of inter-
national law, ordinary norms and norms with a peremptory character and bilateral 
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obligations and obligations owed to the international community of states as a 
whole would bear no signifi cance were international law not to provide for effec-
tive mechanisms for their protection. In the absence of state consensus for the 
establishment of an international organization to respond to such serious viola-
tions of international law, solidarity measures become the only means of 
enforcement of these fundamental interests. 
As the preceding analysis established, the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ 
for long supported by the United States and according to which the US govern-
ment approached the world’s most notorious dictators by friendly means and 
‘quiet diplomacy’ have proved insuffi cient to bring the cessation of serious infringe-
ments of fundamental norms of international law. Similarly, using ‘the carrot as 
well as the stick approach to encourage favorable trends in the protection of 
human rights’1146 has not been successful in convincing those committing geno-
cide, apartheid, torture and aggression to comply with their international 
obligations. By way of contrast, these approaches have made such oppressive 
regimes more intransigent, giving them the impression that they could act with 
impunity. 
Compliance with the law and, for that matter, with international law becomes 
burdensome when such compliance means providing support, directly or indi-
rectly to a regime that engages in practices such as the ones mentioned earlier. In 
this context, the recognition of a customary norm permitting solidarity measures 
in violation of other international obligations is dictated by the need to effectively 
protect and enforce fundamental interests owed to the international community. 
1146 Kommers and Loescher, op. cit., 215.
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